Ex Parte Ushiyama et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 27, 2013

11191933 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 27, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/191,933 07/29/2005 Shigeyuki Ushiyama 1885.1001 5680
21171 7590 02/28/2013
STAAS & HALSEY LLP
SUITE 700
1201 NEW YORK AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, DC 20005
EXAMINER
STEVENS, ROBERT
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2142
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/28/2013 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte SHIGEYUKI USHIYAMA and KANAME MATSUMOTO1
____________________

Appeal 2010-005824
Application 11/191,933
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before ERIC S. FRAHM, MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, and LARRY J. HUME,
Administrative Patent Judges.

HUME, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the second
rejection of claims 1-5 and 7-8. Appellants have previously canceled
claim 6. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.

1 The Real Party in Interest is Fanuc Limited. App. Br. 1.
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Application 11/191,933

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2
The Invention
Appellants’ invention is directed to a control device and method for
an electric motor, in particular, providing control when the motor is intended
to be decelerated and stopped. Spec. p. 1, ll. 6-7, and 25-28.
Exemplary Claims
Claim 1 is an exemplary claim representing an aspect of the invention
which is reproduced below (emphasis added):
1. A control device of an electrical motor,
comprising:
a control part for controlling decelerating and stopping
operations of the electrical motor;
a monitoring part configured to be activated by an
emergency stop signal, for monitoring the operations of the
electric motor; and
a judging part configured to be activated by the
emergency stop signal, for judging whether a velocity of the
electric motor monitored by the monitoring part is abnormal,
wherein
the control part continues controlling the
decelerating and stopping operation of the electric
motor while the judging part judges that the velocity of
the electric motor is normal, and

2 Our decision refers to Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed
Sep. 1, 2009); Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Dec. 9, 2009); Non-Final
Office Action (“NFOA,” mailed May 12, 2009); and the original
Specification (“Spec.,” filed Jul. 29, 2005).
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Application 11/191,933

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the judging part forcibly cuts off power to the
electric motor via a circuit breaker when the judging part
judges that the velocity of the motor is abnormal.

Claim 8 is an exemplary claim representing an aspect of the invention
which is reproduced below (emphasis added):
8. A control device of an electrical motor,
comprising:
a controller controlling decelerating and stopping the
electrical motor when an emergency signal has occurred,
wherein during the decelerating and stopping the electrical
motor when the emergency signal has occurred, if a velocity of
the electric motor is higher than an expected predetermined
velocity, the controller forcibly cuts off power to the electric
motor via a circuit breaker.
Prior Art
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Masaki US 5,481,460 Jan. 2, 1996
Torii US 5,676,217 Oct. 14, 1997
Wilton US 7,122,979 B2 Oct. 17, 2006
Rejection on Appeal
Claims 1-5 and 7-8 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Masaki, Wilton and Torii. Ans. 4.
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Application 11/191,933

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ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
1. Rejection of Claims 1-5 and 7
Issue 1
Appellants argue (App. Br. 5-10) that the Examiner’s unpatentability
rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Masaki and Wilson in
view of Torii is in error. Appellants’ contentions present us with the
following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Masaki,
Wilson and Torii teaches or suggests Appellants’ claimed
control device for an electrical motor that includes, inter alia,
“a judging part configured to be activated by the emergency
stop signal, for judging whether a velocity of the electric motor
monitored by the monitoring part is abnormal, wherein the
control part continues controlling the decelerating and stopping
operation of the electric motor while the judging part judges
that the velocity of the electric motor is normal,” as recited in
claim 1?
Analysis
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’
arguments that the Examiner has erred. We agree with Appellants’
conclusions with respect to claim 1, and we disagree with (1) the findings
and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is
taken and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth by the Examiner in the
Examiner’s Answer (Ans. 5-8) in response to Appellants’ Arguments (App.
Br. 5-10). We highlight and address specific findings and arguments
regarding claim 1 as follows.
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We disagree with the Examiner’s finding that the combination of
Masaki, Wilson and Torii teaches or suggests Appellants’ claimed control
device for an electrical motor that includes, inter alia, “a judging part
configured to be activated by the emergency stop signal, for judging whether
a velocity of the electric motor monitored by the monitoring part is
abnormal, wherein the control part continues controlling the decelerating
and stopping operation of the electric motor while the judging part judges
that the velocity of the electric motor is normal,” as recited in claim 1.
(Ans. 5-8 and 17).
The Examiner correctly points out that “Wilton’s determination of
temperature and voltage may not be an explicit discussion of velocity
monitoring . . . .” Ans. 17. However, we only partially agree with the
Examiner’s finding “that temperature and voltage of an electric motor (i.e.,
caused by the spinning of the motor’s components) are related to, and
therefore suggestive of, velocity.” Id. While these parameters may be
related in some cases to a motor’s rotational velocity, i.e., the dynamic
motion in question, we find that there are a number of other factors that
would be known to a person with skill in the art that could also affect the
temperature and voltage of a motor, e.g., the torque load on the motor, as
well as the ambient operating temperature of the motor.
We also disagree with the Examiner’s characterization of Torii’s
teaching of a vehicle control method that discloses, responsive to a
determination that a velocity abnormality persists, that power may be cut off
to the motor. Ans. 7 (citing Torii col. 21:18-25 as teaching cutting off power
to the vehicle speed control mechanism, and col. 2:15-28, discussing cutting
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Application 11/191,933

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off input current to an electric motor when the motor is in a rotatable state,
and the speed of the vehicle (and hence the motor) is higher than a reference
value)).
Instead, we find that Torii’s teaching (Torii col. 2:15-28) that the
“speed of the vehicle is higher than the reference value for more than a
prescribed time period” refers to the speed of the vehicle, and not the
rotational speed of any electric motor that may be taught by Torii. We
further find that claim 22 of Torii (Torii col. 21:18-25), cited by the
Examiner (Ans. 7) lends support to our interpretation above in that the cited
claim includes a step of “cutting off an electric power supply to the vehicle
speed control mechanism when the step of determining the abnormality in
the vehicle speed control mechanism determines the abnormality.”
We agree with Appellants’ contention that
[T]he vehicle speed control mechanism in Torii is not the
electric motor as recited in claim 1. The vehicle speed control
mechanism in Torii controls an electric motor attempting to
maintain a constant speed of the motor (see claim 18, from
which claim 21 depends, in col. 20, lines 41-64). Thus, in
Torii, when an abnormality in the speed control mechanism is
detected, the power to the speed control mechanism is cut off.
However, Torii does not teach or suggest that the power to the
electric motor is cut off or that the cut off is due to a velocity
abnormality. Therefore, Torii does not correct or compensate
for the admitted failure of Masaki and Wilson to render obvious
that the power is cut off in response to a velocity abnormality.
App. Br. 9 (citing Torii claim 18, col. 20:41-64). We find that Torii is
directed to monitoring and maintaining the speed of an electric vehicle,
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which need not necessarily be the same as monitoring the rotational speed of
an electric motor.
Finally, we agree with Appellants’ contention that
Conventionally, the power supplied to an electric motor
is forcibly cut-off when an emergency signal is output, in order
to avoid the risk of a runaway motor.
In contrast, the control device of claim 1 activates when
an emergency signal is output, and monitors the deceleration
operation of the electric motor cutting off the power only if the
decreasing velocity is abnormal. The advantage of using the
claimed control device is that the stopping time and distance are
significantly reduced.
None of the cited references, Masaki, Wilson and Torii,
anticipates or renders obvious monitoring the velocity after an
emergency signal and cutting-off the power to the electric
motor only when the velocity is judged to be abnormal.
App. Br. 10. We therefore find that none of the art of record teaches or
suggests, after the judging part is activated by the emergency stop signal,
that “the control part continues controlling the decelerating and stopping
operation of the electric motor while the judging part judges that the velocity
of the electric motor is normal,” as recited in claim 1.
Accordingly, Appellants have convinced us of at least one error in the
Examiner’s characterization of the cited art and related claim construction.
Therefore, we cannot sustain the Examiner’s unpatentability rejection of
representative claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We similarly cannot
sustain the Examiner’s unpatentability rejection of dependent claims 2-5,
depending from claim 1. Independent claim 7 recites the limitations at issue
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in commensurate form, so that we likewise cannot sustain the Examiner’s
rejection.
Although Appellants make other arguments, we need not reach a
conclusion on those arguments, as we find this issue to be dispositive with
respect to claims 1-5 and 7.
2. Rejection of Claim 8
Issue 2
Appellants argue (App. Br. 12) that the Examiner’s unpatentability
rejection of claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Masaki and Wilson in
view of Torii is in error. These contentions present us with the following
issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Masaki,
Wilson and Torii teaches or suggests Appellants’ claimed
control device for an electrical motor “wherein . . . if a velocity
of the electric motor is higher than an expected predetermined
velocity, the controller forcibly cuts off power to the electric
motor via a circuit breaker,” as recited in claim 8?
Analysis
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’
arguments that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellants’
conclusions with respect to claim 8, and we adopt as our own (1) the
findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this
appeal is taken and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth by the Examiner in
the Examiner’s Answer (Ans. 13-15 and 30-32) in response to Appellants’
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Arguments (App. Br. 12). However, we highlight and address specific
findings and arguments regarding claim 8 for emphasis as follows.
We agree with the Examiner’s finding that the combination of
Masaki, Wilson and Torii teaches or suggests Appellants’ claimed control
device for an electrical motor that includes “a controller controlling
decelerating and stopping the electrical motor when an emergency signal has
occurred, wherein during the decelerating and stopping the electrical motor
when the emergency signal has occurred, if a velocity of the electric motor is
higher than an expected predetermined velocity, the controller forcibly cuts
off power to the electric motor via a circuit breaker,” as recited in claim 8.
Ans. 13-15 and 30-32.
Appellants contend that:
As argued above relative to claim 1, Wilson does not
disclose or render obvious that, an emergency signal triggers
the controller to control the decelerating and stopping
operations.
In Masaki, various parameters of the engine are
monitored and controlled continuously. Masaki does not
disclose or render obvious that an emergency signal triggers
(i.e. “when an emergency signal has occurred”) a special
operating mode. In Masaki, “if a velocity of the electric motor
is higher than an expected predetermined velocity” the current
supplied to the motor is adjusted. A forcible cut of the power to
the motor occurs in Masaki based on a current abnormality, and
not “if a velocity of the electric motor is higher than an
expected predetermined velocity.” As argued above, a current
abnormality is not the same as a velocity abnormality because
there is not an obvious and direct relationship between the
current and the velocity.
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App. Br. 12. We disagree with Appellants’ contentions regarding claim 8
and point out that, during prosecution, “the PTO applies to the verbiage of
the proposed claims the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their
ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the
art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or
otherwise that may be afforded by the written description contained in the
applicant's specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
Appellants’ contention is not convincing, because claim 8 is not
limited to the controller actually forcibly cutting off power to the electric
motor via a circuit breaker. Instead, claim 8 recites, inter alia, “if a velocity
of the electric motor is higher than an expected predetermined velocity, the
controller forcibly cuts off power . . . .” In other words, instead of reciting
actual performance of the function of forcibly cutting off power via a circuit
breaker, claim 8 recites conditionally performing the function.
We find that the Examiner’s claim construction meets the “broadest
reasonable interpretation” standard with respect to claim 8, and note for
emphasis that one difference in claim 8 compared to claims 1 and 7 is in the
conditional “if” statement in the limitation discussed above. We find that
the recitation of claim 8, “if a velocity of the electric motor is higher than an
expected predetermined velocity, the controller forcibly cuts off power to the
electric motor via a circuit breaker,” is met by Masaki under some
conditions in which the vehicle speed may directly correspond to the motor
speed.
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In addition, Appellants merely argue “a current abnormality is not the
same as a velocity abnormality because there is not an obvious and direct
relationship between the current and the velocity.” App. Br. 12. We note
that Appellants have not specifically addressed the Examiner’s findings
concerning the teaching or suggestion that a motor current abnormality can
be suggestive of a motor velocity abnormality, as recited in claim 8.
Ans. 13-15 and 30-32. We find that the Examiner has met his burden in
setting forth a prima facie case for unpatentability, however Appellants have
not met their resulting burden to provide sufficient evidence or persuasive
arguments that the Examiner erred in his characterization of the cited art and
resulting claim construction – namely, that Masaki cuts power when the
vehicle’s velocity, and thus the velocity of the electric motor, is higher than
an expected predetermined velocity.
Accordingly, Appellants have not convinced us of any error in the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 8, and we therefore sustain that rejection.
CONCLUSIONS
(1) Appellants have established that the Examiner erred with
respect to the unpatentability rejection of claims 1-5 and 7 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a), and we do not sustain the rejection.
(2) Appellants have not established that the Examiner erred with
respect to the unpatentability rejection of claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a),
and we sustain the rejection.
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DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-5 and 7 is reversed.
The decision of the Examiner to reject claim 8 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2011).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART

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