Ex Parte StrassnerDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJan 7, 201412236605 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 7, 2014) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte JOHN STRASSNER1 ____________________ Appeal 2011-007798 Application 12/236,605 Technology Center 2400 ____________________ Before JEFFREY S. SMITH, JOHNNY A. KUMAR, and LARRY J. HUME, Administrative Patent Judges. HUME, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Final Rejection of claims 1, 2, and 4-17. Appellant has previously canceled claim 3. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 The Real Party in Interest is International Business Machines Corp. App. Br. 2. Appeal 2011-007798 Application 12/236,605 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 The Invention Appellant’s invention relates to network device management and, in particular, to systems and methods for maintaining and/or generating network device configurations. Spec. ¶ [0002]. Exemplary Claim Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on appeal (paragraphing and emphases added): 1. A network data construct for use in a network device management system, the network data construct comprising: a plurality of configuration knowledge instances, wherein each configuration knowledge instance comprises logical and physical feature information of a network device but does not specify a particular configuration of the network device, and wherein each configuration knowledge instance is associated with a different network device, and a plurality of configuration data instances, wherein each configuration data instance for each network device is derived from a corresponding configuration knowledge instance for the network device, and wherein each configuration knowledge instance comprises a plurality of layers comprising 2 Our decision refers to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed Dec. 2, 2010); Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Mar. 15, 2011); Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Jan. 21, 2011); Final Office Action (“FOA,” mailed July 22, 2010); and the original Specification (“Spec.,” filed Sep. 24, 2008). Appeal 2011-007798 Application 12/236,605 3 a device family layer representing a family of network devices that all share one or more common features, a device layer representing a specific network device within the family of network devices, a physical layer representing a physical feature of the specific network device, and a logical layer representing a logical feature of the specific network device. Prior Art The Examiner relies upon the following prior art in rejecting the claims on appeal: Lewis US 6,243,747 B1 Jun. 5, 2001 Appeal 2011-007798 Application 12/236,605 4 Rejection on Appeal Claims 1, 2, and 4-17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Lewis. Ans. 3.3, 4 ISSUE Appellant argues (App. Br. 4-7; Reply Br. 2-4) that the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Lewis is in error. These contentions present us with the following dispositive issue: 3 Although not before us on appeal or dispositive of our ultimate Decision, if further prosecution of claim 1 should ensue, it appears claim 1 is not directed to statutory subject matter (i.e., process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter) by reciting, in the preamble, “[a] network data construct for use in a network device management system, the network data construct comprising.” It also appears the phrase “data construct” arguably may equate to a data structure. However, claim 1 does not appear to meet the requirements for claiming a data structure. Data structures not claimed as embodied in computer-readable media are descriptive material per se and are not statutory because they are not capable of causing functional change in the computer. See, e.g., In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (claim to a data structure per se held nonstatutory). Such claimed data structures do not define any structural and functional interrelationships between the data structure and other claimed aspects of the invention which permit the data structure’s functionality to be realized. Cf. In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (data structure embodied in a physical memory found to be statutory). 4 While not before us on appeal or dispositive of our ultimate Decision, if further prosecution of dependent claim 2 should ensue, we invite the Examiner’s attention to claim 2 because of incorrect dependency, i.e., claim 2 recites, in pertinent part, “[t]he network data construct of claim 2,” thus calling into question the patentability of this claim under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. Appeal 2011-007798 Application 12/236,605 5 Did the Examiner err in finding that Lewis discloses the limitations of “wherein each configuration data instance for each network device is derived from a corresponding configuration knowledge instance for the network device, and wherein each configuration knowledge instance comprises a plurality of layers,” as recited in independent claim 1? ANALYSIS We only consider those arguments actually made by Appellant in reaching this decision, and we do not consider arguments which Appellant could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs so that any such arguments are deemed to be waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii). We disagree with Appellant’s conclusions with respect to claim 1, and we adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s Arguments. However, we highlight and address specific findings and arguments regarding claim 1 for emphasis as follows. Appellant admits Lewis teaches template-based configuration generation (App. Br. 5), but contends: Lewis does not teach that the template or configuration comprises a plurality of layers comprising a device family layer representing a family of network devices that all share one or more common features, a device layer representing a specific network device within the family of network devices, a physical layer representing a physical feature of the specific network device, and a logical layer representing a logical feature of the specific network device, as recited in claim 1. Appeal 2011-007798 Application 12/236,605 6 Id. Appellant further contends Lewis’ template and configuration merely provide a list of attributes with no mention of any layers, and particularly does not mention layers of the recited configuration knowledge instance, i.e., “a device family layer . . . a device layer . . . a physical layer . . . and a logical layer,” as required by claim 1. Id. First, we construe the word “layer,” as recited in the claims. Appellant’s Specification indicates the recited “configuration knowledge” is an abstraction which is further defined by various abstraction layers. Spec. ¶ [0016]. We find these various abstraction layers merely provide data or information that relates to a software abstractions of specific device types, a specific device, or physical/logical capabilities according to a device’s features, for example. Spec. ¶ [0016]-[0018]. Therefore, in construing claim 1, we find Appellant’s recitation of “a plurality of layers comprising . . . ,” merely describes data or information, i.e., each of the claimed layers corresponds to different data. However, we need not give patentable weight to descriptive material absent a new and unobvious functional relationship between the descriptive material and the substrate. See In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1583-84 (Fed. Cir. 1994); See also Ex parte Mathias, 84 USPQ2d 1276, 1279 (BPAI 2005) (informative) (“[N]onfunctional descriptive material cannot lend patentability to an invention that would have otherwise been anticipated by the prior art.”), aff’d, 191 Fed. Appx. 959 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rule 36); Ex parte Curry, 84 USPQ2d 1272, 1274 (BPAI 2005) (informative) (“Nonfunctional descriptive material cannot render nonobvious an invention that would have otherwise been obvious.”), Appeal 2011-007798 Application 12/236,605 7 aff’d, No. 06-1003 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rule 36). Thus, non-functional descriptive material does not confer patentability to inventions that are otherwise either anticipated or obvious over the prior art. We find claim 1 does not recite any use of the various layers to achieve a particular outcome or output, or any intermediate processing. We further find claim 1 provides no output or further manipulation of the data in the variously recited layers, except to provide, in the preamble, a statement of intended use, i.e., “[a] network data construct for use in a network device management system.” Our reviewing court has said “[p]reamble language that merely states the purpose or intended use of an invention is generally not treated as limiting the scope of the claim.” Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The Examiner finds, and we agree, Lewis discloses a configuration management system that discloses use of a variety of layers, both logical and physical, which allow the user to configure the network, either manually or automatically with templates. Ans. 9 (citing Lewis, col. 7:42-45; col. 8:26- 33; col. 15:28-39 and 48-53; and Fig. 5). Therefore, given Appellant’s misplaced reliance upon non-functional descriptive material recited in each of the variously recited layers in an attempt to distinguish over the prior art, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Lewis anticipates Appellant’s claimed data construct. Accordingly, Appellant has not provided sufficient evidence or argument to persuade us of any reversible error in the Examiner’s reading of the claim limitations onto the cited prior art. Therefore, we sustain the Appeal 2011-007798 Application 12/236,605 8 Examiner’s anticipation rejection of independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). We also sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of dependent claims 5, 15, and 17, not separately argued. Further, while Appellant raised additional arguments for patentability of dependent claims 2, 4, 6-14, and 16, rejected on the same basis as claim 1, (App. Br. 7-15), we find that the Examiner has rebutted each of those arguments in the Answer by a preponderance of the evidence. Ans. 4-8 and 10-13. Therefore, we adopt the Examiner’s findings and underlying reasoning, which we incorporate herein by reference. We further find dependent claims 2 and 4-17 inherit the deficiencies of claim 1 with respect to the recitation of non-functional descriptive material, discussed supra. Consequently, we also find no reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2, 4, 6-14, and 16. Finally, we have reviewed Appellant’s Reply Brief, which provides similar arguments to those presented in the Appeal Brief concerning the rejection of claim 1. Reply Br. 2-4. Given our claim construction analysis, supra, of Appellant’s recitation of non-functional descriptive material, we remain unpersuaded of any error in the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of the claims on appeal. CONCLUSION The Examiner did not err with respect to the anticipation rejection of claims 1, 2, and 4-17 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) over Lewis, and we sustain the rejection. Appeal 2011-007798 Application 12/236,605 9 DECISION We affirm the decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1, 2, and 4-17. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2011). AFFIRMED msc Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation