Ex Parte YamadaDownload PDFBoard of Patent Appeals and InterferencesJan 12, 200609954149 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 12, 2006) Copy Citation The opinion in support of the decision being entered today was not written for publication and is not binding precedent of the Board. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES ____________ Ex parte Junji Yamada ____________ Appeal No. 2005-2626 Application No. 09/954,149 ____________ Heard: November 16, 2005 ____________ Before KRASS, DIXON, and BARRY, Administrative Patent Judges. DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This is a decision on appeal from the examiner's final rejection of claims 1-6, which are all of the claims pending in this application. We REVERSE. Appeal No. 2005-2626 Application No. 09/954,149 2 BACKGROUND Appellant's invention relates to a power semiconductor device. A copy of independent claim 1 is reproduced below. 1. A power semiconductor device with an electrode structure for taking out electrodes from a power semiconductor element mounted on one of a plurality of first circuit patterns formed on an insulating substrate inside of a case up to an external-connection terminal exposed outside of the case, wherein the external-connection terminal is insert-molded into the case and exposed outside of the case at one end of the terminal while the terminal includes a junction portion having a junction face joined at its other end to a second circuit pattern different from the first circuit pattern on which the power semiconductor element is mounted and directly connected with the power semiconductor element through a wire member bonded to the face opposite to the junction face of the terminal junction portion. The prior art references of record relied upon by the examiner in rejecting the appealed claims are: Mangiagli et al. (Mangiagli) 6,320,258 Nov. 20, 2001 (filed Mar. 23, 1994) Appellant’s Admitted Prior Art (AAPA) Figures 7 and 8 and pp 1-3 of the specification. Claims 1-6 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over AAPA in view of Mangiagli. Rather than reiterate the conflicting viewpoints advanced by the examiner and appellant regarding the above-noted rejections, we make reference to the Answer Appeal No. 2005-2626 Application No. 09/954,149 3 (mailed Nov. 17, 2003) for the examiner's reasoning in support of the rejections, and to the brief (filed Jul. 23, 2003) for appellant's arguments thereagainst. OPINION In reaching our decision in this appeal, we have given careful consideration to appellant's specification and claims, to the applied prior art references, and to the respective positions articulated by appellant and the examiner. As a consequence of our review, we make the determinations which follow. 35 U.S.C. § 103 In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the examiner bears the initial burden of presenting a prima facie case of obviousness. See In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 1532, 28 USPQ2d 1955, 1956 (Fed. Cir. 1993). A prima facie case of obviousness is established by presenting evidence that the reference teachings would appear to be sufficient for one of ordinary skill in the relevant art having the references before him to make the proposed combination or other modification. See In re Lintner, 458 F.2d 1013, 1016, 173 USPQ 560, 562 (CCPA 1972). Furthermore, the conclusion that the claimed subject matter is prima facie obvious must be supported by evidence, as shown by some objective teaching in the prior art or by knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art that would have led that individual to combine the relevant Appeal No. 2005-2626 Application No. 09/954,149 4 teachings of the references to arrive at the claimed invention. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1074, 5 USPQ2d 1596, 1598 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Rejections based on 35 U.S.C. § 103 must rest on a factual basis with these facts being interpreted without hindsight reconstruction of the invention from the prior art. The examiner may not, because of doubt that the invention is patentable, resort to speculation, unfounded assumption or hindsight reconstruction to supply deficiencies in the factual basis for the rejection. See In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017, 154 USPQ 173, 178 (CCPA 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1057 (1968). Our reviewing court has repeatedly cautioned against employing hindsight by using the appellant's disclosure as a blueprint to reconstruct the claimed invention from the isolated teachings of the prior art. See, e.g., Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 902, 907, 5 USPQ2d 1788, 1792 (Fed. Cir. 1988). When determining obviousness, “the [E]xaminer can satisfy the burden of showing obviousness of the combination ‘only by showing some objective teaching in the prior art or that knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art would lead that individual to combine the relevant teachings of the references.’” In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1343, 61 USPQ2d 1430, 1434-44 (Fed. Cir. 2002), citing In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1265, 23 USPQ2d 1780, 1783 (Fed. Cir. 1992). “Broad conclusory statements regarding the teaching of multiple references, standing alone, are not Appeal No. 2005-2626 Application No. 09/954,149 5 ‘evidence.’” In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999, 50 USPQ2d 1614, 1617 (Fed. Cir. 1999). “Mere denials and conclusory statements, however, are not sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact.” Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 999-1000, 50 USPQ2d at 1617, citing McElmurry v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 995 F.2d 1576, 1578, 27 USPQ2d 1129, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Further, as pointed out by our reviewing court, we must first determine the scope of the claim. “[T]he name of the game is the claim.” In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362,1369, 47 USPQ2d 1523, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Therefore, we look to the limitations of independent claim 1. Appellant argues that neither the AAPA nor Mangiagli teach or suggest the “junction portion” and “junction face” as recited in the language of independent claim 1. Independent claim 1 recites that the “junction portion having a junction face joined at its other end to a second circuit pattern different from the first circuit pattern on which the power semiconductor element is mounted and directly connected with the power semiconductor element through a wire member bonded to the face opposite to the junction face of the terminal junction portion.” From our review of the teachings of the AAPA and Mangiagli, we find no teaching or fair suggestion of a junction face directly connected to a circuit pattern and the opposite face connected with the power semiconductor element through a wire member as required by the instant claimed invention. Nor do we find any convincing line of reasoning why it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have Appeal No. 2005-2626 Application No. 09/954,149 6 modified the express teachings of AAPA or Mangiagli to have arrived at the claimed invention without reliance upon hindsight to reconstruct the claimed invention. At pages 4-5 of the Answer, the examiner maintains that Mangiagli et al. disclose in figure 2, external connection leads 28 and 29 have junction portions (the lower part inserted into the package shown in figure 4 of the reference), which one of ordinary skill in the art would have connected with the power semiconductor element 46 of figure 7 of the admitted prior art, when incorporated and utilized as an external connective lead in figure 7, and the opposite side of the connective lead would have been joined with the circuit pattern 43 (of figure 7). Therefore, it would have been obvious to modify the admitted prior art, figures 7 and 8, by using a connective lead as shown in the Mangiagli et al. reference, thereby satisfying the requirements of claim 1. While we agree with the examiner that the leads of Mangiagli may be implemented in the device of the AAPA, we still find no teaching or suggestion to use both the upper and lower junctions faces for the connection to the power semiconductor elements as recited in independent claim 1. Therefore, we cannot sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 and its dependent claims 2-6. Appeal No. 2005-2626 Application No. 09/954,149 7 CONCLUSION To summarize, the decision of the examiner to reject claims 1-6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is REVERSED. REVERSED ERROL A. KRASS ) Administrative Patent Judge ) ) ) ) ) BOARD OF PATENT JOSEPH L. DIXON ) APPEALS Administrative Patent Judge ) AND ) INTERFERENCES ) ) ) LANCE LEONARD BARRY ) Administrative Patent Judge ) Appeal No. 2005-2626 Application No. 09/954,149 8 OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND, MAIER & NEUSTADT, P.C. 1940 DUKE STREET ALEXANDRIA , VA 22314 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation