Ex Parte Vanderzon

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 10, 2016

13727198 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 10, 2016)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/727,198 12/26/2012 James Robert Vanderzon 2863-1-001PCT/US/CON 5477
23565 7590 06/10/2016
Klauber & Jackson LLC
25 East Spring Valley Avenue
Suite 160
Maywood, NJ 07607
EXAMINER
THOMAS, LUCY M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2836
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/10/2016 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte JAMES ROBERT VANDERZON
____________________

Appeal 2016-004790
Application 13/727,198
Technology Center 2800
____________________

Before BRUCE R. WINSOR, MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, and
AARON W. MOORE, Administrative Patent Judges.

STRAUSS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims
10–23. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

THE INVENTION
The claims are directed to a dimmer circuit with improved inductive
load imbalance protection. Spec., Title. Claim 10, reproduced below, is
representative of the claimed subject matter:
10. A protection circuit in a phase control dimmer circuit that, in
use, controls an inductive load, the phase control dimmer circuit
comprising a first switch and a second switch, the first switch in
use determining a firing angle for the second switch, and the
second switch, in series with the inductive load, effecting
conduction of the inductive load in response to the first switch,
the protection circuit comprising:
an imbalance detector for detecting an asymmetrical
operation in the inductive load by detecting a difference between
a conduction period of consecutive positive and negative half
cycles and registering a load imbalance if the difference between
the consecutive positive and negative half cycles exceeds a preset
threshold;
circuit control means for protecting the phase control
dimmer circuit by causing the phase control dimmer circuit to
reduce a DC component in the inductive load upon detection of
the asymmetrical operation, by controlling the first switch.

REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Licata
Pohl
US 3,927,345
US 4,215,554
Dec. 16, 1975
Aug. 5, 1980
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Luchaco
Esakoff
Bens
US 4,876,498
US 6,002,563
US 6,683,420 B2
Oct. 24, 1989
Dec. 14, 1999
Jan. 27, 2004
Masanori JP 2001-052885 Feb. 23, 2001

REJECTIONS1
The Examiner made the following rejections:
Claims 10, 16, 17, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
being anticipated by Licata. Final Act. 2–3.
Claims 10, 11, and 15–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
being anticipated by Esakoff. Final Act. 3–5.
Claims 10–12 and 15–21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Bens and Luchaco. Final Act. 5–8.
Claims 13, 14, 22, and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Bens, Luchaco, Masanori, and Pohl. Final Act. 8–9.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS
1. “The Bens et al. reference does not show, or suggest, controlling a
conduction angle to protect a dimming circuit for an inductive load
and resort to the secondary reference of Luchaco et al. would change
Bens et al. in a material manner contrary to the teaching of Bens et
al.” thereby rendering improper the rejection of claims 10–12 and
15–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Br. 15.

1 Because our decisions in connection with the rejections under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) are dispositive of the Appeal, we do not address the rejections
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).

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2. The combination of references asserted in rejecting claims 10–12 and
15–21 is further improper because “the imbalance detector [of Bens]
would not be expected to work (and in fact would not work) with an
inductive load [as taught by Luchaco], as the detector in Bens et al. is
designed for direct connection to a lamp/load (without a ballast choke
circuit or step down transformer).” Br. 16.
3. Masanori’s diode D1 and capacitor C32 do not form a second divider
chain connected to the other side of capacitor C5 as required by
claims 13 and 22. Br. 18.
4. “[N]either of Masanori or Pohl suggests the arrangement of claim 14
[and 23].” Br. 19.

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments the Examiner has erred in connection with the rejections of
claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We disagree with Appellant’s conclusions
as to these rejections. We adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set
forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken (Final
Act. 5–9) and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s
Answer in response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (Ans. 8–12) and concur with
the conclusions reached by the Examiner. We highlight the following for
emphasis.
In connection with contentions 1 and 2, Appellant argues that because
Luchaco is directed to a phase control dimmer circuit (i.e., the art to which
the pending claims are directed), while Bens is directed to problems specific
to high pressure discharge lamps that require rapid switching but not phase
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control, the rejection based on the combination of Bens and Luchaco should
be viewed as modifying Luchaco according to Bens, rather than vice versa.
Br. 16. That is, according to Appellant, the applicable question is whether it
would have been obvious to modify Luchacco’s phase controlled dimming
circuit that controls an inductive load by incorporating the detector
according to Bens and whether that combination would teach or suggest all
of the elements of independent claims 10, 11, 17, and 20. Id. Appellant
argues the rejection, so formulated, is improper because
1. “[T]he person skilled in the art when faced with the . . .
problem in phase controlled dimming circuits would not
obviously look to circuits for high pressure discharge
lamps with any reasonable expectation of success due to
the underlying technical differences between emission in
incandescent lamps and high pressure discharge lamps”;
and
2. Bens’s imbalance detector would not work with the
inductive load of Luchaco, rendering the resultant
combination and, in particular, the disputed imbalance
detector, inoperative.
Br. 16–17. Appellant argues “given the differences in the types of load, the
imbalance detector [of Bens] would not be expected to work (and in fact
would not work) with an inductive load, as the detector in Bens et al. is
designed for direct connection to a lamp/load (without a ballast choke circuit
or step down transformer).” Br. 16.
The Examiner responds by agreeing Luchaco is a more natural
starting point in analyzing the combination, but still finds Appellant’s
argument unpersuasive. Ans. 9. In connection with Appellant’s argument
that the combination of Bens and Luchaco is improper, the Examiner finds
“Luchaco teaches that [a] dimmer circuit with [a] DC component detector is
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needed for inductive loads to [eliminate] damaging DC current that may
flow through the load” in support of the conclusion “[i]t would have been
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made
to modify the detector of Bens and to use an inductive load.” Final Act. 6.
In rebuttal to Appellant’s argument that imbalance detectors for high
pressure discharge lamps would not be expected to work with loads having a
ballast choke circuit or a step down transformer, the Examiner directs
attention to Engels, U.S. Patent 4,016,451, for disclosing a high pressure
discharge lamp circuit including inductive ballast elements B1 and B2. Ans.
9. The Examiner further finds that Luchaco’s correcting means teaches the
disputed imbalance detector and that Luchaco’s circuit elements 92 and 94
teach the control circuit of the independent claims. Ans. 9–10.
We find Appellant’s contentions 1 and 2 unpersuasive as mere
attorney argument unsupported by sufficient evidence.2
In connection with Appellant’s argument concerning whether Luchaco
or Bens should be the primary reference that is modified by the other,
secondary reference (Br. 16), we note it does not matter which reference is
primary and which reference is secondary: “[W]here the relevant factual
inquiries underlying an obviousness determination are otherwise clear,
characterization by the examiner of prior art as ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ is
merely a matter of presentation with no legal significance.” In re Mouttet,
686 F.3d 1322, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012); accord In re Bush, 296 F.2d 491, 496
(CCPA 1961). In Bush, the Court stated

2 Attorney arguments and conclusory statements that are unsupported by
factual evidence are entitled to little probative value. See In re Geisler,
116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d
699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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[W]e deem it to be of no significance, but merely a matter of
exposition, that the rejection is stated to be on A in view of B
instead of on B in view of A, or to term one reference primary
and the other secondary. It would perhaps have saved much
argument of the kind we have before us if the Patent Office had
stayed with its rejection of the claims as unpatentable over A
and B “considered together” and had merely stated its reasons
for such rejection without formal alinement [sic] of the
references. Fifteen years ago this court pointed out in In re
Cowles, 156 F.2d 551, 554, 33 CCPA 1236, that such differing
forms of expression did not constitute different grounds of
rejection, were of little consequence, and that basing arguments
on them was “attempting to make a mountain out of a
molehill.”
As to the arguments about the differences between phase controlled
diming circuits and high pressure discharge lamp control circuitry posing
substantial difficulties in combining the teachings from these respective
endeavors, such that one skilled in the art would not make the combination
and, if made, the combination would not work (Br. 15–16), these arguments
lack sufficient evidence to persuade us that the proffered combination would
have been “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the
art.” Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)).
Instead, the Engel reference cited by the Examiner supports a finding,
contrary to Appellant’s argument, that high pressure discharge lamps may
include inductive elements such as ballast elements. Ans. 9. We are further
mindful that the skilled artisan would “be able to fit the teachings of multiple
patents together like pieces of a puzzle” because the skilled artisan is “a
person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 420-421.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of independent claims 10, 11, 17, and
20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Bens and Luchaco, together with the
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rejection of dependent claims 12, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 21, which are not
argued separately.
In connection with contention 3, Appellant argues Masanori’s diode
D2 and capacitor C34 are not configured as, and fail to teach, the second
divider chain of claims 13 and 22. Br. 18. The Examiner responds by
explaining that Pohl, not Masanori, teaches the disputed voltage divider
chains. Ans. 11. In the absence of substantive rebuttal, we agree with the
Examiner and sustain the rejection of dependent claims 13 and 22 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) over Bens, Luchaco, Masanori, and Pohl.
Appellant’s contention 4 is unpersuasive as consisting of little more
than naked assertions that the disputed claim elements are not found in the
prior art.3 Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of dependent claims 14 and
23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Bens, Luchaco, Masanori, and Pohl.
Our affirmance of the rejection of claims 10–23 on grounds specified
by the Examiner, namely, under § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Else,
Bens, and Luchaco (claims 10–12 and 15–21) and further in view of
Masanori (claims 13, 14, 22, and 23), constitutes a general affirmance of the
decision of the Examiner on those claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a). We do
not address the rejection of claims 10, 16, 17, and 19 under § 102(b) as
being anticipated by Licata, or the rejection of claims 10, 11, and 15–20 as
being anticipated by Esakoff, separately from the rejection of those claims

3 See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (“A statement which merely points out
what a claim recites will not be considered an argument for separate
patentability of the claim.”); In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (“[W]e hold that the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to
require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation
of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements
were not found in the prior art.”).
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under § 103(a), the Section 103 rejections are dispositive as to all of the
claims involved in the Section 102 rejections.

DECISION
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 10–23 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED