Ex Parte White, Jr.

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Mar 19, 2008

09381742 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 19, 2008)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte NEWTON B. WHITE, JR.
____________

Appeal 2007-2251
Application 09/381,742
Technology Center 3600
____________

Decided1: March 19, 2008
____________

Before HUBERT C. LORIN, ANTON W. FETTING, and
JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judges.

LORIN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Newton B. White, Jr. (Appellant) seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of
the final rejection of claims 169-208.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b)
(2002).

1 An oral hearing was conducted on December 19, 2007.

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SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM-IN-PART. 3

THE INVENTION
The Appellant’s claimed invention “relates generally to using an offer
matching system to collect and to execute binding offers to buy and to sell a traded
item.” (Specification 1:9-10).
Claim 169, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal.
169. A method for operating an offer matching or
information publishing system (which system include
without limitation a computer apparatus) for a traded
item comprising the following steps:
(a) associating a first offer to buy or to sell the
traded item with a first identifier;
(b) receiving a request for information, where;
(i) the request includes the first identifier and
(ii) the request is received in a manner that
does not imply that the request is from a
person entitled to receive nonpublic
information concerning the first offer; and

2 The Appeal Brief indicates that claims 1-51, 56-64, 141, 148-162, and 167 have
been withdrawn; claims 52-55, 124-128, 130-136, 142-147, and 209-214 have
been cancelled; and, claims 65-123, 129, 137-140, 163-166, and 168 have been
allowed. App. Br. 2-4.

3 Our decision will make reference to the Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,”
filed Mar. 19, 2004), the Examiner’s Answer (“Answer,” mailed Apr. 24, 2006),
and the Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Nov. 22, 2004).
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(c) in response to the request, sending a reply
comprising a data item that concerns the
first offer.

THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of unpatentability:
Adams
Hauser
US 3,573,747
WO 97/25801
Apr. 6, 1971
Jul. 17, 1997

The following rejections are before us for review:
1. Claims 169-171, 173-177, 179, and 182-208 are rejected as being directed to
non-statutory subject matter in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 101.
2. Claims 169, 173, 177-179 , 182, 184, 185, 187, 191, 197, 203, and 204 are
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite.
3. Claims 169-176, 179, 181, and 184 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
being anticipated by Adams.
4. Claims 180, 191-195, 197, 198, and 200-202 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §
103(a) as unpatentable over Adams.
5. Claims 177 and 178 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Adams in view of Hauser.
ISSUES
The first issue before us is whether the Appellant has shown that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claims 169-171, 173-177, 179, 182-208 as being
directed to non-statutory subject matter. This issue turns on whether a “data
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stream” (claim 196) is patentable subject matter and whether the claimed invention
is directed to non-statutory subject matter given that operates on a computer
(claims 169-171, 173-177, 179, 182-195, and 197-208).
The second issue before us is whether the Appellant has shown that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claims 169, 173, 177-179 , 182, 184, 185, 187, 191,
197, 203, and 204 as being indefinite. There are two aspects to this issue: (a)
whether claims 177 and 178 are confusing for not clearly indicating whether a
digital signature is included or not and (b) whether the recitation “includes without
limitation a computer apparatus” in claims 169, 173, 179, 182, 184, 185, 187, 191,
197, 203, and 204 renders these claims confusing.
The third issue before us is whether the Appellant has shown that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claims 169-176, 179, 181, and 184 as being anticipated
by Adams.
The fourth issue before us is whether the Appellant has shown that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claims 180, 191-195, 197, 198, and 200-202 as
unpatentable over Adams.
The fifth issue before us is whether the Appellant has shown that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claims 177 and 178 as unpatentable over Adams and
Hauser.
DISCUSSION
Rejection of claims 169-171, 173-177, 179, 182-208 as being directed to non-
statutory subject matter in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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Claim 196
Claim 196 reads as follows:
196. A data stream comprising a plurality of data packets, each of
the data packets comprising a respective identifier and a respective
data item, wherein:
each respective identifier is associated with a respective offer,
and each
respective identifier not associated with any other offer,
an offer matching system has previously received a description
of each
respective offer from a respective participant,
each respective participant possesses information which
discloses that a
respective related person satisfies a respective condition selected from
the group consisting of:
the respective offer is for the benefit of the respective
related person,
the respective offer is for the account of the respective
related person,
the respective related person made an investment
decision to make the respective offer,
the respective related person has a financial interest in the
respective offer,
the respective related person is financially responsible (as
principal, guarantor or otherwise) for the respective offer,
the respective related person is financially responsible (as
principal, guarantor or otherwise) for a trade arising out of the
respective offer,
the respective related person is acting as an agent with
respect to the respective offer,
the respective related person is acting as a principal with
respect to the respective offer,
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the offer matching system possesses information which
discloses for each
respective offer the respective identifier associated with the respective
offer,
each respective data item concerns the respective offer
associated with the
respective identifier,
a set of rules that govern the operation of the offer matching
system permit
the offer matching system to disclose publicly that the respective data
items concern the respective offers and
the set of rules does not permit the offer matching system to
disclose publicly that the respective related persons satisfy the
respective conditions.
The Examiner argued, in part, that the claimed invention “recites non-
functional descriptive material, i.e., mere data.” Answer 3. The Appellant pointed
out that the claim requires, among other things, data packets. App. Br. 15.
Claim 196 is directed to a “data stream.” A stream of data is a type of signal.
This type of signal is not a “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter,” the four categories of subject matter patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
“[T]hus, such a signal cannot be patentable subject matter.” In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d
1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
The rejection of claim 196 is affirmed.

Claims 169-171, 173-177, 179, 182-195, and 197-208
The Examiner argued that the claimed subject matter “is not implemented
with any specific automated computer apparatus.” Answer 3. The Examiner also
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argued that “the claims are not in the “technological” or “useful” arts, and the
claims do not affect or define the technology.” Answer 3-4. This latter rationale is
no longer applicable. Ex parte Lundgren, 76 USPQ2d 1385, 1388 (BPAI 2004)
(precedential) (“there is currently no judicially recognized separate “technological
arts” test to determine patent eligible subject matter under §101.”)
The Appellant argued, in part, that the “obvious meaning of the phrase
‘system (which system include without limitation a computer apparatus)’ is that the
system referred to must contain a computer apparatus but is not limited solely to
systems that contain only a computer apparatus.” App. Br. 18.
We will not sustain the rejection as to these claims.
The Appellant’s argument is specifically directed to independent method
claims 169, 173, 179, 182, 184, 185, 187, 191, 197, 203, and 204, and the claims
which depend on them, all of which contain the phrase “system (which system
include without limitation a computer apparatus)” in their preambles. In light of
this language, the claimed processes are methods for operating an offer matching
or information publishing system limited such that they use, at a minimum, a
computer apparatus. Comiskey established that “the application of human
intelligence to the solution of practical problems is not in and of itself patentable.”
In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
The Supreme Court has reviewed process patents reciting
algorithms or abstract concepts in claims directed to industrial
processes. In that context, the Supreme Court has held that a
claim reciting an algorithm or abstract idea can state statutory
subject matter only if, as employed in the process, it is
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embodied in, operates on, transforms, or otherwise involves
another class of statutory subject matter, i.e., a machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Id. at 1376. However, the instant claims are arguably directed to statutory subject
matter because the steps operate on another class of statutory subject matter, i.e.,
the computer apparatus. “When an unpatentable mental process is combined with
a machine, the combination may produce patentable subject matter ….” Id. at
1379. In that regard, the Examiner has not explained why the combination would
not produce patentable subject matter. We reach the same conclusion as to
independent method claim 177 which, though the argued-over “computer”
language is not included, requires a system involving sending a reply comprising a
“data item” and “digital signature.” These objects suggest and imply that at least
step (c) of the claimed method is performed by a computer. A prima facie case of
unpatentability under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for the claimed subject matter has not been
established

Rejection of claims 169, 173, 177-179 , 182, 184, 185, 187, 191, 197, 203, and 204
are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite.
A. Principles of Law
The test for compliance with the second paragraph of § 112 is whether the
claims set out and circumscribe a particular area with a reasonable degree of
precision and particularity when read in light of the application disclosure as they
would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Moore, 439 F.2d
1232, 1235 (CCPA 1971).
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B. Analysis
Claims 177-178
The Examiner argues that claims 177 and 178 are confusing for not clearly
indicating whether a digital signature is included or not. Answer 4. We agree.
Claim 177 (and likewise claim 178) call for sending a reply that comprises a
digital signature which is “sent to the participant in a manner that is secured
without relying upon the digital signature.” (Emphasis added.) The language of the
claims describes, on the one hand, sending a reply with a digital signature and yet,
on the other hand, the reply may be sent without relying on the digital signature,
suggesting the reply may be sent without a digital signature. The claims are
insolubly ambiguous. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d
1244, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
The Appellant argues that the claims require the reply to comprise a digital
signature but that the reply is secured without relying on a digital signature. App.
Br. 18-19 and Reply Br. 6-8. The Appellant cites the Specification (p. 29, l. 25-p.
30, l. 8) in support of reading “secured” to mean, for example, encryption. We are
not persuaded by this argument. The Appellant has not pointed to anything in the
Specification which would lead one of ordinary skill in the art to read the term
“secured” as meaning something different than simply providing a digital
signature. The passage at p. 29, l. 25-p. 30, l. 8 of the Specification says nothing
about encryption. In fact, the passage describes the possibility of providing a
digital signature (see p. 30, ll. 3-4: “The offer matching system can provide … a
digital signature … .”). The claims do not describe the possibility of providing a
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digital signature. They require (step (c)(1)(B)) and then not require (step (c)( 2)) a
digital signature. Given these contradictory requirements, a person of ordinary skill
in the art could not determine the bounds of the claims. They are not amenable to
construction. Id.

Claims 169, 173, 179, 182, 184, 185, 187, 191, 197, 203, and 204
We will not sustain the rejection under the second ¶ of §112 as to these
claims.
The Examiner argues that the recitation “includes without limitation a
computer apparatus” in claims 169, 173, 179, 182, 184, 185, 187, 191, 197, 203,
and 204 renders these claims confusing. We disagree. To one of ordinary skill in
the art, this recitation indicates that the claimed subject matter requires the
inclusion of a computer apparatus, at a minimum. While the recitation suggests
that other objects can also be included within the scope of the claims, this does not
render the claimed subject matter indefinite. Just because a term (i.e., “without
limitation”) is broad, does not mean it is indefinite. In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904,
908 (1970).
However, we observe that the recitation at issue is enclosed within
parentheses. This sort of claim drafting is discouraged as it may be suggest that the
Appellant intended the parenthetical information to be viewed simply as
supplementary information. Here the Appellant has made it clear on the record that
the information within the parentheses is to be viewed as an express limitation to
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the claimed subject matter. See transcript of the oral hearing.4 Nevertheless, we
suggest the Appellant amend the claims to remove the parentheses.

Rejection of claims 169-176, 179, 181, and 184 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §
102(b) as being anticipated by Adams.
A. Findings of Fact
We find that the following enumerated findings are supported by at least a
preponderance of the evidence. Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (explaining the general evidentiary standard for proceedings before the
Office).
1. Claims 169-176 require a request for information to include a first
identifier associated with an offer to buy or sell a traded item.
2. Adams relates to an apparatus and method for anonymously buying and
selling securities between subscribers.

4 E.g., p. 11:
JUDGE FETTING: … to me the phrase "without limitation" reads out
potentially the computer apparatus. You are saying "includes without limitation."
So doesn't "without limitation" suggest the possibility of not including it?
MR. OPPEDAHL: No. No. "Without limitation" means other things could
be included as well. It could be a computer apparatus plus a ping-pong ball. It
could be a computer apparatus plus a paper clip. "Includes without limitation,"
meaning, yes, computer apparatus, but we're not limiting it to a computer
apparatus.
There could also be a power plug or a battery or something else.

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3. The Examiner argued that Adams describes “[a]ssociating a first offer to
buy or to sell the traded item with a first identifier (col. 10, lines 1-15 and
col. 12, lines 1-9); receiving request for information where the request
includes the first identifier (col. 10, lines 1-15 and col. 12, lines 1-9), …
.” Answer 5.
4. Col. 10, lines 1-15 of Adams reads as follows:
By way of further example, assume that a subscriber B wishes
to Reply to the Book & Broadcast of subscriber A to sell from 10,000
to 20,000 shares of X Corporation at 26½. Assume as above that the
offer by subscriber A has been given an offer number 20,652 and that
subscriber B’s reply to the offer of subscriber A is an offer to buy
15,000 shares of X Corporation at 25½. Referring to FIG. 2,
subscriber B would initiate his reply (i.e., an offer to buy X
Corporation stock) by striking key 184 in the REPLY shift. Subscriber
B next strikes keys 208 in the 1 shift, 166 in the 7 shift, and 188 in the
5 shift, thus keying the security code for the X Corporation. Next
subscriber B strikes the space bar 219 and then keys 210 in the 2 shift,
206 in the 0 shift, 188 in the 5 shift, 190 in the 6 shift and 210 in the 2
shift, thus keying in the code number given to the original offer of
subscriber A to which this Reply is directed.
5. Col. 12, lines 1-9 of Adams reads as follows:
These reference numbers enable the system to achieve its goal
of anonymity among the various subscribers as well as fairness in
effectuating the various transactions. Offers from all subscribers are
given offer reference numbers consecutively from 10,000-99,999.
This number is permanently assigned to an offer until it is removed
from the Book wherein said offer has been listed. Replies from all
subscribers are assigned reply reference numbers from 1-9,999.
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6. Claims 179 and 181 require “publishing … a data packet that comprises
the first identifier and a data item concerning the first offer, where the
data item is not the first identifier.”
7. The Examiner argues: “With respect to claims 179 and 181, Adams
further teaches publishing the information (col. 12, lines 51-62).” Answer
6.
8. Col. 12, lines 51-62 of Adams reads as follows:
Finally, the preferred embodiment of the present invention has
a bank console 234 comprising a printer/receiving unit 236. The bank
console 234 receives data from the computer 130 via line 238. This
data comprises a summary of the transaction within the system for a
given day and is sent via line 238 to the bank console 234 at the end
of each day. This enables the banking institution, wherein said bank
console 234 is located, to perform the necessary financial dealings
associated with each transaction. A remote batch data processing
facility is provided by the computer 130 which stores the data for each
transaction and prepares an appropriate summary therefrom.
9. Claim 184 requires “storing in the offer matching system an association
among a first participant and a first monitor, where the first monitor is
not the first participant.”
10. The Examiner argues: “With respect to claim 184, the claim further recite
and Adams further teaches the offer matching system monitoring the
trade (col. 2, lines 73-, col. 3, lines 1-10).” Answer 6.
11. Col. 2, line 73 to col. 3, line 10 of Adams reads as follows:
Another subprogram of the system allows the originator of the
offer, upon receipt of the response, to enter into an exchange of bids,
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offers, and other negotiating messages. Such an exchange between
two subscribers concerning a single security is called a “Colloquy”. In
a Colloquy the initiative passes automatically from one subscriber to
the other, with the system keeping track of the negotiations and
assuring that both subscribers are continuously aware of the status of
the negotiation. As is true with every subprogram within the system,
every message is fully documented by being produced simultaneously
on the printer/receiving unit of both subscribers and absolute
anonymity is maintained.

B. Principles of Law
“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the
claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art
reference.” Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628, 631
(Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 827 (1987).

C. Analysis
Claims 169-176
The Examiner found that Adams discloses all the limitations of the claimed
method. Answer 5.
The Appellant argued, in part, that “Adams fails to disclose sending and
receiving a request that includes an identifier associated with an offer.” App. Br.
20. (Emphasis original.) See also Reply Br. 10.
Claims 169-176, 179, and 181 all require a request for information with an
identifier. FF 1. The Examiner pointed to col. 10, lines 1-15 and col. 12, lines 1-9
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of Adams as showing a request including an identifier. FF 3. We have carefully
reviewed the indicated passages in Adams but fail to find an express disclosure of
a request for information with an identifier. See FF 4-5.
We note the Examiner’s explanation, in response to the Appellant’s
argument, to the effect that Adams must necessarily teach an identifier with the
request.
Appellant argues that Adams does not teach sending or receiving a
request that includes an identifier associated with an offer. The examiner
respectfully disagrees with Applicant because in Adams (col. 10, lines 4-[ ]),
the identifier “20,562” was given to Subscriber A in order to identify his or
her offer (as admitted by Appellant on page 20 of the brief) therefore
Subscriber B will have to use the same identifier to request information on
the identified offer. A counteroffer is a request or a return offer. In Adams
subscriber A is given an offer identifier to identify the offer, the same offer
identifier is used by Subscriber B to respond to the offer. Therefore Adams
satisfies the claimed limitation of receiving a request that includes an
identifier associated with the offer.
Answer 13. The Examiner appears to be making an inherency argument. However,
we are not persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art practicing Adams’ method
would necessarily require “Subscriber B … to use the same identifier to request
information on the identified offer [as that used by Subscriber A].” Id. There is no
evidence that “the same offer identifier is used by Subscriber B to respond to the
offer.” Id. Moreover, as the Appellant has argued, the question is not whether
Adams teaches an identifier associated with an offer, but whether Adams teaches a
request for information including an identifier associated with the offer, as
claimed. App. Br. 21. There must be no difference between the claimed invention
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and the reference disclosure, as viewed by a person of ordinary skill in the field of
the invention. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech Inc., 927 F.2d
1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1991). When relying upon the theory of inherency, the
Examiner must provide a basis in fact and/or technical reasoning to reasonably
support the determination that the allegedly inherent characteristic necessarily
flows from the teachings of the applied prior art. See Ex parte Levy, 17 USPQ2d
1461, 1464 (BPAI 1990). Under principles of inherency, when a reference is silent
about an asserted inherent characteristic, it must be clear that the missing
descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and
that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill. Continental Can Co. v.
Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991). We are not persuaded that
one of ordinary skill in the art reading Adams would recognize that an identifier of
the type claimed is necessarily present. Accordingly, we do not find that a prima
facie case of anticipation of the invention of these claims over Adams has been
established.

Claims 179 and 181
Claims 179 and 181 require publishing a data packet comprising a first
identifier and a data item concerning the first offer, where the data item is not the
first identifier. FF 6. Neither the disclosure in Adams that the Examiner relied upon
(FF 7), nor the Examiner’s explanation in light of it (FF 8), addresses this claimed
limitation. Accordingly, we do not find that a prima facie case of anticipation of
the invention over Adams has been established.
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Claim 184
Claim 184 requires “storing in the offer matching system an association
among a first participant and a first monitor, where the first monitor is not the first
participant.” FF 9. Neither the disclosure in Adams that the Examiner relied upon
(FF 11), nor the Examiner’s explanation in light of it (FF 10), addresses this
claimed limitation. Accordingly, we do not find that a prima facie case of
anticipation of the invention over Adams has been established.

Rejection of claims 180, 191-195, 197, 198, and 200-202 are rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Adams.
A. Principles of Law
“Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when ‘the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.’” KSR
Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1727, 1734 (2007). The question of
obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including
(1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed
subject matter and the prior art, and (3) the level of skill in the art. Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). See also KSR, 127 S.Ct. at 1734 (“While the
sequence of these questions might be reordered in any particular case, the
[Graham] factors continue to define the inquiry that controls.”) The Court in
Graham further noted that evidence of secondary considerations “might be utilized
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to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter
sought to be patented.” 383 U.S. at 18.

B. Analysis
Claim 180
Claim 180 depends on claim 179 (discussed supra). All that the Examiner
has said with regard to the unpatentability of claim 180 is: “With respect to claim
180, [sic, it] further recites well known execution information and process of an
offer.” Answer 6. Claim 180 in fact further limits claim 179 such that the data item
concerning the first offer is selected from a group consisting of thirty identifiers,
indications, times, information, price, and quantity. We do not see that the
Examiner has addressed the claimed subject matter. Nor has the Examiner
articulated an apparent reason with logical underpinning for determining the
obviousness of the claimed subject matter. We find that the Examiner has failed to
present a prima facie case of obviousness.

Claims 191-195, 197, 198, 200-202
Each of the independent claims 191 and 197 requires “publishing a first data
packet that comprises the first identifier and a first data item, the first data item
concerning” the first offer. The Examiner argues that Adams shows “publishing a
first data packet that comprises the first identifier and a first data item, the first data
item concerning the first offer (col. 12, lines 51-62)” Answer 7. We have reviewed
the passage in Adams at col. 12, lines 51-62. We do not find there any disclosure
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about publishing. Nor has the Examiner articulated an apparent reason with logical
underpinning for determining the obviousness of the claimed subject matter. We
find that the Examiner has failed to present a prima facie case of obviousness.

Rejection of claims 177 and 178 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Adams in view of Hauser.
Except for the limitation that the reply comprises a digital signature, for
which Hauser has been applied, the Examiner relies on Adams to show as known
the subject matter of claims 177 and 178. Answer 8. Claim 177 includes the
limitations of “associating a first offer to buy or to sell the traded item with a first
identifier” and “receiving request for information where the request includes the
first identifier.” Since these limitations are also included in claim 169, the
Examiner is presumably relying on the same passage in col. 10, lines 1-15 and col.
12, lines 1-9 of Adams that was relied upon to show that Adams anticipated the
subject matter of claim 169. See supra. Claim 178 is the apparatus claim
counterpart to method claim 177.
According to our review of col. 10, lines 1-15 and col. 12, lines 1-9, Adams
fails to expressly or inherently describe a request for information with an identifier.
See supra. Otherwise, the Examiner does not articulate an apparent reason with
logical underpinning in reaching a determination of the obviousness of the claimed
subject matter. Accordingly, we find that the Examiner has failed to present a
prima facie case of obviousness.

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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
We conclude the Appellant has failed to show that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 196 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter in violation of
35 U.S.C. § 101 and claims 177 and 178 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph,
as being indefinite.
We conclude that the Appellant has shown that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claims 169-171, 173-177, 179, 182-195, and 197-208 as being directed to
non-statutory subject matter in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 101; claims 169, 173, 179 ,
182, 184, 185, 187, 191, 197, 203, and 204 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, as being indefinite; claims 169-176, 179, 181, and 184 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as being anticipated by Adams; claims 180, 191-195, 197, 198, and 200-
202 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Adams and, claims 177
and 178 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Adams in view of
Hauser.

DECISION
The decisions of the Examiner to reject claim 196 as being directed to non-
statutory subject matter in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and claims 177 and 178
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite, are affirmed.
The decisions of the Examiner to reject claims 169-171, 173-177, 179,
182-195, 197-208 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter in violation of
35 U.S.C. § 101; claims 169, 173, 179 , 182, 184, 185, 187, 191, 197, 203, and 204
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under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite; claims 169-176, 179,
181, and 184 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Adams; claims 180,
191-195, 197, 198, and 200-202 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Adams and, claims 177 and 178 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Adams in view of Hauser, are reversed.
Accordingly, the decision of the Examiner to reject claims 169-208 is
affirmed-in-part.

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

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