Ex Parte WON

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 19, 2018

14527035 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/527,035 10/29/2014
66547 7590 12/21/2018
THE FARRELL LAW FIRM, P.C.
290 Broadhollow Road
Suite 2IOE
Melville, NY 11747
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Sungjoon WON
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.
1398-734
(YPF201307-0005)
CONFIRMATION NO.
7540
EXAMINER
BUTTRAM, ALAN T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2613
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/21/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
pto@farrelliplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SUNGJOON WON 1
Appeal 2018-004481
Application 14/527 ,03 5
Technology Center 2600
Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, ADAM J. PYONIN, and
MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges.
THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1, 2, 4---6, 8-16, and 18-19 (see Final
Act. 2-11 ). Claims 7 and 20 are objected to, but the Examiner indicates that
they would be allowable if rewritten in independent form (see Final Act. 11 ).
Claims 3 and 17 are canceled (see Claims Appendix). We have jurisdiction
over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We AFFIRM.
The present invention relates generally to controlling screen
brightness in an electronic device (see Spec., Abstract).
1 Appellant names Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. as the real party in interest
(App. Br. 1 ).
Appeal 2018-004481
Application 14/527,035
Claim 1 is illustrative:
1. A method of controlling screen brightness in an
electronic device, the method comprising:
determining whether to control screen brightness when
displaying a screen;
detecting a selection of screen information displayed on
the screen;
identifying at least one display area of the selected screen
information displayed on the screen if it was determined to control
screen brightness;
determining a priority of the at least one display area; and
partially controlling screen brightness of at least one
display area having a low priority in the screen information of which
the display area has been identified and partially controlling screen
brightness of a surrounding area corresponding to the selected screen
information.
Appellant appeals the following rejections:
RI. Claims 1, 4--6, 8, 16, 18, and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ I03(a) as being unpatentable over Lee (US 2010/0250984 Al, Sept. 30,
2010), Walker (US 2011/0238671 Al, Sept. 29, 2011), and Gordon (US
2004/0025178 Al, Feb. 5, 2004); and
R2. Claims 2 and 9--15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being
unpatentable over Lee, Walker, and Gordon in combination with various
other prior art (see Final Act. 8-11 ).
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 107 5 (BP AI 2010) (precedential).
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Appeal 2018-004481
Application 14/527,035
ANALYSIS
Rejection under§ 103 (a)
Issue: Did the Examiner err in finding that the combined teachings of
Lee, Walker, and Gordon teach and/or suggest identifying at least one
display area of the selected screen information, as set forth in claim 1?
Appellant contends that "[t]he Examiner admits that 'Walker fails to
teach detecting a selection of screen information displayed on the screen'
[ and] [ w ]ithout teaching this recitation, ... Lee in view of Walker and
Gordon cannot teach 'determining a priority of the at least one display area,'
where the 'at least one display area' is 'of the selected screen information"'
(App. Br. 5).
In other words, Appellant contends that the Examiner cannot rely on
Lee and/or Walker to teach "identifying at least one display area of screen
information displayed on the screen" (see Final Act. 3) and at the same time
state that "Lee as modified by Walker fails to teach detecting a selection of
screen information displayed on the screen" (see Final Act. 4), i.e.,
identifying a display area having the selected screen information. Appellant
further contends that Gordon at paragraph 48 fails to cure this defect of Lee
and Walker because Gordon merely teaches "coordinated emphasis or
highlighting of time slot and title objects" (App. Br. 4). We disagree with
Appellant.
We refer to, rely on, and adopt the Examiner's findings and
conclusions set forth in the Answer. Our discussions here will be limited to
the following points of emphasis.
The Examiner finds, and we agree, that in Gordon "detecting a
selection" is inherent because "[h ]ow else will the system know which area
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Appeal 2018-004481
Application 14/527,035
of the screen to modify" (Ans. 12). "We have recognized that inherency
may supply a missing claim limitation in an obviousness analysis." PAR
Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharm., Inc., 113 F.3d 1186, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
"[O]ur early precedent, and that of our predecessor court, established that the
concept of inherency must be limited when applied to obviousness, and is
present only when the limitation at issue is the 'natural result' of the
combination of prior art elements." Id. at 1195. Here, we find that the
Examiner's inherency determination is the natural result of combining Lee,
Walker, and Gordon.
For example, Gordon discloses "highlighting of time slot and title
objects ... or display area surrounding the object ... such that the
surrounded or proximate object is emphasized" (i-f 48). We find that it
naturally flows that an object must first be selected before any emphasis or
highlighting thereof can occur (see also Gordon ,r,r 45--49, Fig. 3A).
Although Appellant argues that in Gordon "a mask and reveal
function" is being used (Reply Br. 3), whereby "the mask depends on the
program being shown, not on detecting a selection of screen information
displayed on the screen" (id. at 4 ), we find that this argument fails to
distinguish Gordon's mask and reveal scheme from detecting a selection. In
fact, Gordon expressly states that the "mask and reveal function" facilitates
identifying objects within the user interface, (see Gordon ,r 41), i.e.,
detecting a selection of screen information.
Thus, we find that the Examiner has sufficiently shown that the
combined teachings of Lee, Walker, and Gordon teach and/or suggest the
aforementioned argued limitation.
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Appeal 2018-004481
Application 14/527,035
As for Appellant's contention that "the Examiner fundamentally
changed the meaning of the recitation" in claim 1 (see App. Br. 5) and that
the Examiner made erroneous remarks in the Advisory Action dated August
15, 2017 (id. at 7), we deem the Examiner's admission of making "a
typographical error" and "mistakenly relying on the claim set filed 3-23-17"
(see Ans. 12) as harmless error because it appears the Examiner sufficiently
addressed the correct limitations in the Final Rejection, giving Appellant
ample opportunity to respond thereto.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's§ 103(a) rejections.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 3 7 C.F .R. § 1.13 6( a )(1 )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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