Ex Parte Szentistvany

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jul 5, 2011

10524122 (B.P.A.I. Jul. 5, 2011)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
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Ex parte ANDREAS CSABA SZENTISTVANY
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Appeal 2009-011142
Application 10/524,122
Technology Center 3600
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Before STEVEN D.A. McCARTHY, KEN B. BARRETT, and
FRED A. SILVERBERG, Administrative Patent Judges.

BARRETT, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Andreas Csaba Szentistvany (Appellant) seeks our review under 35
U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-12. The
Examiner has indicated that claims 13 and 14 are allowable. Claims 15-19
have been canceled. Claim 20 is objected to as depending from a rejected
base claim, but indicated as being allowable if rewritten in independent
form. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.

THE INVENTION
Appellant’s claimed invention pertains to a stairlift carriage having an
over-speed braking means and an angle determining means. Claim 1,
reproduced below with paragraphing added, is representative of the subject
matter on appeal.
1. A stairlift comprising a stairlift rail;
a carriage mounted on said rail for movement there
along;
a chair mounted on said carriage;
over-speed braking means operable to brake said carriage
from further movement on said rail when the speed of said
carriage on said rail exceeds a predetermined maximum speed,
and
angle determining means for determining out-of-level
positions of said chair, said angle determining means being
capable of causing actuation of said over-speed braking means.

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THE REJECTIONS
The following Examiner’s rejections are before us for review:
1. Claims 1-9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Watson (GB 2 339 419 A, published Jan. 26, 2000) and
Jones (GB 2 322 450 A, Aug. 26, 1998); and
2. Claims 10-12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Gisske (US 4,904,916, issued Feb. 27, 1990) and Bartelt
(US 5,230,405, issued July 27, 1993).

OPINION
The rejection of claims 1-9 as obvious in light of Watson and Jones
Independent claim 1 pertains to a stairlift having an over-speed
braking means governing movement of the carriage on the rail and an angle
determining means for the chair mounted on the carriage. Claim 1 calls for
“said angle determining means being capable of causing actuation of said
over-speed braking means.” Appellant argues that the prior art lacks “an
interconnection between these two sets of controls …” and that the
Examiner has misinterpreted the teachings of Jones concerning a brake.
App. Br. 5-6. Appellant contends that Jones’s mention of a brake is a
reference to the brake for stopping the chair’s angular rotation, not for
stopping the carriage’s movement along the rail. Id. at 6.
The Examiner found that Watson discloses an over-speed braking
means, but not an angle determining means. Ans. 3. The Examiner further
found that Jones discloses an angle determining means and teaches that
deviation beyond the boundaries of a set range should lead to engagement of
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a brake. Id. Specifically, the Examiner (Ans. 3) points to Jones’s statement
that:
Any designer should ensure that suitable safety circuits are
incorporated so that should the seat become displaced by more
than a present amount of say, + or - 5Deg then some sort of
Brake is engaged.
Jones 4. The Examiner maintains that this “introduc[tion] of the concept of
braking” coupled with “a very basic concept of braking a carriage of a stair
lift, as disclosed by Watson, should a chair of said stair lift be angularly
displaced beyond an allowable range” renders Appellant’s claimed invention
obvious. Ans. 8. However, on the record before us, we cannot find by a
preponderance of the evidence that this “very basic concept” (braking a
carriage upon excessive angular seat displacement) was known in the art or
that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand Jones to disclose an
angle determining means capable of causing actuation of an over-speed
brake. As such, the Examiner has failed to articulate reasoning with rational
underpinning sufficient to support the conclusion of obviousness of claim 1.
The Examiner’s articulation of the rejection as applied to independent
claims 8 and 9 are based on the same insufficient reasoning as that for
claim 1. Ans. 5-6. The remaining claims subject to this rejection depend
from claim 1, and therefore suffer from the same deficiency. We cannot
sustain the rejection of claims 1-9 as unpatentable over Watson and Jones.
The rejection of claims 10-12 as obvious in light of Gisske and Bartelt
Claims 11 and 12
Appellant argues claims 11 and 12 as a group. App. Br. 9-11. We
select claim 11 as the representative claim, and claim 12 stands or falls with
claim 11. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
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Independent claim 11 pertains to a stairlift with an over-speed
governor and with stops to prevent the carriage from overrunning the end of
the rail. Claim 11 recites:
limit engagement means … positioned to physically engage
ultimate stops provided at each end of the rail, … wherein said
over-speed governor and said limit engagement means actuate a
common isolation switch thereby cutting power to said drive
motor.
The Examiner found that Gisske discloses a system where an over-
speed governor and a limit engagement means actuate a common isolation
switch (found to be internal to the controller but not depicted) to disengage
the drive motor. Ans. 6. The Examiner further found that Bartelt discloses
limit engagement means (one set of recharging contacts 107 and limit switch
105) positioned to physically engage ultimate stops (bumper 103 and the
mating set of recharging contacts 107), and that the limit engagement means
cuts power to the drive motor. Id.; Bartelt, col. 5, ll. 30-35, figs. 6 & 7. The
Examiner reasons that it would have been obvious to modify Gisske as
taught by Bartelt to use ultimate limit stops in combination with mechanical
limit engagement means to actuate an isolation switch common to both the
limit engagement means and the over-speed governor for the purpose of
safety. Ans. 6-7.
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s findings regarding Gisske are
erroneous. App. Br. 9-10. Specifically, Appellant maintains that the
Examiner erred because Gisske uses infrared sensors as opposed to those
that physically engage ultimate stops and because Gisske’s infrared modules
are not ultimate stops. Id. at 10 (quoting Szentistvany Decl., para. 8).
However, Appellant’s arguments are not commensurate with the Examiner’s
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findings and articulation of the rejection, and thus are not persuasive of
error. In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(“Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references
individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a
combination of references.”) The Examiner found that Gisske discloses
“limit engagement means … to engage limit stops” and acknowledges that
Gisske uses an infrared system. Ans. 6, 10. The Examiner relies on Bartelt
for the “physically engage ultimate stops” aspect. Id. at 6, 10 (referring to,
inter alia, Bartelt’s elements 103 and 105). Appellant does not dispute the
Examiner’s findings regarding Bartelt, but rather appears to agree. See App.
Br. 11 (“Bartlet [sic] shows the provision of the physical ultimate limit stops
in the form of bumpers 103 that are positioned to engage and trigger limit
switches 105 provided on the carriage.”)
Appellant also argues that Bartelt does not disclose an over-speed
governor and that “[o]ne skilled in the art, could not form an accurate or
realistic view as to how physical elements which are not described (the
ultimate limit stops[1]) might operate in conjunction with the over-speed
governor . . .” App. Br. 11. Again, this argument is not commensurate with
the Examiner’s articulated rejection. The Examiner made the uncontested
finding that Gisske discloses an over-speed governor and a limit engagement
means (although an infrared system) that actuate a common isolation switch.
Ans. 6, 10. We are not persuaded that one of ordinary skill would fail to

1 Where Appellant appears to agree that Bartelt discloses physical ultimate
limit stops (App. Br. 11), Appellant’s mention of ultimate limit stops that are
“not described” appears to refer back to their argument that Gisske’s infrared
components are not ultimate limit stops.
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understand how the elements would operate in the Examiner’s proposed
modified system utilizing Bartelt’s physical stops.
We affirm the rejection of claims 11 and 12 as unpatentable over
Gisske and Bartelt.
Claim 10
Independent claim 10 recites a method for testing on over-speed
governor and, in essence, calls for applying to an over-speed governor
circuit an electrical signal simulating a speed and observing the governor’s
response.
The Examiner reasons that the well-known need for testing
components would have rendered obvious the testing “in a usual and
expected fashion” of the over-speed governor in the modified Gisske device.
Ans. 7, 9. Appellant argues that “there is no description given of the form of
the governor [of Gisske] (i.e. no disclosure that it is responsive to electronic
speed sensing means) and no deduction can therefore be made as to how that
governor might be assembled and tested.” App. Br. 11-12.
The Examiner responds:
With respect to Claim 10, contrary to applicant's
assertion, Gisske et al disclose their over-speed governor as
responsive to electronic speed sensing means ([overspeed
sensor] 112, Col. 7, L. 60 - 64, Fig. 1 [sic]) whereby their
microcontroller [element number 42] receives an input from
their speed sensor ….
Ans. 9; see also Gisske, col. 3, ll. 7-10, fig. 7 (electrical system block
diagram depicting the microcontroller and overspeed sensor). We agree that
one would recognize Gisske’s disclosure of a governor responsive to
electronic sensing means, and therefore find the Examiner’s response to
adequately rebut Appellant’s allegation that the rejection is erroneous
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because of the purported lack of a description of the form of Gisske’s over-
speed governor. We affirm the rejection of claim 10 as obvious in light of
Gisske and Bartelt.

DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-9 is reversed. The
decision of the Examiner to reject claims 10-12 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

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