Ex Parte Sxhmidt

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 30, 2017

13738686 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 30, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/738,686 01/10/2013 Olaf Sxhmidt 22135-0174001/120280us01 8783
32864 7590 02/01/2017
FISH & RICHARDSON, P.C. (SAP)
PO BOX 1022
MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55440-1022
EXAMINER
FERRER, JEDIDIAH P
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2164
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/01/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PATDOCTC@fr.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte OLAF SCHMIDT
Appeal 2016-002447
Application 13/73 8,6861
Technology Center 2100
Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, KEVIN C. TROCK, and
JESSICA C. KAISER, Administrative Patent Judges.
STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Introduction
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1—20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
STATEMENT OF THE INVENTION
The claims are directed to generating notifications for in-memory
databases (Abstract). Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is SAP SE (App. Br. 2).
Appeal 2016-002447
Application 13/738,686
1. A computer-implemented method for generating a
notification from an in-memory database update, the method
comprising:
detecting an in-memory database event that inserts, deletes
or modifies a first record in an in-memory database;
executing a first database trigger that corresponds to the
detected in-memory database event;
identifying a first business event definition that is mapped
to the executed first database trigger; and
generating a first notification that corresponds to the
identified first business event definition, the first notification
generated for a first subscriber to the identified first business
event definition.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Eberhard
Samu
Ovsyannikov
Huang
Kann
US 6,212,514 B1
US 6,405,212 B1
US 2006/0190473
US 2011/0276349
US 2012/0023077
Apr. 3, 2001
June 11, 2002
A1 Aug. 24,2006
A1 Nov. 10,2011
A1 Jan. 26, 2012
REJECTIONS
The Examiner made the following rejections:
Claims 1, 7, 8, 14, 15, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
as being anticipated by Ovsyannikov (Final Act. 3—7).
Claims 2, 3, 9, 10, 16, and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Ovsyannikov and Huang (id. at 8—19).
Claims 4, 11, and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Ovsyannikov and Samu (id. at 19-22).
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Application 13/738,686
Claims 5, 12, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Ovsyannikov, Samu, and Kann (id. at 22—26).
Claims 6 and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Ovsyannikov and Eberhard (id. at 26—28).
ISSUES
§ 102(b): Claims 1, 8, and 15
Issue 1: Did the Examiner err in finding Ovsyannikov discloses “an
in-memory database event that inserts, deletes or modifies a first record in an
in-memory database,” as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claims 8
and 15?
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellant’s
conclusions. We adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth by the
Examiner in the Final Action from which the appeal is taken (Final Act. 3—
29), the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Advisory Action (Adv. Act.
2), and the reasons set forth in the Examiner’s Answer in response to
Appellant’s Appeal Brief (Ans. 3—9). We highlight and address specific
findings and arguments for emphasis as follows.
Appellant contends the Examiner erred in finding Ovsyannikov
discloses “an in-memory database event that inserts, deletes or modifies a
first record in an in-memory database,” as recited in claim 1 and similarly
recited in claims 8 and 15 (App. Br. 10—17; Reply Br. 2—11). Specifically,
Appellant argues “the plain meaning given by ‘those of ordinary skill in the
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art’ to the term ‘in-memory database’ is very different from Ovsyannikov's
computer storage media” (App. Br. 10-11). Appellant further argues
because Ovsyannikov does not disclose an in-memory database, the triggers
in Ovsyannikov do not insert, delete, or modify records for an in-memory
database (App. Br. 16—17; Reply Br. 11).
We are not persuaded. Initially, as a matter of claim construction, we
are not persuaded the Examiner’s broad, but reasonable interpretation that an
“in-memory database” may include “computer storage devices with
databases stored on them,” is in error (Ans. 4; Final Act. 28). Appellant
does not explicitly define the term “in-memory database” in the claims or in
the Specification. Rather, the Specification only provides examples of an in­
memory database, “such as SAP HANA” (Spec. 11, 14). Further, while
Appellant asserts “the “[Specification . . . provides detailed subject matter
related to an in-memory database” (Reply Br. 6), that assertion is not
supported by any citation to the Specification or any explanation regarding
what “detailed subject matter” is being taught. Indeed, Appellant does not
proffer an interpretation for “in-memory database,” instead asserting an
ordinarily skilled artisan “would have readily recognized that an ‘in-memory
database’ is different from a traditional database based on the plain meaning
of ‘in-memory database’ alone” (App. Br. 11). Furthermore, Appellant
“assert[s] that an explicit definition is not required” (Reply Br. 6; see App.
Br. 10, 11) and instead provides “general exemplary references” by
providing links to webpages without explanation2 (Reply Br. 4 (emphasis
added); App. Br. 11 (citations omitted)). Even further, Appellant asserts that
2 We note that copies of Appellant’s linked webpages have not been
provided in the Appeal Brief’s Evidence Appendix (App. Br. 29).
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“to one of ordinary skill in the art using only the ‘ordinary and customary
meaning,’ aspects and features of an ‘in-memory’ database would be well-
understood” {id. at 3), but then negates that assertion by stating that
“Appellant[] do[es] not believe that it is necessary to focus solely on the
‘ordinary and customary meaning given to [an in-memory database] by
those of ordinary skill in the art’” {id. at 4). Thus, Appellant has not
proffered any definition of an “in-memory database” or explained what one
of ordinary skill in the art would have understood to be an “in-memory
database.” Accordingly, Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner’s
finding that an “in-memory database” may encompass “computer storage
devices with databases stored on them,” is in error (Ans. 4; Final Act. 28).
The Examiner finds, and we agree, Ovsyannikov “create[s], read[s],
update[s], or delete[s]” data in database based on a trigger (Final Act. 4
(citing Ovsyannikov 1 53, Fig. 2)). The Examiner further finds (Final Act.
28; see also Ans. 6—7), and we agree, Ovsyannikov’s database is provided in
a computing system that executes “program modules including] routines,
programs, objects, components, data structures, etc.[,] that perform
particular tasks or implement particular abstract data types” stored in
computer storage (Ovsyannikov 118; see also Ovsyannikov H 20-23).
Ovsyannikov further describes the system memory includes the computer
storage memory which includes data that are immediately accessible to
and/or presently being operated on by the processing unit (Ans. 6;
Ovsyannikov 121).
Thus, we find Ovsyannikov describes the recited “in-memory
database.”
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Appellant’s argument that “a person of ordinary skill in the art, based
at least on the plain meaning of ‘in-memory database’ alone, and especially
in light of Appellant[’s] specification, would readily recognize that an ‘in­
memory database’ ... is different from” Ovsyannikov’s database (Reply Br.
2—3; App. Br. 10-11) is not persuasive. Appellant concludes that a person
of ordinary skill in the art would be able to distinguish an in-memory
database from Ovsyannikov’s database, but Appellant proffers no evidence
or explanation of what a person of ordinary skill in the art would consider an
in-memory database. Specifically, Appellant does not, for example, provide
a specific citation to the Specification defining an in-memory database or
analysis explaining how an in-memory database is different than the
database stored by Ovsyannikov (see Reply Br. 2—3, 5—6, 9-11; see also
App. Br. 10-14, 16—17). As such, Appellant has not provided us persuasive
argument or evidence that the Examiner’s finding that Ovsyannikov’s
database is an “in-memory database” is in error. Accordingly, we are not
persuaded the Examiner erred in finding Ovsyannikov discloses “an in­
memory database event that inserts, deletes or modifies a first record in an
in-memory database,” within the meaning of claims 1, 8, and 15.
§ 102(b)/§ 103(a): Remaining Claims 2—7, 9—14, and 16—20
Dependent claims 2—7, 9-14, and 16—20 are not separately argued by
Appellant and, thus, these claims fall with their respective independent
claims (see App. Br. 17). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejections
of dependent claims 7, 14, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being
anticipated by Ovsyannikov, dependent claims 2, 3, 9, 10, 16, and 17 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ovsyannikov and Huang,
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dependent claims 4, 11, and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Ovsyannikov and Samu, dependent claims 5, 12, and 19
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ovsyannikov, Samu,
and Kann, and dependent claims 6 and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Ovsyannikov and Eberhard.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 7, 8, 14, 15, and 20 under 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Ovsyannikov is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 2, 3, 9, 10, 16, and 17 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ovsyannikov and Huang is
affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 4, 11, and 18 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ovsyannikov and Samu is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 5, 12, and 19 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ovsyannikov, Samu, and Kann is
affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 6 and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Ovsyannikov and Eberhard is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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