Ex Parte WU

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 25, 2016

12163685 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 25, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
12/163,685 06/27/2008
37123 7590 04/26/2016
FITCH EVEN TABIN & FLANNERY, LLP
120 SOUTH LASALLE STREET
SUITE 1600
CHICAGO, IL 60603-3406
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Jing WU
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
7114-104059-US 9047
EXAMINER
PATEL, SANJIV D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2697
MAILDATE DELIVERY MODE
04/26/2016 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JING WU1
Appeal2014-005726
Application 12/163,685
Technology Center 2600
Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., DANIEL N. FISHMAN, and
AMBER L. HAGY, Administrative Patent Judges.
HAGY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
Final Rejection of claims 1-7, 9-17, and 19-22, which are all of the claims
currently pending.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 Appellant identifies Sony Corporation as the real party in interest. (App.
Br. 3.)
2 Claims 8 and 18 were canceled in an Amendment dated September 26,
2012.
Appeal2014-005726
Application 12/163,685
Introduction
According to Appellant, "[t]he present invention relates in general to
display devices and more particularly to a system and method for disabling a
display device." (Spec. i-f 1.)
Exemplary Claim
Claims 1 and 11 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below with the
disputed limitations italicized, is exemplary of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method for disabling use of a display device, the method
comprising the acts of:
detecting a blackout timer setting for a display device
during startup of the display device, the blackout timer setting
indicating a blackout period;
detecting a current time, by the display device, based on
received broadcast data;
determining, by the display device, if the current time lies
within the blackout period indicated by the blackout timer;
disabling, by the display device, at least one function of
the display device in response to the current time being within
the blackout period, wherein disabling includes disabling the
output of all media by the display device during the blackout
period; and
receiving an authentication code from a user via
biometrics and enabling the at least one function of the display
device.
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Application 12/163,685
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Hayes et al. ("Hayes")
Gutta et al. ("Gutta")
Liu et al. ("Liu")
Kuhn et al. ("Kuhn")
Nagtzaam
Damm
Stecyk et al. ("Stecyk")
(filed Apr. 21, 1999)
US 2003/0046579 Al
US 2004/0003393 Al
US 2004/0075700 Al
US 2005/0240959 Al
US 2005/0240960 Al
US 2006/0130118 Al
US 8,108,891 Bl
REJECTIONS
Mar. 6, 2003
Jan. 1,2004
Apr. 22, 2004
Oct. 27, 2005
Oct. 27, 2005
June 15, 2006
Jan. 31, 2012
Claims 1-3, 9-13, and 19-22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Damm, Hayes, Stecyk, Gutta, Kuhn, and
Nagtzaam. (Final Act. 3-13; Ans. 5.)
Claims 4--7 and 14--17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Damm, Hayes, Stecyk, Gutta, Nagtzaam, and Liu.
(Final Act. 13-19.)
ISSUES
( 1) Whether the Examiner erred in finding the prior art teaches or
suggests "detecting a blackout timer setting for a display device during
startup of the display device, the blackout timer setting indicating a blackout
period," as recited in independent claim 1.
(2) Whether the Examiner erred in finding the prior art teaches or
suggests "receiving an authentication code from a user via biometrics and
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Application 12/163,685
enabling the at least one function of the display device," as recited in
independent claim 1.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections in light of Appellant's
arguments the Examiner has erred. 3 We disagree with Appellant's
conclusions and we adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth
by the Examiner in the Action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 3-
19) and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner's Answer
in response to Appellant's Appeal Brief. (Ans. 3-8.) We concur with the
conclusions reached by the Examiner, and we highlight the following for
emphasis. 4
A. "[D]etecting a blackout timer setting for a display device
during startup of the display device ... "
The Examiner finds Damm discloses "detecting a blackout timer
setting for a display device .... " (Final Act. 3; Ans. 6 (citing Damm i-fi-1 3-
4 ). ) The Examiner additionally finds "common sense alone would counsel
that the parent who sets explicitly sets specified time intervals for blocking
channels would reasonably expect such parameters to be in effect at the
3 Appellant collectively argues the rejection of all claims with regard to the
Examiner's obviousness rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Separate patentability is not argued for independent claim 11 or for
dependent claims 2-7, 9, 10, 12-17, or 19-22. Therefore, based on
Appellant's arguments, we decide the appeal of claims 1-7, 9-17, and 19-22
based on claim 1 alone. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
4 Only those arguments made by Appellant have been considered in this
decision. Arguments Appellant did not make in the Briefs have not been
considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
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Application 12/163,685
startup of a viewing terminal. However, as Appellant is quick to point out,
Damm does not expressly disclose such an aspect .... " (Ans. 6 (emphasis
added).) The Examiner relies on Hayes as disclosing "that the detecting
occurs during the startup of the display device," because it "discloses that V-
chip parameters are detected and applied when a consumer appliance is
powered on." (Final Act. 3 (citing Hayes i-fi-135, 39); Ans. 6-7.)
Appellant argues the Examiner's findings are in error because "Hayes
performs no determinations at startup relating to a blackout timer." (App.
Br. 10 (emphasis added).) This argument is unpersuasive because it does
not address the Examiner's findings-the Examiner relies on Damm, not
Hayes, as disclosing a blackout timer. (Final Act. 3; Ans. 6.) Appellant
further argues "Hayes makes no disclosure with respect to any detection of
any settings at startup," and instead requires "determination with respect to
V-chip status is made only after receipt of a command." (App. Br. 11
(emphases added).) We disagree. As the Examiner finds, and we agree,
once V-chip has been enabled, "the consumer appliance 22 can be adapted to
use the parameters from the most restrictive parameter table when the
consumer appliance 22 is directly powered on." (Ans. 6-7 (citing Hayes
i-f 39).) Contrary to Appellant's assertion, Hayes does not teach that a
separate command is required each time; as the Examiner correctly finds,
once V-chip has been enabled, the "most restrictive parameters" may be
applied when the device is powered on-thus, Hayes teaches detection of
parameters "at startup." (Id.)
Appellant has not persuasively rebutted the Examiner's findings
regarding this disputed limitation.
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B. "[R] eceiving an authentication code from a user via biometrics
and enabling the at least one function of the display device ... "
Appellant argues the Examiner's findings regarding this disputed
limitation are in error because neither Hayes nor Gutta "discloses receiving
an authentication code and resultantly enabling the display device." (App.
Br. 8.) In particular, Appellant argues Hayes teaches only a "remote ID
code" that is "independent of the user" because it is "coupled only to the
remote itself." (Id. (emphasis added).) Appellant then argues that Gutta is
"[ s ]imilarly lacking" because it "makes no reference to enabling or disabling
any aspect of the display device .... " (App. Br. 9.)
We are not persuaded by Appellant's arguments, which are piecemeal
challenges to the references individually. The test for obviousness is not
whether the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all
of the references. "Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the
references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art." In re
Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added). Thus, where, as here, the rejections are based upon the teachings of
a combination of references, "[ n ]on-obviousness cannot be established by
attacking references individually." In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091,
1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing Keller, 642 F.2d at 425).
In addition, we find Appellant's individual challenges are conclusory
and hence are not persuasive of Examiner error. With regard to the Hayes
reference, Appellant's argument is premised on the notion that the limitation
"receiving an authentication code from a user ... " does not encompass
Hayes' teaching of a user providing an authentication code via a specially
programmed remote control. (App. Br. 8.) We disagree. As the Examiner
finds, and we agree, Hayes teaches "enabling the at least one function of the
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display device" when "the ID code of a parent's remote control is received."
(Final Act. 5 (citing Hayes i-f 38).) Claim 1, read reasonably and broadly in
light of the Specification, does not preclude "receiving an authentication
code" via a designated remote control, as the Examiner correctly finds is
taught by Hayes. 5
Appellant's argument regarding the Gutta reference is also
unpersuasive as it fails to address the Examiner's finding regarding that
reference. As the Examiner correctly notes, the Examiner does not rely on
Gutta "for any teaching of enabling or disabling a display device." (Ans. 4.)
Rather, the Examiner relies on Gutta only for teaching use of "biometrics" as
an alternative to entering a password or PIN to be recognized as an
authorized user. (Id. (citing Gutta i-f 35).) We agree the Examiner's finding
is supported by the teachings of Gutta.
In the Answer, the Examiner additionally relies on Kuhn, finding "it
too contemplates the claimed aspect of 'receiving an authentication code
from a user via biometrics and enabling the at least one function of the
display device."' (Ans. 5 (citing Kuhn i-fi-1 12, 13, and Fig. 1) (emphases
added).) In response, Appellant argues "Kuhn's function that it enables is
not a function that is subject to a blackout timer." (Reply Br. 7 (emphasis
added).) Appellant additionally argues that, even in the combined
references, "[t]here has been absolutely no showing of any single function
that is both subject to the blackout timer and also subject to enabling through
receipt of an authentication code via biometrics." (Reply Br. 7 (emphasis
5 We additionally note, contrary to Appellant's argument (App. Br. 8-9),
claim 1 does not recite the "enabling" step as dependent on the "receiving"
step. In any event, in light of the Examiner's findings as discussed herein,
we are not persuaded by Appellant's argument.
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added).) This argument is unpersuasive because it does not address the basis
of the Examiner's rejection. The Examiner relies on Damm as teaching a
blackout timer. (Final Act. 3.) The Examiner combines Damm with Hayes,
Gutta, and/or Kuhn to disclose reenabling the display device (that is,
overriding the blackout timer) upon the user's entry of an authentication
code via biometrics. (Final Act. 3, 5, 6; Ans. 3-5.) As the Supreme Court
has explained, the skilled artisan would "be able to fit the teachings of
multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle" because the skilled artisan
is "a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton." KSR Int'! Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420-21 (2007). Here, Appellant has not
demonstrated that the Examiner's proffered combination would have been
"uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art."
Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418). We are, therefore, unpersuaded by
Appellant's arguments.
C. Teaching Away
Appellant additionally argues the Gutta and Nagtzaam references
"teach against the claimed invention." (App. Br. 11 (emphasis omitted).) In
particular, Appellant argues Gutta teaches parental monitoring of programs
"actually watched by the child" and, thus, "teaches against" blacking out
media entirely. (Id.) We disagree. As the Examiner finds, and we agree,
Gutta discloses an "alternative" and does not provide any "affirmative
disparaging, criticizing, or counseling against using other solutions." (Ans.
8.)
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Appellant also argues N atzgaam "teaches against" the claimed
invention because N agtzaam does not "teach that a child's computer 12 and
the control module 21 are, or can be, a single entity." (App. Br. 12
(emphasis added).) We disagree. As the Examiner finds, and we agree, "a
mere absence of subject matter does not contemplate the condition of
affirmatively disparaging or criticizing against the claimed invention."
(Ans. 8.)
For the foregoing reasons, we are unpersuaded of error in the
Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claim 1, and we, therefore,
sustain that rejection, along with the rejections of claims 2-7, 9-17, and 19-
22, which are not separately argued. (App. Br. 13.)
DECISION
For the above reasons, the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections
of claims 1-7, 9-17, and 19-22 are affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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