Ex Parte Westwick et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardDec 22, 201612981741 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 22, 2016) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/981,741 12/30/2010 Alan L. Westwick SIL.0147US (D-10-600-31) 7067 21906 7590 12/27/2016 TROP, PRUNER & HU, P.C. 1616 S. VOSS ROAD, SUITE 750 HOUSTON, TX 77057-2631 EXAMINER DANG, KHANH ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2185 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/27/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): tphpto@tphm.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ALAN L. WESTWICK and THOMAS S. DAVID Appeal 2015-007997 Application 12/981,741 Technology Center 2100 Before JASON V. MORGAN, NABEEL U. KHAN, and KAMRAN JIVANI, Administrative Patent Judges. JIVANI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants1 seek our review, under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), of the Examiner’s final decisions rejecting claims 1—20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM-IN-PART. 1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Silicon Laboratories, Inc. App. Br. 3. Appeal 2015-007997 Application 12/981,741 BACKGROUND The present application generally relates to an analog interface for a processor-based device. Spec. 11. More specifically, embodiments described within the application relate to a driver selectively coupling a voltage supply to a circuit. See Spec. 13. Claim 1 is illustrative of disputed subject matter and reproduced below. 1. An apparatus comprising: an integrated circuit comprising a processor and a driver, the integrated circuit being fabricated by a process establishing a nominal maximum voltage for components of the integrated circuit, wherein the driver is adapted to selectively electrically couple a voltage higher than the nominal maximum voltage to an external terminal of the integrated circuit. Claim 3 stands rejected under 35U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite. Ans. 3—5 (withdrawing the pending indefmiteness rejection for all claims expect claim 3); Final Act. (Aug. 18, 2014) 2—3 (rejecting claims 1—11 as indefinite). Claims 1—20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Lai (US 2009/0167357 Al; July 2, 2009) and Wang (US 2006/0164054 Al; July 27, 2006). Final Act. 3—6. ANALYSIS We have considered Appellants’ arguments in the Appeal Brief and the Reply Brief, as well as the Examiner’s Answer thereto. We are unpersuaded by Appellants’ arguments for all except claims 7 and 13. 2 Appeal 2015-007997 Application 12/981,741 Therefore, we agree with, and adopt as our own, the Examiner’s findings for claims 1—6, 8—12, and 14—20 to the extent consistent with our analysis below. Indefiniteness of Claim 3 The Examiner rejects claim 3 as indefinite. Final Act. 7—8. Appellants fail to address this rejection of claim 3. See App. Br. 9—10; Reply Br. 1. Arguments not made are considered waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2014). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 3 as indefinite under 35U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. Obviousness A. Claims 1 and 12 Appellants contend the Examiner errs in rejecting independent claims 1 and 12 because “neither Lai nor Wang discloses or renders obvious an integrated circuit that is fabricated by a process that establishes a nominal maximum voltage for components of the integrated circuit.” App. Br. 11, 13. In support, Appellants add, “Lai merely mentions a ‘maximum drive strength,’ which is not a maximum nominal voltage for components of an integrated circuit” {id. at 12); and “Wang merely discloses a clamp circuit to prevent a voltage from reaching components of a voltage regulator^ which] . . . fails to disclose or render obvious . . . electrically coupling] a voltage higher than a nominal maximum voltage” {id. at 13 (emphasis omitted)). Initially, as a matter of claim construction, we find Appellants have not defined explicitly the term “nominal maximum voltage” in the claims or the Specification. We apply the broadest reasonable interpretation of claim 3 Appeal 2015-007997 Application 12/981,741 terms, consistent with the specification, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. ofSci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Where, as here, the Specification does not explicitly define a term, the term should be given its ordinary meaning. See In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Morris, 111 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). We note the Specification describes, “The integrated circuit is fabricated by a process that establishes a nominal maximum voltage for components of the integrated circuit.” Spec. 13. The Specification further describes: For a given semiconductor fabrication process, the maximum voltage is generally governed by the maximum voltage that may be applied across the terminals of the various electrical components that are available in that process without causing temporary or permanent damage to those components, and without causing a substantial degradation in their electrical performance. Id. at 122. In light of these statements in the Specification and principles of construction, we interpret the claimed “nominal maximum voltage” to encompass the maximum voltage applied to a circuit without causing temporary or permanent damage to those components, and without causing a substantial degradation in their electrical performance. Applying this construction of the claimed “nominal maximum voltage,” we are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments. Appellants fail to explain persuasively why Wang’s cited disclosure of a “step down voltage regulator . . . designed to operate over a maximum rated voltage lower than a supply voltage” would not teach or suggest claimed “nominal maximum voltage.” Wang Abst. (emphasis added); see also, Ans. 14 (citing Wang 4 Appeal 2015-007997 Application 12/981,741 Abst., || 13—14); Reply Br. 3 (addressing Lai’s only operating voltage; i.e., neglecting Wang’s maximum rated voltage). Appellants also contend the Examiner errs in rejecting claims 1 and 12 because Lai and Wang do not teach or suggest the claimed driver’s selective coupling of the integrated circuit to a voltage greater than the maximum nominal voltage. App. Br. 11—12, 13. Appellants elaborate, “it does not necessarily follow from Lai’s disclosure that its driver’s voltage is merely an Ohm’s Law function of the drive current (as contended by the Examiner’s Answer)” (Reply Br. 3); and “Wang . . . discusses protecting circuit elements from relatively high input voltages [and thus] . . . teaches away from the claimed invention” (id.). Appellants fail to address the applied combination of Lai’s and Wang’s teachings. Lai’s cited disclosure teaches selective coupling of a circuit to a greater voltage than the intended operating voltage, particularly by overriding the system’s selection of an operating mode. See, e.g., Lai Abst.; 118. Wang’s cited disclosure teaches reducing of a voltage supply if greater than a coupled circuit’s maximum operating voltage. See, e.g., Wang Abst.; 113. The Examiner’s findings are reasonable because the skilled artisan would “be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle” because the skilled artisan is “a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420-21 (2007). Appellants fail to explain persuasively why an artisan of ordinary skill would not contemplate reducing Lai’s override voltage, via Wang’s cited teachings, to the coupled circuitry’s maximum operating voltage. We note Appellants do not present adequate evidence that the resulting arrangements were “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of 5 Appeal 2015-007997 Application 12/981,741 ordinary skill in the art” or “represented an unobvious step over the prior art.” See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418-19). Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claims 1 and 12. B. Claims 2—6, 9, 10, 11, and 14 We also sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claims 2—6, 9, 10, 11, and 14, which are not separately argued (App. Br. 17) and depend from claims 1 and 12. C. Claim 16 Appellants contend the Examiner errs in rejecting independent claim 16 because, though Lai and Wang address Universal Serial Bus (USB) technology, neither discloses selective coupling of a serial bus power line to an external circuit. App. Br. 15. Appellants elaborate that Lai merely mentions USB 2.0, and Wang merely teaches USB interfaces are commonly used for coupling non-volatile memory. Id. Appellants also add, “it is entirely possible that [Lai’s] driver 122 may provide a signal to the circuit 114, without coupling a power line of the USB to the circuit 114.” Reply Br. 4. Appellants’ arguments fail to rebut the Examiner’s finding that, because Lai’s external circuit 114 is USB compliant, an artisan of ordinary skill would understand the connection 112 as being USB compliant and thus providing data and power on respective pins. Ans. 23—24. Appellants’ arguments also fail to rebut the Examiner’s finding that Wang teaches USB devices as being powered by their USB connections. Ans. 24—25; accord 6 Appeal 2015-007997 Application 12/981,741 Wang | 8 (“USB devices . . . may receive a supply in the 3 volt or 5 volt range from legacy devices.”). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claim 16. D. Claims 17—20 We also sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claims 17—20, which are not separately argued (App. Br. 17) and depend from claim 16. E. Claims 7 and 13 Appellants contend the Examiner errs in rejecting dependent claims 7 and 13 because “the Final Office Action makes a mere allegation that Wang and Lai disclose the elements of claims 7 and 13 without providing any citation or reasoning to explain why[.]” App. Br. 16. In support, Appellants add, “Although power conductor 140 of Lai is shown in Fig. 1 as being coupled to the I/O cell, neither Fig. 1 nor the [descriptive] text discloses or renders obvious selectively coupling together power supply rails[.]” Reply Br. 5. Appellants’ argument is persuasive insofar as the rejection is not sufficiently articulated. The Final Action states merely, “[I]t is clear from Lai in view of Wang and discussion above that the processor is adapted to control the driver to selectively couple together power supply rails, at least one of the power supply rails being external to the integrated circuit.” Final Act. 5. Considering the above statement in light of the Examiner’s prior reading of claim 16’s power line on Lai’s USB connection 112 (between the driver 120 and external circuit 114), the Final Action indicates that the Examiner reads claim 7’s and 13 ’s coupling of power supply rails on Lai’s 7 Appeal 2015-007997 Application 12/981,741 driver 120 coupling of the IC power supply 140 (asserted first rail) and connection 112 (asserted second rail). The Answer conversely indicates, however, that the Examiner reads claim 7’s and 13’s power supply rails respectively on Lai’s IC voltage supply 104 and ground 106 (forming the IC power supply 140)—not respectively on the IC power supply 140 and connection 112. Ans. 25 (citing Lai 21—22). The apparent change in the rejection does not, here, in itself necessitate a reversal. See 37 C.L.R. § 41.40(a) (“failure of appellant to [petition against new examiner findings] will constitute a waiver of any arguments that a rejection must be designated as a new ground of rejection.”). The apparent change, however, does necessitate an explanation of how the Examiner perceives the IC voltage supply 104 and ground 106 to be selectively coupled. Because no such explanation is provided, we are unable to discern the rationale underpinning the Examiner’s finding that claim 7’s and 13’s coupling of power supply rails is taught or suggested by the applied prior art. See KSR at 418 (explaining requirement of “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”); In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining notice requirement for rejections). Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claims 7 and 13. F. Claims 8 and 15 Appellants contend the Examiner errs in rejecting dependent claims 8 and 15 because, “[although Lai and Wang generally mention USB interfaces (see discussion of claim 16 above), neither reference discloses or renders obvious the expressly-recited elements of claims 8 and 15 such as 8 Appeal 2015-007997 Application 12/981,741 managing a distribution of power derived from a power line of a Universal Serial Bus by controlling a driver.” App. Br. 17. In support, Appellants add, “Lai merely mentions (Lai, para. no. [0003]) that an I/O cell must meet ‘industry standards, such as energy related to USB.’. . . Wang ... is not being relied by the Examiner’s Answer for these elements.” Reply Br. 6. Appellants’ arguments are unpersuasive because they do not address the Examiner’s finding that the Lai’s driver 120 providing first and second modes of power to the external circuit 114 meets the claim limitation “manage [a] distribution of power.” Ans. 26. A mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements are not found in the prior art is insufficient to show error. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(iv)(2014); In reLovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claims 8 and 15. DECISION The Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 112 rejection of claim 3 is affirmed. The Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claims 1—6, 8—12, and 14—20 is affirmed. The Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claims 7 and 13 is reversed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED-IN—PART 9 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation