Ex Parte TAVA

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 17, 2017

13896883 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 17, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/896,883 05/17/2013 Marcello TAVA 080437.65555US 4336
23911 7590 10/19/2017
CROWELL & MORING LLP
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GROUP
P.O. BOX 14300
WASHINGTON, DC 20044-4300
EXAMINER
KHATIB, RAMI
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3669
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/19/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
edocket @ crowell. com
tche @ crowell. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MARCELLO TAYA
Appeal 2017-003387
Application 13/896,883
Technology Center 3600
Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, LARRY J. HUME, and AARON W. MOORE,
Administrative Patent Judges.
DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appeal 2017-003387
Application 13/896,883
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims
1—5, 7—9, 11—14, and 16—19. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
The claims are directed to a navigation system and method. Claim 1,
reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A navigation system comprising:
an input device operatively configured to receive
destination information from a user;
a memory in which information concerning road sections
and information concerning time-dependent traffic restrictions
are stored such that, in each case, information concerning time-
dependent traffic restrictions is assigned to road sections,
wherein the time-dependent traffic restrictions are based on at
least one of a scheduled road closure, a speed restriction imposed
on one or more particular road sections, a vehicle type restriction
imposed on one or more particular road sections, and a travel
restriction imposed on one or more particular road sections;
a route computation processor operatively configured to
compute a route based on the destination information received
from the user, wherein when computing a route, the memory is
accessed in order to compute the route based on information
concerning road sections and based on information concerning
time-dependent traffic restrictions, and
when computing the route, information concerning time-
dependent traffic restrictions for a first portion of the road
sections, to which information concerning a time-dependent
traffic restriction is assigned, is taken into account only when an
expected arrival time at said first portion of the road sections is
within a time period in which the time-dependent traffic
restriction is applicable and, information concerning time-
dependent traffic restrictions for a second portion of the road
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Application 13/896,883
sections, to which information concerning a time-dependent
traffic restriction is assigned, is not taken into account; and
a display operatively configured to display the route
computed by the route computation processor in response to
receiving the destination information from the user.
REFERENCE
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Myr US 2001/0029425 A1 Oct. 11, 2001
REJECTION
The Examiner made the following rejection:
Claims 1—5, 7—9, 11—14, and 16—19 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Myr.
ANALYSIS
With respect to independent claims 1 and 19, Appellant argues the
claims together. (App. Br. 6). We select independent claim 1 as the
representative claim for the group and will address Appellant’s arguments
thereto. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
Initially, we note the features argued by Appellant merely constitute
non-functional descriptive material and statements of intended use of the
recited applications. The claim simply recites an input device, a memory
storing information, a route computation processor, and a display. The
remainder of the claim is directed to the information content which does not
change the operation of the “navigation system.” We further note that there
is no separate and distinct step of determining a time of day for the time-
dependent traffic restrictions.
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The stored data constitutes non-functional descriptive material, which
“does not lend patentability to an otherwise unpatentable computer-
implemented product or process.” Ex parte Nehls, 88 USPQ2d 1883, 1889
(BPAI 2008) (precedential); see Ex parte Curry, 84 USPQ2d 1272, 1274
(BPAI 2005) (informative), aff’d, Fed. Cir. Appeal No. 2006-1003 (Rule 36)
(June 12, 2006) (“wellness-related” data in databases and communicated on
distributed network did not functionally change either the data storage
system or the communication system used in the claimed method); see also
In reNgai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Nehls, 88 USPQ2d at
1887—90 (discussing non-functional descriptive material). Similarly,
“[a]n[ jintended use or purpose usually will not limit the scope of the claim
because such statements usually do no more than define a context in which
the invention operates.” Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-
Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Accordingly, we need
not attribute any distinguishing character to the asserted claim features.
With respect to independent claim 1, Appellant’s main contention is
that the Myr reference does not disclose the claimed “time-dependent traffic
restrictions” and “when computing the route, information concerning time-
dependent traffic restrictions for a first portion of the road sections, to which
information concerning a time-dependent traffic restriction is assigned, is
taken into account only when an expected arrival time at said first portion of
the road sections is within a time period in which the time-dependent traffic
restriction is applicable and, information concerning time-dependent traffic
restrictions for a second portion of the road sections.” (App. Br. 6).
Specifically, Appellant contends claim 1 recites “time-dependent
traffic restrictions” be taken into account on a selective basis, corresponding
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to when an expected arrival time falls within a time period in which the
time-dependent traffic restriction is applicable. (App. Br. 7).
The Examiner maintains that paragraphs 13—16 of the Myr reference
disclose the time-dependent traffic restrictions. (Ans. 2—3). We agree with
the Examiner. Appellant generally addresses paragraphs 14 and 123 of the
Myr reference and generally contends that the time-dependent traffic
restriction “based on at least one of a scheduled road closure, a speed
restriction imposed on one or more particular road sections, a vehicle type
restrictions imposed on one or more particular road sections, and a travel
restriction imposed on one or more particular road sections” is not disclosed.
(App. Br. 8—9). We disagree with Appellant, and we find that the Examiner
has identified road closures, which are the time-dependent restrictions on
travel. Although Appellant may intend the claimed time-dependent traffic
restrictions to be merely hourly or temporary during a single day, we find
the language of independent claim 1 does not distinguish the length of time
dependency. Additionally, the computation of the travel route and time does
not specifically claim the method to differentiate from the method of
calculation disclosed by the Myr reference. Consequently, Appellant’s
argument does not show error in the Examiner’s finding of anticipation of
representative independent claim 1.
Appellant further argues:
Specifically, statistical or actual traffic information is not
a “time-dependent traffic restrictions” because it is not “based on
at least one of a scheduled road closure, a speed restriction
imposed on one or more particular road sections, a vehicle type
restriction imposed on one or more particular road sections, and
a direction-of-travel restriction imposed on one or more
particular road sections.”
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(App. Br. 8—9). Appellant additionally contends:
even if they could be equated, such as under an obviousness
analysis as opposed to an anticipation analysis, the outstanding
rejection should still be withdrawn because Myr expressly relies
upon its traffic information in what would be the “second portion
of the road sections” (i.e., those further away (claim 2)/closer to
the destination (claim 3)).
(App. Br. 9).
Appellant further argues the Myr reference would seem to teach away
from the above claimed feature. (App. Br. 9). We note ‘“teaching away’ is
irrelevant to anticipation.” Leggett & Platt, Inc. v. VUTEk, Inc., 537 F.3d
1349, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). As a result, Appellant’s
“teaching away” argument does not show error in the Examiner’s finding of
anticipation.
On this record, Appellant has not shown the Examiner’s claim
construction is overly broad, unreasonable, or inconsistent with the
Specification. Additionally, we note the Myr reference further discloses
there are factors that affect travel time calculations, including “[generally
stable changes in road conditions known in advance like closed roads under
construction, traffic reroutes, changes in traffic arrangements because of
visiting dignitaries, etc.” (Myr 1128). Consequently, we find the Myr
reference discloses changes over time in roads, which discloses time-
dependent route changes depending on when the routes are determined.
Appellant contends dependent claims 2—5, 7—9, 11—14, and 16—18
depend either directly or indirectly from independent claims 1 and 19 and, as
a result, are allowable for the same reasons as their independent claims.
(App. Br. 10). We find Appellant has not set forth separate arguments for
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patentability. Because we found no error in the Examiner’s factual findings
or finding of anticipation, we group these claims as falling with their
respective parent independent claim.
REPLY BRIEF
Appellant again presents arguments similar to those advanced in the
Appeal Brief. Appellant contends Myr’s traffic jams are not time-dependent
traffic restrictions. (Reply Br. 1). Appellant further contends Myr cannot
reasonably be equated with the claimed ‘“time-dependent traffic restriction,’
since there is no teaching or suggestion that such traffic conditions are
restrictions that pertain to certain road sections at certain times of the day.”
(Reply Br. 2).
We find Appellant’s argument is not commensurate in scope with the
language of independent claim 1, where “certain times of the day” is not
recited in the language of the claim.
We find the Specification merely sets forth examples of “time-
dependent traffic restrictions” as
For example, a time-dependent traffic restriction may
consist of the fact that a road section is closed at certain times;
that a road section can be traveled only in one direction at certain
times; that only certain vehicle types may travel on the road
section at certain times; or that a road section may only be
traveled at a predefined maximum speed at certain times, etc.
(Spec. 15). Appellant further contends there is no teaching or suggestion
that:
Myr’s “closed roads” are time-dependent, scheduled road
closures. Second, even if they are, there is no teaching as to how
that information is used, let alone any suggestion that the “closed
roads” information is used in a selective manner, as is the case
with the claimed invention.
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(Reply Br. 3). Appellant further argues:
As more fully set forth in the Appeal Brief, the
independent claims require that the particularly-recited time-
dependent traffic restrictions be taken into account on a selective
basis, corresponding to when an expected arrival time falls
within a time period in which the time-dependent traffic
restriction is applicable. In particular, restrictions in areas which
are in the “second portion” of road sections, identified as being
further away in dependent claim 2 or closer to the destination in
claim 3, for example, are not taken into account in computing the
route. Nothing in the paragraphs [0014] - [0016] teach or suggest
that “closed roads” information is used in such an arrangement.
(Reply Br. 3). Appellant further argues paragraph 123 does not discuss the
disclosed invention with regards to the time-dependent traffic restrictions as
proffered in paragraphs 14—16 of Myr. (Reply Br. 3—4).
Appellant finally contends:
Thus, even if the traffic Jams and/or road closures of Myr
are “time-dependent traffic restrictions,” as that term is used in
the claims, Myr still fails to anticipate independent claims 1 and
19 since Myr does not further teach or suggest the operations of
selectively determining whether or not to take those traffic jams
and/or road closures into account in computing a route based on
a comparison between an “expected arrival time” at the location
where the traffic jams and/or road closures actually exists and “a
time period in which the time-dependent traffic restriction is
applicable.”
(Reply Br. 5—6).
We disagree with Appellant, and we find the Myr reference discloses
changes over time in the road, which discloses time-dependent route changes
depending on when the routes are determined. Moreover Appellant’s
Specification does not define or provide a limiting context to differentiate
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the claimed time-dependent traffic restrictions from those disclosed in the
Myr reference.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1—5, 7—9, 11—14, and 16—
19 based upon anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102.
DECISION
For the above reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s anticipation
rejection of claims 1—5, 7—9, 11—14, and 16—19 under 35 U.S.C. § 102.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED
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