Ex Parte Van Den Heuvel et al

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 29, 2019

14359381 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 29, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
14/359,381 05/20/2014 Teun Van Den Heuvel
24737 7590 04/02/2019
PHILIPS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & STANDARDS
465 Columbus A venue
Suite 340
Valhalla, NY 10595
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
2011P01426WOUS 9365
EXAMINER
LE,JOHNH
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2862
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/02/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patti. demichele@Philips.com
marianne.fox@philips.com
katelyn.mulroy@philips.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte TEUN VANDENHEUVEL and
STEVEN ANTONIE WILLEM FOKKENROOD
Appeal2018-000405
Application 14/3 59,381
Technology Center 2800
Before KAREN M. HASTINGS, JAMES C. HOUSEL, and
JEFFREY R. SNAY, Administrative Patent Judges.
SNAY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL 1
Appellant2 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
decision rejecting claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as claiming ineligible
subject matter. 3 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We affirm.
1 We cite to the Specification ("Spec.") filed May 20, 2014; the Final Office
Action ("Final Act.") dated March 7, 2017; Appellant's Appeal Brief ("App.
Br.") filed July 6, 2017; the Examiner's Answer ("Ans.") dated August 15,
2017, and Appellant's Reply Brief ("Reply Br.") filed October 13, 2017.
2 Appellant is Applicant, Koninklijke Philips N.V., which is identified in the
Appeal Brief as the real party in interest (App. Br. 2).
3 The Examiner withdrew the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Ans. 2.
Appeal2018-000405
Application 14/359,381
BACKGROUND
The subject matter on appeal relates to processing data obtained from
an accelerometer to determine the elevation of a person or object in an
elevator. Spec. 1 :2-5, 2: 1-2. Claim 1 is illustrative:
1. A method for detecting a motion of a user or an object in
an elevator with an apparatus, the method comprising:
measuring, with an accelerometer of the apparatus, the
acceleration experienced by the user or the object to obtain a
series of acceleration measurements;
processing, with a processor of the apparatus, the series
of acceleration measurements to identify a peak and a trough
therein that are associated with a start and an end of an elevator
motion;
identifying, with the processor, a section of the
acceleration measurements corresponding to the elevator
motion from the identified peak and trough;
determining, with the processor, an indication of a
change in an elevation of the user or the object during the
elevator motion from the identified section of the acceleration
measurements; and
determining, with the processor, a current floor of a
building on which the user or the object is physically present
from the determined indication of the change in the elevation.
App. Br. 9 (Claims Appendix). Claim 9 recites an apparatus comprising a
processor configured to perform the steps generally as recited in claim 1.
Each remaining claim on appeal depends from claim 1 or 9.
DISCUSSION
The Examiner rejects claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to a judicial exception-namely, an abstract idea without
significantly more. Final Act. 3. Appellant argues the claims as a group.
See App. Br. 3--4; Reply Br. 2-3. In accordance with 37 C.F.R.
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Application 14/359,381
§ 41.3 7 ( c )( 1 )(iv), we select independent claim 1 as representative, and
decide the appeal based on the representative claim alone. Having
considered the Examiner's findings and Appellant's arguments, we are not
persuaded the Examiner reversibly erred in rejecting claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
An invention is patent eligible if it claims a "new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: "[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas" are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int 'l, 573
U.S. 208,216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court's two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217-18 ( citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75-77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is "directed to." See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 ("On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk."); see also Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) ("Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners' application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.").
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219-20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611 );
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594--95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
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Application 14/359,381
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as "molding rubber products" (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
( 1981) ); "tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores" (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267---68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that "[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 ("We
view respondents' claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula."). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim "seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract ... is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, ... and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment." Id. ( citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 ("It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.").
If the claim is "directed to" an abstract idea, we tum to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where "we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an 'inventive
concept' sufficient to 'transform' the claimed abstract idea into a patent
eligible application." Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). "A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include 'additional features' to
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ensure 'that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea]."' Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
"[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[ s] to
transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention." Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. See Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
50 (Jan. 7, 2019) ("Guidance"). Under Step 1 of the Guidance, we
determine whether the claimed subject matter falls within the four statutory
categories: process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. Step
2A of the Guidance is two-pronged, under which we look to whether the
claim recites:
( 1) any judicial exception, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human
activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a}-(c), (e}-(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then, under Step
2B, look to whether the claim:
adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
"well-understood, routine, conventional" in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance.
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We have considered the Examiner's findings and the Appellant's
arguments in light of the controlling case-law and Guidance, and are not
persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Guidance Step 1
There is no dispute that claim 1 is within a statutory category. Claim
1 recites a method.
Guidance Step 2A, Prong 1
Under Step 2A of the Guidance, we first consider whether the
Examiner erred in determining that the claim recites a judicial exception.
The Examiner determined that claim 1 recites an abstract idea. Final Act. 3.
For the reasons explained below, we see no error in that determination.
The Guidance identifies mental processes as one of the enumerated
groupings of abstract ideas. A claim recites a mental process when it
encompasses acts people can perform using their minds or pen and paper.
See, e.g., CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372-
3 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (determining that a claim whose "steps can be performed
in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper" is directed to an
unpatentable mental process). This is true even if the claim recites use of a
generic computer component to perform the process steps. See, e.g., Versata
Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
("Courts have examined claims that required the use of a computer and still
found that the underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via
pen and paper or in a person's mind."); see also 2019 Eligibility Guidance
84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n. 14 ("If a claim, under its broadest reasonable
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interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for the recitation of
generic computer components, then it is still in the mental process category
unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the mind.").
In this case, claim 1 recites "identifying, with the processor, a section
of the acceleration measurements corresponding to the elevator motion."
The claim does not require any particular machine or device in connection
with the identifying step, other than a generic processor. Apart from the
recited processor, a person could perform the step entirely in the mind by
looking at acceleration measurement data and observing whether a given
section of data corresponds to elevator motion. Thus, in the context of claim
1, the step of "identifying" can reside solely within a human thought
process. Accordingly, we conclude that claim 1 recites a mental process,
which is identified in the Guidance as an abstract idea.
Guidance Step 2A, Prong 2
Having determined that the claims recite a judicial exception, our
analysis under the Guidance turns to determining whether there are
additional elements that integrate the exception into a practical application.
See MPEP § 2106.0S(a}-(c), (e}-(h). The additional elements in claim 1 are:
(1) "measuring ... acceleration ... to obtain a series of acceleration
measurements;" (2) "processing ... the series of acceleration measurements
to identify a peak and a trough therein;" (3) "determining ... an indication
of a change in an elevation ... from the identified section of the acceleration
measurements;" and (4) "determining ... a current floor of a building on
which the user or the object is physically present from the determined
indication of the change in the elevation."
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We determine that claim 1 does not recite additional elements that
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. The recited
"measuring" and "processing" steps are data gathering and data
manipulation recited at a high level of generality. See Elec. Power Grp.,
LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (characterizing
certain steps of collecting information, analyzing information by steps
people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, and
presenting the results of collecting and analyzing information, without more,
as matters within the realm of abstract ideas); see also SAP Am., Inc. v.
InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ("As many cases
make clear, even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is
'limited to particular content' or a particular 'source,' that limitation does
not make the collection and analysis other than abstract." (quoting Elec.
Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353, 1355 (citing cases)). "Determining" a change
in elevation and a current building floor from the collected data can be
performed in a person's mind or with pen and paper using mathematical
techniques. See Spec. 14:7-9 ("[A] double integration with respect to time
is performed on each accelerometer signal section to determine the vertical
distance travelled during that particular motion."); id. at 14: 15-18 ("Then,
optionally, the determined vertical distance can be converted into a measure
of the number of floors traversed up or down during the motion by dividing
the determined vertical distance by the or an average floor height ( step
1053), and rounding the result to the nearest integer."). As such, these
determination steps also do not "transform the nature of the claim into a
patent-eligible application." See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217; see also Guidance
84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n. 24 ("USPTO guidance uses the term 'additional
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elements' to refer to claim features, limitations, and/or steps that are recited
in the claim beyond the identified judicial exception.").
Appellant argues that "there are no reliable solutions for determining
which floor of a building a user is on using accelerometer measurements,"
and, for that reason, the claimed invention is a patent-eligible improvement
in computer-related technology. App. Br. 4 (citing McRO, Inc. v. Bandai
Namco Games Am., Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). See also Reply
Br. 3. We find Appellant's argument unpersuasive.
In McRO, the Court found the claim was directed to a "technological
improvement over the existing, manual 3-D animation techniques" and "uses
the limited rules in a process specifically designed to achieve an improved
technological result in conventional industry practice." McRO, 837 F.3d at
1316. The Court found that the claimed rules allowed computers to produce
accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in animated
characters that previously could only be produced by human animators. Id.
at 1313. In this case, Appellant has not identified any analogous
technological improvement attributable to the claimed invention. Moreover,
novelty of the claimed abstract idea, alone, neither demonstrates a
technological improvement nor otherwise transforms the claimed abstract
idea into eligible subject matter. See, e.g., Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor
Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Mayo, 566
U.S. at 90) ("[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.")).
Viewed as a whole, the claim merely applies mental processes to the
environment of determining the floor location of an elevator. "[M]erely
limiting the field of use of the abstract idea to a particular existing
technological environment does not render the claims any less abstract."
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Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1259 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). We are not persuaded that the claimed method effects an
improvement in computer-technology or any other technology or technical
field. See MPEP § 2106.05(a).
Nor does the claimed method apply the judicial exception using any
particular machine. See MPEP § 2106.05(b ). Claim 1 recites a generic
processor and accelerometer. Appellant does not purport that the claim adds
any other meaningful (technological) limitation, i.e., limitations beyond
linking the use of the abstract idea to generic technology. See MPEP
§ 2106.05(c), (e); see also id. at (f)-----(h) (mere instruction to apply a judicial
exception (f), insignificant extra-solution activity (g), and generally
indicating a field of use or technological environment in which to apply a
judicial exception (h), are insufficient to integrate an abstract idea into a
practical application).
For the foregoing reasons, we determine that claim 1 does not
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
Guidance Step 2B
In Alice step two, we consider the elements of the claim, both
individually and as an ordered combination, to assess whether the additional
elements transform the nature of the claim into patent-eligible subject
matter. Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, 776
F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014). "To save a patent at step two, an
inventive concept must be evident in the claims." RecogniCorp, LLC v.
Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017). "An inventive concept
that transforms the abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention must be
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significantly more than the abstract idea itself, and cannot simply be an
instruction to implement or apply the abstract idea on a computer." Bascom
Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
In this context, we also look to see if the additional elements are more
than "well-understood, routine, and conventional" so as to amount to an
inventive concept. Conversely, we consider whether these additional
elements simply append "well-understood, routine, and conventional"
elements, particularly at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
Appellant does not point to any evidence of record that would tend to
show that the "measuring" and "processing" of acceleration data recited in
claim 1 are more than well-understood, routine, and conventional. The
remaining steps in claim 1, as noted, can be formed as a mental process and,
therefore, also are abstract ideas. When considered as an ordered
combination, the steps recited in claim 1 essentially apply a known
mathematical relationship between acceleration, time, and distance traveled
to determine relative movement of an elevator.
For the foregoing reasons, we determine that the additional elements
recited in claim 1 do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea
itself.
For the reasons discussed above and by the Examiner, we are not
persuaded of reversible error in the Examiner's rejection of representative
claim 1. Accordingly, the rejection of claims 1-20 is sustained.
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DECISION
The Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1-20 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
AFFIRMED
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