Ex Parte Walsh et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 29, 2016

12947274 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 29, 2016)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/947,274 11/16/2010 Richard J. Walsh CT-OTO-OIOC/US 1602
125598 7590 01/03/2017
Concert Technology Corporation
20 Depot Street
Suite 2 A
Peterborough, NH 03458
EXAMINER
CAI, WAYNE HUU
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2644
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/03/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
uspto.correspondence@sceneralabs.com
u spto_alert @ concerttechnology .com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte RICHARD J. WALSH, ALFREDO C. ISSA,
and
BENJAMIN FERID ISSA
Appeal 2016-003537
Application 12/947,274
Technology Center 2600
Before CARLA M. KRIVAK, HUNG H. BUI, and
JEFFREY A. STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judges.
KRIVAK, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 11, 12, and 31—36. Claims 1—10 and 13—30 have been withdrawn
from consideration. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm-in-part.
Appeal 2016-003537
Application 12/947,274
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ invention is directed to a method and apparatus for
“location based telecommunication authorization” and “automated call
screening, and specifically relates to the utilization of location history of a
call recipient to determine call authorization” (Title (capitalization altered);
Spec. 12).
Independent claim 11 and dependent claim 12, reproduced below, are
exemplary of the subject matter on appeal.
11. A method comprising:
receiving a request from a first device to communicate
with a second device;
receiving at least one location classification from the first
device and receiving at least one location classification from the
second device;
determining an authorization for the request from the first
device to communicate with the second device by applying at
least one rule to the at least one location classification received
from the first device and the at least one location classification
received from the second device; and
transmitting the request from the first device to
communicate with the second device upon authorization.
12. The method of claim 11 wherein determining the
authorization includes comparing the at least one location
classification received from the first device to at least one prior
location classification associated with the second device.
REFERENCES and REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejected claims 11, 31—33, and 35 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based upon the teachings of Bhatia (US 2008/0076395
Al, published Mar. 27, 2008) and Vendrow (US 2009/0086947 Al,
published Apr. 2, 2009) (Final Act. 6—11).
2
Appeal 2016-003537
Application 12/947,274
The Examiner rejected claims 12, 34, and 36 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
based upon the teachings of Bhatia, Vendrow, and Esh (US 2006/0291629
Al, published Dec. 28, 2006) (Final Act. 12).
ANALYSIS
Claims 11, 31—33, and 35
With respect to claim 11, Appellants contend the Examiner erred in
finding Vendrow discloses location classifications of first and second
devices; rather, Vendrow discloses “the actual location of the devices . . .
[which] is not a location classification for the devices as that term is defined
in the instant specification” (App. Br. 18 (citing Vendrow 141); see also
Reply Br. 5). Appellants assert the Examiner’s combination of Bhatia and
Vendrow does not teach or suggest a rule applied to classifications from a
first device (caller) and from a second device (callee) (App. Br. 13, 15, 19).
Instead, Bhatia’s “indicators are all about the callee” (App. Br. 13), and
Vendrow’s location is “only the caller location . . . [t]he location of the
callee is not used” (App. Br. 19). Appellants additionally contend Vendrow
does not teach determining an authorization by applying a rule and, upon
authorization, transmitting the first device’s request to communicate with the
second device (App. Br. 18—19). Appellants further argue the Examiner’s
combination of Bhatia and Vendrow lacks articulated reasoning (App. Br.
17). We do not agree.
We agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings as our own.
Particularly, we agree with the Examiner Vendrow’s caller location and
callee location are each a “description of the location” indicating “the caller
and the callee whereabouts,” which is commensurate with the broad
3
Appeal 2016-003537
Application 12/947,274
description of “location classification” in Appellants’ Specification.1 (Ans.
3; see also Ans. 6). Appellants’ Specification does not provide an explicit
and exclusive definition of the claimed term “location classification,” rather
it merely provides discussion of non-limiting examples of this term (see
Spec. 37, 52, 60). Thus, as Appellants recognize, “[t]he location
classification is a description of the location” (App. Br. 12).
Moreover, contrary to Appellants’ argument that Bhatia and Vendrow
do not disclose a rule applied to classifications from both first and second
devices (App. Br. 13, 15, 19), Vendrow teaches a routing rule using “the
caller’s location, one or more callee ’s location, the distances between
callers and callees, and the like” (Ans. 7 (citing Vendrow 141 (emphases
added))). As such, we agree with the Examiner that “Vendrow expressly
teaches or suggests that both the caller’s location and the callee’s location
are used” (Ans. 7). Additionally, we agree with the Examiner Bhatia also
applies a rule to the caller and callee devices’ classifications of “current
(un)availability of callees relative to callers” and “history of past behavior
of the callee and the caller” (Ans. 4 (citing Bhatia || 20, 22)).
1 Appellants’ Specification describes “classifications of locations including,
but not limited to, classifications based upon GPS coordinates and GSM
internal identifiers such as cell tower identifier, phone numbers, and the like.
Such locations can be classified using an ontology, list, or the like. For
example, a GPS location . . . may be associated with ‘Duke University, ’
‘school,’ ‘university,’ ‘medical,’ and/or ‘research’” (Spec. 137 (emphases
added)), “locations with a certain classification . . . (e.g., ‘restaurant’
locations near ‘work’ with work related members of a social network)”
(Spec. 152 (emphases added)), and “‘undesirable locations’ [that] refer to
locations or location classifications that a user 10 has avoided . . . , visited
once and never returned, etc.” (Spec. 1 60 (emphases added)).
4
Appeal 2016-003537
Application 12/947,274
We are also not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that Vendrow
does not teach determining an authorization by applying a rule and, upon
authorization, transmitting the first device’s request to communicate with the
second device (App. Br. 18—19). Bhatia (not Vendrow) is relied upon for
teaching “determining an authorization for the request from the first device
to communicate with the second device by applying at least one rule” and
“transmitting the request from the first device to communicate with the
second device upon authorization,” as recited in claim 11 (Final Act. 6
(citing Bhatia 17—19, 21—22)).
As to Appellants’ argument that the Examiner’s combination of
Bhatia and Vendrow is improper (App. Br. 17), the Examiner has articulated
sufficient reasoning for combining Bhatia’s call management based on
caller-callee availability and relationships, with Vendrow’s call management
based on caller’s and callee’s locations, to better manage calls—a concern
shared by Bhatia and Vendrow (Ans. 5—6; Final Act. 6—7 (citing Bhatia
1117—19, 21—22; Vendrow H 41, 46, Abstract, Fig. 8); see also Bhatia 13;
Vendrow 12).
In light of the broad terms recited in claim 11 and the arguments
presented, Appellants have failed to clearly distinguish the claimed
invention over the prior art relied on by the Examiner. Thus, we are not
persuaded of Examiner error and sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claim 11. We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claims 31, 33, and 35, and dependent claim 32, argued
therewith (App. Br. 12, 21).
5
Appeal 2016-003537
Application 12/947,274
Claims 12, 34, and 36
Claim 12 recites “wherein determining the authorization includes
comparing the at least one location classification received from the first
device to at least one prior location classification associated with the second
device.” Claims 34 and 36 recite similar features. The Examiner finds
paragraphs 25—27 of Esh teach determining an authorization by comparing
at least one location classification received from a first device to at least one
prior location classification associated with a second device (Final Act. 12
(citing Esh H 25-27)).
Appellants argue Esh does not teach or suggest a comparison of
locations between devices, and does not disclose determining an
authorization by comparing current and prior location classifications as
claimed (App. Br. 22—23). We agree with Appellants. We have reviewed
the cited portions of Esh—which discuss previous location information of a
calling party when a voice mail message was left, current location
information of the calling party when the voice mail message is retrieved,
and previous or current location of the called party (see Esh || 25—27)—and
agree with Appellants the cited portions do not support the Examiner’s
findings. In particular, Esh does not teach comparing a first device/calling
party location with a second device/called party prior location, and does not
disclose an authorization based on such comparison, as required by claim 12.
Further, the Examiner’s Answer does not respond to Appellants’ arguments
(see Ans. 8 (discussing only “location classification,” not “comparing”)).
On the record before us, we agree the Examiner’s rejection of claims
12, 34, and 36 is not supported by sufficient evidence. Thus, we do not
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 12, 34, and 36.
6
Appeal 2016-003537
Application 12/947,274
DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 11, 31—33, and 35 is
affirmed.
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 12, 34, and 36 is reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
7