Ex Parte TowDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardAug 29, 201713761272 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 29, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/761,272 02/07/2013 Adam Perry Tow 384097.20001 1019 26418 7590 08/31/2017 RFFD SMTTH T T P EXAMINER P.O. BOX 488 (NYC) PITTSBURGH, PA 15230-0488 LE, NINH V ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 1744 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/31/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ptoipinbox @reedsmith.com nycipdocketing@reedsmith.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ADAM PERRY TOW Appeal 2016-007722 Application 13/761,2721 Technology Center 1700 Before DONNA M. PRAISS, MONTE T. SQUIRE, and BRIAN D. RANGE, Administrative Patent Judges. RANGE, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL SUMMARY Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 7—17 and 19. We have jurisdiction. 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE. 1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Mr. Adam Perry Tow. Appellant states that “Mr. Tow is the CEO and co-founder of Seraph Robotics Inc.” Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2016-007722 Application 13/761,272 STATEMENT OF THE CASE2 Appellant describes the invention as relating to advancements in the field of three-dimensional fabrication also known as 3D printing. Appeal Br. 3. In particular, according to Appellant’s Specification, the invention makes use of a pellet based cartridge system to avoid problems of other 3D printers. Spec. 16. Claims 7, 14, and 19, reproduced below with emphasis added to certain key recitations, are the only independent claims on appeal and are illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 7. A three dimensional fabricator comprising: a control unit for receiving instructions from a fabrication command unit and operating a material deposition tool head; a cartridge bay configured to receive material cartridges; a build surface configured to receive material deposited by the material deposition tool head; a first material heating chamber configured to receive a plurality of materials or colors from the cartridge bay, mix or fuse the plurality of materials or colors into a first mixture, and extrude the first mixture to the material deposition tool head for deposition on the build surface to form a three dimensional structure according to a prescribed order and prescribed pattern, wherein the material deposition tool head comprises a second material heating chamber and a deposition tip. 2 In this opinion, we refer to the Final Office Action dated May 8, 2015 (“Final Act.”), the Appeal Brief filed October 7, 2015 (“Appeal Br.”), the Examiner’s Answer dated June 15, 2016 (“Ans.”), and the Reply Brief filed August 8, 2016 (“Reply Br.”). 2 Appeal 2016-007722 Application 13/761,272 14. A three dimensional fabricator comprising: a material deposition tool head comprising a first deposition tip that is mechanically or magnetically attached; a control unit for receiving instructions from a fabrication command unit and operating the material deposition tool head; a second non-identical deposition tip; a build surface for receiving material deposited by the material deposition tool head; wherein the control unit is configured to operate the material deposition tool head to mechanically or magnetically disengage the first deposition tip and mechanically or magnetically engage the second deposition tip without user interaction during fabrication of a three dimensional structure, to deposit material through at least two deposition tips onto the build surface and form the three dimensional structure according to a prescribed order and prescribed pattern. 19. A three dimensional fabricator comprising: a control unit for receiving instructions from a fabrication command unit and operating a material deposition tool head; a build surface for receiving material deposited by the material deposition tool head; and at least one deposition tip attached to the material deposition tool head with a portion of the tip being mechanically, electronically or magnetically adjustable without user interaction to modify the tip opening in shape or size during fabrication of a three dimensional structure according to a prescribed order and prescribed pattern. Appeal Br. 37, 38—39 (Claims App’x). REFERENCES The Examiner relies upon the prior art below in rejecting the claims on appeal: Suenaga US 3,553,371 Jan. 5, 19713 3 The Examiner refers to this reference as “Taro.” See, e.g., Ans. 19. 3 Appeal 2016-007722 Application 13/761,272 Barlage III et al. (hereinafter “Barlage”) Yang et al. (hereinafter “Yang”) Jang et al. Sachs et al. (hereinafter “Sachs”) Fujiwara Gothait et al. US 2005/0139123 Al June 30, 2005 US 2006/0111807 Al May 25, 2006 US 5,784,279 US 6,280,784 B1 Aug. 28, 2001 US 6,405,095 B1 June 11, 2002 US 2004/0217186 Al Nov. 4, 2004 July 21, 1998 (hereinafter “Gothait”) Kidu et al. US 2009/0170230 Al July 2, 2009 (hereinafter “Kidu”) Menchik et al. (hereinafter “Menchik”) US 2010/0208016 Al Aug. 19, 2010 REJECTIONS The Examiner maintains the following rejections on appeal: Rejection 1. Claims 7—13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Menchik in view of Jang or Yang and in further view of Barlage. Ans. 4. Rejection 2. Claims 14—17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Menchik in view of Gothait and in further view of Sachs. Id. at 13. Rejection 3. Claim 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Menchik in view of Gothait or Kidu or Fujiwara and in further view of Suenaga. Id. at 17. Rejection 4. Claims 14—17 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as failing to comply with the written description requirement. Id. at 21. Rejection 5. Claims 14—17 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite. Id. at 22. 4 Appeal 2016-007722 Application 13/761,272 ANALYSIS Rejection 1. The Examiner rejects claims 7—13 as obvious over Menchik in view of Jang or Yang and in further view of Barlage. We focus on independent claim 7. We understand the Examiner’s rejection as presenting three alternatives: combining Menchik and Barlage; or combining Menchik, Jang, and Barlage; or combining Menchik, Yang, and Barlage. Ans. 5—8. We first address the Menchik/Barlage combination. The Examiner finds that Menchik discloses a three dimensional fabricator (i.e., a 3D printer system) having most of the elements recited by claim 7. Ans. 4—5. The Examiner finds that Menchik discloses the recited mixing chamber of claim 7 because the building materials comprise, for example, dyes, powders, photopolymers, and liquid. Appeal Br. 5. The Examiner finds that these building materials are stored in disposable cartridges, pressurized, and then extruded through tubing. Id. The Examiner finds that this process will result in a certain degree of mixing and that the tubes where the mixing occurs constitute claim 7’s recited “heating chamber” configured to “mix or fuse the plurality of materials or colors into a first mixture.” Id. at 5, 24—25; see also Ans. 29 (indicating that Menchik’s tubings leading from the cartridges to the printing head are claim 7’s recited “first material heating chamber”). Appellant argues that Menchik’s tube and valve structure is best characterized as “non-mixing” and that Menchik keeps its materials “separate and distinct.” Appeal Br. 8—9. On the present record, we agree with Appellant that the Examiner has not adequately explained how Menchik teaches a “first material heating chamber . . . configured to . . . mix 5 Appeal 2016-007722 Application 13/761,272 or fuse the plurality of materials or colors into a first mixture.” Appeal Br. 37 (emphasis added). Rather, based on the Examiner’s findings, the mixture that comprises Menchik’s building materials exists prior to entering Menchik’s tubing. The Examiner cogently explains that the process of forcing the materials into the tubing will result in mixing, but the Examiner does not explain how this process will result in mixing or fusing “into a first mixture” as recited by claim 7. In other words, Menchik’s “first mixture” already exists in the cartridge/storage area. Because claim 7 requires mixing or fusing of discrete components to create the first mixture, further mixing of one pre-existing mixture does not equate to mixing “into a first mixture” as recited by claim 7. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection to the extent it is based solely on Menchik combined with Barlage. As an alternative, the Examiner finds that Jang or Yang teach mixing chambers as recited by claim 7 and concludes that it would have been obvious to incorporate such a chamber. Ans. 5—7. The Examiner also finds that Barlage “discloses that it is well-known in the art to have a building material in liquid form ... by incorporating heating elements.” Id. at 8. The Examiner finds that Menchik teaches building material in liquid form (id. at 5, 8) and concludes that it would have been obvious to heat the combined Menchik/Jang and/or Menchik/Yang apparatus “for the purpose of allowing said building and supporting materials to be in liquid form throughout the manufacturing process as desired by Menchik” (id. at 9—10). Appellant argues that the Examiner has not provided adequate reason to combine heating elements into a Menchik/Jang and/or Menchik/Yang apparatus. See generally Appeal Br. 13—21. Appellant argues that rather than requiring a heating chamber, Menchik suggests building materials that 6 Appeal 2016-007722 Application 13/761,272 “are in liquid form to begin with.” Appeal Br. 18—19. A preponderance of the evidence supports this argument. Menchik teaches, for example, that its material may be “curable by electro-magnetic radiation and/or electron beams etc.” (Menchik 130) rather than teaching material that is first heated and later cooled for curing. Appellant also argues that reason to combine a heating chamber is lacking because both Jang and Yang discourage use of a heating chamber. Appeal Br. 15—18. A preponderance of the evidence supports this argument as well. See Jang 1:5 8—60 (explaining that melt extrusion based systems “provided a relatively poor part accuracy”); Yang 1:51—62 (explaining that melting requires expensive heating means and cannot be used to fabricate “edible food items like cakes” as desired by Yang). Thus, based on the record as a whole, we agree with Appellant that the Examiner has not provided an adequate reason why a person of ordinary skill would have added a heating element to Menchik/Jang or Menchik/Yang. Because each of the Examiner’s alternatives is not adequately explained, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 7. We also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 8—13 because of each of those claims depend from claim 7. Rejection 2. The Examiner rejects claims 14—17 as obvious over Menchik in view of Gothait and in further view of Sachs. Ans. 13. Claim 14 recites “a control unit. . . wherein the control unit is configured to . . . operate the material deposition tool head to . . . disengage . . . and . . . engage . . . during fabrication of a three dimensional structure.” Appeal Br. 38 (Claims App’x) (emphasis added). Appellant argues that this recitation is not taught or suggested by the cited references because the Examiner relies on Gothait (see, e.g., Ans. 14—16) and Gothait only teaches replacing a 7 Appeal 2016-007722 Application 13/761,272 nozzle after fabrication. Appeal Br. 25—26 (citing Gothait Fig. 3). The Examiner responds by stating that the recitation “during fabrication of a three dimensional structure” of claim 14 “does not structurally limit the claimed apparatus.” Ans. 43. We disagree with this claim construction. Claim 14 recites a control unit, and the Specification indicates the control unit may be a computer. See Spec. 17. Claim 14 requires that this control unit be “configured to” (e.g., be programmed to) “disengage” and “engage” “without user interaction during fabrication of a three-dimensional structure.” We agree with Appellant that, on the present record, the Examiner has not adequately explained how the cited references teach or suggest a control unit having such a configuration. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 14, and we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 15—17 because those claims depend from claim 14. Rejection 3. The Examiner rejects claim 19 as obvious over Menchik in view of Gothait or Kidu or Fujiwara and in further view of Suenaga. Ans. 17. The Examiner finds that the combination of Menchik with Gothait, Kidu, or Fijuwara is silent as to opening a nozzle without user interaction to modify the nozzle opening in shape or size during fabrication. Ans. 19. The Examiner finds, however, that Suenaga discloses a spray gun capable of adjusting nozzle size/shape and concludes that it would have been obvious to replace a nozzle of Menchik with Suenaga’s “entire spray gun ... for the purpose of providing a means for controlling the flow volume or droplets size of the deposition materials being dispensed . . . [and] facilitate the creation of 3D objects. . . .” Ans. 20. 8 Appeal 2016-007722 Application 13/761,272 Suenaga is a 1971 patent directed to an ink based color copy machine. Ans. 30-32; see also Suenaga Abstract. It does not teach 3D printing. Appellant argues that a person of skill in the art would not have had reason to combine Suenaga’s spray gun with a three dimensional fabricator because while Suenaga “might have been viable for a pure liquid ink-based copy machine [as described in Suenaga]. . . such a structure appears to be at least impractical—if not impossible—for three dimensional fabricators that, in most instances, use building materials of a much greater viscosity.” Id. at Appeal Br. 32—33. A reasonable expectation of success is a necessary part of a prima facie case of obviousness. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 493 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (“a court must ask whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions” (emphasis added)). Whether or not a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation that a particular combination of references would work is a pure question of fact. Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Here, the Examiner does not adequately explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the Suenaga spray gun with a 3D fabricator such as the Menchik fabricator. Rather, the Examiner responds to Appellant’s argument by stating that Suenaga does not teach that its spray gun is not compatible with the materials of Menchik. Ans. 54—55. This response improperly attempts to shift the Examiner’s burden of providing a reason for reasonable expectation of success in the first instance. The Examiner also states that the 9 Appeal 2016-007722 Application 13/761,272 combination “would be capable of fabricating three dimensional structures”; but the Examiner provides no reasoning as to why a person of ordinary skill would have understood this to be the case. Because the Examiner does not adequately explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the teachings of Suenaga and Menchik, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 19. Rejection 4. The Examiner rejects claim 14—17 and 19 as failing to comply with the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112. Ans. 21. The Examiner states that independent claims 14 and 19 each recite “without user interaction” but this recitation is not disclosed in the original specification or claims. Id. at 21—22. Appellant explains that paragraph 60 of the Specification teaches changing deposition tips with an “automatic mechanism” and “without individual instructions.” Reply Br. 6. Appellant also explains that paragraph 6 of the Specification teaches adjusting the shape and/or size of the deposition head “preferably, automatically.” Id. at 7. We agree with the Appellant that the Specification discloses “without user interaction” as recited in claims 14 and 19 sufficiently to satisfy the written description requirement. We therefore do not sustain this rejection. Rejection 5. The Examiner rejects claims 14—17 and 19 as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Ans. 22—23. The Examiner first states that the Specification provides no standard to determine whether the second tip is “non-identical” as recited in claim 14. Id. We agree with Appellant, however, that given the context of the claim and the Specification, “non identical” as recited in claim 14 means tips that are different. Reply Br. 9— 10 Appeal 2016-007722 Application 13/761,272 10. The tips could be, for example, different in size or shape. Id. The recitation is not unclear. The Examiner also states that it is unclear what is meant by “without user interaction” as recited in claims and 14 and 19. Ans. 22—23. We agree with Appellant, however, that given the context of the claims and the Specification, “without user interaction” means that the control unit executes the steps to be performed “without user interaction” in an automatic fashion, i.e., without the involvement of the person operating the three dimensional fabricator. Reply Br. 10. This recitation is also not unclear. We therefore do not sustain the Examiner’s indefiniteness rejection. DECISION For the above reasons, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 7-17 and 19. REVERSED 11 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation