Ex Parte Stuffle et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Sep 29, 2009

10821741 (B.P.A.I. Sep. 29, 2009)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte WERNER STUFFLE, ANDREAS HEIM, and
JOACHIM KLEINE

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Appeal 2009-012065
Application 10/821,741
Technology Center 2800
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Decided: September 29, 2009
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Before CATHERINE Q. TIMM, JEFFREY T. SMITH, and
KAREN M. HASTINGS, Administrative Patent Judges.

SMITH, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision finally rejecting claims 1-10 (Final Office Action, mailed
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December 22, 2005), the only claims pending in the application. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).1
We AFFIRM.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claim 1 is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal, and is
reproduced from the Claims Appendix to the Appeal Brief (“App. Br.”):
1. A speaker unit for use in a motor vehicle, comprising:

at least one speaker having a chassis; and

at least one light source, said at least one light source being installed
in the chassis of a speaker outside of a diaphragm and at least one
light source is electrically connected to a direct-current network on
board the motor vehicle.

The Examiner relies on the following evidence to establish
unpatentability (Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”), mailed November 22, 2006):

Chun-Ying US 5,964,519 October 12, 1999
Barnes US 6,158,869 December 12, 2000
Quinones US 6,283,414 B1 September 4, 2001
Kolpasky US 6,545,418 B1 April 8, 2003

Appellants request review of the following rejections (App. Br. 6-7):
claims 1 and 4-10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the
combined teachings of Kolpasky and Barnes; claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. §
103(a) as unpatentable over the combined teachings of Kolpasky and Barnes
and further in view of Chun-Ying; and claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as

1 In rendering this decision we have considered Appellants’ Brief dated
August 24, 2006, and the Reply Brief dated January 30, 2007.
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unpatentable over the combined teachings of Kolpasky and Barnes and
further in view of Quinones.
Appellants have grouped arguments for claims 1 and 4-10 together.
(See App. Br. generally). Thus, our initial discussion will be limited to
independent claim 1. We will also address separately rejected and/or argued
claims 2, 3, 5, and 6.
ISSUE
The following issue is presented for our review:
Have Appellants shown reversible error in the Examiner’s
determination that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary
skill in the art within the meaning §103 to install a light source in the
chassis of a speaker outside of a diaphragm based on the combined
teachings of Kolpasky and Barnes?
We answer this question in the negative.
FINDINGS OF FACT (“FF”)
1. Kolpasky is directed to illuminating speaker systems for use in
passenger vehicles. (col. 1, ll. 5-8). More specifically, Kolpasky is directed
to providing a light source positioned within a flat-panel speaker for general
lighting. (col. 2, ll. 9-14). Kolpasky discloses it is “desirable to provide an
illuminating speaker assembly which eliminates the need for separate
speaker and lighting fixtures.” (col. 2, ll. 9-13).
2. Kolpasky discloses conventional speakers comprise a conical
diaphragm which are sometimes bulky and require additional space to
accommodate their placement. (col. 1, ll. 22-32).
3. Kolpasky discloses flat-panel, distributed-load loudspeakers
(DML), were discovered in the early 1990s. Kolpasky discloses the
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diaphragm of a DML is the panel that vibrates in a complex pattern over the
entire surface of the speaker. (col. 1, ll. 38-48).
4. Kolpasky discloses the light emitting device is positioned
within the flat-panel speaker for generating light which passes through the
light permeable sound producing panel. (col. 2, ll. 26-28).
5. Barnes describes integrating lighting into a speaker grille
assembly for use in passenger vehicles. (col. 1, ll. 34-40). Barnes discloses
the speaker grille assembly comprises a light emitting device configured to
illuminate a surface. (col. 2, ll. 41-56).
6. Barnes discloses the light emitting device is disposed beneath a
lens attached to the grille which is utilized to create a dispersion of the light
generated by the light emitting device. (col. 4, ll. 9-31). Barnes discloses
the light emitting device can be arranged in various configurations that allow
maximum amount of sound transmission. (col. 4, ll. 58-65).
7. The Examiner cited the Quinones and Chun-Ying references for
describing various known methods for attaching light emitting devices.
These methods include the screw and soldered attachment of light emitting
devices. (Ans. 5-6).
8. Appellants contend that the Examiner has not established a
prima facie case of obviousness because the references do not teach or
suggest providing a light source in the chassis of a speaker outside of a
diaphragm. (App. Br. 8). Appellants contend that “[t]here is nothing in the
specification or drawings of Kolpasky ‘418 which teach or suggest at least
one speaker in a chassis, nor does Kolpasky ‘418 teach or suggest a
diaphragm member.” Appellants contend that Barnes describes a speaker
grille and does not describe a speaker diaphragm structure. (App. Br. 9).
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PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Appellants have the burden on appeal to the Board to demonstrate
error in the Examiner's position. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 985-86 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (“On appeal to the Board, an applicant can overcome a rejection
[under § 103] by showing insufficient evidence of prima facie obviousness
or by rebutting the prima facie case with evidence of secondary indicia of
nonobviousness.”) (quoting In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
1998)). Therefore, we look to Appellants’ Brief to show error in the
proffered prima facie case. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2007).
A claimed invention is unpatentable if the differences between it and
the prior art “are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill
in the art.” 35 U.S.C. § 103. “The combination of familiar elements
according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more
than yield predictable results.” KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
416 (2007). The question to be asked is “whether the improvement is more
than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established
functions.” Id. at 417.
ANALYSIS
Appellants have not shown reversible error in the Examiner’s
determination that it would have been obvious to install a light source in the
chassis of a speaker outside of a diaphragm based on the combined teachings
of Kolpasky and Barnes. Kolpasky and Barnes both are directed to
providing an illumination source with a speaker assembly. Both Kolpasky
and Barnes utilize a light permeable surface (lens) for dispersing the
illuminated light from the speaker assembly. Thus, the prior art suggested to
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a person of ordinary skill in the art the location of light emitting devices and
a speaker assembly below a light permeable surface. Kolpasky discloses a
light emitting device is located on and around the speaker diaphragm.
Barnes discloses the light emitting device is located below and around a
speaker grille. A person of ordinary skill in the art would have reasonably
expected that a light emitting device could have been located at any location
in and around a speaker that did not interfere with the speaker operation.
Further, a person of ordinary skill is a person of ordinary creativity, not an
automaton. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. One of ordinary skill in the art, using no
more than ordinary creativity, would have appreciated that locating a light
emitting device on a speaker chassis assembly would have been an
appropriate location because it would not interfere with the operation of the
speaker. The location of the light emitting device on the chassis would also
allow the light to transmit through a light permeable surface utilized as a
cover for the speaker device. This is further bolstered by the breadth of the
term “the chassis” whose plain meaning would encompass any framework
upon which the speaker is mounted.
Regarding claims 5 and 6, Appellants argued that it cannot be
determined whether the light source of Kolpasky is perpendicular or parallel
to the speaker axis and therefore the limitations of claims 5 and 6 are not
taught. (App. Br. 10-11). Appellants’ arguments are not persuasive for the
reasons set forth by the Examiner. In particular the Examiner notes that
Appellants have failed to define the reference axis. Notwithstanding the
failure to describe a particular axis, Appellants have failed to establish that
the location of the light source perpendicular or parallel to the axis would
have been unobvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art. A person of
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ordinary skill in the art would have had sufficient skill to select the
appropriate angle for incorporating a light source in a speaker assembly. It
is noted that Appellants have not asserted that the location of the light source
on the speaker chassis achieves unexpected results.
Appellants generally contend that the dependent claims 2 and 3 are
not made obvious in view of the teachings of Kolpasky, Barnes, and Chun-
Ying or Quinones. (App. Br. 11-18). Appellants’ contention is not
persuasive because it does not identify an error in the Examiner’s findings
regarding the cited prior art and the determination that it would have been
obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the components as
suggested by the Examiner.
Accordingly, we affirm the rejections of claims 1 and 4-10 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combined teachings of Kolpasky and Barnes; and
claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combined
teachings of Kolpasky and Barnes and further in view of Chun-Ying; and
claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combined
teachings of Kolpasky and Barnes and further in view of Quinones.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Examiner rejecting claims 1-10 is affirmed.

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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(v).

AFFIRMED

kmm

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P.O. Box 70098
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