Ex Parte Westermann

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 1, 2016

12277272 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 1, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
12/277,272 11124/2008
23373 7590 08/03/2016
SUGHRUE MION, PLLC
2100 PENNSYLVANIA A VENUE, N.W.
SUITE 800
WASHINGTON, DC 20037
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Soren Erik Westermann
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
Ql 11046 5722
EXAMINER
ETESAM, AMIR HOS SEIN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2655
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/03/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
PPROCESSING@SUGHRUE.COM
sughrue@sughrue.com
USPTO@sughrue.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SOREN ERIK WESTERMANN
Appeal2015-002374
Application 12/277 ,272
Technology Center 2600
Before ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, MIRIAM L. QUINN, and
STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges.
AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant 1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final
rejection of claims 1-15, i.e., all pending claims. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Widex A/S.
App. Br. 2.
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Application 12/277,272
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Invention
According to the Specification, the "invention relates generally to
hearing aids and to methods of manufacturing hearing aids." Spec. 1: 10-
11. 2 More particularly, the invention concerns customized housings or
shells for hearing-aid units located behind the ear ("BTE"). Spec. 1: 11-13,
Abstract.
Representative Claim
Independent claim 1 exemplifies the subject matter of the claims
under consideration and reads as follows, with italics identifying the
limitations at issue:
1. A hearing aid, comprising
an ear piece,
an acoustic output transducer, and
a custom housing, the custom housing including a battery
compartment, an outlet, an amplifier assembly, a microphone
and a shell, the shell having a first part customized to fit the
contour of the cleft between a pinna and the scull [sic] of an
individual, a second part, and a projection, wherein said first
part and said second part are manufactured integrally by a
rapid prototyping process, and wherein said projection is
shaped as a hook and accommodates an outlet.
App. Br. 15 (Claims App.).
2 This decision employs the following abbreviations: "Spec." for the
Specification, filed November 24, 2008; "Final Act." for the Final Office
Action, mailed April 12, 2013; "App. Br." for the Appeal Brief, filed
May 27, 2014; "Ans." for the Examiner's Answer, mailed October 17, 2014;
and "Reply Br." for the Reply Brief, filed December 17, 2014.
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The Prior Art Supporting the Rejections on Appeal
As evidence of unpatentability, the Examiner relies on the following
prior art:
Bauml et al.
("Bauml")
Bailey
Meyer et al.
("Meyer")
Harrison et al.
("Harrison")
Espersen et al.
("Espersen")
von Dombrowski et al.
("Dombrowski")
US 2006/0177081 Al Aug. 10, 2006
US 7,103,192 B2 Sept. 5, 2006
US 7,164,775 B2 Jan. 16, 2007
US 7,167,572 Bl Jan. 23, 2007
US 7,720,244 B2 May 18, 2010
(filed Mar. 14, 2006)
US 7,844,065 B2 Nov. 30, 2010
(filed Jan. 14, 2005)
The Rejections on Appeal
Claims 1, 5-8, 10-12, and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Dombrowski. Final Act. 4--6, 9-11, 13-15; App. Br. 6;
Ans. 2--4, 7-10, 11-13.
Claims 2 and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Dombrowski in view of Bailey. Final Act. 7, 13;
App. Br. 6; Ans. 5, 11.
Claim 3 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Dombrowski in view of Meyer. Final Act. 7-8; App. Br. 6; Ans. 5---6.
Claim 4 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Dombrowski in view of Harrison. Final Act. 8; App. Br. 6; Ans. 6.
Claim 9 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Dombrowski in view ofEspersen. Final Act. 8-9; App. Br. 6; Ans. 6-7.
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Claim 13 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Dombrowski in view of Bauml. Final Act. 12-13; App. Br. 6;
Ans. 10-11.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the rejections of the pending claims in light of
Appellant's arguments that the Examiner erred. In doing so, we have
evaluated only the arguments that Appellant actually makes on appeal.
The Rejections of Claims 1-5, 7, 9-11,
and 14-15 Under 35 US.C. § 103(a)
Each independent claim requires (1) that a hearing-aid housing or
shell include two parts, (2) that the first part is "customized to fit" between
an individual's ear and skull, and (3) that the first and second parts are
manufactured or prepared by "rapid prototyping." App. Br. 15-18 (Claims
App.).
The "Customized to Fit" Limitation
For the "customized to fit" limitation, Appellant argues that
(1) Dombrowski does not suggest customizing a BTE housing or shell and
(2) the Examiner improperly interprets the language "customized to fit" as
covering a BTE component in Dombrowski, i.e., component 401, that
Dombrowski did not customize for a particular user's ear. App. Br. 6-7, 10;
see Reply Br. 4---6.
For the "customized to fit" limitation, the Examiner does not rely
solely on the reasoning that component 401 satisfies that limitation. The
Examiner also relies on Dombrowski's teaching of customizing a hearing-
aid part that could cause discomfort, e.g., an in-the-ear-canal (or in-canal)
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portion, to find that it would have been obvious to make any part of the
hearing aid "more comfortable for the user." Final Act. 3--4.
In particular, the Examiner finds that Dombrowski:
discloses a custom fit ear mold that is fabricated using a rapid
prototyping technology, in which the contours of the user's ear
canal are scanned, and the scan data is used either directly or
indirectly to replicate the ear canal contours of that user into the
custom fit ear mold.
Final Act. 5; Ans. 3, 8, 12; see Dombrowski 6:4--8. The Examiner further
finds that Dombrowski discusses user comfort "multiple times." Ans. 14;
see, e.g., Dombrowski 3: 15-25, 10:31-36, 26:53-55.
The Examiner reasons that ( 1) users must wear hearing aids for long
periods, (2) accounting for user comfort was "practiced in the art and well
known," and (3) it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill at
the time of the invention to attempt to "provide a comfortable device" based
on a need for user comfort. Ans. 14. Accordingly, the Examiner finds that
Dombrowski' s disclosure concerning "taking [a] measurement and utilizing
a method, rapid prototyping, to customize a portion of a hearing aid" extends
to any hearing-aid part that could cause discomfort. Ans. 14--15.
We agree with the Examiner that Dombrowski teaches or suggests
customizing any hearing-aid part that could cause discomfort, including
BTE housings or shells.
Appellant advances several arguments to the contrary. App. Br. 6-10;
Reply Br. 4--8. For the reasons explained below, however, we do not
consider any of those arguments persuasive.
Appellant argues that ( 1) Dombrowski discloses customizing using
rapid prototyping for only an in-the-ear-canal (or in-canal) unit, namely, the
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"custom fit ear mold" identified by the Examiner, and (2) customizing using
rapid prototyping for in-canal units occurred for reasons that do not apply to
BTE units. App. Br. 7-9; Reply Br. 7-8.
More particularly, Appellant argues that in-canal units provide a "very
confined and irregular space" for components and customizing using rapid
prototyping facilitates optimal component arrangement. App. Br. 8; see
Reply Br. 7. According to Appellant, component arrangement in BTE units
does not involve similar space constraints because they allow "leeway in at
least one dimension" and can be sized "to accommodate the components
without much consequence." App. Br. 8; Reply Br. 7. According to
Appellant, "a less-than-optimal arrangement of components is easily
addressed by simply making the BTE unit very slightly bigger, and no one
notices." App. Br. 8-9; see id. at 10. Instead, Appellant argues that
manufacturing-cost considerations "create a strong incentive" for using
"a standard shape" for BTE units. Id. at 8.
Appellant simply presents attorney argument. Attorney argument
"cannot take the place of evidence." In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405
(CCPA 1974). Thus, we are not persuaded by Appellant's argument.
Furthermore, even if there were evidence of a strong incentive for using a
standard shape, its existence would not negate Dombrowski' s express
teachings of a motivation to customize any part of the hearing aid where
comfort is an issue, which is the case with respect to the BTE unit. See
Winner Int 'l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir.
2000) ("The fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another
benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the
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disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the
benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.").
Appellant asserts without support that an in-the-ear-canal unit must
closely match the shape of the user's ear canal to fit tightly and provide
sound isolation, thus preventing sound leakage that could cause feedback
problems. App. Br. 9; see Reply Br. 8. Appellant also asserts without
support that feedback "is a non-issue" for BTE units and that fit
imperfections for BTE units "have not been seen as a significant problem."
App. Br. 9; see Reply Br. 8. We are not persuaded because Appellant's
argument is not supported by objective evidence regarding sound isolation,
leakage, and feedback. App. Br. 9; see Reply Br. 8. See In re Geisler,
116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[a]n assertion of what seems to
follow from common experience is just attorney argument and not the kind
of factual evidence that is required to rebut a prima facie case of
obviousness"). Additionally, as stated above, even if there were evidence of
reasons for customizing the in-canal part that differ from the reasons for
customizing a BTE unit for user comfort, that evidence does not nullify
Dombrowski's teachings as providing a reason to customize a BTE unit. See
Winner Int'! Royalty Corp., 202 F.3d at 1349 n.8.
Appellant argues that Dombrowski "went to the trouble of using it
[rapid prototyping] for only the in-canal component while not using it for
the BTE unit," and therefore Dombrowski "is consistent" with prior-art
approaches. App. Br. 9. Appellant's argument is not persuasive as
Dombrowski's teachings have not been shown to disparage customization of
the BTE unit or otherwise discourage a person of ordinary skill in the art
from pursuing that path.
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Appellant additionally argues that despite knowledge of rapid
prototyping "for over a decade," no one suggested using rapid prototyping
for customizing BTE housings or shells. App. Br. 9. Appellant similarly
argues that "the fact that rapid prototyping has been known for a long time,"
but was not "used for other parts of a hearing aid," such as BTE housings or
shells, "by itself is evidence of the non-obviousness of using rapid
prototyping to form a BTE." Reply Br. 6; see id. at 8. The mere passage of
time, however, is not evidence of nonobviousness. See, e.g., Iron Grip
Barbell Co. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Appellant further argues that Dombrowski does not (1) "explicitly"
discuss "customizing the BTE unit" by "using rapid prototyping for the BTE
unit," or (2) suggest that rapid prototyping "might be an option" for
customizing the BTE unit. App. Br. 1 O; Reply Br. 8. The
obviousness/nonobviousness analysis, however, "need not seek out precise
teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim"
because the analysis "can take account of the inferences and creative steps
that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ." KSR Int 'l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Thus, we consider Appellant's
arguments unpersuasive.
Accordingly, Appellant's arguments have not persuaded us that the
Examiner erred in finding that Dombrowski teaches or suggests the
"customized to fit" limitation.
The "Rapid Prototyping" Limitation
For the "rapid prototyping" limitation, Appellant argues that
Dombrowski does not suggest using rapid prototyping to make a BTE
housing or shell. App. Br. 7-10; see Reply Br. 6-8.
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As discussed above, however, the Examiner finds that Dombrowski's
disclosure concerning "taking [a] measurement and utilizing a method, rapid
prototyping, to customize a portion of a hearing aid" extends to any hearing-
aid part that could cause discomfort. Ans. 14--15. That finding addresses
the "rapid prototyping" limitation as well as the "customized to fit"
limitation.
For the "rapid prototyping" limitation, Appellant also argues that even
if the prior art teaches customizing BTE units, customization can occur
without rapid prototyping. App. Br. 10. Without citing any evidentiary
support, Appellant states that there are "less expensive and typically more
effective ways of achieving comfort" than through rapid prototyping. Reply
Br. 7. As noted above, attorney argument "cannot take the place of
evidence." Pearson, 494 F .2d at 1405.
However, the "mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not
constitute a teaching away from any of these alternatives because such
disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution
claimed." In re Fulton, 391F.3d1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also In re
Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ('just because better
alternatives exist in the prior art does not mean that an inferior combination
is inapt for obviousness purposes"). That customization can occur without
rapid prototyping does not diminish Dombrowski's disclosure of rapid
prototyping as one customization alternative. See Winner Int 'l Royalty
Corp., 202 F.3d at 1349 n.8.
In addition, Appellant asserts that "[t]he use of rapid prototyping for
an in-canal component has not been primarily driven by comfort
considerations." App. Br. 8. But "any need or problem known in the field
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of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide
a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed." KSR, 550 U.S.
at 420. Here, Appellant admits that rapid prototyping's use for
customization purposes resulted at least in part from comfort considerations.
App. Br. 8.
Accordingly, Appellant has not demonstrated error in the Examiner's
finding that Dombrowski teaches or suggests the "rapid prototyping"
limitation.
Summary for Independent Claims 1, 10, and 15
For the reasons discussed above, Appellant's arguments have not
persuaded us that the Examiner erred in finding that Dombrowski teaches or
suggests (1) customizing any hearing-aid part that could cause discomfort
and (2) using rapid prototyping for making BTE housings or shells. As a
result, Appellant has not established error in the obviousness rejection of
independent claims 1, 10, and 15 based on Dombrowski. Hence, we sustain
the rejection.
Dependent Claims 2-5, 7, 9, 11, and 14
Claims 2-5, 7, and 9 depend directly or indirectly from claim 1, and
claims 11 and 14 depend directly from claim 10. App. Br. 15-18 (Claims
App.). For dependent claims 2--4, 9, and 14, Appellant does not articulate
any patentability arguments beyond the arguments for the independent
claims and does not address Bailey, Meyer, Harrison, or Espersen. App.
Br. 6-10; Reply Br. 4--8. Because Appellant does not argue the claims
separately, they stand or fall together. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
Hence, we sustain the obviousness rejections of claims 2--4, 9, and 14.
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For dependent claims 5, 7, and 11, Appellant makes the same
arguments proffered for independent claims 1 and 10, i.e., that Dombrowski
fails to teach or suggest using rapid prototyping to customize BTE housings
or shells. App. Br. 10-11, 12. As explained above, Appellant's arguments
for the independent claims have not persuaded us that the Examiner erred in
rejecting them for obviousness based on Dombrowski. Hence, we sustain
the obviousness rejection of claims 5, 7, and 11.
The Rejections of Claims 6 and 12 Under 35 US.C. § 103(a)
Claim 6 depends from claim 1, and further requires a "housing fixture
... adapted to hold a telecoil in an orientation selected with consideration to
the orientation of the hearing aid as used." App. Br. 16 (Claims App.).
Claim 12 depends from claim 10, and further requires "selecting a telecoil"
and "deciding the orientation of the telecoil taking into account the
orientation of the hearing aid as used." Id. at 1 7.
The Examiner finds that Dombrowski "discloses that a housing fixture
is adapted to hold a telecoil." Final Act. 6, 11; Ans. 4, 10. The Examiner
relies on design preferences or choices and further finds that a person of
ordinary skill would have been motivated to appropriately orient hearing-aid
components, like a telecoil, "to accommodate different shapes, sizes, [and]
design requirements." Final Act. 6, 12; Ans. 4, 10, 15.
Appellant does not challenge the finding that Dombrowski "discloses
that a housing fixture is adapted to hold a telecoil." App. Br. 11-12; Reply
Br. 8. Rather, Appellant argues that (1) "the examiner has not suggested
what design preferences would be impacted" by telecoil positioning and
(2) no reference supports "the alleged obviousness of these design changes."
App. Br. 11. But design choices that do not "result in a difference in
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function or give unexpected results ... are no more than obvious variations
consistent with the principles known in that art." In re Rice, 341 F.2d 309,
314 (CCPA 1965). Appellant does not argue that appropriately orienting a
telecoil results in a difference in function or gives unexpected results. App.
Br. 11-12; Reply Br. 8. "If a person of ordinary skill can implement a
predictable variation,§ 103 likely bars its patentability." KSR, 550 U.S.
at 417. We are persuaded that the Examiner has articulated a reasonable
rationale of considering different shapes, sizes, and design requirements in
how to orient a telecoil. Final Act. 6, 12; Ans. 4, 10, 15.
Appellant notes that the Specification explains the importance of
appropriate telecoil orientation, i.e., "to properly pick up the magnetic
signal," and that telecoil orientation must not deviate "more than 30 degrees,
[and] preferably not more than 20 degrees from the vertical direction." App.
Br. 11; Spec. 11 :3-6. But claims 6 and 12 do not specify any particular
telecoil orientation or operating parameter dictating that orientation.
Accordingly, Appellant's arguments for claims 6 and 12 have not
persuaded us that the Examiner erred in rejecting those claims for
obviousness based on Dombrowski. Hence, we sustain the obviousness
rejection of claims 6 and 12.
The Rejection of Claim 13 Under 35 USC§ 103(a)
Claim 13 depends from claim 10, and further requires "selecting an
antenna" and "deciding the orientation of the antenna taking into account the
orientation of the hearing aid as used." App. Br. 18 (Claims App.).
The Examiner finds that Bauml "discloses a hearing aid using a
wireless communication module" including "an antenna to perform wireless
communication." Final Act. 12; Ans. 10. As with claims 6 and 12, the
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Examiner relies on design preferences or choices when determining that it
would have been obvious for a person of ordinary skill to arrange "the
antenna in an orientation selected with consideration to the orientation of the
hearing aid." Final Act. 12-13; Ans. 11. The Examiner's finding that a
person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to appropriately orient
hearing-aid components "to accommodate different shapes, sizes, [and]
design requirements" applies to claim 13 as well as claims 6 and 12.
Ans. 4, 15. We agree with the Examiner's finding.
Appellant does not challenge the finding that Bauml "discloses a
hearing aid using a wireless communication module" including "an antenna
to perform wireless communication." App. Br. 12; Reply Br. 8. Rather,
Appellant argues that Bauml does not disclose or suggest an antenna
orientation "selected with consideration to the orientation of the hearing
aid." App. Br. 12; see Reply Br. 8. As with the telecoil according to claims
6 and 12, however, Appellant does not argue that appropriately orienting an
antenna results in a difference in function or gives unexpected results. App.
Br. 12; Reply Br. 8. We are persuaded that the Examiner has stated a
reasonable rationale of considering different shapes, sizes, and design
requirements in selecting an orientation of the antenna. See Ans. 15
("Design preferences to a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would be that
orientation of the various devices and components of hearing aids could be
modified based on the design preferences of the user or the designer to
accommodate different shapes, sizes, design requirements, etc."); see
also id. at 4.
Appellant asserts that the Specification discusses "[ v ]ery specific
considerations [that] apply to the orientation of the antennae .... " App.
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Br. 12. But the Specification states only that "[i]n case of an antenna for
communicating with a remote control or, in case of a binaural fit, an antenna
for communicating with the other hearing aid, other constraints may
prevail." Spec. 11 :6-8. So in contrast to the disclosure of a preferred
telecoil orientation in numerical terms, the Specification refers generally to
"other constraints [that] may prevail" for antenna orientation.
Consequently, Appellant's arguments regarding claim 13 have not
persuaded us that the Examiner erred in rejecting it for obviousness based on
Dombrowski and Bauml. Hence, we sustain the obviousness rejection of
claim 13.
The Rejection of Claim 8 Under 35 USC§ 103(a)
Claim 8 depends from claim 1, and further requires that the "housing
defines an entrance opening with [an] engagement structure at an edge" and
that the "engagement structure" is "adapted for carrying said amplifier
assembly." App. Br. 16 (Claims App.).
The Examiner applies the broadest reasonable interpretation to the
phrase "entrance opening with [an] engagement structure at an edge" and
finds that it reads on the "part of the hearing aid shell disclosed in
[Dombrowski] figure 24 close to the opening" that "holds any component of
the electronic circuitry of the hearing aid device." Ans. 15; see id. at 4; see
also Final Act. 6. The Examiner admits, however, that Dombrowski's
"engagement structure at an edge" does not carry an amplifier assembly.
Final Act. 6; Ans. 5, 15. To address that deficiency, the Examiner
determines that a person of ordinary skill could "modify the location of the
amplifier or any other part of the circuitry" to position the component "close
[to] or away" from the housing's opening based on "design preferences."
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Ans. 15. In addition, the Examiner's finding that a person of ordinary skill
would have been motivated to appropriately orient hearing-aid components
"to accommodate different shapes, sizes, [and] design requirements" applies
to claim 8 as well as claims 6 and 12. Ans. 4, 15.
Appellant disputes that Dombrowski discloses an "entrance opening
with [an] engagement structure at an edge," asserting that "the cited art
simply does not teach the engagement structure claimed .... " App. Br. 12;
Reply Br. 8.
We agree with the Examiner that Dombrowski discloses an "entrance
opening with [an] engagement structure at an edge." In particular,
Dombrowski Figure 24 depicts a BTE housing having a cavity or entrance
opening 203 with electrical contacts 205 mounted on and engaged with two
sides of the opening. Dombrowski 25: 19--30, Fig. 24.
Appellant criticizes the Examiner for ignoring the requirement that the
engagement structure carry an amplifier assembly. App. Br. 11. As noted
above, however, the Examiner admits that Dombrowski's engagement
structure does not carry an amplifier assembly. Final Act. 6; Ans. 5, 15. As
also noted above, the Examiner addresses that deficiency by determining
that a person of ordinary skill could appropriately position hearing-aid
components based on "design preferences." Ans. 15.
In response, Appellant asserts that "the examiner simply dismiss[ es]
as a 'design preference' features that cannot be found in the prior art."
Reply Br. 8. As with the telecoil according to claims 6 and 12 and the
antenna according to claim 13, however, Appellant does not argue that
appropriately positioning an amplifier assembly results in a difference in
function or gives unexpected results. App. Br. 11; Reply Br. 8. We also
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consider Appellant's argument unpersuasive because it does not refute the
Examiner's finding that a person of ordinary skill in the art would be
motivated to position hearing-aid components, such as an amplifier
assembly, close to or away from a BTE housing's opening based on "design
preferences." See Ans. 15 ("Design preferences to a [person of ordinary
skill in the art] would be that orientation of the various devices and
components of hearing aids could be modified based on the design
preferences of the user or the designer to accommodate different shapes,
sizes, design requirements, etc."); see also id. at 4.
Consequently, Appellant's arguments regarding claim 8 have not
persuaded us that the Examiner erred in rejecting it for obviousness based on
Dombrowski. Hence, we sustain the obviousness rejection of claim 8.
DECISION
We affirm the rejections of claims 1-15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 3 7 C.F .R. § 1.13 6( a). See 3 7 C.F .R.
§ 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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