Ex Parte Thomas et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Apr 29, 2011

09995037 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 29, 2011)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
09/995,037 11/26/2001 Jeffrey R. Thomas ITWO:0023 9675
7590 05/02/2011
Ralph A. Graham
Fletcher, Yoder & Van Someren
P.O. Box 692289
Houston, TX 77269-2289
EXAMINER
IP, SIKYIN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1735
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/02/2011 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________________

Ex parte JEFFREY R. THOMAS, RANDALL G. BAXTER,
MARK A. ULRICH, and PAUL D. VERHAGEN
____________________

Appeal 2010-000528
Application 09/995,037
Technology Center 1700
____________________

Before PETER F. KRATZ, CATHERINE Q. TIMM, and
RAE LYNN P. GUEST, Administrative Patent Judges.

GUEST, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
I. STATEMENT OF CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 1-6, 8, 47, 51-55, 57-62, 64-87, and 91-94. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.
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Appellants’ invention relates to a portable induction heating system
that enable large amounts of current to flow through an induction heater and
high temperatures to be achieved in a workpiece with sufficient cooling to
avoid damaging the induction heating cable. Claims 1, 47, and 57 are
illustrative:
1. A portable induction heating system, comprising in
a portable unit:
a power source electrically coupleable to a fluid-cooled
induction heating cable and operable to produce a varying
magnetic field;
a programmable power source controller coupled to the
power source for regulating the power conversion; and
a cooling unit fluidically coupleable to the fluid-cooled
induction heating cable for providing a cooling fluid through
the fluid-cooled induction heating cable and around a
workpiece to cool the fluid-cooled induction heating cable,
wherein the cooling unit is configured to cooperate with at least
the fluid-cooled induction heating cable to provide a single
continuous cooling path operable to dissipate heat from the
fluid-cooled induction heating cable and from an electrical lead
extending from the portable induction heating system to the
fluid-cooled induction heating cable.
47. A portable heating system, comprising in a
portable unit:
a power source operable to apply output power to an
electrical pathway to inductively heat a workpiece, wherein the
electrical pathway includes an induction heating cable adjacent
the workpiece, a supply path from the portable heating system
to the induction heating cable, and a return path from the
induction heating cable to the portable heating system;
a power source controller operable to control the heating
of a workpiece in response to programming instructions
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provided by a user to produce a desired temperature profile in
the workpiece;
a cart operable to transport the power source and power
source controller to the workpiece;
a cooling unit operable to provide a flow of cooling fluid,
the cooling unit being disposed on the cart; and
the induction heating cable, wherein the induction
heating cable is a fluid-cooled induction heating cable that
cooperates with the cooling unit to form at least a portion of a
single cooling pathway that is configured to generally extend
along the supply path and the return path of the electrical
pathway to remove heat therefrom.
57. A portable induction heating system, comprising in
a portable unit:
a power source electrically coupleable to a portable fluid-
cooled induction heating cable and operable to provide output
power to produce a varying magnetic field;
a programmable controller operable to control induction
heating;
a cooling unit fluidically connected to the fluid-cooled
induction heating cable to cool the fluid-cooled induction
heating cable via a cooling fluid, wherein the cooling unit
dissipates heat in the cooling fluid; and
a flow switch coupled to the programmable controller,
wherein the flow switch is configured to detect the cooling fluid
returning from the fluid-cooled induction heating cable and to
effect discontinuation of the output power when the amount of
the cooling fluid returning from the fluid-cooled induction
heating cable is below a threshold amount.

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The Examiner relies upon the following evidence:
First Named Inventor Document No. Issue or Pub. Date
Somes
Henderson
Antier
Duncan
Couffet
Cydzik
Thomas (Thomas ‘483)
Thomas (Thomas ‘439)
US 2,359,058
US 3,403,240
US 4,058,696
US 5,198,053
US 5,430,274
US 5,874,713
US 6,727,483 B2
US 7,015,439 B1
Sep. 26, 1944
Sep. 24, 1968
Nov. 15, 1977
Mar. 30, 1993
Jul. 4, 1995
Feb. 23, 1999
Apr. 27, 2004
Mar. 21, 2006
The Examiner maintains, and Appellants seek review of, the
following rejections:
1. The rejection of claims 1-6, 8, 47, and 51-55 under the judicially
created doctrine of obviousness type double patenting over claims
1-30 of Thomas ‘483;
2. The rejection of claims 57-62, 64-87, and 91-94 under the judicially
created doctrine of obviousness type double patenting over claims 1-
30 of Thomas ‘483 in view of Somes;
3. The rejection of claims 1-6, 8, 47, 51-55, 57-62, 64-87, and 91-94
under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness type double
patenting over claims 1-28 of Thomas ‘439;
4. The rejection of claims 1-6, 8, 47, 51-55, 57-62, 64-87, and 91-94
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Henderson in view of
Couffet, Antier, and Duncan;
5. The rejection of claims 57-62, 64-87, and 91-94 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over Henderson in view of Couffet, Antier,
Duncan, and Somes;
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6. The rejection of claims 79-87 and 91-94 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Henderson in view of Couffet, Antier, Duncan,
Somes, and Cydzik.
II. OBVIOUSNESS-TYPE DOUBLE PATENTING REJECTIONS
BASED ON THOMAS ‘483
The dispositive issue presented for both the first and second rejections
is the same. More particularly, our decision focuses on the “controller”
limitation common to each of the rejected claims.
A. DISPOSITIVE ISSUE ON APPEAL
A first issue on appeal arising from the contentions of Appellants and
the Examiner is: does the evidence support Appellants’ view that the
Examiner erred in concluding that a portable induction heating system
having, among other things, a “controller” is not patentably distinct from the
induction heating system claimed in Thomas ‘483? We answer this question
in the affirmative.
B. DISCUSSION
Appellants contend that the Examiner has not established that certain
recited elements, including the “controller” recited in each rejected claim,
are rendered obvious by the claims of Thomas ‘483 (see Br. 9-14). We
agree with Appellants.
The key question in any obviousness double patenting analysis is:
“Does any claim in the application define merely an obvious variation of an
invention claimed in the patent asserted as supporting double patenting?”
General Foods v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH, 972 F.2d 1272, 1278
(Fed. Cir. 1992). It is critical during the analysis that no part of the patent
disclosure be used as “prior art” against the claims under review, only the
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inventions defined by the claims are relevant. In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438,
441 (CCPA 1970); see also In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 1013 (CCPA1964)
(“We are not here concerned with what one skilled in the art would be aware
[of] from reading the claims but with what inventions the claims define.”).
We note that claims 1-30 of Thomas ‘483 are directed to an induction
heating system comprising a power source, a fluid cooling unit, and a
flexible fluid-cooled induction heating cable (see Thomas ‘483, claims 1-
30). However, the Examiner has directed us to nothing in the patented
claims directed to using a controller or automating the system claimed in
Thomas ‘483.
We adopt the Appellants’ position that “[t]he Examiner appears to be
applying the wrong legal standard, and has not addressed the deficiencies of
the rejections previously pointed out in pages 8-16 of the Appeal Brief”
(Reply Br. 3).
The Examiner repeatedly asserts “a power source and coupleable
cooling unit of USP ‘483 are encompassed by [the instant claims]” (Ans. 8
and 11). The Examiner also includes copies of instant claims 1-3, 57, and 59
and patented claims 12 and 22 with certain claim limitations underlined
(Ans. 9-12). Yet, the Examiner does not match the controller limitations
recited in the instant claims to any element of the patented claims nor does
the Examiner provide an explanation or rationale as to why an induction
heating system having a controller would be not be patentably distinct from
the invention claimed in Thomas ‘483. “[T]here must be some clear
evidence to establish why the variation would have been obvious which can
properly qualify as ‘prior art.’” In re Kaplan, 789 F.2d 1574, 1580 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
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With respect to the second rejection, the Examiner does not rely on
the teaching of Somes to meet the controller limitation of the claims, but
rather to meet the “flow switch” limitation particular to claims 57-62, 64-87,
and 91-94. Thus, the teachings of Somes do not remedy the deficiencies
pointed out by Appellants.
Accordingly, we cannot sustain the obviousness-type double
patenting rejections based on Thomas ‘483 or Thomas ‘483 in view of
Somes.
III. OBVIOUSNESS-TYPE DOUBLE PATENTING REJECTION BASED
ON THOMAS ‘439
With respect to the third ground of rejection, Appellants’ present
arguments with respect to claims 1-6, 8, 47, and 51-55 as a group, for which
we select claim 1 as a representative claim, and claims 57-62, 64-87, and 91-
94 as a group, for which we select independent claim 57 as a representative
claim (Br. 15).
A. DISPOSITIVE ISSUE ON APPEAL
A second issue on appeal arising from the contentions of Appellants
and the Examiner is: does the evidence support Appellants’ view that the
Examiner erred in determining that a portable induction heating system
having, among other things, a “cooling unit” (as recited in independent claim
1) or a “flow switch” (as recited in independent claim 57) is not patentably
distinct from the induction heating system claimed in Thomas ‘439? We
answer this question in the affirmative.
B. DISCUSSION
Appellants contend that the Examiner has not established that certain
recited elements, including the “cooling unit” and the “flow switch” recited
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in the rejected claim, are rendered obvious (see Br. 15). We agree with
Appellants.
We note that claims 1-28 of Thomas ‘439 are directed to an induction
heating system comprising a power source, a temperature feedback device
and a controller to control the power source based on the workpiece
temperature (see Thomas ‘439, claims 1-28). The Examiner has directed us
to nothing in the claims of Thomas ‘439 that directed to a cooling unit, a
flow switch or using fluid as a cooling source.
The Examiner asserts “a power source and a programmable power
source controller of USP ‘439 are encompassed by [the instant claims]”
(Ans. 12). The Examiner also includes copies of instant claims 1, 47, and
51-54 and patented claims 1-8 with certain claim limitations underlined
(Ans. 13-14). For the same reasons discussed above, we agree with
Appellants that “[t]he Examiner appears to be applying the wrong legal
standard, and has not addressed the deficiencies of the rejections previously
pointed out in pages 8-16 of the Appeal Brief” (see Reply Br. 3).
Accordingly, we cannot sustain the obviousness-type double patenting
rejections based on Thomas ‘439.
IV. OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS BASED ON HENDERSON IN VIEW
OF COUFFET, ANTIER, AND DUNCAN
With respect to the fourth ground of rejection, Appellants present
arguments with respect to claims 1-6, 8, 47, and 51-55 as a group (Br. 17-
20). However, we find the scope of claims 1 and 47 sufficiently different to
require us to separately address claims 1-6 and 8 as a group, with claim 1 as
a representative claim and claims 47 and 51-55 as a group with claim 47 as a
representative claim. Appellants then present arguments with respect to
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claims 57-62, 64-87, and 91-94 as a group (Br. 20-21), for which we select
independent claim 57 as a representative claim.
Claim 1
A. ISSUE ON APPEAL
A third issue on appeal arising from the contentions of Appellants and
the Examiner is: does the evidence support the Appellants’ view that the
Examiner erred in concluding that an induction heating system with a
cooling unit coupleable to a fluid-cooled induction heating cable and
configured to cooperate with at least the fluid-cooled induction heating cable
to provide a single continuous cooling path operable to dissipate heat from
the fluid-cooled induction heating cable and from an electrical lead, as
recited in claim 1, would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the
art from the teachings of Henderson? We answer this question in the
negative.
B. DISCUSSION
For the purposes of this rejection, we adopt the Examiner’s findings in
the Answer as our own and add any additional findings of fact appearing
below for emphasis.
It is undisputed that Henderson teaches a first cooling path for the
electrical leads and a second cooling path for the induction heating cable.
Appellants contend that Henderson fails to render obvious a cooling unit that
cooperates with a heat induction cable to form a “single continuous cooling
path operable to dissipate heat from the fluid-cooled induction heating cable
and from an electrical lead,” as recited in claim 1 (Br. 17-20). We disagree
with Appellants that claim 1 positively requires the presence of an induction
heating cable meeting the recited claim limitation.
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During examination, “claims . . . are to be given their broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification, and . . . claim
language should be read in light of the specification as it would be
interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech.
Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Bond, 910 F.2d
831, 833 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
Choosing to define an element functionally, i.e., by what it does,
rather than what it is, carries with it a risk: Where there is reason to conclude
that the structure of the prior art is inherently capable of performing the
claimed function, the burden shifts to the applicant to show that the claimed
function patentably distinguishes the claimed structure from the prior art
structure. See In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re
Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); In re Hallman, 655 F.2d 212, 215
(CCPA 1981).
Claim 1 only structurally recites a power source, a programmable
power source controller, and a cooling unit. Appellants have claimed the
cooling unit functionally. Thus, the recited cooling unit need only be
capable of being coupled to a fluid-cooled induction heating cable and need
only be configured so as to be capable of cooperating with at least the fluid-
cooled induction heating cable to form a single cooling path (see claim 1).
We cannot agree with Appellants that the structure of the electrical leads or
the structure of the fluid-cooled induction heating cable must be present to
meet the structural requirements of claim 1.
Appellants do not dispute that Henderson teaches a cooling unit
coupled to an induction heating element 22, which is fluid-cooled via inlet
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conduits 14, 84, and 75 and outlet conduits 77, 84, and 12. Appellants’
Specification provides no particular structure for the cooling unit.
As such, we determine it is reasonable for the Examiner to conclude
that the cooling unit taught by Henderson has a structure which is capable of
being connected to an induction heating cable to form a single cooling path.
Appellants point to nothing in the structure of the cooling unit of Henderson
that is different from the structure of the cooling unit claimed that would
inhibit the capability of Henderson’s cooling unit to be connected as
claimed.
Appellants’ arguments do not reach the Examiner’s application of the
teachings of Couffet, Antier, and Duncan.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-6 and 8
as obvious over the teachings of Henderson in view of Couffet, Antier, and
Duncan.
Claim 47
A. ISSUE ON APPEAL
A fourth issue on appeal arising from the contentions of Appellants
and the Examiner is: does the evidence support the Appellants’ view that the
Examiner erred in concluding that an induction heating system with a fluid-
cooled induction heating cable that cooperates with a cooling unit to form at
least a portion of a single cooling pathway that is configured to generally
extend along a supply path and a return path of an electrical pathway, as
recited in claim 47, would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the
art based on the teachings of Henderson? We answer this question in the
affirmative.
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B. DISCUSSION
Appellants contend that Henderson, which teaches a first cooling path
for the electrical leads and a second cooling path for the induction heating
cable, fails to render obvious “at least a portion of a single cooling pathway”
formed by the fluid-cooled induction heating cable as claimed (Br. 17-20).
We agree with the Appellants that “the Examiner has not indicated where he
believes the Henderson et al. reference makes such a disclosure” (Br. 20).
Specifically, the Examiner references Figure 4 elements as reading on
“circulate cooling fluid” as apparently justifying a broad interpretation of the
term “single cooling pathway” (Ans. 15). However, we are unable to
understand how the Examiner has applied the prior art in light of this
interpretation. The Examiner then identifies “water conduits 12 and 14 and
water-cooled electrical conduits 16 and 18” (Ans. 15). In light of
Appellants’ arguments, it is unclear how the Examiner finds that the claims
read on both water conduits 12 and 14 and electrical conduits 16 and 18.
The Examiner then recites a portion of Henderson discussing tubular
elements 78, 82, and 80 as an “inter-connection” (Ans. 16). It is apparent
from the teachings of Henderson that tubular elements 78, 82, and 80 are
water conduits that interconnect water cooled electrical conduits 16 and 18
(Henderson, col. 3, ll. 5-25; Figure 5). The Examiner has not articulated his
rejection such that he has matched the claim language to the teachings in the
reference sufficient to establish a prima facie case of obviousness.
In the process of reversing the Examiner’s rejections, it is appropriate
to interpret the recitations of claim 47. In re Wilder, 429 F.2d 447, 450
(CCPA 1970) (“[T]he first inquiry must be into exactly what the claims
define.”). In doing so, we note that, unlike claim 1 discussed above, claim
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47 positively recites a fluid-cooled induction heating cable forming “at least
a portion of a single cooling pathway” that “generally extends” along a
supply and return electrical pathway (see claim 47). A broadest reasonable
interpretation of claim 47 would not require fluid-cooling along the entire
electrical pathway. As such, it would appear that conduits 14 and 12 and
their fluid connection to heating element 22 would read on the claimed
single cooling pathway recited in claim 47. However, we are constrained to
reverse the Examiner’s rejection by the Examiner’s failure to clearly
articulate his rejection and the apparent reliance on conduits 16 and 18 as
meeting the claimed limitations.
The water flowing through conduits 16 and 18 does not cool the
induction heating coil (Henderson, col. 3, ll. 26-61). Thus, to the extent that
the Examiner contends that conduits 16 and 18 constitute the fluid cooled
induction heating cable recited in claim 47, we cannot agree with the
Examiner.
Accordingly, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claim 47 as
obvious over the teachings of Henderson in view of Couffet, Antier, and
Duncan. Since the Examiner has applied the teachings of Henderson in the
same manner for dependent claims 51-55, we are similarly constrained to
reverse the rejection of these claims as obvious over Henderson in view of
Couffet, Antier, and Duncan.
Claim 57
A. ISSUE ON APPEAL
A fifth issue on appeal arising from the contentions of Appellants and
the Examiner is: does the evidence support Appellants’ view that the
Examiner erred in concluding that an induction heating system having a flow
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switch as recited in claim 57 would have been obvious to one of ordinary
skill in the art having the teachings of Henderson? We answer this question
in the affirmative.
B. DISCUSSION
The Examiner contends that Henderson teaches that, via solenoid 122,
valve 120 turns off power to heating element 22 if no (low) coolant is
circulating and turns on power to heating element 22 if detectable coolant is
circulating (Ans. 17) (citing Henderson, col. 3, ll. 65-71).
Appellants contend that the Examiner has mischaracterized the
teachings of Henderson and that, in fact, the opposite is true, i.e., that
coolant flow through valve 120 is turned on and off based on whether power
is being provided to the heating element 120 (Reply Br. 5).
We agree with the Appellants that the Examiner has improperly
characterized the solenoid 122 and valve 120 taught by Henderson.
The Examiner has directed us to nowhere in the teachings of
Henderson to show that solenoid 122 and/or valve 120 is configured to
detect a coolant fluid, as recited in claim 57. Henderson states that “[t]he
solenoid 122 . . . is connected to the power supply . . . to actuate the valve
120 through solenoid 122 to open position and supply cooling water to the
induction heating element 22 only when power is being delivered to the
heating element” (Henderson, col. 3, ll. 65-71). Thus, the solenoid
122/valve 120 feature of Henderson is not “configured to detect a cooling
fluid,” but is merely opened and closed upon power being delivered to the
heating element.
Accordingly, we cannot sustain the Examiner’s fourth rejection of
claim 57 based on the teachings of Henderson. Since the Examiner has
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applied the teachings of Henderson in the same manner to reach the “flow
switch” limitation of each of independent claims 57, 68, 79, and 87 and the
claims that depend therefrom, we cannot sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
any of claims 57-62, 64-87, and 91-94 as obvious over Henderson in view of
Couffet, Antier, and Duncan.
V. OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS BASED ON HENDERSON IN VIEW
OF COUFFET, ANTIER, DUNCAN, AND SOMES
With respect to the fifth rejection, Appellants focus their arguments
on the presence of a flow switch “configured to detect the cooling fluid
returning from the fluid-cooled induction heating cable” that causes the
output power to discontinue “when the amount of the cooling fluid returning
from the fluid-cooled induction heating cable is below a threshold amount”
that is common to independent claims 57, 68, 79 and 87, which we address
with respect to the flow switch limitation of claim 57.
Appellants do not advance any additional arguments for the sixth
rejection in addition to those addressed for the fifth rejection. Thus, the
issues presented for both the fifth and sixth rejections are the same.
A. ISSUE ON APPEAL
With respect to the fifth and sixth rejections, a sixth issue on appeal
arising from the contentions of Appellants and the Examiner is: does the
evidence support Appellants’ view that the Examiner erred in concluding
that an induction heating system having a flow switch as recited in claim 57
would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art having the
teachings of Henderson in view of Somes? We answer this question in the
negative.
B. DISCUSSION
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Appellants contend that “flow sensing device 17 [of Somes] operates
in a manner diametrically opposed to, and cannot be logically equated with,
the flow switch recited in the instant claims” (Br. 25). The Examiner does
not dispute Appellants’ characterization of the teachings of Somes that flow
sensing device 17 discontinues power output when the amount of coolant
returning from the inducing head 10 is above a certain level, rather than
below a threshold amount as recited in claim 57 (see Br. 24-25 and Ans. 7
and17-18).
However, the Examiner notes that Appellants’ Specification does not
disclose or define any particular structure for a flow switch that would
necessarily cause it to perform the function of discontinuing power only
when a low amount of coolant is detected (Ans. 16).
Appellants have defined the flow switch functionally, i.e., by what it
does, rather than what it is. It is undisputed that the flow sensing device 17
of Somes is configured to be capable of detecting coolant returning from a
heat induction head 10 and of sending a signal to a power source to control
the output power based upon the particular detection of fluid. Thus, it is not
clear that the structure of the flow switch claimed and the flow sensing
device 17 of Somes is any different. To the contrary, it is reasonable for the
Examiner to conclude that the same flow sensing device 17 would be
inherently capable of sending a similar signal upon detection of low fluid as
opposed to the detection of greater amounts of fluid. Thus, the burden is
properly shifted to Appellants to show a structural distinction between the
flow switch claimed and the flow sensing device 17 taught by Somes. See
In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Ludtke, 441
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F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); In re Hallman, 655 F.2d 212, 215 (CCPA
1981).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s fifth rejection of claim 57
based on the teachings of Somes. Since the Examiner has applied the
teachings of Somes in the same manner to reach the “flow switch” limitation
of each of independent claims 57, 68, 79, and 87 and the claims that depend
therefrom, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 57-62, 64-87, and
91-94 as obvious over Henderson in view of Couffet, Antier, Duncan, and
Somes.
With respect to the sixth rejection, Appellants’ arguments do not
reach the Examiner’s additional application of the teachings of Cydzik.
Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 79-87, and 91-94 as
obvious over Henderson in view of Couffet, Antier, Duncan, Somes, and
Cydizk for the same reasons discussed above.
VI. CONCLUSION
On the record before us and for the reasons discussed above, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejections of (a) claims 1-6 and 8 under 35 U.S.C. §
103 as unpatentable over Henderson in view of Couffet, Antier, and Duncan;
(b) claims 57-62, 64-87, and 91-94 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Henderson in view of Couffet, Antier, Duncan, and Somes; and (c)
claims 79-87 and 91-94 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Henderson in view of Couffet, Antier, Duncan, and Cydzik.
However, we cannot sustain (a) the obviousness-type double patenting
rejections maintained by the Examiner or (b) the rejection of claims 47, 51-
55, 57-62, 64-87, and 91-94 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Henderson in view of Couffet, Antier, and Duncan.
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VII. DECISION
We affirm-in-part the Examiner’s decision.
VIII. TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

cam