Ex Parte Watson et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 30, 2017

12801668 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 30, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
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Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
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APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/801,668 06/18/2010 William Todd Watson 040675-1162 2528
27111 7590 02/01/2017
GORDON fr RFFS T T P
EXAMINER
101 WEST BROADWAY HAIDER, FAWAAD
SUITE 1600
SAN DIEGO, CA 92101 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3627
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/01/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipdocket @ gordonrees .com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex Parte WILLIAM TODD WATSON, LEONARD CECH,
JAMES GREGORY STANLEY, and SCOTT KERBY
Appeal 2015-0035801
Application 12/801,6682
Technology Center 3600
Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, NINA L. MEDLOCK, and
AMEE A. SHAH, Administrative Patent Judges.
MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
1 Our decision references Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed
August 29, 2014) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Feb. 4, 2015), and the
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed December 5, 2014) and Final Office
Action (“Final Act.,” mailed March 12, 2014). The record includes a
transcript of the hearing held on January 10, 2017.
2 Appellants identify TK Holdings Inc. as the real party in interest. App.
Br. 1.
Appeal 2015-003580
Application 12/801,668
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1—7 and 15—21. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b). An oral hearing was held on January 10, 2017.
We REVERSE.
CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellants’ claimed invention “relates generally to the field of
occupant classification” (Spec. 12).
Claims 1 and 15 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1,
reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A system for classifying an occupant located on a
seating surface of a vehicle seat comprising:
a movable element located in the vehicle seat, wherein the
movable element is configured to move when there is downward
force on the element;
an electric field sensor located in the vehicle seat, wherein
the electric field sensor includes a first conductor positioned
below the seating surface of the seat;
a sensing circuit configured to supply a first signal to the
first conductor;
wherein the sensing circuit includes measurement
electronics configured to measure the current being supplied to
the first conductor, wherein the measurement is affected by the
presence of an object on the seating surface, and wherein the
measurement electronics are configured to measure the vibration
of the moveable element; and
a controller configured to discriminate between different
types of objects located on the seating surface based on changes
in the current being supplied to the first conductor and the
vibration of the moveable element; and wherein the controller is
configured to communicate the occupant classification based on
the discrimination.
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Application 12/801,668
REJECTION
Claims 1—7 and 15—21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Stanley et al. (US 6,598,900 B2, iss. July 29, 2003,
hereinafter “Stanley”) and Shostak et al. (US 2006/0025897 Al, pub. Feb. 2,
2006, hereinafter “Shostak”).
ANALYSIS
We are persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the Examiner erred in
rejecting independent claims 1 and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) at least
because neither Stanley nor Shostak, individually or in combination,
discloses or suggests a system for classifying an occupant located on a
seating surface of a vehicle seat comprising “a movable element located in
the vehicle seat, wherein the movable element is configured to move when
there is downward force on the element;” “an electric field sensor . . .
including] a first conductor positioned below the seating surface of the
seat;” and “a sensing circuit configured to supply a first signal to the first
conductor . . . [and] configured to measure the current being supplied to the
first conductor . . . and the vibration of the moveable element,” as recited in
independent claim 1 and similarly recited in independent claim 15 (App.
Br. 6—11; see also Reply Br. 2—5).
The Examiner asserts that in Stanley, “there is someone sitting
(moveable element) [on a vehicle seat] causing a downward force” (Ans. 4
(citing Stanley, Figs. 1—3, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 19)), and that Shostak also
discloses a moveable element, i.e., a movable mass, a movable headrest, and
a movable item (id. (citing Shostak || 369, 652, 893)). However, we agree
with Appellants that someone sitting on a vehicle seat, as disclosed in
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Application 12/801,668
Stanley, cannot correspond to Appellants’ claimed movable element at least
because both claims 1 and 15 recite both “an occupant” and “a movable
element” (Reply Br. 2). Indeed, as Appellants observe, “[a]t best, ‘someone
sitting’ on the seat, as disclosed in Stanley, corresponds to the ‘occupant,’ as
opposed to a separate ‘movable element’ located in the seat” (id. at 3).
That the moveable element is separate from an occupant or other
object located on the surface of a vehicle seat also is clear from the ultimate
limitation of claim 1, i.e., that “a controller [is] configured to discriminate
between different types of objects located on the seating surface based
on . . . the vibration of the moveable element.” Claim 15 includes
substantially similar language.
We also cannot agree with the Examiner that any of the movable
mass, movable headrest, and movable item, as disclosed in Shostak,
constitute a “movable element,” as called for in claims 1 and 15 (id.
(citing Shostak || 369, 652, and 893)).
Shostak discloses an arrangement for providing a boosted signal from
a signal-generating device, e.g., a SAW device, that comprises an antenna
and a circulator having a first port connected to the antenna to receive a
signal from the antenna and a second port adapted to be connected to the
SAW device to provide a signal to, and receive a signal from the SAW
device (Shostak 1366). Shostak discloses that an energy-supply module
may optionally be provided to supply energy to operate the circulator, and
further discloses, in paragraph 369 cited by the Examiner, that the energy
supply may comprise “at least one movable mass.” Shostak’s movable mass
is, thus, part of an energy-supply module, not part of a “system for
classifying an occupant located on a seating surface of a vehicle seat,” as
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Application 12/801,668
recited in independent claims 1 and 15. The movable mass also is not
located in a vehicle seat, as called for in the claims.
For much the same reasons, neither Shostak’s moveable headrest nor
its moveable item corresponds to Appellants’ claimed moveable element.
The moveable headrest is described in paragraph 652 of Shostak with
reference to Figure 114 and, as shown in the figure, is located above the seat
back, not “in the vehicle seat,” as recited in claims 1 and 15.
Shostak discloses in cited paragraph 893 that antennas are an
important aspect to SAW and RFID wireless devices “such as can be used in
tire monitors, seat monitors, weight sensors, child seat monitors, fluid level
sensors and similar devices or sensors which monitor, detect, measure,
determine or derive physical properties or characteristics of a component in
or on the vehicle or of an area near the vehicle,” and explains that
“[i]n many cases, the location of a SAW or RFID device needs to be
determined such as when a device is used to locate the position of a movable
item in or on a vehicle such as a seat” (id. (emphasis added)). In other
words, the “movable item,” as disclosed in paragraph 893 of Shostak, is a
vehicle component, e.g., a seat. As such, it logically follows that Shostak’s
movable item is not “a movable element located in the vehicle seat,” as
recited in claims 1 and 15.
Moreover, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that any of the
movable mass, movable headrest, and movable item, as disclosed in
Shostak, constitute a “movable element,” as called for in claims 1 and 15,
we agree with Appellants that there is nothing in the cited portions of
Stanley and/or Shostak that discloses or suggests the combination of a
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vibrating moveable element and an electric field sensor in the specific
locations recited in the claims (see Reply Br. 5).
Responding to Appellants’ arguments, the Examiner asserts that
Stanley discloses an electric field sensor, including a conductor, located
under the surface ofthe vehicle seat (Ans. 4 (citing Stanley H 1311, 1312,
1324, 1325; and Figs. 11—13)) and sensing circuitry configured to measure
the current being supplied to the conductor (id. (citing Stanley, Fig. 14)).
The Examiner further points to the Background section of Stanley as
disclosing a vibration sensor incorporated into a vehicle seat (id.)? Yet, we
fail to see why, and the Examiner does not explain why, a person of ordinary
skill in the art would have had an apparent reason to combine these two
completely independent, different embodiments.
In view of the foregoing, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of independent claims 1 and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). For the same
reasons, we also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent
claims 2—7 and 16—21. Cf. In reFritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (“dependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from
which they depend are nonobvious”).
3 The Background section of Stanley states, “U.S. Pat. No. 5,404,128
teaches the use of a vibration sensor incorporated into the seat to detect the
subtle vibrations caused by the breathing and heart rhythms so as to
determine whether or not a person is present.” Stanley, col. 4,11. 14—18.
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DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—7 and 15—21 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) is reversed.
REVERSED
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