Ex Parte Townsend et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardSep 22, 201613341545 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 22, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 13/341,545 12/30/2011 10949 7590 09/26/2016 Nokia Corporation and Alston & Bird LLP c/o Alston & Bird LLP Bank of America Plaza, 101 South Tryon Street Suite 4000 Charlotte, NC 28280-4000 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Karl Townsend UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 042933/413215 2835 EXAMINER XIA,XUYANG ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2143 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/26/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): usptomail@alston.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte KARL TOWNSEND and ROB HAITANI Appeal2015-005632 Application 13/341,545 Technology Center 2100 Before LINZY T. McCARTNEY, NORMAN H. BEAMER, and MELISSA A. HAAPALA, Administrative Patent Judges. BEAMER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) the Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1-3, 5-12, and 14--20. 1 Claims 4 and 13 are cancelled. We have jurisdiction over the pending rejected claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We affirm. 1 Appellants identify Nokia Corporation as the real party in interest. (App. Br. 2.) Appeal2015-005632 Application 13/341,545 THE INVENTION Appellants' disclosed and claimed invention is directed to intuitive multitasking involving multiple devices and user interfaces. (Abstract.) Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal: 1. A method comprising: causing a first user interface to be presented on a first device, the first user interface defining an initial user interface area; receiving an indication to present a second user interface; causing the second user interface to be presented on the first device, the second user interface being presented at least partially within the initial user interface area; causing the first user interface to be presented concurrent with the second user interface so as to define a resized user interface area that is smaller than the initial user interface area and is at least partially within the initial user interface area, wherein the first user interface is associated with the first device, and the second user interface is associated \~1ith a second device; receiving user input via the first device requesting to transfer content from the second device to the first device; and in response to receiving the user input, permitting the first device to access the content. REJECTIONS The Examiner rejected claims 1-3, 7, 8, 10-12, 16, 17, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Williams et al. (US 2010/0050092 Al, pub. Feb. 25, 2010). (Final Act. 2-5.) 2 Appeal2015-005632 Application 13/341,545 The Examiner rejected claims 5, 6, 14, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Williams and Bhatt et al. (US 2011/0119609 Al, pub. May 19, 2011). (Final Act. 6-8.) The Examiner rejected claims 9 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Williams and Kerr et al. (US 2009/0313584 Al, pub. Dec. 17, 2009). (Final Act. 8-9.) ISSUES ON APPEAL Appellants' arguments in the Briefs present the following issues: 2 Issue One: Whether the Examiner erred in finding Williams discloses the independent claim 1 limitations "receiving user input via the first device requesting to transfer content from the second device to the first device; and in response to receiving the user input, permitting the first device to access the content," and the similar limitations recited in independent claims 10 and 19. (App. Br. 11-12.) Issue Two: Whether the Examiner erred in finding Williams discloses the claim 2 limitation "controlling the second device with the user input received via the second user interface on the first device," and the similar limitation recited in claims 11 and 20. (App. Br. 12-13.) 2 Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellants and the findings of the Examiner, we refer to the Appeal Brief (filed Oct. 24, 2014); the Reply Brief (filed May 12, 2015); the Final Office Action (mailed Mar. 24, 2014); and the Examiner's Answer (mailed Mar. 13, 2015) for the respective details. 3 Appeal2015-005632 Application 13/341,545 ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections in light of Appellants' arguments that the Examiner errs. We disagree with Appellants' arguments, and we adopt as our own ( 1) the pertinent findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 2-9) and (2) the corresponding findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner's Answer in response to Appellants' Appeal Brief (Ans. 10- 15). We concur with the applicable conclusions reached by the Examiner and emphasize the following. Issue One In finding Williams discloses the limitations at issue, the Examiner relies on William's disclosure of an implementation of content sharing and instant messaging involving two client devices, each with the capability of displaying two user interfaces, where one of the interfaces on each user device is used for instant messaging and the other to display and share content items such as pictures. (Final Act. 2-3; see Williams Abstract, Figs. 4--7; i-fi-133-34, 44--52.) In particular, the Examiner refers to an example described in Williams, and finds the claimed "first device" is a client device identified in the example as belonging to "Bob," the claimed "user input" is Bob's message, "Do you have any pictures," and the claimed "response ... permitting ... access" is the resulting sharing of pictures as described in the example. (Ans. 10-11; see Williams Figs. 4--7; i-fi-1 44--52.) Appellants argue the Examiner errs because, in the above example described in Williams, permitting access is not "in response to" Bob's request for pictures, but rather is in response to the other user, Adam, 4 Appeal2015-005632 Application 13/341,545 initiating picture sharing by selecting an entry in a drop-down menu. (App. Br. 11-12; see Williams i-f 45.) This argument is unpersuasive because, notwithstanding the fact that Adam must provide further input to initiate sharing, Adam's input is in response to Bob's original request, and thus the claimed "permitting the first device to access the content" is "in response to receiving [Bob's] input," under a broad but reasonable interpretation of "in response to." (Ans. 10-12.) Appellants also argue the Examiner's broad construction of the claim "would introduce security vulnerabilities" that would not be presented if the claim were properly construed. (App. Br. 12.) However, as the Examiner explains, no such security vulnerability arises in the above-described example in Williams, which the Examiner correctly finds discloses the claim limitations, because "The other user Adam explicitly gives the permission for Bob to access files (pictures) on his computer." (Ans. 12.) Issue Two Appellants further argue the Examiner errs in finding Williams discloses "controlling the second device with the user input received via the second user interface on the first device," because "content sharing would not be interpreted by one skilled in the art to imply controlling another device." (App. Br. 12-13.) This argument is not persuasive, given Williams' disclosure that the display of content on the user interfaces "is controllable by both the first and second clients" (emphasis added). (Ans. 13-14; Williams i-f 50; see also Williams i-f 49 ("A variety of other control functions are also contemplated.")) 5 Appeal2015-005632 Application 13/341,545 CONCLUSIONS For the reasons stated above, we sustain the anticipation rejection of claims 1, 2, 10, 11, 19, and 20. We also sustain the anticipation rejection of claims 3, 7, 8, 12, 16, and 17, and the obviousness rejections of claims 5, 6, 14, and 15 over Williams and Bhatt, and of claims 9 and 18 over Williams and Kerr, which rejections are not argued separately with particularity. DECISION We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 1-3, 5-12, and 14--20. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 6 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation