Ex Parte Tombley et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMay 18, 201613715062 (P.T.A.B. May. 18, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 131715,062 12/14/2012 28395 7590 05/20/2016 BROOKS KUSHMAN P,CJFG1L 1000 TOWN CENTER 22NDFLOOR SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Roger Arnold Tombley UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 83340834 1561 EXAMINER SWARTHOUT, BRENT ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2689 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/20/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): docketing@brookskushman.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ROGER ARNOLD TROMBLEY and THOMAS EDWARD PILUTTI Appeal2014-009542 Application 13/715,062 Technology Center 2600 Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, and DENISE M. POTHIER, Administrative Patent Judges. BAUMEISTER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal2014-009542 Application 13/715,062 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's rejections of claims 1-18: Claims 1, 2, 4, 6-8, 10, 12-14, 16, and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over McClellan (US 2008/0306996 Al; published Dec. 11, 2008) and Farmer (US 2003/0004644 Al; published Jan. 2, 2003). Final Act. 2-3. 1 Claims 3, 9, and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over McClellan, Farmer, and Kellum (US 2004/0153244 Al; published Aug. 5, 2004). Final Act. 3--4. Claims 5, 11, and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over McClellan, Farmer, and Caminiti (US 2013/0253816 Al; published Sept. 26, 2013). Final Act. 4. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellants, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). We affirm. 1 Throughout this Opinion, we refer to (1) the Final Rejection mailed March 7, 2014 ("Final Act."); (2) the Appeal Brief filed June 2, 2014 ("Br."); (3) the Examiner's Answer mailed June 30, 2014 ("Ans."). 2 Appeal2014-009542 Application 13/715,062 SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION Appellants' invention is a collision warning system (CWS). Spec. i-f 20. In one embodiment, the CWS uses global positioning satellite (GPS) coordinates to locate vehicles and collision objects. See id. ,-r 38, 45. This CWS also uses a remote database to log collision events. Id. i-f 4 7. The database flags collision events that occur at a certain location and updates systems in vehicles connected to the database. Id. i-fi-146-47. Independent claim 1, reproduced below with our emphasis, is illustrative: 1. A computer-implemented method comprising: wirelessly receiving a collision object identification, identifying an extra-vehicular, with respect to a reporting vehicle, object creating potential collision hazard, from the reporting vehicle at a local server; receiving information relating to the collision object identification; storing the collision object identification and the information in a database of collision object identifications; and sending the collision object identification and the information to other remote vehicle systems to update the other remote systems. THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OVER McCLELLAN AND FARMER Contentions The Examiner concludes that claim 1 would have been obvious in view of McClellan and Farmer. Ans. 5. In the proposed combination under § 103, the Examiner finds that McClellan's database stores the recited (1) collision object identification and (2) information relating to this 3 Appeal2014-009542 Application 13/715,062 identification, as recited in claim 1. Id. at 4. In particular, the Examiner finds that McClellan's data about other vehicles involved in a crash corresponds to the recited collision-object identification. Id. (citing McClellan iii! 27-28). Furthermore, the Examiner finds that McClellan's crash data in Table 1 corresponds to information relating to this identification. Ans. 4. The Examiner additionally interprets the recited storing step to correspond to McClellan's accumulation of this crash data. Id. at 5. Appellants argue that the claims are patentable over the McClellan- Farmer combination and quote the recited storing step. Br. 6. In Appellants' view, it would not have been obvious to store collision-event warning in a database. Id. According to Appellants, there is no reason to store McClellan's alarms in a database because events reported to emergency responders are serious. Id. Issues Has the Examiner established by a preponderance of the evidence that McClellan would have taught or suggested storing in a database ( 1) the collision object identification and (2) information relating to this identification, as recited in claim 1? Analysis On this record, we see no error in the Examiner's obviousness rejection of claim 1. First, Appellants do not explain how the admission that McClellan lacks a stored "collision event warning" relates to a claim limitation. See Br. 6. The term "collision event warning" does not appear in the quoted storing step. See id. Nor does the term appear elsewhere in claim 1. 4 Appeal2014-009542 Application 13/715,062 Rather, the claimed database stores two elements: (1) collision object identification and (2) information relating to this identification. In the Answer, the Examiner finds that McClellan stores both recited elements in a database. Ans. 4 (citing McClellan iii! 27-28, Table 1). That is, the Examiner finds that the recited storing is met by McClellan's database operation without further modification. See Ans. 5. To these findings, Appellants provide no rebuttal. Moreover, Appellants' argument in the Brief (Br. 6) does not squarely address, let alone persuasively rebut, the Examiner's position (Ans. 4). The crash data cited to address the limitation at issue (Ans. 4--5) does not include the alarms discussed by Appellants (Br. 6). For example, McClellan's emergency alarms may be triggered by database operations. See id. if 40. But unlike the crash data (see McClellan iii! 24--29), the Examiner finds that these alarms are not stored in the database. See Final Act. 2-3; see also Ans. 4 (describing McClellan;s database elements). On this record, we are unpersuaded by Appellants' arguments (Br. 6) directed to teachings not relied upon to address the limitation at issue (see Ans. 4--5). 5 Appeal2014-009542 Application 13/715,062 For the foregoing reasons, we will sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 1 as well as the rejection of independent claims 72 and 13,3 as well as dependent claims 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, and 18, which are not argued separately from claim 1. See Br. 6. THE OTHER OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS We also sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejections of claims 3, 5, 9, 11, 15, and 17 over McClellan, Farmer, and at least one of the additional 2 Claim 7 recites a "computer-readable storage medium." Our precedent indicates that those of ordinary skill in the art would interpret a storage medium broadly, but reasonably, to include signals per se when the Specification lacks a definition to the contrary. See Ex parte Mewherter, 107 USPQ2d 1857, 1862 (PTAB 2013) (precedential). When the broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim covers a signal per se, the claim must be rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as covering non-statutory subject matter. 1'.feivherter, 107 USPQ2d at 1862 (citing Jn re 1\fuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). We leave to the Examiner to determine whether claim 7 recites patent-eligible subject matter under § 101. 3 Claim 13 is a system comprising one element: "a processor configured to" perform several functions. The phrase "processor configured to" can be used as a substitute for "means for," and thus, may invoke the application of § 112, sixth paragraph. Ex parte Lakkala, 108 USPQ2d 1392, 1397 (PTAB 2013) (informative). See also Ex parte Ero!, 107 USPQ2d 1963, 1969 (PTAB 2013) (informative) (holding the phrase "a processor adapted to" was used as a substitute for "means for"); Ex parte Smith, 108 USPQ2d 1198, 1203---04 (PTAB 2013) (informative) (holding the phrase "a processor programmed to" was used as a substitute for "means for"). We leave to the Examiner to determine whether that is the case here. And if so, we further leave to the Examiner to determine whether the system is equivalent to a single means to accomplish the recited function and, therefore, an improper single-means claim under§ 112, first paragraph. See In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714--15 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cited in Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2164.08(a) Rev. 07.2015, 9th ed., (Nov. 2015). 6 Appeal2014-009542 Application 13/715,062 references of Kellum and Caminiti (Final Act. 3--4). Appellants have not pointed out particular errors in the Examiner's reasoning. Br. 7. Rather, Appellants argue that Kellum and Caminiti do not cure the deficiencies of McClellan and Farmer, but Appellants provide no additional analysis of the rejection. Id. We are not persuaded by these arguments for the reasons discussed previously. 7 Appeal2014-009542 Application 13/715,062 DECISION The Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1-18 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 8 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation