Ex Parte Waltermann et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 22, 201713189869 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 22, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/189,869 07/25/2011 Rod D. Waltermann RPS920110032USNP(710.170) 1083 58127 7590 03/22/2017 FERENCE & ASSOCIATES LLC 409 BROAD STREET PITTSBURGH, PA 15143 EXAMINER HENNING, MATTHEW T ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2491 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/22/2017 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ROD D. WALTERMANN and DAVID RIVERA Appeal 2016-006506 Application 13/189,869 Technology Center 2400 Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, JOHN PINKERTON, and CARL L. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges. COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1—8, 10-16, 18, 19, and 21—23. Claims 9, 17, and 20 are cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. The Invention The claimed invention relates to “[djevices, methods and products . . . that provide for remote authentication of mobile information handling devices.” (Abstract). Appeal 2016-006506 Application 13/189,869 Representative Claim Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal: 1. An information handling device comprising: one or more processors; a display device accessible by the one or more processors; a memory in operative connection with the one or more processors; wherein, responsive to execution of program instructions accessible to the one or more processors operating through a mobile operating system, the one or more processors: allow communication with at least one remote authentication architecture; deny access to the information handling device responsive to a device screen lock event; and [L] grant access to the information handling device screen responsive to: utilizing screen lock functionality for remote authentication in which a device screen unlock event comprises entry of alphanumeric enterprise network logon credentials authenticated at the at least one remote authentication architecture. (Contested limitation L bracketed and emphasized). Rejections A. Claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 10-12, 15, 18, 21, and 22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combined teachings and suggestions of Yeap et al. (US 2005/0216747 Al; Sept. 29, 2005) 2 Appeal 2016-006506 Application 13/189,869 (hereinafter “Yeap”) and Sriraghavan et al. (US 2011/0154444 Al; June 23, 2011) (hereinafter “Sriraghavan”). B. Claim 3 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combined teachings and suggestions of Yeap, Sriraghavan, and AAPA (Applicants’ Admitted Prior Art). C. Claims 5 and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combined teachings and suggestions of Yeap, Sriraghavan, and Childs et al. (US 2004/0003190 Al; Jan. 1, 2004) (hereinafter “Childs”). D. Claims 7 and 14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combined teachings and suggestions of Yeap, Sriraghavan, and Bowen et al. (US Patent Application Publication Number 2011/0254659 Al; Oct. 20, 2011) ((hereinafter “Bowen”). E. Claims 8, 16, 19, and 23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combined teachings and suggestions of Yeap, Sriraghavan, and McLaren et al. (US 2010/0306858 Al; Dec. 2, 2010) hereinafter (“McLaren”). Grouping of Claims Based on Appellants’ arguments, we decide the appeal of all claims rejected under rejection A on the basis of representative independent claim 1. Based on Appellants’ arguments, we decide the appeal of all claims rejected under rejection E on the basis of representative dependent claim 23. We address rejections B, C, and D, infra. To the extent Appellants have not advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims and/or 3 Appeal 2016-006506 Application 13/189,869 limitations, or other issues, such arguments are considered waived. See 37 C.F.R. §41.37(c)(l)(iv). ANALYSIS Rejection A of Independent Claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) We have considered all of Appellants’ arguments and any evidence presented. We disagree with Appellants’ arguments, and we adopt as our own: (1) the findings and legal conclusions set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken, and (2) the findings, legal conclusions, and explanations set forth in the Answer in response to Appellants’ arguments. (Ans. 2—14). However, we highlight and address specific findings and arguments for emphasis in our analysis below. We decide the following issues presented in this appeal: Issue 1: Did the Examiner err by improperly combining the Yeap and Sriraghavan references, because Sriraghavan purportedly “teaches away from the teachings of Yeap,” as argued by Appellants. (App. Br. 10). Issue 2\ Under § 103, did the Examiner err by finding the cited combination of Yeap and Sriraghavan would have taught or suggested contested limitation L: grant access to the information handling device screen responsive to: utilizing screen lock functionality for remote authentication in which a device screen unlock event comprises entry of alphanumeric enterprise network logon credentials authenticated at the at least one remote authentication architecture[,] within the meaning of claim 1? 1 (emphasis added). 1 We give the contested claim limitations the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification. See In re Morris, 111 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Cf Spec. 142 (“although illustrative example 4 Appeal 2016-006506 Application 13/189,869 Regarding issue one, Appellants contend, inter alia: Sriraghavan specifically teaches away from using the User ID and password entry of Yeap. See Yeap at [0066] - [0067]. Rather, Sriraghavan teaches the use of non-text based password methods and criticizes the use of text-based passwords for being weak or difficult to remember. See Sriraghavan at [0001] and [0020] - [0021], Applicants respectfully submit that the Office has failed to clearly articulate the rationale to support why one skilled in the art would combine the teachings of Yeap and Sriraghavan, as is required per MPEP § 2143. (App. Br. 10-11). The Examiner disagrees: First of all, Sriraghavan does not teach away from the use of the UserlD and password entry of Yeap. As the examiner has already stated in the rejection, Yeap does not state that the username and password are text based. Rather, the examiner has relied upon the common knowledge in the art at the time of invention in rendering obvious the use of alphanumeric usernames and passwords. Second, Sriraghavan explicitly teaches the use of alphanumeric characters in the passcode, as can be seen in Paragraph 0047 which recites "a text box 561 can be revealed to permit the user to enter one or more alphanumeric characters, if the passcode also includes characters." This falls within the scope of "alphanumeric logon credentials". In the combination, since the credentials are used to authenticate to a corporate server over a network, they fall within the scope of "alphanumeric enterprise network logon credentials". Further, Sriraghavan explicitly claimed that part of the passcode is alphanumeric, as can be seen in Sriraghavan claim 3. Why would Sriraghavan claim the use of alphanumeric characters in the passcode if embodiments have been described herein with reference to the accompanying figures, it is to be understood that this description is not limiting and that various other changes and modifications may be affected therein by one skilled in the art without departing from the scope or spirit of the disclosure.”). 5 Appeal 2016-006506 Application 13/189,869 Sriraghavan was teaching away from the use of such alphanumeric characters? Rather, Sriraghavan is teaching combining alphanumeric characters with other credentials in order to make the passcode more secure. This combined passcode still falls within the scope of an alphanumeric credential, as it contains alphanumeric characters. The claims do not preclude the credentials from including non-alphanumeric parts. (Ans. 3—4). Regarding Appellants’ “teaching away” argument, we find Appellants ignore Sriraghavan’s alternative teaching (| 47) of user passcode entry. As found by the Examiner (Ans. 4), Sriraghavan’s alternative embodiment (147) expressly incorporates alphanumeric textual characters: “a text box 561 can be revealed to permit the user to enter one or more alphanumeric characters, if the passcode also includes characters.” Therefore, Appellants have failed to address the Examiner’s specific findings. (Ans. 4). We note an obviousness inquiry is not limited to the prior art’s preferred embodiment. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Moreover, “[cjombining two embodiments disclosed adjacent to each other in a prior art patent does not require a leap of inventiveness.” Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 554 F.3d 982, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Because teaching an alternative or equivalent method does not teach away from the use of a claimed method, In re Dunn, 349 F.2d 433, 438 (CCPA 1965), on this record, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred by improperly combining Yeap and Sriraghavan under §103. Contested limitation L of Claim 1 Regarding contested limitation F, we find the Examiner’s legal conclusion of obviousness is supported by a preponderance of the evidence, 6 Appeal 2016-006506 Application 13/189,869 and we adopt the Examiner’s underlying factual findings in support of the legal conclusion of obviousness. (Final Act. 6—7; Ans. 2—12). We particularly note Sriraghavan (153) teaches remote authentication within the meaning of contested limitation L: “Alternatively, the verification can be executed by the authentication platform 119, which is maintained by a service provider. That is, the verification can be performed as part of a managed service by the service provider.” Given this evidence {id.), and the teachings of Yeap as cited by the Examiner (Final Act. 6—7), we find a preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner’s underlying factual findings regarding the combined teachings and suggestions of Yeap and Sriraghavan: Yeap provides, among other things, teachings of a system where a user of a client device enters their user name and password, and this is verified by a remote corporate server in order to allow access to the corporate server. This can be seen in Paragraph 0102 of Yeap, for example. Sriraghavan teaches that mobile devices should lock when not in use and the user should be verified in order to unlock the device, and further that remote authentication platforms of service providers can be used to perform the re-authentication for unlocking the device. This can be seen in paragraphs 0050-0053 of Sriraghavan. In the combination of Yeap and Sriraghavan, it would have been obvious to the person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention for the mobile device of Yeap (i.e. the cell phone) to lock when not in use, and further to require user authentication in order to unlock the device. It further would have been obvious to the person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention that the authentication verification can be performed at the corporate server of Yeap. (Ans. 2-3). 7 Appeal 2016-006506 Application 13/189,869 We additionally note “the question under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is not merely what the references expressly teach but what they would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.” Merck & Co., Inc. v. Biocraft Laboratories, Inc., 874 F. 2d 804, 807-08 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see also MPEP § 2123. Moreover, on this record, we find the Examiner’s proffered combination of the respective teachings of Yeap and Sriraghavan would have merely yielded predictable results, and therefore would have been obvious to an artisan possessing an ordinary level of skill at the time of Appellants’ invention. See KSR Int 7 Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007) (“The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”). This reasoning is applicable here. For at least the aforementioned reasons, and based upon a preponderance of the evidence, Appellants have not persuaded us the Examiner erred. Accordingly, we sustain rejection A of representative independent claim 1, and rejection A of the associated grouped claims, which fall with claim 1. See Grouping of Claims, supra. Rejections B, C, and D under §103 Because Appellants have not advanced separate and substantive arguments regarding specific claims that were rejected under rejections B, C, and D, such arguments are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). 8 Appeal 2016-006506 Application 13/189,869 Rejection E of Dependent Claim 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Claim 23 recites: 23. The program product of claim 19, wherein the program code further comprises: program code that provides a screen lock settings menu including a numeric pin selection; a local alphanumeric password selection; and an enterprise logon selection; wherein the information handling device screen is locked according to a selection indicated in the screen lock settings menu. (Emphasis added regarding contested limitations). Regarding the Examiner’s reliance on “Official Notice” to support the rejection of claim 23, Appellants contend, inter alia: “Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the screen lock settings menu of the type claimed were well known, this fact is not instantly and unquestionably demonstrable.” (App. Br. 16). Appellants further contend: even if the notice is taken, the claimed menu content is not taught by the references. Specifically, the references fail to teach a "screen lock settings menu including a numeric pin selection; a local alphanumeric password selection; and an enterprise logon selection." Claim 23 (emphasis added). None of the references (i.e., Yeap, Sriraghavan, or McLaren), teach or even make mention of a screen lock settings menu, let alone a screen lock settings menu comprising different selections. (App. Br. 17) (emphasis added). However, in reviewing the record, we find no unequivocal statement in Appellants’ Briefs that “<2 screen lock settings menu including a numeric 9 Appeal 2016-006506 Application 13/189,869 pin selection; a local alphanumeric password selection; and an enterprise logon selection;” (claim 23) were not well known in the art at the time of Appellants’ invention. Instead, Appellants merely assert the Examiner has not provided evidence. (App. Br. 16). To adequately traverse the Examiner’s finding, Appellants must specifically point out the supposed errors in the Examiner's action, which would include stating why the noticed fact is not considered to be common knowledge or well-known in the art. See MPEP § 2144.03. Accordingly, because Appellants have not met their burden of showing that the Examiner erred, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection E of representative claim 23 as being obvious over the combination of Yeap, Sriraghavan, and McLaren. (See Final Act. 11—12). Associated grouped claims 8, 16, and 19 fall with claim 23 under rejection E. See Grouping of Claims, supra. Reply Brief To the extent Appellants advance new arguments in the Reply Brief not in response to a shift in the Examiner’s position in the Answer, we note arguments raised in a Reply Brief that were not raised in the Appeal Brief or are not responsive to arguments raised in the Examiner’s Answer will not be considered except for good cause. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2). Conclusion 2 2 In the event of further prosecution, we leave it to the Examiner to consider whether at least independent claim 18 (and the claims which depend thereon) should be rejected under 35 U.S.C. §112, first paragraph, for lack of enablement. Regarding claim 18, no particular element of the program product (including a “program code” element) is positively 10 Appeal 2016-006506 Application 13/189,869 For at least the aforementioned reasons, we find a preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner’s underlying factual findings and ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness regarding all contested claims on appeal. DECISION We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1—8, 10—16, 18, 19, and 21—23 under § 103(a). No time for taking any action connected with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED recited as performing the recited function of: “utilizing screen lock functionality for remote authentication in which a device screen unlock event comprises entry of alphanumeric enterprise logon credentials authenticated at the at least one remote authentication architecture.'1'’ (emphasis added). Such pure functional claiming broadly covers all structures, program products, or other means for performing the recited “utilizing” function. The Specification, however, discloses only those structures, program products, or means known to Appellants. Nor does claim 18 positively recite a “user” who performs a step or act of utilizing the recited screen lock functionality (in which case claim 18 would be indefinite as a “hybrid” claim) (“A single claim which claims both an apparatus and the method steps of using the apparatus is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph.” MPEP § 2173.05(p)(II) (citing In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litigation, 639 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing IP XL Holdings v. Amazon.com, Inc., 430 F.3d 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005))). Therefore, we leave it to the Examiner to consider a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for lack of an enabling disclosure commensurate with the scope of the claim (“pure functional claiming”). Although the Board is authorized to reject claims under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), no inference should be drawn when the Board elects not to do so. See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 1213.02 (9th Ed., Rev. 07.2015, Nov. 2015). 11 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation