Ex Parte Van Den Heuvel

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jun 29, 2012

10236181 (B.P.A.I. Jun. 29, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte SEBASTIAAN ANTONIUS FRANSISCUS ARNOLDUS VAN
DEN HEUVEL
____________

Appeal 2009-015010
Application 10/236,181
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before THOMAS S. HAHN, CARL W. WHITEHEAD, JR., and
BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, Administrative Patent Judges.

WHITEHEAD, JR., Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appeal 2009-015010
Application 10/236,181

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a final rejection of
claims1-13. Appeal Brief 4. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

Introduction
The invention is directed to “a device and a method of providing
conditional access to a content item where a specimen of the content item is
stored on a storage medium . . . .” Appeal Brief 6.
.
Exemplary Claim
Exemplary independent claim 1 under appeal reads as follows
(limitations in dispute are emphasized):
1. A method of providing conditional access to a
content item, the method comprising the acts of:
storing a specimen of the content item on a storage
medium,
monitoring a transmission channel for a subsequent
transmission of a further specimen of the content item,
collecting at least one right associated with the
subsequent transmission, and
storing the at least one right as a right associated with
the stored specimen.

Rejections on Appeal
Claims 1-7 and 9-12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(e) as being
anticipated by Sprunk (U.S. Patent Application Publication Number
2002/0002706 A1; published January 3, 2002). Answer 3-5.
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Application 10/236,181

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Claims 8 and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Sprunk and Lamkin (U.S. Patent Application Publication
Number 2004/0220926 A1; published November 4, 2004). Answer 5-6.

Issue on Appeal
Does Sprunk teach or suggest collecting rights associated with the
subsequent transmission of the same content item, and storing the collected
rights as a right associated with the stored specimen of the same content
item?

ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that Sprunk does not teach or suggest the present
invention as recited in independent claim 1, and similarly recited in
independent claims 4 and 9 because:
Sprunk does not even teach or suggest collecting
rights associated with the subsequent transmission of the
very same content item, and storing the collected rights as
a right associated with the stored specimen of the very
same content item. This provides substantial benefits such
as being able to view the same stored protected (e.g., play-
back only once) content more than once, e.g., without
having to download the same item twice.
Rather, the right associated with the subsequent
transmission of a specimen of the very same content
already stored is collected, and the collected right is stored
as a right associated with the stored specimen.
Paragraphs [0056]-[0057] and FIG 4 of Sprunk
disclose storing or discarding an object based on matching
signatures. Further, Paragraphs [0056] and [0053] of
Sprunk disclose content distribution, monitoring of
running applications, and stopping execution of the
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Application 10/236,181

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running applications if authorization expires. In addition,
Paragraph [0067] of Sprunk discloses conveying rights
and checking the rights to determine authorization.
Further, Paragraphs [0086]-[0087] and [0094] of Sprunk
(recited in the fourth paragraph of the Advisory Action)
recite checking whether a usage limit has been reached or
whether a timer expired.
There is simply no teaching or suggestion in
Sprunk of “collecting at least one right associated with
the subsequent transmission” of a further specimen of
the content item already stored, as recited in independent
claim 1, and similarly recited in independent claims 4 and
9.
Corrected Appeal Brief 5-6 (filed March 10, 2008).
The Examiner responds:
[T]he examiner respectfully disagrees with the appellant
because the rejection of record relies upon Sprunk to teach
conditional access for video program or software use
within a television set top box. As to independent claim1,
reading the claims in the broadest sense, the Sprunk
reference clearly discloses the claimed “storing a
specimen of the content item on a storage medium” is met
by crippled demonstration software (free preview) which
is stored on a storage device (see paragraph 0091,0094;
Figs]. 11-13). The claimed “monitoring a transmission
channel for a subsequent transmission of a further
specimen of the content item” is met by access control
processor (ACP) 240 monitors an application
(transmission of object 608), if user does not purchase the
object 608 kill or stop execution of unauthorized
application; if user purchases the program which would
update the authorization and give user the full version of
the program (see paragraph 0036, 0053, 0092-0094;
Figs]. 11-13). The claimed “collecting at least one right
associated with the subsequent transmission” is met by
authorized to use the missing features of the object (e.g.,
the program is already stored in the system, does not need
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to download again) (see paragraph 0067, 0086-0087,
0094). The claimed “storing the at least one right as a
right associated with the stored specimen” is met by
storing rights with a [sic] object (see paragraph 0056-
0057; Fig. 4).
Other embodiments of Sprunk reference also reads
on the claimed limitations. For example, a program with
trial period (stored specimen), user purchases after loaded
twice (monitoring user’s authorization, access right for the
program), and continually use the same program
(subsequent transmission of further specimen of the
content item) where access right is collected in order for
continually use (see paragraph 0095-0098).
Answer 7-8.
We do not find Appellant’s arguments to be persuasive. The
Examiner has shown where the Sprunk reference teaches the disputed claim
features in his rejection (Answer 3-4) and further, the Examiner has
expounded upon how the disputed claim limitations read on several
embodiments disclosed within Sprunk (Answer 7-8). No Reply Brief was
filed by Appellant that exposes flaws in the Examiner’s findings, reasoning,
or underpinning rationale. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claims 1, 4 and 9. For the above reasons, we also sustain the
rejections of dependent claims 2, 3, 5-8 and 10-13, whose merits are not
separately argued. In re Nielson, 816 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

DECISION
The rejections of claims 1-13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 are affirmed.

Appeal 2009-015010
Application 10/236,181

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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED

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