Ex Parte Tomar et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 21, 2016

13403359 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 21, 2016)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/403,359 02/23/2012 Abhay Singh Tomar H0032038/4874/114851 9186
92556 7590
HONEYWELL/HUSCH
Patent Services
115 Tabor Road
P.O.Box 377
MORRIS PLAINS, NJ 07950
12/23/2016 EXAMINER
LOTFI, KYLE M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2489
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/23/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patentservices-us @ honey well, com
amy. hammer @ hu schblackwell .com
pto-chi@huschblackwell.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ABHAY SINGH TOMAR, YUVRAJ SINGH,
BOBBY NARAYANAN, and BHUPESH KUMAR KOLI
Appeal 2016-004400
Application 13/403,359
Technology Center 2400
Before JUSTIN BUSCH, LINZY T. McCARTNEY, and SCOTT E. BAIN,
Administrative Patent Judges.
McCARTNEY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims
1—20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
Appeal 2016-004400
Application 13/403,359
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The present patent application “relates to video monitoring systems
and more particularly to the monitoring of secure areas.” Spec. 11. Claim 1
illustrates the claimed subject matter:
1. A method comprising:
an input of a monitor or personal computer (PC) coupled
to a video server receiving indicia from a security person viewing
video through the monitor or PC within a control room of a
security system from an image source of live scenes, events or
alarms detected through the security system, the indicia
identifying the image source, and a sequence of video images of
interest from the image source, the indicia also requesting that
notification be sent to a user of a wireless electronic device;
a processor of the monitor or PC pushing a notification of
the identified source via a push notification service through a
public communication network and a persistent connection to the
user of the wireless electronic device in response to the request;
a user input of the wireless electronic device receiving
input accepting the notification; and
the wireless electronic device automatically launching a
viewing application installed on the wireless electronic device in
response to the acceptance, the viewing application downloading
video images from the image source to the wireless electronic
device for viewing.
REJECTIONS
Claims 1—20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over various combinations of Babich et al. (US 7,679,507 B2; Mar. 16,
2010), Dickerson et al. (US 2007 /0076094 Al; Apr. 5, 2007), Qureshi et al.
(US 2011/0173681 Al; July 14, 2011), Huisking (US 2013/0057695 Al; Mar.
7, 2013), and Seeley et al. (US 6,097,429; Aug. 1, 2000).
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Application 13/403,359
ANALYSIS
Claim 1
Appellants contend the Examiner’s combination of Babich,
Dickerson, Qureshi, and Huisking fails to teach or suggest the following
limitation recited in claim 1:
an input of a monitor or personal computer (PC). . . receiving
indicia from a security person . . . identifying the image source,
and a sequence of video images of interest from the image
source, the indicia also requesting that notification be sent to a
user of a wireless electronic device.
App. Br. 7—8, 10. In particular, Appellants argue Babich “automatically
provides video or still images of detected alarm events” and Babich’s
“central panel opens a cell phone session with the end-user cell phone, and
sends the video clip or a still photo to the end-user.” Id. at 7—8 (quoting
Babich 1:5—8, 7:44—50). Appellants also contend “Babich does not request
or sent [sic] notification to ‘a user of a wireless electronic device.’ Instead,
the Babich central panel 110 opens a cell phone connection and directly
sends the video.” Id. at 10. In Appellants’ view, “[t]his is different than
sending notifications as under RFC 4627.” Id.
We find Appellants’ arguments unpersuasive. As an initial matter,
Appellants’ arguments are incommensurate with the scope of claim 1.
Claim 1 does not recite “sending notifications as under RFC 4627” as argued
by Appellants. See id. Moreover, the cited portions of Babich describe
embodiments in which “[t]he event detection and captured video are
automatically forwarded to the central station where security monitoring
personal [sic] contact the designated end-user by cell phone to verify the
nature of the alarm event.” Babich 7:46—50 (reference numbers omitted and
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Application 13/403,359
emphasis added); see also Ans. 2 (citing Babich 6:59—62; 7:44—50, 55—62;
Fig. 2), 5(citing Babich 8:63—67, Fig. 5); Final Act. (citing Babich 8:5—6).
These portions of Babich also teach that, in some cases, personnel at the
central station can receive “particulars” about the alarm event, the particulars
including relevant times, dates, and identification information. Babich 6:59-
63. Finally, the cited parts of Babich indicate that the process of notifying
an end-user about an alarm event involves the security personnel sending the
captured video to the end-user from a computing device. For example,
Babich discloses “the central station . . . sends or attempts to send the
captured video or still photo to the end-user cell phone ... to prompt
hi[m]/her to verily the nature of the detected event, or cancel. .. the alarm
using the various cell phone keys.” Babich 8:4—9. And Babich depicts
security personnel at the central station using a computing device to
communicate with an end-user device. See id. Figs. 2; 4B. In light of these
disclosures, we agree with the Examiner that Babich teaches or suggests the
disputed limitation.
Appellants also argue that the Examiner’s combination of Babich,
Dickerson, Qureshi, and Huisking fails to teach or suggest:
receiving indicia from a security person viewing video through
the monitor or PC . . . from an image source of live scenes, events
or alarms detected through the security system, the indicia
identifying the image source, and a sequence of video images of
interest from the image source, the indicia also requesting that
notification be sent to a user of a wireless electronic device;
a processor of the monitor or PC pushing a notification of the
identified source via a push notification service.
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Application 13/403,359
See App. Br. 8—9. Specifically, Appellants contend Qureshi “merely
discloses authentication processes used with connections for social network
sites,” which Appellants contend “is clearly not the same as” the disputed
limitations. Id. at 9.
We find Appellants’ argument unpersuasive. The Examiner did not
find that Qureshi alone teaches or suggests these limitations. The Examiner
found a combination of Babich and Qureshi teaches these limitations. In
particular, the Examiner found Babich teaches or suggests the “receiving
indicia from a security person” limitation but does not explicitly disclose the
“processor of the monitor or PC pushing a notification” limitation. See Final
Act. 6—7. The Examiner found that Qureshi teaches that using push
notifications to notify a user of an event was well known in the art at time of
the invention. See Qureshi || 35, 37, 46; Final Act. 6 (citing Qureshi 146);
Ans. 3^4 (citing Qureshi || 35, 37), 5. The Examiner concluded a
combination of Qureshi’s and Babich’s teachings suggests the “processor of
the monitor or PC pushing a notification” limitation as recited in claim 1.
See Final Act. 6—7. Appellants’ arguments against Qureshi alone have not
persuaded us the Examiner erred. “[0]ne cannot show non-obviousness by
attacking references individually where, as here, the rejections are based on
combinations of references.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA
1981).1
1 Appellants also argue the Examiner erroneously found “that ‘the automatic
e-mail notification system of Babich employs the basic features of push
notification as claimed.’” App. Br. 10. For the reasons set forth by the
Examiner in the Answer, we find this argument unpersuasive. See Ans. 5.
But even if we were to agree with this argument, we would not agree the
Examiner erred, as the Examiner relied on Qureshi for the push notification
aspects of the limitation. See Final Act. 6; Ans. 3—4, 5.
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Application 13/403,359
Next, Appellants contend the Examiner’s combination of Babich,
Dickerson, Qureshi, and Huisking fails to teach or suggest “a user input of
the wireless electronic device receiving input accepting the notification” as
recited in claim 1. App. Br. 9. According to Appellants, Dickerson’s
“acknowledge button is not the same as a user input accepting a notification”
because it was well known that “an acknowledge button simply
acknowledges receipt of something already sent.” Id. With respect to
Huisking, Appellants contend “one particular acknowledge button (as under
Huisking) does not disclose the use of every acknowledge button in every
context throughout the universe.” Id. at 12.
We find Appellants’ argument unpersuasive. The Examiner found
Huisking teaches this limitation because Huisking discloses “[o]nce the user
accepts a notification, the doorbell security system server may begin
streaming video and establish a bi-directional audio link between the board
and the mobile computing device.” Huisking | 80 (reference number
omitted); see also Ans. 4—5 (discussing the application of Huisking to this
limitation). Appellants’ unsupported assertion that Huisking does not
disclose this limitation has not persuaded us that the Examiner erred. Cf. In
re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold that the Board
reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive arguments in
an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked
assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.”).
Appellants further argue that the Examiner’s rejection is “improper
. . . because none of the cited references are directed to the problem solved
by the claimed invention,” namely “being able to automatically forward
video using a social networking connection.” App. Br. 16. Appellants
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Application 13/403,359
contend “[sjince the problem is not recognized, there would be no reason to
combine the references.” Id.
We find Appellants’ argument unpersuasive. The Examiner provided
reasons why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to
make each of the proposed modifications. See Final Act. 6—8, 10-12.
Appellants’ contention that these reasons are not directed to the problem the
inventor sought to solve has not persuaded us these reasons are insufficient
because “the law does not require that the references be combined for the
reasons contemplated by the inventor.” In re Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 1312
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
Finally, Appellants argue for the first time in the Reply Brief that
claim 1 requires “the exchange of information between (1) a processor of a
monitor or PC and a wireless electronic device, and separately, (2) the
wireless electronic device and an image source.” Reply Br. 2. Appellants
assert “the wireless electronic device receives a notification . . . via the push
notification service and the public communication network” and “separately
downloads video images from the image source via a secure connection over
the public communication system and not via the push notification service.”
Id. Put differently, Appellants contend “the wireless electronic device does
not download the video images from the monitor or PC processor that
transmitted the notification to the device.” Id. Appellants argue the
Examiner’s combination of Babich, Dickerson, Qureshi, and Huisking fails
to teach or suggest such an arrangement. Id. at 2—3.
We find Appellants have waived this argument. Despite being able to
make this argument in the Appeal Brief, Appellants first raised this
argument in the Reply Brief. Compare App. Br. 7—16, with Reply Br. 2-4.
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“[A] reply brief [is not] an opportunity to make arguments that could have
been made in the principal brief on appeal to rebut the Examiner’s
rejections, but were not.” Ex parte Borden, 93 USPQ2d 1473, 1474 (BPAI
2010) (informative); see also 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2). “When new issues
have been raised by the Appellant [in a reply brief] ... the Board, unless
good cause is shown, will not consider those new issues.” Borden, 93
USPQ2d 1473, 1476; see also 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2). Here, Appellants
have not shown good cause for the untimely presentation of this argument.
Therefore, we will not consider it.
For the above reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1.
Appellants have not presented separate, persuasive arguments for claims 2—
16. Accordingly, we also sustain the Examiner’s rejections of these claims.
Remaining Claims
Appellants’ arguments concerning claim 17 are substantially similar
to arguments Appellants raised in the context of claim 1. See App. Br. 12—
13. We find these arguments unpersuasive for the reasons discussed above
and sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 17. Because Appellants have
not presented separate, persuasive patentability arguments for the claims that
depend from claim 17 (claims 18—20), we also sustain the Examiner’s
rejections of these claims.
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Appeal 2016-004400
Application 13/403,359
DECISION
We affirm the rejection of claims 1—20.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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