Ex Parte Venegas

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 15, 2017

13460346 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 15, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/460,346 04/30/2012 Frank Venegas JR. IDS-19102/14 2164
131270 7590
BELZER PC
ATTN: John G. Posa
2905 Bull Street
Savannah, GA 31405
11/15/2017 EXAMINER
AISAKA, BRYCE M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2851
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/15/2017 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte FRANK VENEGAS, JR.
Appeal 2017-001387
Application 13/460,3461
Technology Center 2800
Before ADRIENE LEPIANE HANLON, LINDA M. GAUDETTE, and
SHELDON M. McGEE, Administrative Patent Judges.
McGEE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134, Appellant appeals from the Examiner’s
rejection adverse to the patentability of claims 1—5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6.
We affirm.
1 Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Frank Venegas, Jr.
App. Br. 1.
Appeal 2017-001387
Application 13/460,346
BACKGROUND
The subject matter on appeal is directed to a stand for charging an
electric or hybrid vehicle. Spec. 14.
Sole independent claim 1 is illustrative.
1. A charging stand for an electric or hybrid vehicle, comprising:
a post or pole extending upwardly from a ground surface
terminating in an upper end;
an electrical power control unit disposed in the post or
pole;
a polymeric sheath covering the post or pole, including the
upper end thereof;
user controls accessible on or through the polymeric
sheath;
a retractable power cord having one end in communication
with the electrical power control unit and an opposing end with
a plug adapted for coupling to a vehicle for recharging purposes;
a housing including a rotatable spool onto which the
retractable power cord is wound;
an access door on the housing; and
apparatus causing the access door to remain closed until
the user controls confirm that a user is authorized to access and
use the power cord.
App. Br. 7.
REFERENCES
The Examiner relies on the following references as evidence of
unpatentability:
Rees US 2010/0277075 A1 Nov. 4, 2010
Bianco US 2011/0074351 A1 March 31, 2011
Donnelly US 2011/0106329 A1 May 5, 2011
2
Appeal 2017-001387
Application 13/460,346
REJECTIONS ON APPEAL
I. Claim 1—3 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Bianco in view of Donnelly (Final Act. 3—5); and
II. Claims 4 and 5 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Bianco in view of Donnelly and Rees (Final Act.
5).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Examiner finds that Bianco discloses all of the elements recited in
sole independent claim 1, except for the limitations requiring “a polymeric
sheath covering the post or pole,” “user controls accessible through the
polymeric sheath,” and “an access door on the housing” that remains closed
until authorized access is provided. Final Act. 4. The Examiner finds, and
Appellant does not dispute (App. Br., Reply Br., generally), that these
limitations were well known in the art at the time of the invention, and relies
on the disclosure of Donnelly as evidence of such knowledge. Id. The
Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to the skilled artisan to
incorporate Donnelly’s well-known plastic protective features and access
door into Bianco’s charging station in order to “safely provide electrical
connections and prevent unauthorized access,” thereby achieving the
invention as claimed. Id.
OPINION
We address the claims separately to the extent they are so argued by
Appellant. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv)(2015).
3
Appeal 2017-001387
Application 13/460,346
Claims 1—3
We have reviewed Appellant’s arguments and are not persuaded that
Appellant has identified reversible error. In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365—
66 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining the Board’s long-held practice of requiring
an Appellant to identify the alleged error in the Examiner’s rejection). We
sustain the rejection of claims 1—3 based on the findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and rebuttals to arguments expressed by the Examiner in the Final
Action and in the Answer. We add the following comments for emphasis
and completeness.
Appellant contends that it would not have been physically possible to
modify Bianco’s charging station by incorporating Donnelly’s polymeric
sheath. App. Br. 4; Reply Br. 2. This argument fails to identify reversible
error, however, because “[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the
features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the
structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed invention must
be expressly suggested in any one or all of the references. Rather, the test is
what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to
those of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA
1981). See also In reNievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973) (“Combining
the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their
specific structures.”). Rather, “when the question is whether a patent
[application] claiming the combination of elements of prior art is obvious,”
the answer depends on “whether the improvement is more than the
predictable use of prior art elements according to their established
functions.” KSRInt’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). Here,
it is undisputed that the individual elements recited in the claims were
known in the prior art. Moreover, Appellant does not argue any
4
Appeal 2017-001387
Application 13/460,346
unpredictable results based on adding a polymeric protective sheath to a post
or pole, and we perceive none.
We furthermore disagree with Appellant’s arguments against the
Examiner’s proffered motivation to combine the references. App. Br. 4—5;
Reply Br. 2. Specifically, Appellant’s arguments that “Bianco already
allows the charger to safely provide electrical connections and prevent
unauthorized access” (App. Br. 4), and that the Examiner fails to “provide a
rationale for the proposed combination” (Reply Br. 2) are unavailing.
Contrary to Appellant’s position, the Examiner indeed provides a sound
rationale for including Donnelly’s use of plastic protective materials and an
access door into Bianco’s charging stand, i.e., to have “additional ways to
enhance the safety and security of the” charger. Ans. 4. Here, we
emphasize Bianco’s preference in one embodiment for “a standalone
outdoor installation which provides publicly accessible power.” Bianco
1 89. The skilled artisan would have appreciated that such installations may
not have some of the security features disclosed elsewhere in Bianco such as
an entrance gate to be used, for example, in a parking garage application. Id.
at 9, 71. Therefore, the skilled artisan would have expected the additional
security and/or safety measures taught by Donnelly to be desirable in the
event that the features of Bianco (e.g., the entrance gate) were either not
used or were insufficient to prevent unauthorized and/or safe access to the
charging station. Additionally, we are left unpersuaded by Appellant’s
position that a polymeric sheath would be superfluous in view of Bianco’s
canopy. App. Br. 4; Reply Br. 2. Despite Appellant’s argument to the
contrary (Reply Br. 2), the Examiner indicates that Bianco’s canopy
provides shelter to vehicles being charged. Ans. 3 (citing Bianco 1 91 (“The
canopy 270 provides shelter for using the charging station and charging the
5
Appeal 2017-001387
Application 13/460,346
vehicle at an outdoor location.”)). We agree with the Examiner (Ans. 3) that
this purpose is different than that identified for Donnelly’s plastic protective
feature, which assists in the safe operation of the electrical outlet (Donnelly
146).
Claims 4 and 5
Upon review of Appellant’s arguments against the rejection of claims
4 and 5, we are unpersuaded of reversible error. We, therefore, sustain the
rejection of these claims for the reasons expressed by the Examiner in the
Final Action and in the Answer. We add the following.
Appellant’s arguments that Rees is non-analogous art (App. Br. 5;
Reply Br. 3) are unavailing. The Specification indicates that additional light
may be necessary during operation of the charging station, and that such
light may be activated when a person or vehicle comes in close proximity to
the charging stand. Spec. H 14, 16. Rees is relied on by the Examiner for
its teaching of optical sensors to detect an object’s presence or the lack of
ambient light. Final Act. 5.
Thus, because the Specification recognizes the problem that additional
light may be needed during a charging operation, and because Rees teaches
optical sensors useful for detecting when such light should be provided (see
e.g., Rees 14), we do not consider Rees to be non-analogous art. In other
words, Rees is analogous art because it is “reasonably pertinent to the
particular problem with which the inventor is involved,” i.e., illuminating an
area with insufficient light. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
We also observe that Appellant does not offer any evidence to support
the argument regarding the level of ambient light that is available in Bianco
and Donnelly. App. Br. 5; Reply Br. 3. Moreover, we emphasize that
6
Appeal 2017-001387
Application 13/460,346
Bianco’s installation is “preferably a standalone outdoor installation”
(Bianco 1 89) which the skilled artisan would have reasonably expected to
benefit from additional light during darker periods of the day or at night.
SUMMARY
The Examiner’s final decision to reject claims 1—5 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1).
AFFIRMED
7