Ex Parte Walrath

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 29, 2014

11262076 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 29, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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Ex parte CRAIG WALRATH1
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Appeal 2011-009036
Application 11/262,076
Technology Center 2400
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Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, THU A. DANG, and
LARRY J. HUME, Administrative Patent Judges.

HUME, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Final
Rejection of claims 1, 2, 7-11, and 24. Appellant has previously canceled
claims 3-6, and 12-23. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 The Real Party in Interest is Hewlett-Packard Development Company, LP.
App. Br. 3.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
The Invention
Appellant’s invention relates to an access control system for use with
an intelligent data management arrangement (IDMA). Abstract.
Exemplary Claims
Claims 1 and 24, reproduced below, are representative of the subject
matter on appeal (emphases added to disputed limitations):
1. An access control system for use with an
intelligent data management arrangement (IDMA) comprising:
a source component for providing a content signal, the
content signal originating from a content source;
a destination component for receiving the content signal;
and
an IDMA in communication with the source component
and the destination component, the IDMA comprising,
a content control component that selectively controls the
source component to not receive the content signal and
separately to receive, but not send, the content signal, and
a display control component that selectively controls the
destination component not to receive the content signal and
separately to receive and store, but not display, the content
signal.

2 Our decision refers to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed
Sep. 13, 2010); Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Feb. 22, 2011); Examiner’s
Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Dec. 22, 2010); Final Office Action (“FOA,”
mailed May 13, 2010); and the original Specification (“Spec.,” filed
Oct. 27, 2005).
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24. The access control system of claim 1 wherein the
IDMA is in communication with a plurality of content sources
and a plurality of destination devices and controls one source
component differently than another source component and also
controls one destination device differently than another
destination device.
Prior Art
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence in
rejecting the claims on appeal:
Leung US 2002/0095673 A1 July 18, 2002
Tsuria US 2003/0126594 A1 July 3, 2003
Ellis US 2005/0251827 A1 Nov. 10, 2005
(filed Jul. 11, 2005)
Helms US 2005/0278740 A1 Dec. 15, 2005
(filed Jun. 10, 2004)
Friedman US 7,231,178 B2 June 12, 2007
(filed Mar. 4, 2003)
Rejections on Appeal3
1. Claims 1, 7-11, and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over the combination of Ellis, Friedman, Leung, and
Tsuria. Ans. 4.
2. Claim 2 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combination of Ellis, Friedman, Leung, Tsuria, and
Helms. Ans. 9.

3 We note the Examiner has withdrawn the 35 U.S.C. § 112 rejection of
claims 1, 2, 7-11, and 24. Ans. 3.
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ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
We only consider those arguments actually made by Appellant in
reaching this decision, and we do not consider arguments which Appellant
could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs so that any such
arguments are deemed to be waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
We disagree with Appellant’s arguments with respect to claims 1, 2,
7-11, and 24, and we adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth
by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken and (2) the
reasons and rebuttals set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in
response to Appellant’s Arguments. However, we highlight and address
specific findings and arguments regarding claims 1 and 24 for emphasis as
follows.
1. § 103(a) Rejection of Claims 1 and 7-11
Issue 1
Appellant argues (App. Br. 9, 10; Reply Br. 1, 2) the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1 and 7-11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combination of Ellis, Friedman, Leung, and Tsuria is
in error. These contentions present us with the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding that the cited prior art combination
teaches or suggests an IDMA comprising “a content control component that
selectively controls the source component to not receive the content signal
and separately to receive, but not send, the content signal,” as recited in
claim 1?
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Analysis
Appellant contends:
the Examiner seems to attribute equipment in the uplink portion
of Friedman’s system to the claimed “content control
component.” That being the case, then it would not appear
possible for Friedman’s content control component to also be
capable of the claim requirement to control the content source
(the set top box per the Examiner) “separately to receive but not
send the content signal” (per Leung). There would appear to be
no way an uplink piece of equipment could permit a remote set
top box from receiving but not sending the content signal.
App. Br. 9. Appellant further contends Leung does not teach or suggest:
the content control component controls the content source
“separately to receive, but not send, the content signal.[”]
Specifically, the Examiner noted that blocking circuit 14 can
block the signal from the cable box 10 from reaching the TV
display 16. The blocking circuit blocks the cable box’s signal
from reaching the TV display 16, but the blocking circuit
cannot not control the cable box . . . from receiving but not
sending the content signal . . . [after] the blocking circuit 14
blocks the signal, the cable box 10 has already sent its signal to
the blocking circuit.
Id. Finally, because Leung does not explicitly teach that components 10, 12,
14, 18, 20, and 22 could all be combined together in a single set-top box,
Appellant speculates, “[i]t could be that cable box 10 connects to a separate
box that contains the remaining components 12, 14, 18, 20, and 22 in which
case such a hypothetical box would not be capable of controlling the cable
box 10 to receive but not send the content signal.” App. Br. 10.
As an initial matter in our claim construction analysis, we construe
several terms found in the disputed limitations.
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Source Component
Appellant defines, by way of example, a source component as being:
a cable receiver, a video cassette recorder/player (VCR), a
digital video disk recorder/player (DVD), a satellite receiver, a
personal video recorder/player (PVR), an antenna, a stereo
system, a radio, a personal computer, a digital storage system, a
compact disc player, an Internet connection, a network
connection, a game console, a camera, a camcorder, a phone
system, a television, a network storage device, an electronic
storage device, and a projector, and any other source capable of
delivering content.
Spec. [Para 28]. Accordingly, under the broadest reasonable interpretation
standard,4 we conclude a “source component” is any source of electronic
data representing content.
Intelligent Data Management Arrangement (IDMA)
Appellant’s disclosure states: “IDMA 302 serves to manage signals
present in a content distribution system. Thus, IDMA 302 receives remote
control signals 316 either locally or via remote 308 that may be configured
utilizing a wired or wireless connection.” Spec. [Para 27]. Further, “a
remote control signal may originate from any of a variety of sources such
that an IDMA may be considered a universal remote control receiving
system as well.” Spec. [Para 63].
Thus, we conclude an IDMA is a universal remote control receiving
system that manages signals in a content distribution system.

4 Claim terms are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation, as
understood by those of ordinary skill in the art and taking into account
whatever enlightenment may be had from the Specification. In re Morris,
127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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Content Control Component
Appellant’s disclosure states:
Access, therefore, may be limited in any of several ways.
First, objectionable content (or content signals) may be blocked
at content sources 1302-1308. Thus, a content source may be
blocked from receiving content by a content control component
where access authorization is denied. Second, objectionable
content (or content signals) may be blocked from leaving
content sources 1302-1308. Thus, a content source may be
blocked from sending content by a content control component
where access authorization is denied. Third, objectionable
content (or content signals) may be blocked from being
displayed on a particular display device 1310-1319.
Spec. [Para 70]. We note Appellant’s drawings and written description do
not provide any indication of the location of the content control component
in the disclosed access control system, and leave open the inference that the
content control component can be located at the content source, or within the
IDMA. However, we note claim 1 appears to require that the content control
component be located within the IDMA, i.e., “the IDMA comprising, a
content control component . . . .”
Appellant’s “Summary of Claimed Subject Matter” (App. Br. 7, FN 5)
indicates support for this limitation, i.e., “content control component,” may
be found in the original disclosure at Fig. 4 (element 402, “input module”),
and page 7, line 1 of paragraph 31 through p. 10 line 4. We disagree with
Appellant’s characterization that the recited “content control component”
reads on input module 402.
We have reviewed this lengthy citation, and find the most relevant
portion to this issue to be located in Specification paragraph 34, to wit:
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A third module, interface module 408 includes control
interface 426, display interface 428, and content interface 430.
Control interface 426 may be configured to process
communication between IDMA 400 and content sources and to
provide a user interface for controlling content sources and
remote control devices. Control interface 426 may be
implemented in hardware, software, or both without departing
from the present invention.
Spec. [Para 34]; and see FIG. 4 (control interface 426). Thus, we find
control interface 426 more reasonably supports Appellant’s recitation of a
“content control component,” and not input module 402, as set forth by
Appellant. App. Br. 7.
Thus, we conclude the scope of the recited “content control
component” reasonably encompasses a functional module or component,
located in the IDMA, that blocks unauthorized content.
Destination Component
Appellant’s disclosure states “IDMA 302 may be configured to send
display signal 310 to destination or destination component 306. In some
embodiments, display signal 310 is simply source content signal 314 passed
through IDMA 302. In other embodiments, display signal 310 may be
altered to conform to destination 306 standards.” Spec. [Para 30].
It may be appreciated that there are many types of destinations.
For example, a display is one type of destination that may
receive a display signal. Other types of destinations are a
storage device and a content source. Thus, a content source
may serve dual functionality in some embodiments by
providing a content signal and receiving a display signal.
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Id. Thus, using the broadest reasonable interpretation, we conclude the
scope of a “destination component” encompasses an electronic component
that receives an output from the IDMA.
Display Control Component
The only portions of Appellant’s original disclosure that discuss the
recited “display control component” state, “although a content source may
be configured to receive and send blocked content, display devices 1310-
1316 may be blocked from receiving blocked content by a display control
component where access authorization is denied” (Spec. [Para 70]), and “a
display control component for controlling access of the destination
component.” Originally-filed Claim 1. Thus, under the broadest reasonable
interpretation standard, we conclude the scope of a “display control
component” encompasses a functional module which is used to block access
to the content source by the destination component.
Having construed the claim terms in the disputed limitations, we now
turn to our analysis of the Examiner’s fact finding and legal conclusion of
obviousness.
We find Appellant’s challenge to the references individually is not
convincing of error in the Examiner’s position. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d
413, 426 (CCPA 1981) (“one cannot show non-obviousness by attacking
references individually where, as here, the rejections are based on
combinations of references” (citations omitted)). Additionally, “[t]he
combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be
obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” KSR Int’l Co.
v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). Furthermore, the artisan is not
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compelled to blindly follow the teaching of one prior art reference over the
other without the exercise of independent judgment (see Lear Siegler, Inc. v.
Aeroquip Corp., 733 F.2d 881, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
In the present case, the Examiner found the proposed combination
would have resulted in using Friedman’s conditional access system to track
allowed channels for each set-top box (Ans. 5 and 11 (citing Friedman Fig.
3, element 43; and col. 4, ll. 24-32)), with Leung’s teaching or suggestion of
a blocking circuit in a set-top box or IDMA. Ans. 12; and see Leung
¶¶ [0061], [0074], [0083]; Fig. 2 (blocking circuit 14); Fig. 4 (blocking
circuit 38); Fig. 5 (blocking circuit 39). We find this articulated rationale to
be sufficient to justify the combination.
Appellant has provided no evidence that combining such teachings,
i.e., combining the various elements 10, 12, 14, 18, 20, and 22 in Leung’s
Figure 2 into a single set-top box, was “uniquely challenging or difficult for
one of ordinary skill in the art,” Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. v. Fisher-Price,
Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007), nor has Appellant presented
evidence that this incorporation yielded more than expected results.
Accordingly, Appellant has not provided sufficient evidence or
argument to persuade us of any reversible error in the Examiner’s reading of
the contested limitations on the cited prior art. Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 1. As Appellant has
not provided separate arguments with respect to dependent claims 7-11,
rejected on the same basis as claim 1, we similarly sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
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§ 103(a) Rejection of Claim 2
Claim 2 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combination of Ellis, Friedman, Leung, Tsuria, and
Helms. Ans. 9. However, Appellant merely argues, “[c]laim 2 depends on
claim 1. Claim 1 is allowable over its cited art as explained above. Helms
does not satisfy the deficiencies noted above, and thus claim 2 is also in
condition for allowance.” App. Br. 11.
When Appellant does not separately argue the patentability of
dependent claims, the claims stand or fall with the claims from which they
depend. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Sernaker,
702 F.2d 989, 991 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Therefore, lacking separate, substantive
arguments, we pro forma sustain the Examiner’s unpatentability rejection of
claim 2.
2. § 103(a) Rejection of Claim 24
Issue 2
Appellant separately argues (App. Br. 10, 11; Reply Br. 2, 3) the
Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over the combination of Ellis, Friedman, Leung, and
Tsuria is in error. These contentions present us with the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding that the cited prior art combination
teaches or suggests “wherein the IDMA is in communication with a plurality
of content sources and a plurality of destination devices and controls one
source component differently than another source component and also
controls one destination device differently than another destination device,”
as recited in claim 24?
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Analysis
With respect to dependent claim 24, added during prosecution,
Appellant contends ‘“claim 24 requires that ‘the IDMA is in communication
with a plurality of content sources and a plurality of destination devices’ . . .
[and] the IDMA ‘controls one content source differently than another
content source and also controls one destination device differently than
another destination device.’” App. Br. 10. “Specifically, Ellis does not
teach controlling destination devices from the one location[, and while] Ellis
may teach controlling a secondary set-top box . . . controlling such a set-top
box is not at all the same as controlling a destination device as is required by
the claim.” App. Br. 11.
The Examiner finds, and we agree, Ellis would have taught or at least
suggested “controlling both content sources and destination devices . . .
[i.e.,] by controlling the set-top box (a content source) in a child’s room.”
Ans. 13.
[F]or example, the IDMA of Ellis is also inherently controlling
the television (destination device) in said child’s room. For
example, if a parent were to restrict a child's set-top box from
receiving R-rated movies, then the child's television could also
not display R-rated movies from the set-top box, and thus the
television (destination device) would also be controlled. Claim
24 has none of the specific limitations which define how the
devices are controlled, i.e. where the signals are blocked, and
the limitations of claim 1 which do require such teaching are
[taught] by Friedman[.]
Ans. 14.
Accordingly, Appellant has not provided sufficient evidence or
argument to persuade us of any reversible error in the Examiner’s reading of
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the contested limitations on the cited prior art. Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent claim 24.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err with respect to the unpatentability rejections
of claims 1, 2, 7-11, and 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combination
of prior art of record, and we sustain the rejections.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 2, 7-11, and 24.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2011).
AFFIRMED

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