Ex Parte StephensDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJun 26, 201310446565 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 26, 2013) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 10/446,565 05/27/2003 Adrian P. Stephens P16283-4137 1910 50889 7590 06/27/2013 SCHUBERT LAW GROUP PLLC c/o CPA Global P.O. BOX 52050 MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55402 EXAMINER SAMS, MATTHEW C ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2646 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/27/2013 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte ADRIAN P. STEPHENS ____________ Appeal 2010-012128 Application 10/446,565 Technology Center 2600 ____________ Before SCOTT R. BOALICK, DENISE M. POTHIER, and MATTHEW R. CLEMENTS, Administrative Patent Judges. CLEMENTS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1, 3-7, 16, 18-22, 31, 33, and 34. Claims 2, 8-15, 17, 23- 30, 32, and 35-40 are cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s invention generally relates to a time division multiple access scheme in which a communication medium can be shared by different Appeal 2010-012128 Application 10/446,565 2 types of devices. For example, a wireless access point may transmit a medium reservation packet to devices of one type, which packet instructs those devices not to transmit for a specific time interval so that devices of a second type have access to the medium during that time interval. See generally Abstract, Fig. 3, Spec. ¶ 0020. Claim 1 is illustrative: 1. A method comprising: during a first phase in which to communicate with devices of a first type, transmitting a first medium reservation packet to indicate to devices of a second type not to transmit during the first phase, by providing privileged access to a communication medium for a device transmitting the first medium reservation packet; communicating with devices of the first type during the first phase; during a second phase in which to communicate with devices of a second type, transmitting a second medium reservation packet to indicate to devices of the first type not to transmit during the second phase, by providing privileged access to the communication medium for the device transmitting the second medium reservation packet; and communicating with devices of the second type during the second phase; wherein the first phase and the second phases are non- overlapping in time. THE REJECTIONS 1. Claims 1, 3-7, 16, and 18-22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Bridgelall (US 6,895,255 B1; filed Oct. 20, 2000; issued May 17, 2005). Ans. 3-5. 2. Claims 31, 33, and 34 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Bridgelall. Ans. 5-7. Appeal 2010-012128 Application 10/446,565 3 THE ANTICIPATION REJECTION OVER BRIDGELALL The Examiner finds that Bridgelall discloses every recited element of representative claim 1. Ans. 3-5. Appellant argues that (1) Bridgelall’s clear to send (CTS) and request to send (RTS) signals are not transmitted “during a first phase in which to communicate with devices of a first type;” (2) Bridgelall’s CTS signal does not “provid[e] privileged access to a communication medium for a device transmitting the first medium reservation packet;” (3) neither Bridgelall’s CTS signal nor its sleep mode directive are a “medium reservation packet;” (4) Bridgelall’s sleep mode directive is not transmitted “during a second phase in which to communicate with devices of a second type” and does not “provid[e] privileged access to the communication medium for the device transmitting the second medium reservation packet;” (5) Bridgelall’s 802.11 devices do not “communicat[e] … during the second phase;” and (6) Bridgelall’s 802.11 phase and its Bluetooth phase are not “non-overlapping in time.” App. Br. 6-8. ISSUES Under § 102, has the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1 by finding that Bridgelall discloses: (1) “during a first phase in which to communicate with devices of a first type, transmitting a first medium reservation packet to indicate to devices of a second type not to transmit during the first phase;” (2) “providing privileged access to a communication medium for a device transmitting the first medium reservation packet;” (3) a “medium reservation packet;” Appeal 2010-012128 Application 10/446,565 4 (4) “during a second phase in which to communicate with devices of a second type, transmitting a second medium reservation packet to indicate to devices of the first type not to transmit during the second phase;” (5) “communicating with devices of the second type during the second phase;” and (6) “wherein the first phase and the second phase are non-overlapping in time.” ANALYSIS On this record, we find no error in the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of representative claim 1. Appellant’s argument that Bridgelall’s RTS and CTS signals are not transmitted “during the Bluetooth communication phase” is unpersuasive. App. Br. 6-7; Reply Br. 4. Appellant argues that the RTS and CTS signals occur prior to a “Bluetooth communications phase.” Id. We understand Appellant refers to Bridgelall’s Bluetooth communications 75 to 84. Bridgelall, Fig. 2. However, the Examiner did not map the recited “first phase” to communications 75 to 84. As mapped by the Examiner, the “first phase” begins with RTS signal (70) and ends with Bluetooth activity (82). Ans. 8. Such a “first phase” includes RTS signal 70 and CTS signal 72. Bridgelall, Fig. 2. Moreover, we find the Examiner’s construction of “first phase” to be reasonable. The term “first phase” is not used in the Specification. The only limitation on “first phase” is that its purpose is “to communicate with devices of a first type.” Claim 1. In our view, the inclusion of two 802.11 communications (70 and 72) in the first phase is not inconsistent with that purpose. As a result, we are not persuaded of error in Appeal 2010-012128 Application 10/446,565 5 the Examiner’s mapping of “first phase” to Bridgelall’s communications 70 to 82 in Fig. 2. Appellant’s argument that Bridgelall’s RTS signal is not “for the 802.11g devices to refrain from transmitting” is also unpersuasive. App. Br. 7-8; Reply Br. 4. Appellant’s argument relates to the requirement in claim 1 that the function of the first medium reservation packet is “to indicate to devices of a second type not to transmit during the first phase.” However, this is exactly the function of Bridgelall’s RTS signal. As the Examiner points out, the RTS signal “reserve[s] a transmission time interval in a frame of the first wireless protocol for purposes of operating under the second wireless protocol.” Ans. 7-8 (quoting Bridgelall, col. 1, ll. 56-61). As Bridgelall further explains: Access point 102 acknowledges [the RTS signal] with a clear to send (CTS) signal 72 providing a time interval for operation of a transmission from dual mode mobile unit 10. The CTS signal causes other mobile units, MU-a and MU-b, to set their network allocation vector (NAV) to a value indicating that the network will be busy during the transmission time interval requested by the dual mode unit 10. Bridgelall, col. 5, ll. 22-29. As is evident from the passage above, the CTS signal that ultimately causes MU-a and MU-b to refrain from transmitting during the time interval is directly responsive to the RTS signal relied upon by the Examiner. Id. Although the other 802.11 devices (i.e., “devices of a second type”) receive the CTS signal, not the RTS signal, the function of the RTS signal is nevertheless “to indicate to devices of a second type not to transmit during the first phase.” That function is achieved by triggering the acknowledgement from the access point in the form of the CTS signal, but claim 1 does not exclude such an arrangement. Specifically, claim 1 does Appeal 2010-012128 Application 10/446,565 6 not require that the “medium reservation packet” be received by the “devices of a second type.” As a result, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s finding that Bridgelall’s RTS signal is “to indicate to devices of a second type not to transmit during the first phase.” Appellant’s argument that Bridgelall’s CTS signal allows another device to transmit is also unavailing. App. Br. 7; Reply Br. 4-5. The Examiner relies upon Bridgelall’s RTS signal, not its CTS signal. As explained above, the RTS signal triggers an acknowledgement from access point 102 that causes other mobile units to refrain from transmitting during a time interval. As a result, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s finding that Bridgelall’s RTS signal “provid[es] privileged access to a communication medium for a device transmitting the first medium reservation packet.” Appellant’s argument that neither Bridgelall’s RTS signal 70 nor its Bluetooth standby signal 84 are a “medium reservation packet” because they are “different types of transmissions” is also unpersuasive. App. Br. 7; Reply Br. 5. Claim 1 does not require that the “second medium reservation packet” be the same type of transmission as the “first medium reservation packet.” In fact, claim 1 recites different functions for each of the “medium reservation packets.” The “first medium reservation packet” is “to indicate to devices of the second type not to transmit during the first phase,” whereas the “second medium reservation packet” is “to indicate to devices of the first type not to transmit during the second phase.” (Emphasis added). As disclosed in Appellant’s Specification: …first device 110 and second device 120 may not be capable of communicating with one another, for example where first device 110 is arranged to communicate using a first wireless standard such as the Appeal 2010-012128 Application 10/446,565 7 IEEE 802.11a standard, and where second device 120 is arranged to communicate using a second wireless standard such as a higher throughput wireless communication standard directed toward, for example, operation at or near the 5GHz frequency of the IEEE 802.11a standard. … first device 110 and second device 120 may not be able to receive and honor a wireless medium reservation made by the other device, or may not receive or process medium reservation packets sent by the other device, …. Spec. ¶ 0020 (emphasis added). Given that devices of a “first type” may communicate using a different standard than devices of a “second type,” it is not clear that the “same type of transmission” must be used to notify both devices of a first type and devices of a second type. Because Bridgelall’s RTS signal and Bluetooth standby signal 84 satisfy the requirements of claim 1, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s findings. Appellant’s argument that Bridgelall’s Bluetooth standby signal is “not even a directive to refrain from transmission” is also unpersuasive. App. Br. 7-8; Reply Br. 5-6. Bridgelall discloses that “mobile unit 10 … may signal the slave units at the end of the Bluetooth radio activity (signal 84) to cause the slaves to enter a lower power “STANDBY” mode during the time the dual mode mobile unit undertakes 802.11 communication.” Bridgelall, col. 5, ll. 52-57; see also Ans. 11. It is undisputed that the Bluetooth devices enter the lower power mode in response to Bluetooth standby signal 84, and that they refrain from transmitting while in that mode. Appellant argues that the effect of refraining from transmission is incidental to the primary purpose of Bluetooth standby signal 84, which is to cause Bluetooth devices to power down to a low-power mode. App. Br. 7. This argument is not commensurate with the scope of the claims. Claim 1 does not exclude the “second medium reservation packet” from having effects in addition to “indicat[ing] to devices of the first type not to transmit during the Appeal 2010-012128 Application 10/446,565 8 second phase,” and therefore, does not exclude the use of a low-power standby signal in order to indicate to devices not to transmit. As a result, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s finding that Bridgelall’s Bluetooth standby signal 84 is the “second medium reservation packet.” Appellant’s argument that Bluetooth standby signal 84 does not “provid[e] privileged access to the communication medium” because both types of devices are prevented from transmitting is also unpersuasive. App. Br. 8; Reply Br. 6. Although the 802.11 devices cannot resume transmitting while their network allocation vectors (NAV) are set to a value indicating that the network will be busy, they may resume transmitting after ACK 88 is received from the access point. Ans. 12-14. As the Examiner points out, Appellant’s claims do not require the second type of devices (802.11) to transmit during the entire second phase. Ans. 13. The “second phase” begins with Bluetooth standby signal 84 and continues until another RTS is transmitted to reserve time for Bluetooth activity. Ans. 8. Thus, after ACK 88 is received, mobile unit D-MU has “privileged access to the communication medium” (i.e., free from transmissions by Bluetooth devices) for the duration of the “second phase” (i.e., until another RTS signal is transmitted) in which to communicate with devices of a second (i.e., 802.11) type. As a result, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s finding that Bridgelall’s Bluetooth standby signal “provid[es] privileged access to a communication medium” “during a second phase.” For the same reasons, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that both types of devices are prevented from transmitting during the second phase. App. Br. 8; Reply Br. 6. As explained above, 802.11 devices D-MU, MU-a, and MU-b are not prevented from transmitting during the portion of Appeal 2010-012128 Application 10/446,565 9 the second phase following ACK 88. Ans. 12-14; see also Bridgelall, col. 5, ll. 42-46, (“This provokes an acknowledgement signal 88 from access point 102 which indicates according to the 802.11 protocol that the transmission has been completed. Thereafter the system continues in normal 802.11 operation.”). Finally, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that Bridgelall’s “first phase” and “second phase” are not “non-overlapping.” App. Br. 8; Reply Br. 6. Appellant’s argument fails to address the rejection. The Examiner maps the recited “first phase” to Bridgelall’s communications 70 to 82, not to “the time period of the NAV.” The fact that Bluetooth standby signal 84 overlaps the time period of the NAV is immaterial. As mapped by the Examiner, there is no overlap between communications 70 to 82 (the recited “first phase”) and communication 84 until another RTS signal (the recited “second phase”). As a result, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s finding that Bridgelall’s “first phase” and “second phase” are non-overlapping. We therefore sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1 and of independent claim 16 which recites commensurate limitations. Appellants did not present separate arguments for the dependent claims 3-7 and 18-22 and we affirm the rejection of those claims for similar reasons. THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OVER BRIDGELALL We also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of claims 31, 33, and 34. Ans. 6-7. Appellant refers to the arguments made in connection with claim 1, and alleges that Bridgelall teaches away for the same reasons. Appeal 2010-012128 Application 10/446,565 10 App. Br. 14-15. We are not persuaded by these arguments, however, for the reasons previously discussed. CONCLUSION The Examiner (1) did not err in rejecting claims 1, 3-7, 16, and 18-22 under § 102; and (2) did not err in rejecting claims 31, 33, and 34 under § 103. ORDER The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 3-7, 16, 18-22, 31, 33, and 34 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED rwk Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation