Ex Parte Stewart et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jun 20, 2003

08996567 (B.P.A.I. Jun. 20, 2003)

1 As correctly noted by the examiner (answer, page 3), a substantially
correct copy of claim 13 appears in the appendix to the brief. In line 1,
"claim" should be "claimed."
The opinion in support of the decision being entered today was not written for
publication and is not binding precedent of the Board.
Paper No. 24
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________
Ex parte ALBERT J. STEWART and LAWRENCE G. STANLEY
____________
Appeal No. 2001-2019
Application No. 08/996,567
____________
ON BRIEF
____________
Before FLEMING, DIXON, and LEVY, Administrative Patent Judges.
LEVY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the
examiner's final rejection of claims 1-131, which are all of the
claims pending in this application.
BACKGROUND
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Appellants' invention relates to a building alarm system
with synchronized strobes. An understanding of the invention can
be derived from a reading of exemplary claim 1, which is
reproduced as follows:
1. A method of synchronizing audible alarms and visual
strobes comprising:
connecting the audible alarms and visual strobes to common
power lines and applying a voltage through the common power
lines; and
thereafter, changing the voltage on the power lines to
control timing of the audible alarms and visual strobes.
The prior art references of record relied upon by the
examiner in rejecting the appealed claims are:
Markl 4,329,677 May 11, 1982
Kollin 4,365,238 Dec. 21, 1982
Right 4,499,453 Feb. 12, 1985
Tigwell et al. 4,620,190 Oct. 28, 1986
(Tigwell)
Berry, III 4,881,058 Nov. 14, 1989
Claims 1, 2, 5-7, 11, and 12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over Berry, III in view of Markl.
Claim 3 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Berry, III in view of Markl and Tigwell.
Claim 4 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Berry, III in view of Markl, Tigwell, and
Kollin.
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Claims 8-10 and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Berry, III in view of Markl and Right.
Rather than reiterate the conflicting viewpoints advanced by
the examiner and appellants regarding the above-noted rejections,
we make reference to the examiner's answer (Paper No. 18, mailed
December 26, 2000) for the examiner's complete reasoning in
support of the rejections, and to appellants' brief (Paper No.
17, filed August 7, 2000) and reply brief (Paper No. 19, filed
February 23, 2001) for appellants' arguments thereagainst. Only
those arguments actually made by appellants have been considered
in this decision. Arguments which appellants could have made but
chose not to make in the brief have not been considered. See 37
CFR 1.192(a).
OPINION
In reaching our decision in this appeal, we have carefully
considered the subject matter on appeal, the rejections advanced
by the examiner, and the evidence of obviousness relied upon by
the examiner as support for the rejections. We have, likewise,
reviewed and taken into consideration, in reaching our decision,
appellants' arguments set forth in the briefs along with the
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Application No. 08/996,567
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examiner's rationale in support of the rejections and arguments
in rebuttal set forth in the examiner's answer.
Upon consideration of the record before us, we
affirm-in-part.
In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103, it is incumbent
upon the examiner to establish a factual basis to support the
legal conclusion of obviousness. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071,
1073, 5 USPQ2d 1596, 1598 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In so doing, the
examiner is expected to make the factual determinations set forth
in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17, 148 USPQ 459, 467
(1966), and to provide a reason why one having ordinary skill in
the pertinent art would have been led to modify the prior art or
to combine prior art references to arrive at the claimed
invention. Such reason must stem from some teaching, suggestion
or implication in the prior art as a whole or knowledge generally
available to one having ordinary skill in the art. Uniroyal,
Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1051, 5 USPQ2d 1434,
1438 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins &
Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 293, 227 USPQ 657, 664 (Fed.
Cir. 1985); ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d
1572, 1577, 221 USPQ 929, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984). These showings
by the examiner are an essential part of complying with the
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burden of presenting a prima facie case of obviousness. Note In
re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir.
1992). If that burden is met, the burden then shifts to the
applicant to overcome the prima facie case with argument and/or
evidence. Obviousness is then determined on the basis of the
evidence as a whole. See id.; In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038, 1039,
228 USPQ 685, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d
1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984); and In re
Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1052, 189 USPQ 143, 147 (CCPA 1976).
We consider first the rejection of claims 1, 2, 5-7, 11, and
12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Berry, III
in view of Markl. We begin with claim 1. The examiner's
position (answer, page 4) is that Berry, III does not
specifically state that alarm synchronization is effected by
changing voltage on the power lines. To make up for this
deficiency of Berry, III, the examiner turns to Markl for a
teaching of the "desirability of allowing plural lights to be
flashed in an alarm system all based on a common clocking action
to assure that flashing takes place at the intended time, the
activation of lights being triggered by a changing voltage level
over power lines 541, 542." The motivation offered by the
examiner (id.) is that "variation between activation times of
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alarms could have been minimized, thus providing more uniform,
less confusing alerts." The examiner adds (answer, pages 4 and
5) that:
Since Berry teaches desirability of having audible
and visual alerts activated simultaneously in an
emergency condition warning system, one of ordinary
skill in the art would have found it obvious to use
a synchronous alarm activation technique as taught
by Markl to activate both audible and visual alarms,
in order that more precise activation of both types
of alerts could have been effected, so that a user
would have been less likely to be confused by out
of sync alerts.

Appellants assert (brief, page 6) that there is no indication in
Berry, III of details regarding the flash lamp 310, and that at
best, the flash lamp 310 would be a typical strobe that would
fire when the required firing voltage is reached across a
charging capacitor, and would thus be free running. Appellants
argue that "[t]hus, Berry, III does not teach or suggest
synchronization of audible alarms and visual strobes."
Turning to Markl, appellants assert (brief, page 6) that
Markl discloses a signal light system for use along a highway,
and fails to teach or suggest any type of audible alarm or any
synchronization of the same. It is further argued (brief, page
6) that the combination of Berry, III and Markl fail to teach or
suggest an alarm system in which an audible alarm and a visual
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alarm are being controlled by a change in voltage on the power
lines.
We find that Berry, III is directed to an emergency alarm
system with both audible and visual signal devices (col. 1, lines
14-16). A master control panel 10 connects to a plurality of
alarm units 308 through a two conductor transmission line 304,
306 (col. 16, line 67 through col. 17, line 1). Control panel 10
supplies DC power on lines 20 (C,D) (col. 17, lines 39-42) and
supervisory and alarm functions on lines 22 (E,F)(col. 5, lines
64-68; col. 6, lines 7-11, and figure 1). An interface module 34
(figure 2) is connected control panel 10 (col. 6, lines 42-45)
and alarm units 308. As shown in figure 6, each alarm unit 308
includes an electrical lamp 310 and a loud speaker 312. The
alarm units operate in one of three alarm modes: (1) solely an
audible alarm mode from the units; (2) solely a visual alarm mode
from the units, and (3) a combination of both audible and visual
alarm modes from the units (col. 17, lines 4-8). In the absence
of an alarm condition, control panel 10 provides a negative d.c.
voltage on terminal E with respect to terminal F. With the coil
of relay K8 deenergized, contacts K8A and K8B are in the position
shown in figure 6. Line 304 is negative with respect to line 306
which causes reverse bias to be applied to diodes 318. Blocking
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capacitors 316 similarly prevent current flow to the speaker
transformers 312. Thus, the supervisory current flow is solely
through the lines 304 and 306, and through the end of line
resistor 320 in figure 6, which is the intent of the supervisory
function (col. 19, lines 35-46).
The operation of the alarm system can be readily understood
by referring to figures 2 and 6. When switch 320 in figure 2,
which is in series with the coil of relay K8, is closed, this
will give rise to operation of the flashing lights 310 only of
alarm units 308 (col. 18, lines 6-11). Switch 320 is a manually
operable switch that is accessible to the operator of the system
(col. 18, lines 11-14). In the absence of an alarm signal from
terminals E and F, closing of switch 320 will cause the coil of
relay K8 to be energized, shifting the contacts of K8A and K8B to
be shifted to the opposite position. This results in +24 volts
d.c. being applied to alarm units 308, resulting in the forward
biasing of diodes 318, thus providing d.c. power to the flashing
lights 310 (col. 18, lines 14-22). Note that at this time, d.c.
current does not flow through the primary of the transformers of
speakers 312 due to the presence of capacitor 316. Although
diode 338 conducts, diodes 332 and 336 are reverse biased and are
non-conductive (col. 18, lines 22-29). If switch 320 is now
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opened, K8 will be de-energized and contacts K8A and K8B to
return to their original positions shown in figure 6, and the
flashing lights 310 will turn off. Thus, switch 320 can be
thought of as "flashing light-only" switch (col. 18, lines
29-39). Berry, III further disclose that in the event switch 320
has been closed and an alarm condition has been indicated by a
reversal of the voltage on terminals E and F of control panel 10,
or alternatively, a verbal message is initiated by depressing
master microphone button 162, the appearance of positive voltage
on the coils of relays K1 and K6 will forward bias diode 326,
causing transistor 322 to cease conduction, de-energizing the
coil of relay K8, and causing the contacts K8A and K8B to assume
the position shown in figure 6, wherein the alarm units 308 will
be supplied with audio, (either a siren-type signal or speech) on
transmission line 304, 306. The audio signal in turn will be
coupled through capacitors 316 and fed to speakers 312. In
addition, the audio will be rectified by rectifiers 332, 334,
336, and 338 of the bridge, filtered by capacitors 314, and
applied to the flashing lights 310. Thus, a combined audio and
visual alarm mode will ensue (col. 18, lines 40-57). Further
control over the visual/audible alarm mode is provided by switch
330 that is connected to transformer tap 328 in figure 2. If the
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switch 330 is moved to the open position (solid lines shown in
figure 2) the full output voltage from the secondary of
transformer 288 is applied to terminals G and H of module 34, and
the alarm units 308 will respond with simultaneous transmission
to the speakers 312 and operation of the flashing lights 310. If
the switch is then closed (dotted lines shown in figure 2) only
one half the secondary voltage will be applied to terminals G and
H. The speakers 312 will still respond, and by proper choice of
then operating parameters of the flashing lights 310, the
resultant d.c. voltage can be below the threshold voltage
required for operation of the flashing lights 310 (col. 19, lines
1-24); i.e., speaker only.
From the disclosure of Berry, III we find that in a non-
alarm condition, the alarm system is under supervisory control
with a negative d.c. voltage on terminal E with respect to
terminal F. During an alarm condition, the voltage on terminals
E and F is reversed, the speakers 312 will sound an alarm and the
flashing lights 310 will be turned on. We note that this
disclosure of Berry, III regarding the reversal of the voltage on
the terminals E and F during an alarm condition, was not brought
to our attention by either the examiner or the appellants. In
addition, we find that Berry, III activates speakers 312 and
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lights 310 at the same time, and to the same extent as does
appellants invention. As shown in appellants' figure 1, both the
audible alarms A and strobe alarms S are coupled across a pair of
power lines 18, 20. As set forth in appellants' specification
(page 5) "[w]hen there is no alarm condition, the network 16 may
be monitored by applying a reverse polarity DC voltage across the
network. . .. With an alarm condition, the system controller
would apply power across lines 18 and 20 with a positive polarity
to cause all alarms to provide their respective audible and
visual indications." Because the speakers 312 and the lamps 310
are in parallel with each other as are alarms A and S of
appellants, we find that the change of voltage in Berry, III will
result in the alarms being activated in the same fashion in
Berry, III as appellants' alarms A and S. Thus, because Berry,
III provides synchronization between the audible and visual
alarms (albeit, with no synchronization among the visual alarms)
we find that Berry, III discloses "synchronizing audible alarms
and visible strobes" as broadly recited in claim 1. Moreover, we
find that Berry, III discloses "changing the voltage on the power
lines to control timing of the audible alarms and visual strobes"
because Berry, III discloses activating the audible alarms and
visual alarms upon a change in voltage potential across the
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terminals E and F during an alarm condition. The timing is
controlled because the audible and visual alarms are turned on in
response to a change in voltage polarity across terminals E and
F.
We are cognizant of the fact that appellants synchronize the
visible alarms S by charging a capacitor to a firing voltage
level that is maintained without activating the strobe, and we
agree that this functionality is not found in Berry, III. From
our review of Berry, III we agree with appellants (brief, page 6)
that Berry, III is silent as to the details of the flash lamp.
However, we find that as broadly drafted, this functionality
/limitation is lacking in claim 1. Accordingly, we find that
Berry, III meets the recited limitations of claim 1.
Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that Berry, III does not teach
synchronization of the audible and visual alarms, and/or does not
teach controlling the timing of the audible and visual alarms,
upon a change in voltage, we agree with the examiner (answer,
page 5) that an artisan would have been taught to synchronize and
control the timing of the audible and visual alarms, as taught by
Markl. Appellants assert that Markl is directed to a signal-
light system for use along a highway, not an alarm system.
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We find that Markl (col.1, lines 8-11) is directed to a
signal light system, to be provided along roads and highways.
Markl discloses that it is known to provide emergency-phone
stations at intervals along the highway, that have signal light
systems that are caused to blink, in order to warn drivers that
they are approaching an accident or the like (col. 1, lines 8-
20). More complicated versions of highway blinking light systems
involve a series of emergency phone stations, at which, in the
event of an upcoming traffic hazard, a first activated system may
have only one of its flash lamps in blinking operation. The next
station closer to the accident site has two of its lights
blinking, and the station closest to the accident having three of
its lamps blinking, to provide the effect of increasing urgency
(col. 1, lines 47-63). Markl further discloses (col. 4, lines 6-
17) that
In accordance with a further concept of the
invention, resort is had to a synchronization
or central clocking technique, to which are
referenced all moments at which flashing occurs,
and therefore the starts and ends of all interflash
intervals, at all flash lamps of each individual
station, and at all flash lamps of all stations
in a series of activated stations. Although such
a synchronization or central clocking technique
is not needed per se for the display effects to be
implemented, it constitutes a singularly effective
approach to the confusion presented by the various
time-constants.
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Figure 1 discloses a succession of emergency phone stations
spaced at intervals along the highway between manned highway
police posts (central stations) (col. 5, lines 41-45). As shown
in figure 2, each emergency phone station is provided with a
flashing lamp signaling subsystem comprised of four flash lamps,
provided on an L-shaped bracket (col. 6, lines 62-68). Markl
further discloses (col. 8, lines 24-32) that “[d]epending upon
the nature of the hazard involved it may be appropriate to
activate a series of stations at one side of the highway only,
e.g., in the case of a traffic accident or a traffic jam, or it
may be appropriate to activate a series of stations at both sides
of the highway, e.g., in the case of a localized stretch of fog,
a localized region of road-icing, etc.” Flash lamp control
system is shown in figure 4. When firing voltage Uz is applied
to ignition transformer U5.1, glow lamp GL1 is fired. Flash
voltage Ub, applied across the two main electrodes of flash lamp
BR1, effects firing of the latter. The firing method of figure 4
is externally triggered firing. This is in contrast to the usual
method in which the moment of ignition is determined exclusively
by the instantaneous state of charge in each flash lamp's storage
condenser. The triggering of the flash lamps can be triggered
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from the central stations by abruptly increasing or decreasing
the level of the transmitted voltage (col. 10, lines 7-32). This
has the great advantage of assuring that the firing instants of
the flash lamps will all be referenced to a common clocking
action, and in that way assure that the various firing instants
all occur at the proper times and in the intended sequences. In
conventional flashing lamp highway signaling systems, the
difference in transmission paths creates different time
constants, and the various firing instants are free running and
unsynchronized with each other (col. 10, line 36 through col. 11,
line 26).
From the disclosure of Markl, we find that Markl
synchronizes the flashing of the emergency lights to warn
motorists of traffic accidents, traffic jams, road icing, etc.
Because Markl teaches the use of synchronized flashing lights to
warn motorists of road emergencies, we find that Markl is related
to an alarm system, and would have suggested to an artisan that
the flashing lights should be synchronized to overcome the
problems associated with random flashing caused by differing time
constants.
We are not persuaded by appellants' assertion (brief, page
6) that Markl is not directed to an audible alarm or
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synchronization of same. We note that Markl was not cited or
relied upon by the examiner for a disclosure or suggestion of an
audible alarm, as this feature is found in Berry, III.
From all of the above, we find that the examiner has
established a prima facie case of obviousness of claim 1 that not
been successfully rebutted by appellants. Accordingly, the
rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed.
Turning to independent claim 5, we observe that claim 5 does
not require synchronization. We affirm the rejection of claim 5
based upon our findings, supra, with respect to Berry, III and
Markl.
Turning to independent claim 11, we observe that claim 11
neither requires synchronization nor timing control. We affirm
the rejection of claim 5 based upon our findings, supra, with
respect to Berry, III and Markl. Accordingly, the rejection of
claims 1, 5, 6, 11, and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed.
We turn next to dependent claims 2 and 7. Appellants assert
that claims 2 and 7 are allowable due to their dependency upon
claims 1 and 5. The examiner provides reasons (answer, page 7)
as to why claims 2 and 7 are considered to be unobvious over the
prior art. In view of appellants lack of assertion of error on
the part of the examiner, we make reference to our findings,
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supra, with respect to Berry, III and Markl and affirm the
rejection of claims 2 and 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
We turn next to the rejection of claim 3 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Berry, III in view of Markl and
Tigwell. Appellants (brief, page 7) acknowledge that Tigwell
teaches the utilization of a synchronizing signal to
simultaneously flash plural lights, but assert that "there is
still no teaching or suggestion in any of the cited reference to
combine them in a way such that the voltage is changed on the
power lines to control the timing of the visual and audible
alarms." We observe that appellants' argument is directed to the
limitations of claim 1, from which claim 3 depends. In view of
our findings, supra, with respect to Berry, III, Markl, and the
teachings of Tigwell of providing a synchronizing signal to
synchronize a plurality of lanterns (col. 1, line 67 through col.
2, line 2 and col. 2, lines 3-7), we are not convinced of any
error on the part of the examiner. Accordingly, the rejection of
claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed.
We turn next to the rejection of claim 4 under 35 U.S.C.
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§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Berry, III, Markl, Tigwell and
Kollin. Appellants (brief, page 7) do not dispute the findings
of the examiner (answer, page 5) with respect to Kollin, but
rather argues to the effect that Kollin does not make up for the
deficiencies of Berry, III, Markl, and Tigwell. In view of our
findings, supra, with respect to Berry, III and Tigwell, and the
reasons in support of the rejection found on pages 5 and 6 of the
answer, we are not convinced of any error on the part of the
examiner and agree with the examiner that the teachings of Berry,
III, Markl, Tigwell and Kollin suggest the language of claim 4.
Accordingly, the rejection of claim 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is
affirmed.
We turn next to the rejection of claims 8-10 and 13 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Berry, III in view of Markl
and Right. Appellants assert (brief, page 8) that claim 8
recites that the capacitor is charged "to a firing voltage
without activating the strobe," and that the cited references
fail to teach this limitation. We agree. We find that although
Berry, III discloses that a change in the voltage on lines E and
F during an alarm condition activates the speakers 312 and the
flashing lights 310, we find no teaching in Berry, III, Markl or
Right would have taught or suggested charging the capacitor to a
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firing voltage without activating the strobe. Accordingly, the
rejection of claims 8-10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is reversed.
With regard to claim 13, which depends from claim 11, the
examiner presents reasoning (answer, page 6) as to why the
examiner considers claim 13 to be met by the prior art. Claim 13
contains language identical to claim 2. In view of our findings,
supra, with respect to claims 2 and 11, and the lack of any
arguments by appellants, we are not convinced of any error on the
part of the examiner. Accordingly, the rejection of claim 13
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed.
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CONCLUSION
To summarize, the decision of the examiner to reject claims
1-7 and 11-13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is affirmed. The decision of
the examiner to reject claims 8-10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is
reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in
connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 CFR § 1.136
(a).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
MICHAEL R. FLEMING )
Administrative Patent Judge )
)
)
)
) BOARD OF PATENT
JOSEPH L. DIXON ) APPEALS
Administrative Patent Judge ) AND
) INTERFERENCES
)
)
)
STUART S. LEVY )
Administrative Patent Judge )
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SSL/kis
HAMILTON, BROOK,
SMITH & REYNOLDS, P.C.
530 VIRGINIA ROAD
P. O. BOX 9133
CONCORD, MA 01742-9133