Ex Parte Wagener et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 29, 2018

13083948 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 29, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/083,948 04/11/2011
33072 7590 12/03/2018
KAGAN BINDER, PLLC
SUITE 200, MAPLE ISLAND BUILDING
221 MAIN STREET NORTH
STILLWATER, MN 55082
UNITED ST A TES OF AMERICA
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Thomas J. Wagener
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
TEF0227/US (786US01) 9230
EXAMINER
LEE, DOUGLAS
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1714
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/03/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@kaganbinder.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte THOMAS J. WAGENER, JEFFERY W. BUTTERBAUGH, and
DAVID DEKRAKER
Appeal2018-001663
Application 13/083,948
Technology Center 1700
Before KAREN M. HASTINGS, N. WHITNEY WILSON, and
CHRISTOPHER C. KENNEDY, Administrative Patent Judges.
WILSON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants 1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
January 23, 2017 decision finally rejecting claims 1-5, 7-9, 12-16, 24, 25,
28, and 29. We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 The real party in interest is identified as TEL PSI, INC., a subsidiary of
Tokyo Electron Ltd. (Appeal Br. 3).
Appeal2018-001663
Application 13/083,948
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellants' disclosure is directed to a method of processing a
microelectronic workpiece using spray processor tools (Spec. 1 ). In
particular, it relates to a method for controlling the mixing of the treatment
fluids that can occur near substrate surfaces when using spray processor
tools in order to minimize negative consequences which may result from
uncontrolled mixing of those fluids (id.). The mixing of the fluids is
controlled by the use of suction to prevent drips of fluids coming from
dispensing nozzles (id. at 4). Details of the claimed invention are set forth in
independent claim 1, which is reproduced below from the Claims Appendix
of the Appeal Brief (argued limitations in italics):
1. A method of processing a microelectronic workpiece, the
method comprising:
positioning a microelectronic workpiece in a process
chamber comprising first and second dispense nozzles the first
and second dispense nozzles configured to independently direct
one or more treatment fluids at the microelectronic workpiece;
dispensing a first treatment fluid through a first dispense
line and into the process chamber with the first dispense nozzle;
terminating dispensing of the first treatment fluid into the
process chamber with the first dispense nozzle;
applying suction to the first dispense line and the first
dispense nozzle to remove residual first treatment fluid
comprising the acid from the first dispense line and first
dispense nozzle;
after applying suction to the dispense line and the first
dispense nozzle, dispensing a second treatment fluid through a
second dispense line and into the process chamber with the
second dispense nozzle; and
maintaining suction applied to the first dispense line and
the first dispense nozzle during at least a portion of dispensing
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Application 13/083,948
the second treatment fluid from the second dispense nozzle to
remove residual first treatment fluid comprising the acid from
the first dispense line and first dispense nozzle,
wherein the first treatment fluid comprises an acid and
the second treatment fluid comprises a fluid that exothermically
mixes with the acid.
REJECTIONS
I. Claims 1-5, 7-9, 12-16, and 25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ I03(a) as unpatentable over Ho,2 in view ofNguyen3 and Araki. 4
II. Claim 24 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as unpatentable
over Ho, in view of Nguyen and Araki, and further in view ofDeKraker5
and Tomita. 6
III. Claims 28 and 29 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as
unpatentable over Ho, in view of Nguyen and Araki, and further in view of
Collins. 7
DISCUSSION
Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments set forth by
Appellants in the Appeal Brief and the Reply Brief, we determine that the
2 Ho et al., US 2004/0206375 Al, published October 21, 2004.
3 Nguyen, US 7,306,114 B2, issued December 11, 2007.
4 Araki et al., US 2004/0261817 Al, published December 30, 2004.
5 DeKraker et al., US 2008/0283090 Al, published November 20, 2008.
6 Tomita et al., US 5,634,980, issued June 3, 1997.
7 Collins et al., US 2007 /0245954, issued October 25, 2007.
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preponderance of the evidence of record supports the obviousness rejection
on appeal.
The Examiner has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case
of obviousness based on an inherent or explicit disclosure of the claimed
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 103. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445
(Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[T]he examiner bears the initial burden, on review of the
prior art or on any other ground, of presenting a prima facie case of
unpatentability."). To establish a prima facie case of obviousness, the
Examiner must show that each and every limitation of the claim is described
or suggested by the prior art or would have been obvious based on the
knowledge of those of ordinary skill in the art. In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071,
1074 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Appellants do not offer separate arguments in connection with any of
the claims (see Appeal Br. 15-16). Accordingly, we focus our discussion on
the rejection of claim 1, and the remaining claims on appeal will stand or fall
with claim 1.
Appellants argue that none of Ho, Nguyen, or Araki, alone or in
combination, teach the following limitations from claim 1: ( 1) "first and
second dispense nozzles configured to independently direct one or more
treatment fluids at the microelectronic workpiece" and (2) "maintaining
suction applied to the first dispense line and the first dispense nozzle during
at least a portion of dispensing the second treatment fluid from the second
dispense nozzle to remove residual first treatment fluid comprising the acid
from the first dispense line and first dispense nozzle."
Limitation (1). The Examiner finds that this limitation is taught by
Ho, in particular arms 405 and 406 as shown in Figure 4 and described in
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Application 13/083,948
paragraph 37. Other than the simple assertion that Ho does not teach this
limitation (Appeal Br. 10), Appellants do not provide any explanation of
why the Examiner's findings with regards to this limitation are erroneous
(see id. at 10-12).
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellants and in light of the arguments and evidence
produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010)
(precedential) ("Filing a Board appeal does not, unto itself, entitle an
appellant to de nova review of all aspects of a rejection. If an appellant fails
to present arguments on a particular issue- or, more broadly, on a
particular rejection- the Board will not, as a general matter, unilaterally
review those uncontested aspects of the rejection."), cited with approval in
In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("[I]t has long been the
Board's practice to require an applicant to identify the alleged error in the
examiner's rejections.")). Moreover, the Federal Circuit has held that the
Board reasonably requires more substantive arguments in an Appeal Brief
than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the
corresponding elements were not found in the prior art. See In re Lovin, 652
F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Thus, in the absence of a substantive
explanation of why the Examiner's findings in this regard are erroneous, we
do not find reversible error in them.
Moreover, as explained by the Examiner (Ans. 11-12), Ho explicitly
teaches the presence of limitation (1) above, in particular in Figure 4 and
paragraphs 36 and 37.
Accordingly, Appellants do not show reversible error in the
Examiner's findings that limitation (1) is disclosed by Ho.
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Limitation (2). The Examiner cites (Final Act. 3) to the following
language in Ho in support of his determination of the obviousness of
limitation (2):
Further, each of arms 405 and 406 may include a mechanism
configured to prevent fluid dripping from the nozzles when the
nozzles are not activated from touching the substrate. For
example, the nozzles may include a vacuum port or suck up
valve (not shown) that is configured to receive unwanted fluid
drips during off times. Alternatively, nozzles may include a gas
aperture that is configured to blow unwanted droplets of fluid
away from the substrate surface.
(Ho ,r 37, emphasis added). The Examiner finds that Ho does not explicitly
disclose applying suction to the first dispense line and the first dispense
nozzle to remove residual first treatment fluid from the first dispense line
and first dispense nozzle (Final Act. 3). However, the Examiner finds that
Nguyen discloses a method wherein after terminating delivery of the
treatment fluid, the nozzle is suctioned to remove treatment liquid contained
in the nozzle and channel (id.). Therefore, according to the Examiner, it
would have been obvious to modify Ho to use the nozzle of Nguyen such
that the dispense lines and nozzles are suctioned after termination of the
dispensing of the treatment fluid in order to prevent unwanted solution from
dripping onto the wafer and reduce maintenance costs by using a more cost
effective dispense head (id. at 3--4).
Appellants argue that one of skill in the art would not have seen any
"apparent reason or benefit based on ... Nguyen" to modify Ho's system
with the nozzles of Nguyen because Ho does not appear to appreciate the
risk of damaging a substrate due to the exothermic reaction between an acid
and a second liquid, for example water (Appeal Br. 11-13). However, as
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explained in detail by the Examiner (Ans. 12-13), Ho explicitly teaches the
use of suction to prevent dripping of liquids onto the substrate from the
dispense nozzles (Ho ,r 37). To the extent that Appellants are arguing that
Ho does not appreciate the specific problem sought to be corrected by
Appellants, this argument is not persuasive. Even if the rationale articulated
by the Examiner for combining or modifying the references differs from that
used by Appellants, an obviousness rejection can still be proper.
The question is not whether the combination was obvious to
[Appellants] but whether the combination was obvious to a
person with ordinary skill in the art. Under the correct analysis,
any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time
of invention and addressed by the [claim] can provide a reason
for combining the elements in the manner claimed.
KSR Int 'l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007). KSR instructs us
that, in making determinations of obviousness, we must not limit our
analysis only to the problem Appellants were trying to solve.
With regards to Appellants' argument that the art does not suggest
maintaining suction to the first dispense line and nozzle while dispensing
from the second dispense line and nozzle, we agree with the Examiner that
Ho explicitly discloses the use of suction to prevent dripping of liquids onto
the substrate from the dispense nozzles (Ho ,r 37). While Ho does not
disclose when that suction should be applied, Araki teaches a similar
suctioning step to remove unwanted residual solution where the suctioning
can be stopped after the ejection of the treatment fluid is stopped or the
suctioning can be constant (Araki ,r 150). The Examiner determined that it
would have been obvious to have the suction taught by Ho be constantly
driven as suggested by Araki in order to ensure that no unwanted treatment
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fluid is dripped onto the wafer. In other words, having the suction on
constantly would minimize the risk that unwanted treatment fluid is dripped
on the wafer, and having the suction on constantly would mean that the
suction is maintained while the second treatment fluid is dispensed through
the second nozzle. Appellants have not persuasively refuted this reasoning.
CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the rejection of claims 1-5, 7-9, 12-16, and 25 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Ho, in view of Nguyen and Araki.
We AFFIRM the rejection of claim 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Ho, in view of Nguyen and Araki, and further in view of
DeKraker and Tomita.
We AFFIRM the rejection of claims 28 and 29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Ho, in view of Nguyen and Araki, and further in view of
Collins.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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