Ex Parte WebberDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJun 30, 201713299271 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 30, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/299,271 11/17/2011 Paul Webber 6583-145 2025 111285 7590 Sheridan Ross P.C. 1560 Broadway Suite 1200 Denver, CO 80202 07/05/2017 EXAMINER DRAGOESCU, CLAUDIA B ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2141 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/05/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): edocket @ sheridanross .com flexpatents-sr@ sheridanross.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte PAUL WEBBER Appeal 2016-001430 Application 13/299,2711 Technology Center 2100 Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, JOSEPH P. LENTIVECH, and MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1—20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. Technology The application relates to a device with two screens that can change “from a single screen operating mode to a multiple screen operating mode.” Spec. Abstract. Illustrative Claim Claim 1 is illustrative and reproduced below with the limitations at issue emphasized: 1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Z124. App. Br. 2. Appeal 2016-001430 Application 13/299,271 1. A method, comprising: providing a device having at least first and second screens, physically connected by a hinge, wherein, in an open configuration, the first and second screens face in a similar direction, wherein, in a closed configuration, the first and second screens are back-to-back in different planes and face in an opposite direction; in a first display mode in the closed configuration, presenting a first user interface for an email application on a first screen, wherein the first display mode includes displaying content in a landscape orientation and displaying content on the first screen; receiving input from a user, wherein the input includes a change in the number of screens that are in view of the user by opening the device into the open configuration; in response to opening the device into the open configuration, determining a second display mode in the open configuration, wherein the second display mode includes displaying content in a landscape orientation and displaying content on at least the first and second screen; in response to the change from the closed configuration to the open configuration that changes the number of screens that are in view of the user and the determination that the device is in a second display mode, presenting the first user interface on a first screen; in response to the change from the closed configuration to the open configuration that changes the number of screens that are in view of the user and the determination that the device is in a second display mode, presenting a second user interface on a second screen, wherein the second user interface is also associated with the email application, and wherein the second user interface providing content different from and not previously provided in the first user interface. Rejection Claims 1—20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Ohki et al. (US 2007/0285401 Al; Dec. 13, 2007), 2 Appeal 2016-001430 Application 13/299,271 Chiang et al. (US 2010/0081475 Al; Apr. 1, 2010), and Freund (US 2010/0060587 Al; Mar. 11, 2010). Final Act. 2-3. ISSUES 1. Did the Examiner err in finding the combination of Ohki and Chiang teaches or suggests the following limitation recited in claim 1: in response to the change from the closed configuration to the open configuration that changes the number of screens that are in view of the user and the determination that the device is in a second display mode, presenting a second user interface on a second screen, wherein the second user interface is also associated with the email application, and wherein the second user interface providing content different from and not previously provided in the first user interface? 2. Did the Examiner err by improperly combining the teachings and suggestions of Ohki and Chiang? ANALYSIS Claim 1 recites “in response to the change from the closed configuration to the open configuration that changes the number of screens . . ., presenting a second user interface on a second screen . . . associated with the email application . . . [and] providing content different from and not previously provided in the first user interface.” The Examiner relies on the combination of Ohki and Chiang for teaching or suggesting this limitation. The Examiner finds “Ohki teaches a device with two screens that can operate in one-screen mode when closed, or in two-screen mode when open.” Ans. 3. In Ohki, when “the user opens the device to display two screens,” the “second screen displays a keyboard for entering text in a new email.” Id. (citing Ohki Fig. 7). Appellant, however, contends that the keyboard “is a separate input application that is not 3 Appeal 2016-001430 Application 13/299,271 associated with the email application.” App. Br. 8.2 For the second reference, the Examiner finds “Chiang teaches a device with one screen that can operate in one-window mode or two- windows mode.” Ans. 3. Thus, Chiang teaches displaying multiple windows for the same application on one screen. For example, “in two- windows mode, one window displays the list of emails, and the other window displays text of a selected email, thus the second window provides content different from the first window.” Id. (citing Chiang Fig. 10A, 1 55). Appellant, however, argues “Chiang only describes a single screen” and thus Chiang’s device “cannot open or respond to opening.” App. Br. 9. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments attacking Ohki and Chiang individually. “Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of references.” In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). We agree with the Examiner that the “combination of Ohki and Chiang teaches a device that can open from one screen to two screens [as in Ohki], and both screens [as in Ohki] display different views of an email application [as in Chiang].” Ans. 4 (emphasis added). Thus, in the combination, upon opening the device in Ohki, Ohki’s second screen displays Chiang’s second window for an email application. It follows that we are not persuaded the combination of Ohki and Chiang fails to teach or suggest the disputed “in response to” limitation recited in claim 1. Appellant further contends no motivation exists to combine Ohki and 2 Although not necessary for our decision, we note Figure 61C of the present application depicts the second screen showing a “Keyboard — Email Layout,” similar to Ohki’s teaching in Figure 7 of the second screen displaying a keyboard for email input. See Spec. 1412. 4 Appeal 2016-001430 Application 13/299,271 Chiang. App. Br. 10. The Examiner, however, finds Chiang teaches splitting the screen . . . automatically, for example when the device orientation changes .... Thus the screen is split when the aspect ratio of the screen changes. . . . The aspect ratio of the screen also changes when the second screen [of Ohki] is opened, therefore it would be obvious to apply the teaching of Ohki to split the screen when the total screen area changes by opening another screen. Ans. 5. Thus, it would have been “obvious to expand displaying the email application from one view on one screen to two views on two screens, when the device is opened.” Id. Given the record before us, we agree with the Examiner. “Both Ohki and Chiang are from the same field of endeavor” (Ans. 4), and the aspect ratio changing in Ohki when adding a second screen would have motivated a person of ordinary skill in the art to consider various user interfaces for dealing with the changed aspect ratio, including displaying a second window for the same application as taught by Chiang. The Examiner correctly finds Ohki already teaches “the second screen displays a keyboard for entering text in a new email” (Ans. 3), and as the Supreme Court has said, “[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007). Appellant also argues the combination would (1) “require significant, and improper, redesign”; (2) violate “the principle of operation for both of these references”; and (3) “render the systems inoperable.” App. Br. 10. Yet aside from these conclusory assertions, Appellant proffers no evidence or argument to persuade us the combination would result in any of these outcomes. Appellant further argues “the references actually teach away from the combination as the combination would require the devices to do 5 Appeal 2016-001430 Application 13/299,271 something different from what is described in the references.” App. Br. 10. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. “A reference does not teach away, however, if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage investigation into the invention claimed.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). Here, there is no evidence of criticism, discrediting, or discouragement. Other than conclusory attorney argument, Appellant “presents no evidence that the [Examiner’s proposed modification] was uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art.” Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007). As such, we are not persuaded the Examiner improperly combined the teachings and suggestions of the references. Thus, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s proposed combination. Appellant also argues dependent claims 4, 7, and 10 for the same reasons as discussed above. App. Br. 11. We agree with the Examiner, however, for the reasons discussed above and in the Answer. Ans. 6—8. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, and claims 2—20, which Appellant argues are patentable for similar reasons. See App. Br. 11-12; 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). DECISION For the reasons above, we affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—20. No time for taking subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED 6 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation