Ex Parte WON

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 5, 2019

14196135 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 5, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/196,135 03/04/2014
68103 7590 06/07/2019
Jefferson IP Law, LLP
1130 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 420
Washington, DC 20036
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Sung-Joon WON
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
0201-0890 9036
EXAMINER
PACK, CONRAD R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2174
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/07/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
usdocketing@jeffersonip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SUNG-JOON WON
Appeal2018-008196
Application 14/196, 13 5 1
Technology Center 2100
Before JAMES R. HUGHES, ERIC S. FRAHM, and
MICHAEL T. CYGAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
CYGAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF CASE
Introduction
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
Final Rejection of claims 1-3, 5-14, 16-21, 23-32, and 34--37, which
constitute all the claims pending in this application. Claims 4, 15, 22, and
33 have been cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 According to Appellant, Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. is the real party in
interest. App. Br. 2.
Appeal2018-008196
Application 14/196,135
Disclosed Invention and Exemplary Claim
The disclosed invention relates to a mobile device and a method of
controlling the mobile device. Spec. ,r 2. Touch screen control of a mobile
device generally requires the user to touch the device, which may be
inconvenient when the device is in, for instance, the user's pocket. Id. at ,r,r
4--5. The disclosed invention addresses this situation by a method of
controlling a mobile device that executes an action in a display unchecking
mode. Id. at ,r 9. A display unchecking mode may be triggered by, for
instance, pressing of a home button for at least a predetermined time. Id. at
,r 77. The display unchecking mode refers to a mode in which a user can
control the mobile device without viewing its display. Id. at ,r 80.
Independent claim 1 below is exemplary of the disclosed invention,
and reads as follows:
1. A method of controlling a mobile device that executes an action
in an inhibited display input mode, the method comprising:
detecting a trigger to enter an inhibited display input mode
for a touch screen;
displaying a help screen illustrating a plurality of user
inputs corresponding to a plurality of commands in the inhibited
display mode;
entering into the inhibited display input mode;
detecting an event while in the inhibited display mode;
executing a command based on the event;
when the help screen is displayed on the touch screen
during the inhibited display input mode, detecting if a touch input
corresponds to a shape for triggering a second trigger; and
in response to detecting the second trigger, removing the
help screen from the touch screen and performing voice
reproduction of the help screen.
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Application 14/196,135
Independent claims 19 and 37 recite limitations commensurate with
the limitations recited in claim 1. Dependent claims 2-3, 5-14, 16-18, 20-
21, 23-3 2, and 34--3 6 each incorporate the limitations of their respective
independent claims. Appellant does not argue any claims separately from
claim 1. App. Br. passim.
Examiner's Rejections
The Examiner rejects claims 1-2, 7, 19, 20, 25, and 37 under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being obvious over the combination of Patel et al.
(U.S. 2012/0144299 Al; published June 7, 2012) (hereinafter, "Patel") and
Rossi, Jr. et al. (U.S. 2015/0268234 Al; published Dec. 1, 2005 (hereinafter
"Rossi").
The Examiner rejects claims 3 and 21 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ I03(a) as being obvious over the combination of Patel and Rossi, and
further in view of Son et al. (U.S. 2011/0291974 Al; published Dec. 1,
2011) (hereinafter "Son").
The Examiner rejects claims 5---6 and 23-24 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ I03(a) as being obvious over the combination of Patel and Rossi, and
further in view of Markiewicz et al. (U.S. 2009/0319894 Al; published Dec.
24, 2009) (hereinafter "Markiewicz").
The Examiner rejects claims 8 and 26 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ I03(a) as being obvious over the combination of Patel and Rossi, and
further in view of Pisula et al. (U.S. 2010/0060586 Al; published Mar. 11,
2010) (hereinafter "Pisula") and Lessing et al. (U.S. 2012/0236037 Al;
published Sep. 20, 2012) (hereinafter "Lessing").
The Examiner rejects claims 9, 13, 2 7, and 31 under pre-AIA 3 5
U.S.C. § I03(a) as being obvious over the combination of Patel and Rossi,
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Application 14/196,135
and further in view of Ahonen et al. (U.S. 2009/0146961 Al; published June
11, 2009) (hereinafter "Ahonen") and Boeckmann et al. (U.S. 2009/0157388
Al; published June 18, 2009) (hereinafter "Boeckmann").
The Examiner rejects claims 10 and 28 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ I03(a) as being obvious over the combination of Patel and Rossi, and
further in view of Krzyzanowski et al. (U.S. 2010/0157989 Al; published
June 24, 2010) (hereinafter "Krzyzanowski").
The Examiner rejects claims 11 and 29 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ I03(a) as being obvious over the combination of Patel and Rossi, and
further in view of Son et al. (U.S. 2011/0291974 Al; published Dec. 1,
2011) (hereinafter "Son").
The Examiner rejects claims 12 and 30 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ I03(a) as being obvious over the combination of Patel and Rossi, and
further in view of Hugg et al. (U.S. 2012/0185547 Al; published July 19,
2012) (hereinafter "Hugg") and Kassiedass et al. (U.S. 2011/0263235 Al;
published Oct. 27, 2011) (hereinafter "Kassiedass").
The Examiner rejects claims 14 and 32 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ I03(a) as being obvious over the combination of Patel and Rossi, Ahonen,
and Boeckmann, and further in view of Hayes (U.S. 2012/0179970 Al;
published July 12, 2012).
The Examiner rejects claims 16 and 34 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ I03(a) as being obvious over the combination of Patel and Rossi, and
further in view of Dao et al. (U.S. 2012/0287076 Al; published Nov. 15,
2012) (hereinafter "Dao").
The Examiner rejects claims 17 and 35 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ I03(a) as being obvious over the combination of Patel and Rossi, and
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Application 14/196,135
further in view ofRimas-Ribikauskas et al. (U.S. 2010/0060586 Al;
published Mar. 11, 2010) (hereinafter "Rimas-Ribikauskas").
The Examiner rejects claims 18 and 36 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ I03(a) as being obvious over the combination of Patel and Rossi, and
further in view of Backlund et al. (U.S. 2012/0068937 Al; published Mar.
22, 2012) (hereinafter "Backlund").
The rejections of claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, are
withdrawn and do not form part of this appeal. Adv. Act. 1-2.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections (Final Act. 2-31) in light
of Appellant's contentions that the Examiner has erred (App. Br. 4--8).
Further, we have reviewed the Examiner's response to Appellant's
contentions. Ans. 2-5. We have also reviewed the Appellant's Reply Brief.
Appellant contends that the combination of applied references does not teach
or suggest "in response to detecting the second trigger, removing the help
screen from the touch screen and performing voice reproduction of the help
screen," as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 5.
The Examiner rejects claim 1 over the combination of Patel and Rossi.
Final Act. 5. With respect to the limitation at issue, the Examiner finds that
Patel teaches "in response to detecting the second trigger, performing voice
reproduction of the help screen." Id. at 7. However, the Examiner finds that
Patel does not teach or suggest the entirety of limitation at issue. The
Examiner finds Rossi teaches or suggests, in response to detection of a
trigger (a user interaction), performing voice reproduction ("spoken help
information") and removing a visual help screen ("visual help information").
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Application 14/196,135
Id. at 8. The Examiner also finds Rossi teaches removal of the visual help
information either automatically after a predetermined amount of time, or in
response to an express request of the user. Id. at 9.
The Examiner determines that the broadest reasonable interpretation
of the claim permits a single trigger to result in both an immediate ( spoken
help) response and a delayed (visual help removal) response. Ans. 4. The
Examiner reasons that both the immediate and delayed response take place
"in response to" that trigger. Id. Based on the above-described claim
interpretation, the Examiner determines that it would have been obvious to
one having ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings and suggestions
of Patel and Rossi to arrive at the claimed invention. Final Act. 9--10.
Appellant contends that the claim requires a single trigger to directly
cause both presentation of spoken help information and removal of the help
screen. App. Br. 6. Appellant argues that Rossi does not teach or suggest a
single trigger that causes both events to occur, but instead provides a trigger
that causes presentation of visual and spoken help information, and then a
subsequent trigger that causes removal of the visual help screen information.
Id. at 6-8. The subsequent trigger of Rossi may be either an express user
request or a predetermined time delay. Id. Appellant notes that the
Specification characterizes a time delay as a trigger. Reply Br. 3 ( citing
Spec. ,r 84 ). Appellant argues that Rossi's time delay acts as an intervening
event such that that the removal of the visual help screen is not "in response
to" the same trigger that causes performance of the voice reproduction.
Reply Br. 2-3.
We are not persuaded by Appellant's contention of error in the
Examiner's rejection. It is uncontested that Rossi teaches or suggests a
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trigger to cause presentation of spoken help information. Reply Br. 3; Ans.
4. It is also uncontested that Rossi teaches automatic removal of the visual
help information, which occurs after a predetermined amount of time. Id.
We agree with the Examiner that the broadest reasonable claim
interpretation of "in response to" does not exclude a time-delayed automatic
removal of the help screen as taught or suggested by Rossi.
Appellant has not persuasively argued the Examiner's interpretation
as inconsistent with the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with
the Specification. Appellant points to the Specification for a time delay
being itself a separate trigger. Reply Br. 3 (citing Spec. ,r 84). However,
Appellant has not pointed to any portion of the Specification that clarifies
the scope of actions that are "in response to" a trigger. Appellant has not
pointed to, and nor do we find, any portion of the Specification to describe a
triggered response that excludes a time delay between voice reproduction
and removal of help screen. Although Appellant points to operation 1024 as
exemplifying the help removal action (Reply Br. 2), the Specification
describes the help removal action 1024 as following the voice reproduction
action after a time delay. See, e.g., Spec. ,r,r 156-158 (describing a double
tap trigger and a voice reproduction response (operation 1022), followed by
removal of the visual help indications ( operation 1024) if there is no input
for a predetermined time). Accordingly, we do not find that Appellant has
shown persuasively that, in light of the Specification, the broadest
reasonable construction of claim 1 prohibits any time delay between (i.e.,
simultaneous performance of) the claimed help removal and voice
reproduction actions.
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Application 14/196,135
Furthermore, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking
references individually where the rejection is based on combinations of
references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co.,
800 F.2d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Moreover, the person of ordinary skill in
the art is "a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton." KSR Int'! Co.
v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,421 (2007). Here, Appellant has argued
solely against the individual features of Rossi for the disputed limitation of
"in response to detecting the second trigger, removing the help screen from
the touch screen and performing voice reproduction of a portion of the help
screen." App. Br. 4. However, the Examiner also invokes Patel for teaching
or suggesting "in response to detecting the second trigger, performing voice
reproduction of a portion of the help screen." Final Act. 7-8. Accordingly,
Appellant has not persuasively argued that the combination of teachings or
suggestions relied upon by the Examiner would not make obvious the
claimed invention.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant has not shown that the Examiner
erred in rejecting claim 1. Since Appellant relies on the identical arguments
for claims 2-3, 5-14, 16-21, 23-32, and 34--37, Appellant has not shown
the Examiner erred in also rejecting those claims over the base references of
Rossi and Patel.
CONCLUSIONS
We conclude that Appellant has not shown that the Examiner has
erred in rejecting independent claims 1 and 37 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being obvious over the combination of Rossi and Patel, or in rejecting claims
2-3, 5-14, 16-21, 23-32, and 34--37 as being obvious over the base
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Application 14/196,135
combination of Rossi and Patel in view of various further prior art
references. In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner's obviousness
rejections of claims 1-3, 5-14, 16-21, 23-32, and 34--37.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's rejections of claims 1-3, 5-14, 16-21, 23-
32, and 34--37 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). No time period for taking
any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under
37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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