Ex parte Wixson

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Feb 19, 2002

08742432 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 19, 2002)

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The opinion in support of the decision being
entered today was not written for publication
in a law journal and is not binding precedent
of the Board.
Paper No. 18
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES

Ex parte LAMBERT ERNEST WIXSON

Appeal No. 1999-2315
Application No. 08/742,432

ON BRIEF

Before HAIRSTON, JERRY SMITH and BARRETT, Administrative
Patent Judges.
JERRY SMITH, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134
from the examiner’s rejection of claims 1-3, 7, 8, 11 and 13-
17. Claims 4-6, 9, 10 and 12 have been indicated to contain
allowable subject matter.
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Application No. 08/742,432
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The disclosed invention pertains to a method and
apparatus for identifying and tracking objects within a scene
represented by a sequence of images. More particularly, the
invention uses a combination of two distinct methods for
object detection. One method is suited for well-lit scenes,
while the other method is suited for poorly-lit scenes.
Representative claim 1 is reproduced as follows:
1. A method of identifying and tracking objects within a
scene represented by a sequence of images comprising the steps
of:
generating a reference image containing background
information of the scene;
selecting an image from said sequence of images as a two
dimensional object image;
converting said two dimensional object image into a one-
dimensional strip of object image values;
converting said reference image into a one-dimensional
reference strip of reference values;
producing a difference strip of difference values by
comparing the reference values in the reference strip to the
object image values in the one-dimensional strip; and
processing said difference strip to identify moving
objects in said scene.
The examiner relies on the following references:
Lo et al. (Lo) 4,959,714 Sep. 25, 1990
Kajiwara 5,218,414 June 08, 1993
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Application No. 08/742,432
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Shinohara 5,606,376 Feb. 25, 1997
(filed June 02,
1995)
M. Kilger, “A shadow Handler in a Video-based Real-time
Traffic Monitoring System,” IEEE Workshop on Application of
Computer Vision 11-18 (May 1992).
Claims 1-3, 7, 8, 11 and 13-17 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103. As evidence of obviousness the examiner
offers Shinohara in view of Kajiwara with respect to claims 1-
3, 11, 13, 15 and 17, adds Kilger to this combination with
respect to claim 16, and adds Lo to the basic combination with
respect to claims 7, 8 and 14.
Rather than repeat the arguments of appellant or the
examiner, we make reference to the briefs and the answer for
the respective details thereof.
OPINION
We have carefully considered the subject matter on
appeal, the rejections advanced by the examiner and the
evidence of obviousness relied upon by the examiner as support
for the rejections. We have, likewise, reviewed and taken
into consideration, in reaching our decision, the appellant’s
arguments set forth in the briefs along with the examiner’s
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rationale in support of the rejections and arguments in
rebuttal set forth in the examiner’s answer.
It is our view, after consideration of the record before
us, that the evidence relied upon and the level of skill in
the particular art would not have suggested to one of ordinary
skill in the art the obviousness of the invention as set forth
in claims 1-3, 7, 8, 11 and 13-17. Accordingly, we reverse.
In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103, it is
incumbent upon the examiner to establish a factual basis to
support the legal conclusion of obviousness. See In re Fine,
837 F.2d 1071, 1073, 5 USPQ2d 1596, 1598 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In
so doing, the examiner is expected to make the factual
determinations set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.
1, 17, 148 USPQ 459, 467 (1966), and to provide a reason why
one having ordinary skill in the pertinent art would have been
led to modify the prior art or to combine prior art references
to arrive at the claimed invention. Such reason must stem
from some teaching, suggestion or implication in the prior art
as a whole or knowledge generally available to one having
ordinary skill in the art. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley
Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1051, 5 USPQ2d 1434, 1438 (Fed. Cir.),
Appeal No. 1999-2315
Application No. 08/742,432
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cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta
Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 293,
227 USPQ 657, 664 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1017 (1986); ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732
F.2d 1572, 1577, 221 USPQ 929, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984). These
showings by the examiner are an essential part of complying
with the burden of presenting a prima facie case of
obviousness. Note In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24
USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992). If that burden is met,
the burden then shifts to the applicant to overcome the prima
facie case with argument and/or evidence. Obviousness is then
determined on the basis of the evidence as a whole and the
relative persuasiveness of the arguments. See Id.; In re
Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038, 1039, 228 USPQ 685, 686 (Fed. Cir.
1986); In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788
(Fed. Cir. 1984); and In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1052, 189
USPQ 143, 147 (CCPA 1976). Only those arguments actually made
by appellant have been considered in this decision. Arguments
which appellant could have made but chose not to make in the
brief have not been considered (see 37 CFR § 1.192(a)).
Appeal No. 1999-2315
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The examiner rejects each of independent claims 1, 11 and
13 based on the teachings of Shinohara and Kajiwara. With
respect to claim 1, the examiner finds that Shinohara teaches
the claimed invention except for the steps which relate to a
one-dimensional strip. The examiner cites Kajiwara as
teaching the conversion of a two-dimensional window of an
object image into a one-dimensional strip of the object image.
The examiner finds that it would have been obvious to the
artisan to use the teachings of
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Kajiwara to modify Shinohara’s method by converting the two-
dimensional images of the object into one-dimensional images
of the object. The examiner also finds that it would have
been obvious to the artisan to convert a two-dimensional
window of the background image into a one-dimensional strip
(answer, pages
4-5). With respect to claims 11 and 13, the examiner cites
Shinohara as additionally teaching the generation of
brightness difference values and energy difference values and
using these values to classify an object image (id., pages 5-
6).
Appellant argues these independent claims separately.
With respect to independent claim 1, appellant argues that
Kajiwara does not teach the step of converting a two-
dimensional image into a one-dimensional strip as asserted by
the examiner. Appellant points out that the section of
Kajiwara relied on by the examiner does not teach or suggest
the element of claim 1 for which it is relied on by the
examiner (brief, pages 9-10). The examiner responds that the
one-dimensional box in Figures 7(c) and 4B of Kajiwara defines
all image pixels on a column (q) of a strip of width (S) which
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agrees with appellant’s definition of 2D/1D conversion
(answer, pages 8-9). Appellant responds that the box in
Kajiwara is clearly a two-dimensional object (s pixels
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wide by m pixels long), and that there is no disclosure of
converting this box into a one-dimensional strip as claimed
(reply brief).
We agree with the position argued by appellant. Kajiwara
does not teach or suggest the conversion of a two-dimensional
object image into a one-dimensional strip of the object image
for reasons explained by appellant. Since Kajiwara does not
provide this teaching, it also does not teach or suggest the
steps of converting the reference image into a one-dimensional
strip, producing a difference strip and processing the
difference strip to identify moving objects as recited in
claim 1. Therefore, we do not sustain the examiner’s
rejection of independent claim 1.
With respect to independent claims 11 and 13, appellant
argues that both Shinohara and Kajiwara process the magnitudes
of the pixel values in the input images and do not teach or
suggest the claimed generation of an energy difference value
or any form of energy computation (brief, pages 11-12). The
examiner responds that Shinohara discloses the generation of a
brightness difference value, an energy difference value, and
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the comparison of these values to threshold values to classify
each object image value (answer, pages 9-10).
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We again agree with the position argued by appellant. We
are unable to equate the mean value and variance computations
of Shinohara with brightness difference value computations and
energy difference value computations as the examiner has done.
We agree with appellant that there is no teaching in Shinohara
of computing energy difference values and comparing energy
difference values to energy difference threshold values as
recited in claims 11 and 13. Therefore, we do not sustain the
examiner’s rejection of independent claims 11 and 13.
Since we have not sustained the examiner’s rejection of
independent claims 1, 11 and 13, we also do not sustain the
rejection of any dependent claims based only on the teachings
of Shinohara and Kajiwara. Although the examiner has applied
the additional teachings of Kilger or Lo to dependent claims
7, 8, 14 and 16, the additional teachings of Kilger and Lo do
not overcome the deficiencies in the basic combination
discussed above. Therefore, we do not sustain the rejection
of any of the dependent claims on appeal.
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In summary, we have not sustained any of the examiner’s
rejections of the claims on appeal. Therefore, the decision
of
the examiner rejecting claims 1-3, 7, 8, 11 and 13-17 is
reversed.
REVERSED
KENNETH W. HAIRSTON )
Administrative Patent Judge )
)
)
)
)
JERRY SMITH ) BOARD OF PATENT
Administrative Patent Judge ) APPEALS AND
) INTERFERENCES
)
)
)
LEE E. BARRETT )
Administrative Patent Judge )
JS:clm
Appeal No. 1999-2315
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