Ex Parte TramoniDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardSep 29, 201613663319 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 29, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 13/663,319 10/29/2012 38106 7590 10/03/2016 Seed IP Law Group LLP/ST (EP ORIGINATING) 701 FIFTH AVENUE, SUITE 5400 SEATTLE, WA 98104-7092 Alexandre Tramoni UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 859063.658 4761 EXAMINER HESS, DANIEL A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2876 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 10/03/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): Patentlnfo@SeedIP.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ALEXANDRE TRAMONI Appeal2015-004376 Application 13/663,319 Technology Center 2800 Before KAREN M. HASTINGS, DONNA M. PRAISS, and JEFFREY R. SNAY, Administrative Patent Judges. PRAISS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner's rejection of claims 1-23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Keen et al. (US 2008/0194200 Al, published August 14, 2008) ("Keen") and Charrat et al. (US 2007 /0045418 Al, published March 1, 2007) ("Charrat"). We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). WE AFFIRM. 1 The real party in interest is STMicroelectronics (Rousset) SAS. (App. Br. 2). Appeal2015-004376 Application 13/663,319 Claim 1 is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. An antenna circuit coupleable to a device of transmission/reception by inductive coupling, comprising: a first inductive element in parallel with a capacitive element; a first dual purpose inductance coupled between a first node of the parallel association and a first terminal of a switch; and a second dual purpose inductance coupled between a second node of the parallel association and a second terminal of the switch, the first and second dual purpose inductances configurable by the switch to cooperate as a second inductive element in the parallel association. App. Br. 23 (Claims Appendix). Appellant's arguments focus on the limitations of claim 1 (App. Br. 17-21 ). We choose independent claim 1 as representative. Appellant relies on the same arguments for each of independent claims 1, 9, 14, and 20, and do not present separate arguments for dependent claims 2-8, 10-13, 15-19, and 21-23 (e.g.; App. Br. 21). Therefore; claims 2-23 will stand together with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). ANALYSIS Upon consideration of the evidence on this appeal record and each of Appellant's contentions, we find that the preponderance of evidence supports the Examiner's conclusion that the subject matter of Appellant's claims is unpatentable over the applied prior art. We sustain the Examiner's§ 103 rejection essentially for the reasons set out by the Examiner in the Answer, including the Response to Argument section. We add the following for emphasis. 2 Appeal2015-004376 Application 13/663,319 Appellant's main arguments are that "[i]n the present application, the prior art capacitive elements C 1 have been replaced with inductive elements L'" (App. Br. 20), "the absence of such capacitors are an inventive feature expressly recited in claim 1" (id.), "[t]he capacitors of Keen are not nodes" (id. at 15), and "[ t ]he C 1 a and C 1 b capacitors of Charrat provide similar signal modification functions as capacitors 75, 74 in Keen" (id. at 17). Appellant also contends that the capacitors of Keen and Charrat "teach away from the claims," specifically, the recitation of first and second nodes in claim 1, and that modification of Keen or Charrat to eliminate their capacitors would change the principle of operation of the prior art (App. Br. 20). See also Reply Br. generally. Applicant's arguments are unpersuasive of error by the Examiner because claim 1 does not preclude the presence of the prior art capacitors in the claimed antenna circuit. The term "comprising" is a term of art that means "'including but not limited to."' CIAS, Inc. v. Alliance Gaming Corp., 504 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The use of the word "comprising" in the preamble of claim 1 means that the antennae circuit may also include additional capacitive elements. The fact that the Specification comparatively describes the functional block diagram of Figure 2 as replacing two capacitive elements depicted as C 1 in Figure 1 with two inductive elements L' does not limit the plain language of the claims that are broader than the disclosed embodiment. See Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Sci., Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Regarding Appellant's argument that Keen's capacitors 74, 75 and Charrat' s capacitors C 1 a, C 1 b are not nodes as required by claim 1, we do not see an appreciable difference between the dictionary definitions identified 3 Appeal2015-004376 Application 13/663,319 by the Examiner and the Appellant for this term. According to the Examiner, the term means "'[a] point of junction between two connectors. The location where a line has a defined position. The point where signals leave one system and enter another.'" Ans. 2. According to Appellant, the term means "[ w ]ithin a circuit, a point of interconnection between two or more components such as input and output terminals." Reply Br. 3. Appellant does not direct us to any specific definition in their Specification for what constitutes "node" as recited in claim 1. Reply Br. 3. As such, the Examiner has reasonably determined that this claim term encompasses the capacitors of Keen and Charrat because the identified capacitors have "a point of junction between two connectors at each of the capacitor terminals," they "also define a specific position of a line in a circuit," and they each "couple a transceiver system with an antenna system" (Ans. 2). In re ICON Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (if the specification does not provide a definition for claim terms, the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification is applied). Appellant asserts that "[i]n view of [Appellant's definition of node], the analysis provided in the Examiner's Answer that 'the capacitors including the capacitor terminals and the position defined by the capacitors are nodes' is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of obviousness." Reply Br. 4. Because we fail to see an appreciable difference between the two proffered definitions of node, we likewise find Appellant's argument insufficient for failing to point out the significance of any difference. Appellant merely identifies the Examiner's definition as being associated with broadband local area networks while "[t]he claims at issue are more closely aligned with electronic circuits than broadband local area networks," but concedes "[i]t is 4 Appeal2015-004376 Application 13/663,319 not to say that the present claims could not apply to a circuit having applicability in broadband networks or any other communication technology for that matter." Id. at 3. Because we agree with the Examiner that the capacitors of Keen and Charrat are nodes as required by claim 1, we do not find persuasive Appellant's argument that "both Charrat and Keen discourage the first and second nodes recited in the independent claims." Reply Br. 7. "A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant." In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). As noted by the Examiner, Keen and Charrat cannot be said to discourage the use of a first and second dual purpose inductor as claimed because both disclose capacitors "which 'couple' first and second dual purpose inductances in a parallel association with a first inductive element and a capacitive element when a switch is closed" (Ans. 5). Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner's rejection. The Examiner's decision is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). AFFIRMED 5 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation