12118329 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 5, 2016)

Ex Parte Srinivasa Rao et al

Patent Trial and Appeal BoardAug 5, 2016

12118329 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 5, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 12/118,329 05/09/2008 23494 7590 08/09/2016 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS IN CORPORA TED P 0 BOX 655474, MIS 3999 DALLAS, TX 75265 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Phanish Hanagal Srinivasa Rao UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. TI-65063 1800 EXAMINER SHERIF, FA TUMA G ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2649 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/09/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): uspto@ti.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte PHANISH HANAGAL SRINIV ASA RAO, SHERIN SASIDHARAN, and NARENDRAN RAJAN M. Appeal2014-009907 Application 12/118,329 Technology Center 2600 Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., JON M. JURGOV AN, and AARON W. MOORE, Administrative Patent Judges. JURGOVAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants 1 seek review under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 134(a) from the Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1-3, 5-10, and 12-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 6(b). We affirm.2 1 Appellants identify Texas Instruments Incorporated as the real party in interest. (App. Br. 4.) 2 Our Decision refers to the Specification filed May 9, 2008 ("Spec."), the Final Office Action mailed May 23, 2013 ("Final Act."), the Appeal Brief filed Feb. 21, 2014 ("App. Br."), the Examiner's Answer mailed July 18, 2014 ("Ans."), and the Reply Brief filed Sept. 18, 2014 ("Reply Br."). Appeal2014-009907 Application 12/118,329 CLAIMED INVENTION The claims are directed to technology enabling a speaker to arbitrate which audience members have access to a server and loudspeaker via their mobile communication devices. (Spec. Title, Abstract, i-f 2 7.) Claim 1, reproduced below with disputed language shown in emphasis, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. An audience and speaker interactive communications system, comprising: a server coupled to a loudspeaker, said server including an application module for receiving and decoding speech samples and transmitting said speech samples to said loudspeaker; and a mobile communications device having a connectivity application for gaining access to said server over an unlicensed wireless communication frequency spectrum, said mobile communications device including a client application module for encoding and transmitting said speech samples to said server over said unlicensed wireless communication frequency spectrum, wherein said application module arbitrates between communications from two or more of said mobile communications devices; and wherein a speaker of said audience and speaker interactive communications system is a final arbiter of an audience member accessing said server, through speaker employment of said application module. (App. Br. 32 - Claims App'x.) REJECTIONS Claims 1-3, 8, 9, 15, and 17-19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) based on Gupta (US 2009/0111443 Al; Apr. 30, 2009) and Jaiswal et al. (US 2009/0028316 Al; Jan. 29, 2009) ("Jaiswal"). (Final Act. 4--8.) 2 Appeal2014-009907 Application 12/118,329 Claims 6, 7, 10, 13, 14, 16, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) based on Gupta, Jaiswal, and Iwase (US 2008/0020806 Al; Jan. 24, 2008). (Final Act. 8-11.) Claims 5 and 12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) based on Gupta, Jaiswal, and Mangum (US 2007 /0065794 Al; Mar. 22, 2007). (Final Act. 11-12.) ANALYSIS Claims 1, 8, and 15 Appellants argue the claimed speaker is not equivalent to Jaiswal's moderator. (App. Br. 21-30; Reply Br. 3-5.) As support for this distinction, Appellants rely on the Specification and a dictionary definition, arguing that a speaker is a person who delivers a speech, lecture, or other presentation to an audience. (App. Br. 21-26- Items 7I, 7I-A, 71-Bi, 7I-Bii, 7I-Biii, citing Jaiswal i1i17, 17, and 19, Fig. 1, Spec. i1i12, 18, and 27, dictionary.com definition of "speaker.") Under this interpretation, Appellants contend the cited references do not teach or suggest the claimed speaker. To the contrary, the Examiner finds that Jaiswal's moderator is a "speaker" who can speak as well as control which audience member has access to the conference call system. (Ans. 11, citing Jaiswal i1i17, 16, and 19, Final Act. 4--6.) The Examiner concludes that Jaiswal's moderator is indistinguishable from the claimed speaker. We agree with the Examiner's findings and conclusion of obviousness underÂ§ 103(a) (Final Act. 4--6, 7; Ans. 3-5, 10-12), which we adopt as our own. Jaiswal teaches the moderator may participate in conference calls (i-f 15), and that the moderator may control, in conjunction with the system, 3 Appeal2014-009907 Application 12/118,329 which of the participants may speak on the conference call, by muting or unmuting the participants' lines (i-fi-f 7, 16, and 19). Thus, Jaiswal's moderator has the capability to speak to the participants, and is, together with the system, the final arbiter of which participant may speak on the conference call at any given time. Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that J aiswal, in combination with Gupta, teaches or at least suggests the claimed limitation. Appellants argue a speaker is a person that provides a speech, lecture, or other presentation to an audience (App. Br. 24), but the claims recite no such feature. Although claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification, at the same time, care must be taken not to read limitations from the specification into the claims. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Appellants' proposed interpretation of speaker reads limitations into the claims and thus contravenes established case law. Accordingly, we do not find Appellants' argument persuasive to show Examiner error. Appellants also state the claimed speaker is to be differentiated from the audience, and that "[a] speaker of the present Application is not a member of an audience who speaks, or in the alternative, a moderator of Jaiswal .... " (App. Br. 24--25, Item 71-Bii, citing Spec. i1i12, 18, and 27, Reply Br. 3-5.) However, the claims recite "a speaker of said audience," implying the speaker is an audience member. (Emphasis added.) Thus, 4 Appeal2014-009907 Application 12/118,329 Appellants' arguments are not commensurate in scope with the claims, and we do not find these arguments persuasive to show Examiner error. To the extent Appellants argue Gupta does not teach or suggest the disputed limitation (App. Br. 26-27, Item 7I-Ci), we note the Answer clarifies that the Examiner relies on both Gupta and Jaiswal to teach this feature (Ans. 12). Specifically, the Examiner notes Gupta teaches a speaker as any one of the audience members speaking to other audience members, and Jaiswal teaches a person controlling (in other words, arbitrating access to) the conference server. (Id.) Appellants' argument against Gupta is not persuasive and fails to show Examiner error, both because it misapprehends how the Examiner applies the references in the rejection, and because it attacks Gupta in isolation without considering its combination with Jaiswal. Nonobviousness cannot be established by attacking the combined references individually. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981)). Instead, the combined references must be considered "as a whole" in the obviousness analysis from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art. (In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971); 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a).) Appellants further argue there is no teaching or suggestion that Jaiswal's moderator is also a speaker, as claimed. (App. Br. 28, Item 7I- Cii.) However, a cited passage from Jaiswal teaches managing a conference call among participants and a moderator. (Jaiswal i-f 7.) A person of ordinary skill would have understood that a moderator is one of the speakers that manages a speaking event. Moreover, a "moderator" is defined as "1 : one who arbitrates: mediator 2 : one who presides over an assembly, meeting, or discussion." Merriam-Webster.com (last viewed 7 /26/16). A 5 Appeal2014-009907 Application 12/118,329 person of ordinary skill would have understood these definitions of moderator fit the manner in which speaker is used in the claims. Appellants further argue the Examiner is incorrect in finding Jaiswal's moderator is a person who is able to speak because this is not a speaker as claimed. (App. Br. 28 - Item 7I-Cii.) We disagree with this argument for the reasons explained. Specifically, without resorting to improper importation of limitations from the Specification into the claims, Jaiswal's moderator is indistinguishable from the claimed speaker. Furthermore, the claims do not establish how such a distinction would relate to the claimed systems and method in order to distinguish them over the cited references. Appellants argue Jaiswal's participants and moderator are two separate entities. (App. Br. 29-Item 7I-D.) Even if true, this does not establish the claimed speaker is patentably distinct from Jaiswal's moderator. Appellants also repeat many of the same arguments relative to the Advisory Action (App. Br. 29-30 - Items 71-Ei, 71-Eii), which we find unpersuasive for the stated reasons. Remaining Claims No separate arguments are presented for the remaining claims, which are dependent from one of claims 1, 8, and 15. For the reasons stated, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in the rejection of the remaining claims. CONCLUSION An obviousness rejection underÂ§ 103(a) requires that "there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness." KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 6 Appeal2014-009907 Application 12/118,329 398, 418 (2007) (quoting Jn re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted)). On this record, we find the Examiner's reasoning and underpinning adequate to support the conclusion of obviousness. DECISION We affirm the Examiner's rejections of claims 1-3, 5-10, and 12-20 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a). No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. Â§ 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 7