Ex Parte Van Wiemeersch et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 30, 2016

13716484 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 30, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
131716,484 12/17/2012
28395 7590 07/05/2016
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FG1L
1000 TOWN CENTER
22NDFLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
John Robert Van Wiemeersch
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
83341680 1020
EXAMINER
ZANELLI, MICHAEL J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3661
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/05/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JOHN ROBERT VAN WIEMEERSCH,
ROBERT BRUCE KLEVE, STEVEN YELLIN SCHONDORF,
THOMAS LEE MILLER, BRIAN BENNIE, DAE WOOK KWON, and
PAUL ALDIGHIERI
Appeal2014--007350
Application 13/716,484
Technology Center 3600
Before NEALE. ABRAMS, THOMAS F. SMEGAL, and
LISA M. GUIJT, Administrative Patent Judges.
SMEGAL, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
John Robert Van Wiemeersch et al. (Appellants) 1 seek our review
under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner's Final Rejection under 35 U.S.C. §
102(b) of claims 1-20. 2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Ford Global
Technologies, LLC. Br. 2.
2 While there are several errors in the Examiner's numbering of the claims in
the Final Action and Answer, we understand Appellants to be appealing
from the Final Rejection of claims 1-20. See Br. 1, 8. See also Non-Final
Rejection dated March 21, 2013.
Appeal2014--007350
Application 13/716,484
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 1, 8, and 15 are independent. Claim 1 is reproduced below
and illustrates the claimed subject matter, with disputed limitations
emphasized.
1. A system comprising:
one or more processors configured to:
communicate wirelessly with a vehicle and a cellular phone to
receive user requests from the cellular phone to control an
audible vehicle location component;
verify that the user is authorized to request control of the location
component;
upon verification, transmit to the vehicle a request from the user
to change an element of a locating sound produced by the
audible vehicle location component.
REJECTIONS
The following Examiner's rejections are before us for review.
I. Claim 20 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, fourth
paragraph, as being an improper dependent claim.
II. Claims 1-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Wang (US 2004/0203634 Al, pub. Oct. 14, 2004) and
Milch (US 2011/0029875 Al, pub. Feb. 3, 2011).
III. Claims 1-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Chestnutt (US 2009/0167524 Al, pub. July 2, 2009) and
Milch.
ANALYSIS
Rejection I
Appellants do not contest this rejection. See generally Br.
Accordingly, we summarily sustain the Examiner's decision rejecting claim
20 as an improper dependent claim.
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Application 13/716,484
Re} ection II
Claims 1, 2, 3, 6-10, and 13-17
Claims 2, 3, 6, and 7 depend from independent claim 1. Claims 9, 10,
13, and 14 depend from independent claim 8. Claims 16 and 1 7 depend
from independent claim 15. Appellants argue claims 1-3, 6-10, and 13-17
together in contesting the rejection of these claims over Wang and Milch.
See Br. 6-7. We select claim 1 as the representative claim for this group,
and the remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R.
41.37(c)(l)(iv).
In rejecting claim 1, the Examiner finds that Wang discloses, a
processor-based system having, inter alia, a cellular phone to control an
audible vehicle location component and looks to Milch for teaching control
of the location component by transmitting "a request from the user to change
an element of a locating sound produced by the audible vehicle location
component," as recited by claim 1. Final Act. 3--4. (emphasis added). The
Examiner reasons that "[a ]ll the claimed elements were known in the prior
art and one skilled in the art could have combined the elements as claimed
by known methods with no change in their respective functions, and the
combination would have yielded predictable results." Id. at 4.
Appellants take issue, pointing out that while "Milch does disclose a
user utilizing a user interface to map new audio content onto various
instances of vehicle alarms," that "in Milch, there is complete replacement
of the old locating sound with a new locating sound," while Appellants'
claims recite "changing an 'element' of a locating sound." Br. 6. Thus,
Appellants contend that "the entire sound is not replaced, but rather an
element of the sound is changed." Id.
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Application 13/716,484
The Examiner first explains that "the customization taught by Milch
[0012] enables a user to change an element of the locating sound to 'any
audio clip, song, ringtone, jingle, audio file (e.g., music file), audio
recording, audio component of media content (e.g., audio component of a
video clip), or any segment, component, or combination of these or other
forms of audio content that may be audibly played back."' Ans. 2 (citing
Milch, para. 13). The Examiner continues by reasoning that "[s]electing a
sound, or any segment, component, or combination thereof, and using that
sound as the vehicle locating sound as disclosed by Milch constitutes a
'change' in the sound," because "[t]he term 'element' may be reasonably
interpreted to mean, for example, the entire song or just a portion of the
song." Id. at 2-3. The Examiner then determines that "[b ]oth would
constitute a change in an element of the sound since the sound before and
after the change would be different." Id. at 3. Appellants have not apprised
us of any error in the Examiner's findings or conclusions, and we find none.
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of
claims 1-3, 6-10, and 13-17 over Wang and Milch.
Claims 4, 11, and 18
Appellants do not present separate arguments for claims 11 and 18
apart from the arguments for claim 4. See Br. 7. Accordingly, claims 11
and 18 stand or fall with claim 4.
Appellants recite the additional limitation of claim 4 and contend that
"[ t ]here is no teaching or suggestion in Milch or the combination that a
varied output component can be selected, as claimed." Id.
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Application 13/716,484
The Examiner responds that "the selection of a vehicle audio
component to use for responding to a location request reads on Milch's
assigning a particular sound (component) to the vehicle location event."
Ans. 3 (citing Milch, paras. 13 and 16, and Fig. 3). While observing that
Appellants point to paragraph 79 "for support of the language of claim 4,"
the Examiner explains that paragraph 79 "merely discloses customizing
audible sounds for locating a vehicle (chirp, horn honk)." Id. The Examiner
concludes that "the selection of the sound component is interpreted to
correspond to the selection of an audio output component (i.e., selection of a
particular sound) to be assigned to the vehicle locating event." Id. (again
citing Milch, Fig. 3). Appellants have not apprised us of any error in the
Examiner's findings or conclusions, and we find none.
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of
claims 4, 11, and 18 over Wang and Milch.
Claims 5, 12, and 19
Appellants do not present separate arguments for claims 12 and 19
apart from the arguments for claim 5. See Br. 7. Accordingly, claims 12
and 19 stand or fall with claim 5.
Appellants recite the additional limitation of claim 5 and first contend
that "[ t ]here is no mention in Milch . . . of changing the duration element of
a current audio sound, as claimed." Id. However the Examiner correctly
points out that claim 5 "does not refer to a current audio sound." Ans. 4.
We agree. See Br. 9, Claims App. 3 As we are instructed by our reviewing
3 We have added page numbers to the Claims Appendix attached to
Appellants' Appeal Brief.
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Application 13/716,484
court, "limitations are not to be read into the claims from the specification."
In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing In re Zietz,
893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
Appellants also contend that "[t]he duration [in Milch] may vary for
different source files, but there is no teaching of user-specified duration
control." Br. 7. However, the Examiner explains that "Milch discloses
being able to use segments or components of the audio clip, song, ringtone,
etc. and thus provides a means of specifying the duration of the sound (i.e.,
chorus of the song)." Ans. 3--4. Again, Appellants have not apprised us of
any error in the Examiner's findings or conclusions, and we find none.
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of
claims 5, 12, and 19 over Wang and Milch.
Rejection III
We affirmed the rejection of claims 1-19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the Wang and Milch. Consequently, we find it
unnecessary to reach a decision about the cumulative rejection of claims 1-
19 under 35 U.S.C § 103(a) over Chestnut and Milch. See 37 C.F.R. §
41.50(a)(l) ("The affirmance of the rejection of a claim on any of the
grounds specified constitutes a general affirmance of the decision of the
examiner on that claim . . . . ").
Obviousness of Claim 20 over Wang and Milch and Chestnut and
Milch
We do not sustain the rejections of claim 20 based on obviousness,
proforma, because these rejections are necessarily based on speculative
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assumptions as to the meaning of the claim. See In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859,
862---63 (CCP A 1962). For reasons discussed above, dependency of claim
20 on claim 20 renders this claim indefinite. It should be understood,
however, that our decision in this regard is based solely on the indefiniteness
of the claim and does not reflect on the adequacy of the prior art evidence
applied in support of the Examiner's rejection.
DECISION
The rejection of claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, fourth paragraph, is
AFFIRMED.
forma.
forma.
The rejection of claims 1-19 over Wang and Milch is AFFIRMED.
The rejection of claim 20 over Wang and Milch is REVERSED pro
The rejection of claims 1-19 over Chestnut and Milch is AFFIRMED.
The rejection of claim 20 over Chestnut and Milch is REVERSED pro
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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