Ex Parte Tomik et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 15, 2017

13191702 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 15, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/191,702 07/27/2011 Filip Tomik 83183693 4598
28395 7590 09/19/2017
RROOKS KTTSHMAN P C /FfTET EXAMINER
1000 TOWN CENTER KIRBY, BRIAN R
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3747
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/19/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing @brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte FILIP TOMIK, ERIC MICHAEL RADEMACHER,
ALEXANDER O'CONNOR GIBSON,
JOHN ANTHONY DEMARCO,
CHAD EVERETTE GRIFFIN, and KIRK PEBLEY
Appeal 2016-002638
Application 13/191,702
Technology Center 3700
Before LYNNE H. BROWNE, MICHELLE R. OSINSKI, and
GORDON D. KINDER, Administrative Patent Judges.
BROWNE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Filip Tomik et al. (Appellants) appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the
rejection of claims 1—5. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
Appeal 2016-002638
Application 13/191,702
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Sole independent claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1. An automotive vehicle comprising:
an engine;
an alternator or integrated starter generator; and
at least one controller configured to reduce voltage output
of the alternator or integrated starter generator prior to initiating
an auto stop of the engine in response to an ambient light level
being less than a threshold ambient light level and a speed of the
vehicle being less than a threshold vehicle speed.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Hamelin US 4,825,139 Apr. 25, 1989
Stam US 6,049,171 Apr. 11,2000
Shozo JP 2006/183546 A July 13,2006
REJECTIONS
I. Claims 1, 2, and 5 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Shozo and Stam.
II. Claims 3 and 4 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Shozo, Stam, and Hamelin.
DISCUSSION
Appellants argue claims 1, 2, and 5 together. Appeal Br. 3. Further,
Appellants do not present arguments pertaining to the separate rejection of
claims 3 and 4. Rather, Appellants argue that “[cjlaims 3 and 4 are
patentable because they depend from claim 1.” Id. Accordingly, our
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Application 13/191,702
disposition with respect to the rejection of claim 1 is dispositive for all
claims and all rejections involved in this Appeal.
The Examiner finds that Shozo discloses all of the limitations of claim
1 except for “an ambient light level being less than a threshold ambient light
level as a requirement for initiating the gradual deterioration of the output
voltage.” Final Act. 3 (emphasis omitted). The Examiner further finds that:
Sta[m] teaches reducing voltage output (automatic dimming) to
the vehicle headlamps in response to: an ambient light level
being less than a threshold ambient light level (Fig. 3 and Col. 3,
lines 15—25) in order [to] prevent rapid changes in illumination
which may startle a driver during low ambient light conditions,
such as at night.
Id. In addition, the Examiner determines that:
it is clear from the disclosure that reducing voltage output
(automatic dimming) during conditions where ambient light
levels are higher than at night (low ambient light) is unnecessary
since [] rapidly changing light levels emitted from headlamps or
tail lamps during conditions with high ambient light levels are
less likely to be perceived as startling to a driver.
Id. Based on this information, the Examiner reasons that it would have been
obvious to modify “Shozo to incorporate the teachings of Stam to include
reducing voltage output levels in response to an ambient light level being
less than a threshold ambient light level since it has been shown that rapid
changes in illumination may startle a driver during low ambient light
conditions.” Id. at 4.
Noting that “Shozo does not execute rapid changes in illumination
that may startle a driver during low ambient light conditions,” Appellants
argue that “the examiner impermissibly creates a problem within the context
of Shozo—that does not otherwise exist—for the sole purpose of finding
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Appeal 2016-002638
Application 13/191,702
reason to combine the teachings of Stam with Shozo.” Appeal Br. 3
(emphasis omitted).
Appellants’ argument is not responsive to the rejection as articulated
by the Examiner. The rejection does not rely on Shozo as evidence of the
problems associated with rapid changes in illumination. See Final Act. 3.
Rather, the rejection relies on Stam to show that such problem exists and for
the solution to the problem. Id. The rejection proposes that it would have
been obvious to modify Shozo’s controller to address this problem in
addition to the problems it already solves. See id. The combination of
familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when
it does no more than yield predictable results. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 416. “[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device,
and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would
improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious
unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” Id. at 417. When
considering obviousness of a combination of known elements, the operative
question is thus “whether the improvement is more than the predictable use
of prior-art elements according to their established functions.” Id.
Appellants do not explain why the proposed modification is more than the
combination of familiar elements according to known methods to yield
predictable results or indicate that the proposed modification is beyond the
skill of one skilled in the art. Thus, Appellants do not apprise us of error.
In the Reply Brief, Appellants take issue with the Examiner’s further
explanation of the reasoning for the proposed modification. See Reply Br. 2.
However, Appellants again mischaracterize the Examiner’s reasoning. In
the Answer, the Examiner explains why voltage drops occur and how Shozo
counteracts the effects of voltage drops. See Ans. 6—7. The Examiner then
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Application 13/191,702
reasons that Shozo’s method would also work for the problem identified in
Stam. See id. at 7—8. The Examiner notes that the problem identified by
Stam would be most noticeable to a vehicle driver at lower ambient light
levels. Id. at 8. Based on this information, the Examiner determines that it
would have been obvious to incorporate “ambient light levels being less than
a threshold as a condition for executing reduction of voltage output levels
restricts [sic] the voltage reduction procedure to only those times a driver
would be capable of perceiving a rapid change in lighting.” Id. Although,
Appellants may be right that such incorporation would not result in system
components being used less often or extend the life of those components
(see Reply Br. 2), Appellants do not explain why the main reason for the
proposed modification (i.e. reducing passenger displeasure caused by rapidly
changing light levels) does not adequately support the Examiner’s reasoning.
See Final Act. 3; Reply Br. 7. Thus, Appellants do not apprise us of error.
For these reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims
1, 2, and 5 as unpatentable over Shozo and Stam. As this issue is dispositive
for claims 3 and 4 as well, we also sustain the Examiner’s decision rejecting
claims 3 and 4 as unpatentable over Shozo, Stam, and Hamelin.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1—5 is AFFIRMED.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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