Ex Parte Vandevanter

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Sep 10, 2009

10373573 (B.P.A.I. Sep. 10, 2009)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte JOHN S. VANDEVANTER
____________

Appeal 2008-002722
Application 10/373,5731
Technology Center 2100
____________

Decided: September 11, 2009
____________

Before HOWARD B. BLANKENSHIP, JEAN R. HOMERE, and
CAROLYN D. THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judges.

THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

1 Application filed February 25, 2003. The real party in interest is General
Electric Company.
Appeal 2008-002722
Application 10/373,573

2
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection
of claims 12-22 mailed October 21, 2005, which are all the claims remaining
in the application, as claims 1-11 are cancelled. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

A. INVENTION
Appellant invented a system and method for providing a power
distribution system. The system includes a first processor for executing a
first task having a first priority, and a second processor for executing a
second task having a second priority. (Spec. 25, Abstract.)

B. ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIMS
The appeal contains claims 12-22. Claims 12, 20, and 22 are
independent claims. Claims 12 and 20 are illustrative:
12. A processor system for a centralized circuit breaker
protection system for a power distribution system, comprising:
a first processor for executing an instantaneous
overcurrent trip for a plurality of circuit breakers in said centralized
circuit breaker protection system; and
a second processor for executing a task other than said
instantaneous overcurrent trip for said plurality of circuit breakers.

20. A method of executing tasks in a power distribution
system, comprising:
employing a first processor for executing a first
protection task having a first priority to control a plurality of circuit
breakers in the power distribution system; and
Appeal 2008-002722
Application 10/373,573

3
employing a second processor for executing a second
task having a second priority to monitor and control said plurality of
circuit breakers.

C. REFERENCES
The references relied upon by the Examiner as evidence in rejecting
the claims on appeal are as follows:
Bilas US 5,315,499 May 24, 1994
Alexander US 6,038,516 Mar. 14, 2000
Ragle US 6,492,910 B1 Dec. 10, 2002
Hamamatsu US 6,845,301 B2 Jan. 18, 2005
(Filed Jan. 30, 2002)

D. REJECTIONS
The Examiner entered the following five (5) rejections which are
before us for review:
(1) Claims 20 and 21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being
anticipated by Bilas;
(2) Claims 12-14, 17, 18, and 20-22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e) as being anticipated by Hamamatsu;
(3) Claim 19 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Hamamatsu;
(4) Claim 16 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Hamamatsu in view of Alexander; and
(5) Claim 15 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Hamamatsu in view of Ragle.

Appeal 2008-002722
Application 10/373,573

4
II. FINDINGS OF FACT
The following findings of fact (FF) are supported by a preponderance
of the evidence.
Bilas
1. Bilas discloses “a load panel enclosure having a plurality of circuit
breakers, each of which opens and closes in response to a control signal . . .
A microcomputer generates the control signals to control the position of the
circuit breakers. . . .” (Abstract; see also Col. 2, ll. 63-65.)

Hamamatsu
2. Hamamatsu discloses that “[t]he component controlling-and-
monitoring unit 30 controls and monitors the main-circuit units and sends
out commands such as a command for circuit trip to the switchgear 25.”
(Col. 8, ll. 47-50.)
3. Hamamatsu discloses that “Fig. 55 shows typical ‘bays’ or ‘bay
zones’ for a switch-gear.” (Col. 21, ll. 17-18.)
4. Hamamatsu discloses that “in a transformer circuit, one bay zone
of protection and control usually include the higher and the lower voltage
sides, although the switchgears of the higher and the lower voltage sides are
not necessarily disposed close to each other.” (Col. 22, ll. 15-19.)
5. Hamamatsu discloses that “[c]ontrol commands (downward
information) from the main-circuit control unit 21-1 and the protecting unit
22-1 or collective controlling-and-monitoring equipment 3 in the control
main building 1 to the substation main-circuit components . . . are exchanged
through the process bus 29 and the component controlling-and-monitoring
unit (CMU) 30.” (Col. 8, ll. 40-47.)
Appeal 2008-002722
Application 10/373,573

5
III. PRINCIPLES OF LAW
In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102, “[a] single prior art
reference that discloses, either expressly or inherently, each limitation of a
claim invalidates that claim by anticipation.” Perricone v. Medicis Pharm.
Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005), citing Minn. Mining & Mfg.
Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1565 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
Anticipation of a patent claim requires a finding that the claim
at issue ‘reads on’ a prior art reference. In other words, if
granting patent protection on the disputed claim would allow
the patentee to exclude the public from practicing the prior art,
then that claim is anticipated, regardless of whether it also
covers subject matter not in the prior art.
Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed Cir. 1999)
(internal citations omitted).
“What matters is the objective reach of the claim. If the claim
extends to what is obvious, it is invalid under § 103.” KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007). To be nonobvious, an
improvement must be “more than the predictable use of prior art elements
according to their established functions.” Id. at 417.

IV. ANALYSIS
Grouping of Claims
In the Brief, Appellant argues claims 20 and 21 as a group (App. Br.
4-6). For claim 21, Appellant repeats the same argument made for claim 20.
We will, therefore, treat claim 21 as standing or falling with claim 20.
Appellant argues claims 12-14, 17, 18, and 20-22 as a group (App. Br.
7-10). For claims 13, 14, 17, 18, and 20-22, Appellant repeats the same
Appeal 2008-002722
Application 10/373,573

6
argument made for claim 12. We will, therefore, treat claims 13, 14, 17, 18,
and 20-22 as standing or falling with claim 12.
No separate arguments were made for claims 15, 16, and 19, thus
claims 15, 16, and 19 shall stand or fall with claim 12.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii). See also In re Young, 927 F.2d 588,
590 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

The Anticipation Rejection
Claims 20 and 21
Anticipated by Bilas

We first consider the Examiner’s rejection of the claims under 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Bilas.
Appellant contends that “the microcomputers 102, 120 of Bilas simply
do not execute protection tasks. While the circuit breakers themselves may
individually execute protection tasks, these tasks are simply not executed by
microcomputers 102, 120.” (App. Br. 5.) Appellant further contends that
“the controller 102 in Bilas executes energy management tasks and, not,
protection tasks as claimed.” (App. Br. 6.)
The Examiner found that “the microcomputer 102 [in Bilas] does
execute a protection task, since one of ordinary skill in the art would have
known that opening a circuit breaker is a protective task because it
disconnects an electrical load from an electrical power line.” (Ans. 10.)
Issue: Has Appellant shown that the Examiner erred in finding that
Bilas discloses a first processor for executing a first protection task?”

Appeal 2008-002722
Application 10/373,573

7
In essence, Appellant contends that while Bilas’ circuit breakers
themselves execute protection tasks, these tasks are not executed by Bilas’
microcomputer 102 (App. Br. 5). We disagree.
Given that Appellant admits that Bilas operates circuit breakers and
operating circuit breakers denotes a “protection task” (App. Br. 5), the only
question that remains is whether such a protection task is executed by Bilas’
processor. The Examiner found that Bilas’ microcomputer 102 executes a
protection task (Ans. 10). We agree.
Specifically, Bilas discloses that the circuit breakers open and close in
response to a control signal from the microcomputer 102 (FF 1). In other
words, it is Bilas’ microcomputer 102 that transmits the signal to cause the
circuit breakers to operate. Thus, we find Appellant’s argument that these
tasks are simply not executed by microcomputer 102, unpersuasive.
Thus, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s
conclusion of anticipation for representative claim 20. Therefore, we affirm
the Examiner’s § 102 rejection of independent claim 20 and of claim 21,
which falls therewith.

Claims 12, 20, and 21
Anticipated by Hamamatsu

Appellant contends that “one PCU 23 and therefore one protecting
unit 22 is used in the control of one circuit breaker 25 and, not, the ‘plurality
of circuit breakers’ as claimed.” (App. Br. 8.) Appellant further contends
that “the Sixth embodiment, like the previous embodiments, simply
discloses that each PCU 23 (and therefore each protecting unit 22) executes
Appeal 2008-002722
Application 10/373,573

8
tasks for a single bay, and therefore for a single switchgear 25.” (App. Br.
9-10.)
The Examiner found that “[i]n Hamamatsu, figure 1, element number
22-1 is a protecting unit which is a ‘first processor’ . . . The protecting unit
controls circuit breaker (switchgear) 25” (Ans. 17). The Examiner further
found that “Figure 55 clearly displays a plurality of circuit breakers in a bay
as shown in the bay labeled TRANSFORMER BAY . . . Since a single
protecting unit controls a bay with multiple circuit breakers, Hamamatsu
clearly teaches a ‘first processor’ that executes tasks for a ‘plurality of
circuit breakers.’” (Ans. 18.)

Issue: Has Appellant shown that the Examiner erred in finding that
Hamamatsu discloses “a first processor for executing . . . for a plurality of
circuit breakers?”
In essence, Appellant’s only contention is that Hamamatsu fails to
disclose a single embodiment having one processor for executing a plurality
of circuit breakers (App. Br. 7-10). In response to this contention, the
Examiner found that Hamamatsu discloses a “bay” or “bay zone” having a
plurality of circuit breakers which is controlled by the main circuit unit of
Figure 1 (Ans. 17-18).
Specifically, Hamamatsu discloses that a controlling-and-monitoring
unit 30 sends commands, such as a command for a circuit trip, to the
switchgear 25 (i.e., circuit breaker) (FF 2). Hamamatsu further discloses a
typical switchgear with “bay zones” of protection and control, i.e., a
plurality of circuit breakers (FF 3-4). The Examiner reasons that “[s]ince a
single protecting unit controls a bay with multiple circuit breakers,
Appeal 2008-002722
Application 10/373,573

9
Hamamatsu clearly teaches a ‘first processor’ that executes tasks for a
‘plurality of circuit breakers.’” (Ans. 18.) We agree. Appellant has not
shown how the “typical bay zones” for the switchgear having multiple
circuit breakers, as illustrated in Hamamatsu’s Fig. 55, are exclusive to
Figure 55 and cannot be incorporated into Figure 1.
Furthermore, Hamamatsu discloses that control commands can come
from the main-circuit control unit 21-1 and the protecting unit 22-1 (i.e.,
PCU 23-1) or from the collective controlling-and-monitoring equipment 3 in
the control main building 1 to the substation main-circuit components via the
CMU 30 (FF 5: see also Figure 1). In other words, the collective
controlling-and-monitoring equipment 3, a common processor, can send
commands to the CMU 30 to trip the circuit breakers in each of the main
circuits 20-1, 20-2, etc.
As such, we find that the claimed “first processor for executing . . .
for a plurality of circuit breakers” also reads on Hamamatsu’s collective
equipment 3 exchanging of commands with the CMUs 30 of multiple main
circuits 20-1, 20-2, etc.
Thus, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s
conclusion of anticipation for claim 12, 20 and 22. Therefore, we affirm the
Examiner’s § 102 rejection of independent claim 12, 20, and 22 and of
claims 13, 14, 17, 18, and 21, which fall therewith.

The Obviousness Rejection
As for the rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), Appellant fails to
provide any separate arguments pertaining thereto. Therefore, we sustain
Appeal 2008-002722
Application 10/373,573

10
the Examiner’s § 103 rejections of claims 15, 16, and 19 for the same
reasons given above regarding claim 12.

V. CONCLUSIONS
We conclude that Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claims 12-22.
Thus, claims 12-22 are not patentable.

VI. DECISION
In view of the foregoing discussion, we affirm the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 12-22.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2009).

AFFIRMED

erc

Paul D. Greeley, Esq.
Ohlandt, Greeley, Ruggiero & Perle, L.L.P.
One Landmark Square, 10th Floor
Stamford CT 06901-2682