Ex Parte Sun et alDownload PDFBoard of Patent Appeals and InterferencesFeb 22, 201010794704 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 22, 2010) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES ____________ Ex parte BINGXI SUN, DAVID M. PUNG, ASHISH BODKE, and NETY M. KRISHNA ____________ Appeal 2008-004171 Application 10/794,704 Technology Center 1700 ____________ Decided: February 22, 2010 ____________ Before LINDA M. GAUDETTE, KAREN M. HASTINGS, and MICHAEL P. COLAIANNI, Administrative Patent Judges. COLAIANNI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION This is in response to a Request, filed November 23, 2009, for reconsideration of our Decision, decided October 28, 2009, wherein we sustained the § 103 rejection of claims 7-15 as being unpatentable over Subrahmanyan in view of Catabay. Appeal 2008-004171 Application 10/794,704 2 Appellants argue that the Board erred because one of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to combine the water plasma of Catabay with the hydrogen treatment step of Subrahmanyan (Request 2). Appellants’ arguments focus on Subrahmanyan teaching a two step pre-cleaning process whereas Catabay teaches a single step pre-cleaning process as not providing a reason to combine the two steps into a single step (Request 2-4). Specifically, Appellants argue Subrahmanyan teaches a two step pre-cleaning process in which a resist is removed using an oxidation step followed by a reducing treatment with hydrogen to remove oxides whereas Catabay uses a single step resist removal process using water plasma such that there is no teaching or suggestion to support the Board’s decision that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Catabay’s water plasma with Subrahmanyan’s hydrogen plasma step to mitigate damage to low-K dielectrics (Request 2). Along this vein of argument, Appellants contend that the Board erred in its citation to column 9, line 50 to column 10, line 6 of Subrahmanyan as showing an embodiment where no oxygen treatment step is used (Request 4). Appellants contend that Subrahmanyan discloses pre-cleaning “steps,” which indicates using more than one step and that Subrahmanyan’s claims cited by the Board as showing an embodiment where oxygen is not necessarily present is in error because Subrahmanyan’s claim 2 recites that the plasma includes oxygen (Request 4-5). Contrary to Appellants’ arguments, we adhere to our analysis that Subrahmanyan discloses that an oxygen treating step is not Appeal 2008-004171 Application 10/794,704 3 necessarily required (Dec. 7-9). As found on pages 7 and 8 of the Decision, Subrahmanyan discloses an example at column 9, lines 51- 63 that does not use an oxygen plasma step. Rather, Subrahmanyan’s column 9 Example plainly discloses pre-cleaning “steps” that include stabilizing the chamber with a hydrogen gas mixture and then applying RF power to the coil in the chamber to clean the substrate (Subrahmanyan, col. 9, ll. 51-63). Therefore, Appellants’ argument that pre-cleaning “steps” somehow implies that an oxygen step is used is contrary to the express teaching of that particular example. As stated in the Decision (Dec. 8), our interpretation of Subrahmanyan’s column 9 example is further supported by patentee’s claims 1, 5, and 6, which Subrahmanyan states provide the scope of the invention (col. 11, ll. 33-37). Subrahmanyan’s claim 1 does not recite using an oxygen plasma step. Rather, as indicated by Appellants (Request 4), the requirement that the plasma of claim 1 be oxygen plasma is found in claim 2. Although claim 1 does not exclude using oxygen plasma as argued (Request 4), interpreting claim 1’s plasma to be oxygen plasma would render claim 2 superfluous and redundant. Moreover, claim 6, which depends from claims 1 and 5, states that the plasma consists of hydrogen or a mixture of hydrogen and N2, Ar, or Ne. Plainly, claim 6, which uses the closed claim language “consisting of” to further limit the plasma of claim 1, excludes all other plasma gases, including oxygen. So, Subrahmanyan claims an embodiment where hydrogen or a mixture of hydrogen and N2, Ar, or Ne solely is used to generate the plasma of claim 1. Appeal 2008-004171 Application 10/794,704 4 With this proper understanding of the scope of Subrahmanyan’s invention, Appellants’ arguments regarding the incompatibility of combining Catabay’s one step process with Subrahmanyan’s two step process are without persuasive merit. Appellants further argue that the Examiner’s reference to Subrahmanyan’s citation to the Sukharev patent that teaches using water plasma prior to removal of the copper oxide, indicates that a two step process is required (Request 3-4). For the reasons noted above, we find Appellant’s argument unpersuasive. Furthermore, we stated in the footnote on page 3 of the Decision that we have not considered the Sukharev patent in determining the propriety of the Examiner’s rejection for the reasons noted therein (Dec. 3). We decline the invitation to consider such evidence now. Appellants further argue that there is no teaching to use water plasma to remove oxides such that there is no reason to combine Catabay’s water plasma used to remove resists with Subrahmanyan’s hydrogen plasma step used to remove oxides (Request 2-3). As stated on page 9 of the Decision, such an argument fails to address the Examiner’s stated reason for using Catabay’s water plasma as part of the hydrogen treatment step in Subrahmanyan’s process: to remove photoresists and copper oxides in a single step and prevent degradation to the dielectric material. Moreover, as found on page 8 of the Decision, which Appellants do not contest, Catabay discloses using mixtures of hydrogen and water plasma to remove resists (Dec. 8), which provides an additional reason for combining Catabay’s water plasma with Appeal 2008-004171 Application 10/794,704 5 Subrahmanyan’s hydrogen plasma to simultaneously treat the photoresists and native oxides. The teachings of the references, as a whole, would have suggested the combination such that the combination is not based on impermissible hindsight as argued (Request 5). Accordingly, Appellants’ argument is not persuasive. For the above stated reasons, we adhere to our conclusions that Appellants have not shown reversible error in the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claims 7-15 over Subrahmanyan in view of Catabay. The Request for Reconsideration is granted to the extent that we have considered Appellants’ request, but denied to the extent that we shall not modify our Decision. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). DENIED cam PATTERSON & SHERIDAN, LLP – APPM/TX 3040 POST OAK BLVD., SUITE 1500 HOUSTON, TX 77056 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation