Ex Parte Wolff et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardNov 20, 201714382839 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 20, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/382,839 09/04/2014 Tobias Wolff NUANCE-053PUS 3919 115788 7590 11/22/2017 Nuance EXAMINER c/o Daly, Crowley, Mofford and Durkee, LLP 354A Turnpike Street KIM, JONATHAN C Suite 301A Canton, MA 02021-2714 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2659 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/22/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ip.inbox@nuance.com docketing@dc-m.com amk@dc-m.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte TOBIAS WOLFF, MARKUS BUCK, TIM HAULICK, and SUHADI ULM Appeal 2017-005023 Application 14/382,839 Technology Center 26001 Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, DENISE M. POTHIER, and JASON J. CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges. POTHIER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON REQUEST FOR REHEARING Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.52, Appellants have submitted a timely Request for Rehearing dated November 6, 20172 (hereafter the “Request”), requesting rehearing of the September 5, 2017 opinion (hereafter the “Opinion” or “Op.”)that (1) affirmed the Examiner’s indefiniteness rejection of claims 4, 8, 9, 21, and 25—27; (2) reversed the Examiner’s anticipation and obviousness rejections of claims 1—10 and 18—30; and (3) presented new grounds of rejection for claims 1—10 and 18—30. Op. 15. 1 The real party of interest is listed as Nuance Communications, Inc. App. Br. 2. 2 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.7(a). Appeal 2017-005023 Application 14/382,839 We have reconsidered the Opinion in light of Appellants’ comments in the Request and find no errors. We therefore decline to change our prior decision for the following reasons. Claim 1 recites, in pertinent part, a device comprising “a voice-control module coupled to the microphones, the voice control module having a computer processor and a memory configured to: .. . communicate to the specific one of the possible speakers that the voice-control module is in the selective listening mode for the specific one of the possible speakers.” App. Br. 12 (Claims App’x).3 Such a limitation requires the processor and memory be configured to (e.g., programmed) to communicate to a specific speaker that the voice-control module is in a selective listening mode for the specific speaker. Id. We disagree that this claim requires a device actively communicate to a specific speaker as argued. Request 2. Next, Appellants contend Tadashi4 may or may not perform the actions discussed on pages 8 through 11 of the Opinion. Request 2. Based on this understanding, Appellants conclude that, “if no further utterances are made by the driver” after “utter[ing] the keyword ‘car navigation,’” Tadashi does not communicate to the specific speaker that it is in the selective listening mode as required by claim 1. //.(underlining omitted). We are not persuaded. Even assuming Tadashi discloses alternative embodiments where there is no communication to a specific speaker that a voice-control module is in a selective listening mode as urged by Appellants, this scenario is not dispositive to the issue of anticipation. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Mustek 3 We refer to the Appeal Brief (App. Br.) filed September 20, 2016. 4 Tadashi, EP 1 400 814 A2, published Mar. 24, 2004. 2 Appeal 2017-005023 Application 14/382,839 Systems, Inc., 340 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[A] prior art product that sometimes, but not always, embodies a claimed method nonetheless teaches that aspect of the invention,”) As Appellants acknowledge (see Request 2 (stating “Tadashi might perform some of the actions discussed in pages 8-11 of the Decision”)), Tadashi discloses scenarios where a processor and memory communicate to a specific speaker that the voice-control module is in a selective listening mode for the specific speaker. Op. 8—11 (citing Tadashi || 81—95, Fig. 9). We, thus, disagree that Tadashi fails to disclose the above, disputed claim feature (Request 3), and refer to the decision (Op. 8—11) for more details. Appellants further assert they disagree with the first paragraph on page 10 of the Opinion. Request 3. In that paragraph, we noted that Tadashi illustrates an embodiment where the system has switched from a broad listening mode to a selective listening mode for the driver, stating: To illustrate, when driver 401 states “temperature down” (third entry in first column), the system recognizes this command (third entry in fourth column) and responds by lowering the selection temperature of the air conditioner (third entry in fifth column). Id. || 88—90, Fig. 9. When passenger 402 states “cold” or “temperature up” (first and second entries in second column), the system does not respond (fourth and fifth entries in fifth column). Id. || 91—92, Fig. 9. As such, Tadashi’s response to driver 401’s lower temperature request (e.g., turning on a fan and the changing the car’s internal temperature) and Tadashi’s failure to respond to passenger 402’s request communicates aurally (e.g., fan sounds), through a temperature change to the specific speaker (e.g., driver 401), and by not responding to others’ requests that the voice-control module is in the selective listening mode for the specific one speaker as required by claim 1. See id. || 88—90, Fig. 9. 3 Appeal 2017-005023 Application 14/382,839 Op. 10. Regarding this paragraph, Appellants argue that a fan being turned on “may occur for many reasons,” including “a change in external temperature” or “someone opening a window,” and “[i]t is not all clear that a fan turning on is communicating anything to anyone.” Request 3. We are not persuaded. As noted above, merely because there may be scenarios in Tadashi where a fan is turned on for reasons other than responding to the user’s command, this does not negate the scenario where a fan is turned on based on the user’s voice, thus properly communicating to the specific speaker that the voice-control module is in the selective listening mode. Likewise, although there may be “reasons having nothing to do with Tadashi focused on driver only utterances” that its system does not respond to a passenger’s command (id.), one scenario includes a failure to respond to the passenger as a manner to communicate to the specific speaker that the voice- control module is in a selective listening mode. Op. 10. Additionally, Appellants do not dispute that sensing the temperature change in the car in response to the speaker’s command fails to communicate to the specific speaker that the voice-control module is in the selective listening mode as recited. Request 3. In any event, Appellants have not discussed, let alone persuasively rebutted, the two additional obviousness rejections of claims 1, 3—10,18, and 20-30. Op. 12—15 (discussing Tadashi’s first embodiment (Figures 1—3) and Tadashi’s second embodiment (Figure 4)). Nevertheless, despite Appellants’ contention that the new rejections “are not consistent with the broadest reasonable interpretation of Tadashi” (Request 4), this argument is unavailing. Claims— not the prior art —are given their broadest reasonable 4 Appeal 2017-005023 Application 14/382,839 construction in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Am. Acad, of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Moreover, counsel merely asserts this position without providing sufficient, supporting evidence. See, e.g.,In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 139-40 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Regarding dependent claim 2, Appellants assert Tadashi discloses a single vocabulary, and that both the broad listening mode and the selective listening mode use the same word vocabulary “in an ASR [(automatic speech recognition)] sense,” as opposed to different vocabulary as recited in the claim. Request 4 (quoting Spec. 1255). Appellants contend that the same vocabulary in Tadashi is recognized in bothmodes, although only certain words result in performing certain processing. Id. We are not convinced. Claim 2 recites “the broad listening mode uses an associated broad mode recognition vocabulary and the selective listening mode uses a different associated selective mode recognition vocabulary.” App. Br. 12 (Claims App’x). Appellants reproduce Paragraph 25 of the Specification in the Request, attempting to distinguish between claim 2 and Tadashi. Request 4. Although this paragraph discusses different acoustic models may be used in the ASR engine depending on the listening mode, this feature is not recited in claim 2. App. Br. 12 (Claims App’x). This paragraph also states ASR grammar needs to be switched when switching listening modes, but once again, such a feature is not recited in claim 2. Id. 5 Appellants incorrectly refer to Paragraph 1. Request 4. We will refer to Paragraph 25, instead of Paragraph 1, in this opinion. 5 Appeal 2017-005023 Application 14/382,839 When construing this limitation in light of the disclosure, we fail to see a distinction between the claimed vocabularies and those in Tadashi. See Am. Acad, of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3dat 1364. As explained in the Opinion, the present application’s broad listening mode uses limited vocabulary, including a selective mode activation word, and the selective listening mode uses an extended or larger vocabulary. Op. 11 (citing Spec. || 17, 19). There is nothing in the present application’s disclosure that excludes the same words from being in both vocabularies. Op. 12 (citing Spec. || 17, 19). Likewise, Tadashi discloses different vocabulary consistent with the Specification. Op. 11 (citing Spec.|| 17, 19). That is, Tadashi discusses and shows (1) a broad listening mode using limited vocabulary, including a selective mode activation word (e.g., “car navigation” in Tadashi), and (2) a selective listening mode using an extended vocabulary (e.g., “temperature down” and “thank you.”). Tadashi || 88, 90, 93, 94, Fig. 9, cited in Op. 11. We have considered the arguments raised by Appellants in the Request, but the arguments are not persuasive to find that the Board misapprehended or overlooked points in the original decision. Based on the record before us now and in the original appeal, we are still conclude that (1) the Examiner did not err in rejecting the claims 4, 8, 9, 21, and 25—27 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph and (2) claims 1—10 and 18—30 are anticipated and/or obvious over the cited art. Op. 8—15. We have granted the Request to the extent that we have reconsidered our decision of September 5, 2017, but we deny the request with respectto making any changes therein. REHEARING DENIED 6 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation