Ex Parte Stein

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 23, 2017

12308197 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/308,197 10/23/2009 Fridtjof Stein BOSC.P5735/11602898 3707
24972 7590 02/27/2017
NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP
1301 Avenue of the Americas
NEW YORK, NY 10019-6022
EXAMINER
DORSEY, RENEE
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2682
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/27/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
nyipdocket@nortonrosefulbright.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte FRIDTJOF STEIN
Appeal 2016-005959
Application 12/308,197
Technology Center 2600
Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, JEREMY J. CURCURI, and
AARON W. MOORE, Administrative Patent Judges.
CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 13—25. Non-Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
Claims 13—16, 24, and 25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over Tsuboi (US 2006/0119472 Al; June 8, 2006) and Markandey
(US 5,500,904; Mar. 19, 1996). Non-Final Act. 3-6.
Claims 17—19 and 21—23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over Tsuboi, Markandey, and Winner (US 6,580,385 Bl; June 17,
2003). Non-Final Act. 6—8.
Appeal 2016-005959
Application 12/308,197
Claim 20 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Tsuboi,
Markandey, and Yuasa (US 7,761,230 B2; July 20, 2010). Non-Final Act.
8-9.
We affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ invention relates to a method for detecting a traffic space.
See Abstract. Claim 13 is illustrative and reproduced below:
13. A method for detecting a traffic space in a vicinity of a motor
vehicle using a driver assistance system having a monocular image sensor
situated in the motor vehicle, the method comprising:
generating, using the monocular image sensor situated in the motor
vehicle, chronologically successive images of the traffic space in the vicinity
of the motor vehicle, wherein the chronologically successive images of the
traffic space are generated at continuous points in time and each of the
chronologically successive images corresponds to a different point in time of
the traffic space;
ascertaining a visual flow in the generated chronologically successive
images from the monocular image sensor;
examining the visual flow for discontinuities; and
assigning discontinuities found in the visual flow to objects of the
traffic space in the vicinity of the motor vehicle.
ANALYSIS
The Obviousness Rejection of Claims 13-16,24, and 25
over Tsuboi and Markandey
The Examiner finds Tsuboi and Markandey teach all limitations of
claim 13. Non-Final Act. 3—5; see also Ans. 3.
Appellant presents the following principal arguments:
i. Tsuboi captures a single (synthesized) image at a certain point
in time. See App. Br. 4. The single image is not used in a future obstacle
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detection process; rather, in a future obstacle detection process, a new image
is generated. See App. Br. 4; see also Reply Br. 3^4.
ii. Tsuboi uses multiple cameras on the exterior of the vehicle—
not a monocular image sensor situated in the motor vehicle. See Reply Br.
3.
iii. Tsuboi teaches away from the claimed invention because
Tsuboi does not analyze successive images. See App. Br. 5; see also Reply
Br. 4.
iv. The record does not support the Examiner’s legal conclusion of
obviousness. See Reply Br. 6—8.
We do not see any error in the Examiner’s findings and reasons that
are contested by Appellant. We concur with the Examiner’s conclusion of
obviousness.
Regarding Appellant’s arguments (i) and (ii), the Examiner finds
Tsuboi teaches (claim 1):
generating, using the monocular image sensor situated in
the motor vehicle, chronologically successive images of the
traffic space in the vicinity of the motor vehicle, wherein the
chronologically successive images of the traffic space are
generated at continuous points in time and each of the
chronologically successive images corresponds to a different
point in time of the traffic space[.]
Non-Final Act. 3 (citing Tsuboi Tflf 25, 28).
We agree with and adopt this finding as our own. Tsuboi (125)
discloses cameras 101—104. Tsuboi (128) discloses generating an image at
a certain point in time (and subsequently generating a new image). Thus,
Tsuboi teaches (claim 1): “generating, using the monocular image sensor
situated in the motor vehicle, chronologically successive images of the
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traffic space in the vicinity of the motor vehicle” (one of Tsuboi’s cameras
101—104), “wherein the chronologically successive images of the traffic
space are generated at continuous points in time and each of the
chronologically successive images corresponds to a different point in time of
the traffic space” (one of Tsuboi’s cameras 101—104).
Contrary to Appellant’s argument (i), Tsuboi is only relied on to teach
the generating of the successive images; the Examiner finds Markandey
teaches the further actions of the claimed method, which process successive
images. See Non-Final Act. 3^4.
Contrary to Appellant’s argument (ii), any one of Tsuboi’s cameras
101—104 teaches a monocular image sensor. Further, Tsuboi reasonably
suggests, to a skilled artisan, the cameras 101—104 as situated in the motor
vehicle. See Tsuboi Tflf 24—25 (cameras 101—104 mounted on a vehicle).
Regarding Appellants’ argument (iii), we note that while an
alternative may be inferior to or less desirable than another, that alone is
insufficient to teach away from the inferior alternative unless the disclosure
criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourage that alternative. In re Fulton,
391 F.3d 1195, 1200-1 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Here, Tsuboi (128) discloses
generating and processing a single (synthesized) image. This does not
constitute a teaching away from processing successive images.
Finally, with regard to Appellant’s argument (iv), the Examiner
reasons “it would have been obvious, to one of ordinary skill in the art at the
time of the invention, to modify the obstacle detector for vehicle of Tsuboi
with the edge detection technique of Markandey et al. for the purpose of
collision avoidance.” Non-Final Act. 5. The Examiner has articulated a
reasoning with a rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
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obviousness. Put another way, “the purpose of collision avoidance” (Non-
Final Act. 5) sufficiently explains why a skilled artisan would have
combined the teachings of Tsuboi and Markandey to reach the claimed
invention. We adopt this reason as our own and concur in the Examiner’s
conclusion. Modifying Tsuboi’s system to include Markandey’s techniques
would have been a predictable use of prior art elements according to their
established functions—an obvious improvement. As the U.S. Supreme
Court has explained:
When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design
incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it,
either in the same field or a different one. If a person of
ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103
likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique
has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary
skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar
devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless
its actual application is beyond his or her skill. Sakraida [v. Ag
Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976)] and Anderson’s-Black Rock[,
Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)] are
illustrative—a court must ask whether the improvement is more
than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their
established functions.
KSRInt’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007).
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 13, as well as
claims 14, 15, 24, and 25, which are not separately argued with particularity.
Regarding claim 16, it recites, in pertinent part: “wherein a condition
of a terrain next to a road is inferred from detected discontinuities of the
visual flow.”
The Examiner finds Markandey teaches the further limitations recited
in claim 16. Non-Final Act. 5 (citing Markandey col. 16,11. 35—39); see also
Ans. 3. Appellant contests this finding. See App. Br. 5 (Markandey does
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Application 12/308,197
not infer a condition of a terrain next to a road); see also Reply Br. 5. We do
not see any error in this contested finding of the Examiner.
Markandey (col. 16,11. 35—39) (emphasis added) discloses:
“Although the examples of Table 1 and Table 2 are related to moving target
indication applications, the noise reduction technique of the preferred
embodiment can in general be used in other optical flow applications such as
sensor motion estimation, and terrain structure estimation.”
In reaching our conclusion, we emphasize that Appellant does not
contest the Examiner’s finding (see Non-Final Act. 4) that Markandey
teaches (claim 13) “assigning discontinuities found in the visual flow to
objects of the traffic space in the vicinity of the motor vehicle”; and we
agree with and adopt as our own the Examiner’s further finding that
Markandey’s teaching (Markandey col. 16,11. 35—39) of terrain structure
estimation as an optical flow application reasonably suggests (claim 16)
“wherein a condition of a terrain next to a road is inferred from detected
discontinuities of the visual flow.”
We, therefore, also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 16.
The Obviousness Rejection of Claims 17-19 and 21-23
over Tsuboi, Markandey, and Winner
Appellant does not present arguments for claims 17—19 and 21—23.
See App. Br. 3—5; Reply Br. 2—8.
Claims 17—19 and 21—23 depend from claim 13.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 17—19 and
21—23 for the same reasons discussed above with respect to claim 13.
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The Obviousness Rejection of Claim 20
OVER TSUBOI, MARKANDEY, AND YUASA
Appellant does not present arguments for claim 20. See App. Br. 3—5;
Reply Br. 2—8.
Claim 20 depends from claim 13.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 20 for the
same reasons discussed above with respect to claim 13.
ORDER
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 13—25 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1).
AFFIRMED
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