Ex Parte TiraspolskyDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardApr 25, 201411381242 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 25, 2014) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/381,242 05/02/2006 Alexander Tiraspolsky 0005875USU/4254 4016 27623 7590 04/25/2014 OHLANDT, GREELEY, RUGGIERO & PERLE, LLP ONE LANDMARK SQUARE, 10TH FLOOR STAMFORD, CT 06901 EXAMINER KHAN, MEHMOOD B ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2646 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/25/2014 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte ALEXANDER TIRASPOLSKY ____________________ Appeal 2011-010232 Application 11/381,242 Technology Center 2600 ____________________ Before: JOSEPH L. DIXON, JAMES R. HUGHES, and ERIC S. FRAHM, Administrative Patent Judges. DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2011-010232 Application 11/381,242 2 STATEMENT OF CASE Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a rejection of claims 1- 3, 5-17, and 27-30. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. The claims are directed to mobile telephone-based peer-to-peer sharing. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method, comprising: storing a content in a first mobile telephone; receiving a request that indicates a desire for the content to be provided to a second mobile telephone; and sending a request to the first mobile telephone for the first mobile telephone to transmit the content directly from the first mobile telephone to the second mobile telephone. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal is: Harrow Manion Hurtta US 2003/0074403 A1 US 2005/0216559 A1 US 2006/0010226 A1 Apr. 17, 2003 Sep. 29, 2005 Jan. 12, 2006 REJECTIONS The Examiner made the following rejections: Claims 1-3, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, and 27-30 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Harrow and Manion. Appeal 2011-010232 Application 11/381,242 3 Claims 5-7, 9, 12, 15, and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Harrow, Manion, and Hurtta. ANALYSIS Claims 1-3, 5-13, 27, and 28 Regarding independent claim 1, Appellant contends modifying Harrow in view of Manion would change the principle of operation of Harrow’s system because Harrow “specifically requires participation by directory server 302, and in the Manion et al. publication, the nodes 100 obtain content from one another without the assistance of a server . . .” (Br. 17-18). Appellant further contends modifying Harrow to send a request to transmit content from the directory server 302 to Client D, rather than from Client A to Client D, would also change the principle of operation of Harrow’s system (Br. 18). We disagree with Appellant. Appellant’s first argument that combining Manion with Harrow would change Harrow’s principle of operation (Br. 17-18) is not persuasive because the embodiment the Examiner relies on in Manion does in fact use a distribution server. Specifically, Manion discloses “[c]ontent requests on the server can then be redirected to a content distribution group for distribution to peers to reduce load on the centralized content distribution server” (Manion, ¶ 0007). Appellant’s second argument that modifying Harrow to send a request to transmit content from the distribution server would change Harrow’s principle of operation (Br. 18) is also not persuasive. The Examiner’s proposed modification merely changes how to send a request to transmit content, while the architecture of Harrow’s system remains intact (see Ans. 4-5, 8-9). That is, it would have been obvious to send a request to transmit Appeal 2011-010232 Application 11/381,242 4 content from Harrow’s distribution server to a client possessing the desired content, rather than communicate directly from the client seeking the content to the client possessing the content, in view of Manion’s disclosure of forwarding content requests from a client through a distribution server (see Ans. 8). The principle of operation of Harrow—to transmit the actual content from peer to peer—would be unchanged in this combination. We are therefore not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1, and claims 2, 3, 5-13, 27, and 28 not specifically argued separately. Claims 14-17, 29, and 30 Although argued separately, Appellant’s contentions for independent claim 14 are similar to those discussed above regarding claim 1 (see Br. 19- 20). Thus, for the reasons detailed above, we also sustain the rejection of claim 14, and claims 15-17, 29, and 30 not specifically argued separately. CONCLUSION The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1-3, 5-17, and 27-30 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a). DECISION For the above reasons, the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-3, 5-17, and 27-30 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Appeal 2011-010232 Application 11/381,242 5 tj Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation