Ex Parte Wang et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 2, 2017

13541106 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 2, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/541,106 07/03/2012 Qing Wang 83197509 7007
28395 7590 06/06/2017
RROOKS KTTSHMAN P C /FfTET EXAMINER
1000 TOWN CENTER WILTEY, NICHOLAS K
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3669
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/06/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing @brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte QING WANG, MING LANG KUANG, and
CAROL LOUISE OKUBO
Appeal 2016-0002281
Application 13/541,1062
Technology Center 3600
Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, MICHAEL W. KIM, and
PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, Administrative Patent Judges.
HOFFMANN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final rejection of
claims 1—17. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.
1 Our decision references Appellants’ Specification (“Spec.,” filed July 3,
2012), Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed Apr. 16, 2015), and Reply Brief
(“Reply Br.,” filed Sept. 29, 2015), as well as the Examiner’s Answer
(“Answer,” mailed Sept. 17, 2015).
2 According to Appellants, “[t]he real party in interest is Ford Global
Technologies, LLC.” Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2016-000228
Application 13/541,106
According to Appellants, the invention “relates to a hybrid vehicle,
and a method and system for controlling the powertrain of the hybrid
vehicle.” Spec. 11. Claims 1, 8, and 14 are the only independent claims on
appeal. Appeal Br., Claims App. We reproduce claims 1, 8, and 14, below,
as illustrative of the appealed claims.
1. A method for controlling a vehicle having an engine, a
generator drivably coupled to the engine, a traction motor
electrically coupled to the generator and to an electrical energy
storage device, comprising:
while the engine is providing drive torque, increasing
engine output to increase available traction motor torque at a rate
that varies based on available power from the electrical energy
storage device when driver demanded power exceeds a
corresponding threshold.
8. A vehicle, comprising:
an engine;
a generator drivably connected to the engine;
a battery electrically coupled to a motor and the generator;
and
a controller configured to increase engine output to
increase rotational speed of the generator and available motor
torque while the engine is running, wherein a magnitude of the
increase of engine output is based upon a difference between
available power in the battery and desired power in the motor and
generator.
14. A computer system for controlling an engine in a
hybrid electric vehicle comprising:
a controller communicatively coupled to an engine and
programmed to
transmit power to wheels of the vehicle from both
an engine and a traction motor; and
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Appeal 2016-000228
Application 13/541,106
while engine power is transmitting, increase engine
power, to increase available traction motor torque, at a rate
that varies based on available power from an electrical
energy storage device when driver demands exceed a
corresponding threshold.
REJECTIONS AND PRIOR ART
Claims 1, 2, 8, 9, and 14—16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Gray (US 7,104,349 B2, iss. Sept. 12, 2006).
Claims 10 and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Gray and Ashizawa (US 2008/0058154 Al, pub. Mar. 6,
2008).
Claims 3,4, 11, and 12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Gray and Syed (US 2011/0010031 Al, pub. Jan. 13,
2011).
Claims 5 and 6 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Gray and Chen (US 2005/0246076 Al, pub. Nov. 3, 2005).
Claims 7 and 17 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Gray and Huang (US 2009/0029828 Al, pub. Jan.
29, 2009).
ANALYSIS
Independent Claim 1
Appellants argue that in Gray, “energy from the engine is converted to
electric energy to power the motor to provide drive torque,” but Gray’s
engine itself does not provide drive torque, because it does not provide direct
mechanical power to the wheels. Appeal Br. 9-10. Appellants further argue
the ordinary artisan would understand that the claimed ‘“drive torque’ is
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Appeal 2016-000228
Application 13/541,106
actual torque output that is mechanically used to ‘drive’ the wheels.” Reply
Br. 2-3.
We disagree with Appellants, because the claim language “engine . . .
providing drive torque” broadly does not require a direct mechanical
connection to the driven wheels. The Specification does not define or limit
“drive torque” to be through mechanical, and not electrical, connection to
the wheels. Gray discloses providing drive torque through an electric motor
connected to the wheels in “a series hybrid vehicle 10 with a secondary
power source 12, coupled to HCCI engine 16 via a generator 28.” Gray
col. 4,11. 44—50.3 Gray, thus, meets the claim language. For this reason, we
sustain the rejection of independent claim 1.
Dependent Claims 6 and 7
Appellants advance no argument directed specifically to claims 6
and 7, and, thus, we sustain the rejection of these claims under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a).
Independent Claim 8 and Dependent Claim 9
We are persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the section of Gray
cited by the Examiner, which refers to Gray’s Figure 2, and the “B” portion
3 Though we construe the claim language not to require a direct mechanical
connection from a combustion engine to the driven wheels, Gray discloses
that “the present invention is preferably operated as a series hybrid vehicle,
but may also be operated as a parallel hybrid vehicle.” Gray col. 4,
11. 35—37 (emphasis added). Appellants’ Specification describes “a parallel-
type hybrid in which an engine, a motor, and a transmission are connected in
series by clutches that control which of the engine and/or motor drives the
transmission.” Spec. 115. Thus, Gray’s description of a parallel hybrid
vehicle appears to disclose a direct mechanical connection between an
engine and wheels.
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Appeal 2016-000228
Application 13/541,106
of a graph illustrated in the figure, does not disclose “a controller configured
to increase engine output,” because
[rjegion “A” of Gray ... is the only time in which an “increased
engine output” occurs, as required by the claims. And, when the
vehicle operates in region “A,” Gray... does not teach “wherein
a magnitude of the increase of engine output is based upon a
difference between available power in the battery and desired
power in the motor and generator.”
Appeal Br. 12 (emphasis omitted).
More specifically, Gray discloses
continuing with portion B of the FIG. 2 sample cycle, it should
be noted that the desired speed/load operating point for the
engine, even at relatively steady operating conditions, may be
above or below the vehicle power output demand, as may be
desired for adjusting the level of stored energy in the energy
storage device. Thus, in FIG. 2, because of the previous use of
stored energy for acceleration, the engine preferably operates in
B at a level of high efficiency at a power output level higher than
the current vehicle power demand, so that excess engine output
may be used to replenish stored energy levels.
Gray col. 6,11. 49-59.
The cited portion of Gray, therefore, shows a constant engine speed,
which we are persuaded does not support the Examiner’s finding that an
increase of engine speed is disclosed, as claimed. Thus, we do not sustain
the rejection of independent claim 8, nor of dependent claim 9 rejected with
claim 8.
Dependent Claims 10—13
The Examiner does not establish on the record that either Ashizawa or
Syed remedies the deficiencies of Gray as to the rejection of independent
claim 8. Therefore, we do not sustain the rejections of dependent claims 10—
13 that depend from claim 8.
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Appeal 2016-000228
Application 13/541,106
Independent Claim 14 and Dependent Claims 15 and 16
We are persuaded by Appellants’ argument that “[sjeries hybrid
vehicles, such as the vehicle of Gray . . ., are not capable of transmitting
engine power to the wheels; only motor power is transmitted to the wheels.”
Appeal Br. 11 (emphasis omitted).
In response to Appellants, the Examiner finds that Gray discloses that
engine power is “converted” to electrical power that is supplied to the
wheels, and, thus, the engine transmits power through the electric motor.
Answer 5. However, we construe the claim language “transmit[ting] power
to wheels of the vehicle from both an engine and a traction motor” to require
the transmission of power to the wheels through the traction motor and one
connection that is independent of the traction motor. The Examiner has not
established in the Final Action or Answer that Gray teaches such an
arrangement. Thus, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 14, nor of
dependent claims 15 and 16 rejected along with claim 14.
Dependent Claim 17
The Examiner does not establish adequately that Huang remedies the
deficiencies of Gray in the rejection of independent claim 14. Therefore, we
do not sustain the rejection of claim 17 that depends from claim 14.
Dependent Claim 2
Dependent claim 2 recites “wherein the rate of increasing engine
output varies based upon a difference between available power in the
electrical energy storage device and a combination of desired motor power
and desired generator power.” We agree with Appellants that the rejection
of claim 2 is in error for the same reasons set forth above for independent
claim 8, which recites a similar recitation.
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Appeal 2016-000228
Application 13/541,106
Dependent claims 3—5
The Examiner does not establish adequately that either Syed or Chen
remedies the deficiencies of Gray in the rejection of dependent claim 2.
Therefore, we do not sustain the rejections of claims 3—5 that depend from
claim 2.
DECISION
We AFFIRM the rejection of claims 1, 6, and 7 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a).
We REVERSE the rejections of claims 2—5 and 8—17 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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