Ex Parte Werner

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 16, 2017

12862821 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 16, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/862,821 08/25/2010 Wolfgang Werner 1012-0143/2008P52052
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4712
57579 7590 03/20/2017
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EXAMINER
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2814
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/20/2017 ELECTRONIC
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PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte WOLFGANG WERNER
Appeal 2015-006376
Application 12/862,821
Technology Center 2800
Before KAREN M. HASTINGS, JAMES C. HOUSEL, and
CHRISTOPHER C. KENNEDY, Administrative Patent Judges.
HOUSEL, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision finally rejecting claims 1—8, 11, 12, 14, and 17—20
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We have jurisdiction over the appeal under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.2
1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is INFINEON
TECHNOLOGIES AG. Appeal Br. 2.
2 Our decision refers to the Specification (Spec.) filed August 25, 2010, the
Examiner’s Final Office Action delivered April 10, 2014, Appellant’s
Appeal Brief (Appeal Br.) filed November 12, 2014, the Examiner’s Answer
(Ans.) delivered April 21, 2015, and Appellant’s Reply Brief (Reply Br.)
filed June 15, 2015.
Appeal 2015-006376
Application 12/862,821
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The invention relates to a semiconductor component having a
dielectric layer stack above a semiconductor body, a first electrically
conductive layer arranged above the stack, and a second electrically
conductive layer arranged between adjacent dielectric layers in the stack.
Spec. 3 and 4. Appellant discloses that the adjacent dielectric layers have
different dielectric properties. Id. at 14. In addition, Appellant provides a
voltage divider which is switched between the first conductive layer and the
semiconductor body, whereas the second conductive layer is electrically
connected only to this voltage divider. Id.
Independent claim 1, reproduced below from the Claims Appendix to
the Appeal Brief, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal. The
limitation at issue is italicized.
1. A semiconductor component, comprising:
a semiconductor body;
a first electrically conductive layer adjacent the
semiconductor body;
a first dielectric layer located between the semiconductor
body and the first electrically conductive layer and having first
dielectric properties;
a second dielectric layer located between the
semiconductor body and the first electrically conductive layer
and having second dielectric properties different from the first
dielectric properties;
a second electrically conductive layer arranged between
the first dielectric layer and the second dielectric layer; and
a voltage divider, connected to the semiconductor body,
the first electrically conductive layer and the second electrically
conductive layer, wherein the second electrically conductive
layer is connected to the voltage divider by an electrically
conductive connection that is constant in all operating states of
the semiconductor component.
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Appeal 2015-006376
Application 12/862,821
Claims 19 and 20 are the remaining pending independent claims on
appeal. Claim 19 recites that the second electrically conductive layer
dissipates charges penetrating through the dielectric layers via an electrically
conductive connection that “is fixed regardless of the operating state of the
semiconductor component.” Claim 20 recites that the voltage divider has a
third node that is “always connected to the second electrically conductive
layer regardless of the operating state of the semiconductor component.”
ANALYSIS
The dispositive issue before us on appeal is whether Appellant has
identified reversible error in the Examiner’s finding that Rueckes teaches a
second conductive layer connected to the voltage divider by an electrically
conductive connection that is “constant,” “fixed,” or “always connected” in
all operating states of the semiconductor component. In re Jung, 637 F.3d
1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[I]t has long been the Board’s practice to
require an applicant to identity the alleged error in the examiner’s
rejections.” (citation omitted)). For the reasons given by Appellant in the
Appeal and Reply Briefs, we answer this question in the affirmative and,
therefore, will not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection.
The Examiner finds, in relevant part, that Rueckes teaches a
semiconductor component having a second conductive layer 23 electrically
connected to the voltage divider by a connection that is constant in all
operating states of the component. Ans. 3, 5—6 (and is fixed and always
connected regardless of the operating state of the component), citing
3 Throughout this Decision, for clarity, we present labels to elements in
figures in bold font, regardless of their presentation in the original document.
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Appeal 2015-006376
Application 12/862,821
Rueckes 8:67—9:3. In particular, the Examiner finds that Rueckes shows a
semiconductor component that has been programmed to the OFF-state such
that the second conductive layer 2 is always connected to the voltage divider
via the capacitive coupling C12 between the first and second conductive
layers 1, 2 and capacitive coupling C23 between the second conductive layer
and the semiconductor body 3. Ans. 6, citing to Rueckes, Figs. 2 and 6A.
The Examiner further finds that Rueckes’ component is a one-time
programmable (OTP) memory which cannot be reprogrammed once
programmed, i.e., will remain OFF for all operating states of the device.
Ans. 8—9, citing Rueckes 9:44-46 and 11:34—35. Thus, the Examiner finds
that Rueckes’ component shown in Figure 6A that has been programmed
provides a constant electrical connection between the second conductive
layer and the voltage divider. Ans. 9.
Appellant contends that Rueckes fails to teach an electrical connection
between the second conductive layer 2 and voltage divider C12, C23 that is
“constant/fixed/always connected in every operating state of Rueckes’
device.” Appeal Br. 7. In particular, Appellant argues that Rueckes’ open
or OFF-state and closed or ON-state for the device represent two different
operating states of the device. Id. In addition, Appellant urges that the
distinction the Examiner makes between Rueckes’ programming states and
operating states is illusory because Rueckes describes the programming of
the device as an operation. Id. at 8 and 13, citing Rueckes 8:4—8. Appellant
proffers a definition of operating state as “a particular condition that a device
is functioning at a specific time.” Appeal Br. 12. Appellant also urges that
the operating states of a switching device, as in Rueckes, include the on and
off states. Because claim 1 requires an electrical connection that is
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Appeal 2015-006376
Application 12/862,821
constant/fixed/always connected regardless of the operating state of the
device, Appellant argues that claim 1 does not encompass a switching
device, i.e., does not include the OTP device of Rueckes. Id. at 13.
Appellant directs our attention to extrinsic evidence, i.e., two U.S. patents
which are not included in the Appeal Brief, confirming that the operating
state of an OTP device encompasses the various programming states of the
device. Id. at 8 and 14.
Further, Appellant argues that Rueckes’ device, when in the OFF-
state, can always be operated/programmed into the ON-state. Id. at 8 and
15. Yet, it is only when the device is in the OFF-state that the second
conductive layer is connected to the voltage divider C12, C23. Id. In this
regard, Appellant asserts that when Rueckes’ device is programmed to the
ON-state, the capacitor C12 is shorted out, thereby creating a permanent
direct connection between control gate 1 and floating gate 2. Id. at 10.
Further, because the electrical connection between Rueckes’ second
conductive layer 2 and voltage divider C12, C23 can be changed via
programming, Appellant argues Rueckes fails to teach that this connection is
constant/fixed/always connected. Id. at 10-11.
After review of the opposing positions articulated by Appellant and
the Examiner, the applied prior art, and Appellant’s claims and Specification
disclosures, we determine that the Appellant’s arguments are sufficient to
identify reversible error in the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 1.
In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Though the Examiner
finds that Rueckes teaches that the semiconductor component once
programmed cannot be reprogrammed, regardless of whether the device is in
the OFF-state or the ON-state, this finding is not adequately supported in the
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Appeal 2015-006376
Application 12/862,821
record. Specifically, the Examiner directs attention to Rueckes, column 11,
lines 34 and 35, for support for this finding. However, this portion of
Rueckes, which states that “[t]his bit has been programmed once; as an OTP
cell, it cannot be reprogrammed,” refers to the device after it has been
programmed to the ON-state. The Examiner does not explain how this
portion, or any other teaching in Rueckes, refers to the OFF-state as being
permanently set into that state and cannot be reprogrammed.
In addition, we credit Appellant’s interpretation of “operating states”
when considered in conjunction with Rueckes OTP switching device. We
note that, though the Examiner disagrees with Appellant’s characterization
of Rueckes’ programming states as operating states, the Examiner does not
provide a contrary meaning of “operating state,” nor does the Examiner
dispute that Rueckes’ OTP is a switching device. Therefore, as Appellant
asserts, “operating state” means “a particular condition that a device is
functioning at a specific time.” For Rueckes’ OTP device, all operating
states would include any condition that the device is functioning at any time.
This interpretation is consistent with Appellant’s Specification and Figures
which teach a “constant/fixed/always connected” connection between
second conductive layer 50 and voltage divider 60 regardless of the
operating state of the device. See Figs. 1—5, Spec. 4, 5, 34, and 35.
Applying the above claim interpretation to Rueckes, it is clear that Rueckes
only maintains a connection between floating gate 2 and capacitors C12, C23
when the device is in the OFF-state, but not in the ON-state. Therefore, the
finding that Rueckes teaches a connection between a second conductive
layer and a voltage divider that is constant, fixed, or always connected
regardless of the operating state of the device is in error.
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Appeal 2015-006376
Application 12/862,821
The Examiner does not rely on Cheung to remedy this deficiency in
Rueckes, nor does the Examiner find that Cheung teaches or suggests a
connection between a second conductive layer in a dielectric stack and a
voltage divider that is constant, fixed, or always connected regardless of the
operating state of the device. Absent such a teaching, the Examiner’s
obviousness conclusion, which relies on the Examiner’s erroneous finding
that Rueckes’ connection between floating gate 2 and capacitors Cu, C23
being constant, fixed, or always connected regardless of the operating state
of the device, lacks sufficient rational underpinning. In re Kahn, 441 F.3d
977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be
sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some
articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal
conclusion of obviousness.” (citations omitted)), quoted with approval in
KSRInt’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). We will not sustain
the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1—8, 11, 12, 14, and 17—20 over the
combination of Rueckes in view of Cheung.
DECISION
Upon consideration of the record, and for the reasons given above and
in the Appeal and Reply Briefs, the decision of the Examiner rejecting
claims 1—8, 11, 12, 14, and 17—20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Rueckes in view of Cheung is reversed.
REVERSED
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