Ex Parte Srinivasan et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 2, 2016

12974567 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 2, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
12/974,567 12/21/2010
6147 7590 06/06/2016
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
GLOBAL RESEARCH
ONE RESEARCH CIRCLE
BLDG. Kl-3A59
NISKAYUNA, NY 12309
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Prashant Srinivasan
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
243693 3954
EXAMINER
MCDOWELL, LIAM J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
PTAB
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/06/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
haeckl@ge.com
gpo.mail@ge.com
Lori.e.rooney@ge.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte PRASHANT SRINIVASAN, PHILIPPE GIGUERE,
MANI SH GUPTA, and R WIT AM MITRA
Appeal2014-004551
Application 12/974,567
Technology Center 3700
Before WILLIAM A. CAPP, GEORGE R. HOSKINS and
ARTHUR M. PESLAK, Administrative Patent Judges.
CAPP, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the final
rejection of claims 1-5, 7-18, and 20-22. We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
Appeal2014-004551
Application 12/974,567
THE INVENTION
Appellants' invention relates to control systems for wind turbines.
Spec. i-f 1. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on
appeal.
1. A distributed control system for a wind farm comprising
wind turbines and acoustic receptors, the control system
compnsmg:
acoustic receptors, each configured to measure an acoustic
emission generated within said wind farm and generate a
penalty notification identifying a penalty to be assessed based
on the measured acoustic emission;
communication devices, each configured to receive a
respective penalty notification from a respective acoustic
receptor; and
a processor coupled to said communication devices, said
processor configured to, for at least some of the wind turbines:
calculate an acoustic emission level to be generated by a
respective wind turbine based on the respective penalty
notification, based on an acoustic model of the respective
wind turbine; and based on at least one of a power
generated by the respective wind turbine and an economic
value attributed to the respective wind turbine; and
adjust at least one characteristic of the respective wind
turbine to cause the respective wind turbine to operate at the
calculated acoustic emission level.
THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence in support of the
rejections:
Bonnet
Eggleston
Nielsen
Subramanian
US 2007 /0031237 Al
US 2010/0135798 Al
US 2011/0175356 Al
US 8,035,241 B2
2
Feb. 8,2007
June 3, 2010
July 21, 2011
Oct. 11, 2011
Appeal2014-004551
Application 12/974,567
The following rejections are before us for review:
1. Claims 1-5 and 15-18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as
being anticipated by Nielsen.
2. Claims 1-5 and 15-18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Nielsen.
3. Claims 1-5, 7-18, and 20-22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Eggleston and Bonnet.
4. Claims 1-5, 8-12, 15-18, 21, and 22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Eggleston and Nielsen.
5. Claims 7 and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Nielsen and Subramanian.
OPINION
Anticipation of Claims 1-5 and 15-18 by Nielsen
Appellants argue claims 1-5 and 15-18 as a group. Appeal Br. 8-10.
We select claim las representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2015).
The Examiner finds that Nielsen discloses all of the limitations of
claim 1. Final Action 4---6. In particular, the Examiner finds that Nielsen
discloses acoustic receptors configured to measure an acoustic emission and
generate a penalty notification based on the acoustic emission. Id. at 5.
Appellants traverse the Examiner's rejection by arguing that Nielsen
fails to disclose acoustic receptors configured to measure an acoustic
emission as claimed. Appeal Br. 8. Appellants also argue that Nielsen lacks
generation of a penalty notification as claimed. Id. at 10.
In response, the Examiner directs our attention to paragraph 5 5 of
Nielsen which explains that wind turbine 1 has noise measurement means
for providing information on the actual noise level. Ans. 3 (citing Nielsen
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Application 12/974,567
1155). \Ve have reviewed paragraph 55 of Nielsen and compared it to the
acoustic receptors disclosed and claimed in claim 1 that measure an acoustic
emission. Apart from the use of different terminology, we are unable to
discern any patentable distinction between Nielsen's noise measurement
means and Appellants' acoustic receptors that measure an acoustic emission.
See In re Bode, 550 F.2d 656, 660 (CCPA 1977) (while anticipation requires
disclosure of each and every element of the claim at issue in a single prior
art reference, the disclosure need not be in haec verba). The Examiner's
finding that Nielsen discloses acoustic receptors that measure an acoustic
emission is supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
With respect to the penalty limitation, the Examiner explains that
Nielsen's sound measurement means is used to calculate an output in the
form of a control reference signal such as a speed set point. Ans. 4 (citing
Nielsen i-f 62). The Examiner further explains that a decrease in power or
speed in the wind turbine that is enacted to decrease the noise level will
reduce the output of the turbine resulting in a lost output, which, according
to the Examiner, constitutes a "penalty." Ans. 4--5.
The dispute over the "penalty" limitation is largely a matter of claim
construction. During examination of a patent application, pending claims
are given their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the
specification. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed.
Cir. 2004). Under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, claim
terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning as would be
understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire
disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
2007). The Specification is "the single best guide to the meaning of a
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Application 12/974,567
disputed term," which "acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms
used in the claims or when it defines terms by implication." See Phillips v.
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1320-21 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Appellants' Specification describes the term "penalty" in the
following manner:
As used herein in the exemplary embodiment, the term
"penalty" refers to a monetary amount assessed as a result of
acoustic emissions exceeding the penalty threshold.
Alternatively, a ''penalty" may be an amount of power
generation that must be reduced by wind turbines 100 and/or
wind farm 300 as a result of acoustic emissions exceeding the
penalty threshold, and/or any other quantity that enables wind
farm 300 to function as described herein.
Spec. 9-10 (emphasis added). Thus, Appellants' Specification explains that
a "penalty" is not necessarily a fine or similar monetary sanction imposed,
for example, by a regulatory agency. Id. Rather, it also may refer to the
imposition of a power generation reduction. Id.
Nielsen discloses a method of controlling the noise emissions from a
wind park. Nielsen i-f 7. Nielsen's method employs a noise emission module
to estimate the event of excessive noise at one or more locations with the
result that operation of the wind park is altered to prevent excessive noise
emissions. Id. i-f 13. Certain aspects of controlling operation of the wind
park involve reducing the rotational speed and/or reducing the power output
of some of the wind turbines in the park. Id. i-fi-129-31. In certain
embodiments, the emission emulation module is provided with actual
operational data of the wind turbines including rotor speed, power output,
pitch angle and/or actual noise measurement data provided by "noise
measurement means." Id. i-f 55. Based on the information provided, the
noise emission emulation module generates a control reference signal such
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Appeal2014-004551
Application 12/974,567
as a rate power set-point or rated rotor speed set-point for individual wind
turbines or to a group of wind turbines in the park. Id. i-f 62. The emulation
module also generates orders to shut down one or more wind turbines having
the most noise impact. Id. i-f 63. In view of the foregoing, we determine that
the Examiner's finding that Nielsen discloses the generation of a "penalty
notification" as claimed is supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's anticipation rejection of
claims 1-5 and 15-18.
Unpatentability of Claim 1-5and15-18 over Nielsen
The Examiner finds that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
understand that permission to operate a wind turbine is either contractually
or regulatory based and that economic, monetary, or other penalty would be
incurred upon breaking the terms of the contract or breaking the law by
exceeding specified noise thresholds. Final Action 6 (citing Nielson i-f 69).
The Examiner concludes that it vvould have been obvious to a person of
ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify the
system of Nielsen to use such a penalty as part of the noise threshold
analysis. Id. According to the Examiner, a person of ordinary skill in the art
would have done this so that the turbine operates below the threshold so that
the penalty is not increased or does not recur to prevent further economic
loss. Id.
In traversing the Examiner's alternative ground of rejection of
obviousness over Nielsen, Appellants rely on the same factual allegations
that we previously considered with respect to the Nielsen anticipation
ground of rejection. Appellants do not other otherwise challenge the
Examiner's unpatentability ground of rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). In
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particular, Appellants do not challenge the Examiner's conclusion that, in
view of Nielsen's other teachings concerning the use of noise measurement
means, it would have been obvious to modify Nielsen to impose a penalty as
part of its noise threshold analysis. Accordingly, we are not apprised of
error and we sustain the Examiner's unpatentability rejection of claims 1-5
and 15-18 over Nielsen.
Unpatentability of Claims 1-5, 7-18, and 20--22
over Eggleston and Bonnet
Appellants argue claims 1-5, 7-18, and 20-22 as a group. Appeal
Br. 10-13. We select claim 8 as representative.
The Examiner finds that Eggleston discloses all of the limitations of
claim 8, except for calculating an acoustic emission level based on an
acoustic model of the first wind turbine. Final Action 15-17. In particular,
the Examiner notes that Eggleston does not use the term "penalty" per se,
but observes that a decrease in power or speed of a wind turbine to decrease
the noise level results in a reduced output of the turbine which may properly
be characterized as a penalty. Id. at 16. Alternatively, the Examiner finds
that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that permission to
operate the turbine is contractually/regulatory based and that economic
(monetary) or other penalty would be incurred upon breaking the terms of
the contract or breaking the law by exceeding specified noise thresholds. Id.
at 16-17. The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to a
person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to
modify Eggleston to use a penalty as part of the noise threshold analysis. Id.
at 17. According to the Examiner, a person of ordinary skill in the art would
have done this so that a penalty is not increased or does not recur. Id.
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The Examiner relies on Bonnet as teaching an acoustic model that
recognizes the noise signature of each of a plurality of turbines. Final
Act. 17. The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to a
person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to
modify Eggleston to identify each turbine as taught by Bonnet. Id.
According to the Examiner, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
done this to achieve individual control of each turbine. Id.
Appellants traverse the Examiner's rejection by arguing that
Eggleston fails to disclose the limitation in claim 8 directed to measuring an
acoustic emission and generating a penalty notification. Appeal Br. 11.
Appellants acknowledge, however, that Eggleston discloses sensors that
measure noise. Id. Appellants similarly acknowledge that Eggleston
discloses providing a noise control signal and that a controller may control a
plurality of wind turbines in response to receiving a noise control signal
from a sensor. Id.
In response, the Examiner states that Eggleston' s sensor 11 detects
and measures noise. Ans. 6 (citing Eggleston i-f 27). The Examiner explains
that Eggleston provides signals from sensor 11 to a controller 40, which
compares the received signal to a threshold. Id. at 7 (citing Eggleston i-f 24).
The Examiner further explains that, if the threshold is exceeded, a signal is
sent to the wind turbines to reduce noise. Id. (citing Eggleston i-f 28). The
Examiner characterizes such control over the turbines to reduce noise as
imposition of a penalty, or generation of a penalty notification, within the
meaning of claim 8.
As previously discussed with respect to the Examiner's rejections
based on the Nielsen reference, we think that imposition of a power or speed
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Application 12/974,567
,..J • • • • • • 1 1
reuuctwn m response to excessive nmse emisswns may proper1y oe
characterized as a penalty or generation of a penalty notification. Thus, we
determine the Examiner's findings of fact are supported by a preponderance
of the evidence and that the Examiner's legal conclusion of unpatentability
is well-founded. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's unpatentability
rejection of claims 1-5, 7-18, and 20-22.
Unpatentability of Claims 7 and 20
over Nielsen and Subramanian.
Claim 7 depends from claim 1 and claim 20 depends from claim 15.
Claims App. Claims 7 and 20 stand rejected as being unpatentable over
Nielsen in combination with Subramanian. Final Action 35-36. In
traversing the rejection of these claims, Appellants rely on the arguments
presented for the patentability of claim 1 as conferring patentability on
claims 7 and 20. Appeal. Br. 14. For the reasons previously discussed with
respect to the unpatentability rejection of claim 1 over Nielsen, we are not
apprised of error and we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 7 and 20.
Unpatentability of Claims 1-5, 8-12, 15-18, 21, and 22
over Eggleston and Nielsen
In view of our rulings with respect to the grounds of rejection
previously discussed, we need not and do not reach the ground of rejection
over the combination Eggleston and Nielsen. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(l)
(The affirmance of the rejection of a claim on any of the grounds specified
constitutes a general affirmance of the decision of the examiner on that
claim, except as to any ground specifically reversed).
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Application 12/974,567
DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-5, 7-18, and 20-22 is
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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