Ex Parte Spiess

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Sep 8, 2006

10068243 (B.P.A.I. Sep. 8, 2006)

The opinion in support of the decision being entered today was not w
for publication and is
ritten
not binding precedent of the Board.

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte BYRAN SPIESS
____________

Appeal No. 2006-1692
Application No. 10/068,243
Technology Center 3726
____________

ON BRIEF
____________

Before CRAWFORD, LEVY, and FETTING, Administrative Patent Judges.
LEVY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal from the examiner's final
rejection of claims 1-13, which are all of the claims pending in
this application.

We AFFIRM-IN-PART.
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BACKGROUND
The appellant's invention relates to a roller for conveyor
belts, which provides means for immediate visual inspection
(specification, page 1).
Claim 1 is representative of the invention, and is reproduced as
follows:
1. An aircraft roller system comprising:

(1) a roller adapted to communicate cargo into and
out of an aircraft, the roller being
cylindrical in shape having a length and a
diameter, the roller having a center aperture
extending through the length of the roller and
the roller being fabricated from a polymer,
the polymer having a burn rate of less than
4.0 inches per minute, a compressibility
strength of a least 200 psi, impact strength
of at least 0.5(ft.lbs.)/inch, flexural
strength of at least 20 psi;

(2) a shaft in the form of an elongate cylinder
having a diameter sized to rotatably fit within
the central aperture of the roller, the shaft
further having means for retention located upon
the shaft ends;

(3) an elongate “U” shaped roller rack, the roller
rack sized to extend the length of the roller
and having a pair of upwardly extending ends
located adjacent the ends of the roller, each
end having an aperture sized to receive the
respective shaft end and located the shaft in a
fixed location the rack being joined to an
aircraft.

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Rather than reiterate the conflicting viewpoints advanced by
the examiner and the appellant regarding the above-noted
rejections, we make reference to the answer (mailed March 8,
2004) for the examiner's complete reasoning in support of the
rejections, and to the brief (filed December 12, 2003) and reply
The prior art references of record relied upon by the
examiner in rejecting the appealed claims are:
Thompson et al. 4,203,509 May 20, 1980
(Thompson)

Rowles 6,354,424 Mar. 12, 2002
(filed Jun. 1, 2000)

Claim 6 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph, as containing subject matter which was not described
in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one
skilled in the relevant art that the inventor, at the time the
application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention;
and in particular, as containing new matter.
Claims 7, 10, and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
as being anticipated by Thompson.
Claims 1-6, 8, and 9 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Thompson in view of Rowles.
Claims 11 and 12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Thompson.
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brief (filed June 10, 2004) for the appellant's arguments
thereagainst.
Only those arguments actually made by appellant have been
considered in this decision. Arguments which appellant could
have made but chose not to make in the brief have not been
considered. See 37 CFR § 41.37(c)(1)(vii)(eff. Sept. 13, 2004).
OPINION
In reaching our decision in this appeal, we have carefully
considered the subject matter on appeal, the rejections advanced
by the examiner, and the evidence of lack of written description,
anticipation and obviousness relied upon by the examiner as
support for the rejections. We have, likewise, reviewed and
taken into consideration, in reaching our decision, appellant’s
arguments set forth in the briefs along with the examiner's
rationale in support of the rejections and arguments in rebuttal
set forth in the examiner's answer.
Upon consideration of the record before us, we make the
determinations which follow. We begin with the rejection of
claim 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as lacking
written description.
The written description requirement serves "to ensure that
the inventor had possession, as of the filing date of the
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application relied on, of the specific subject matter later
claimed by him; how the specification accomplishes this is not
material." In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262, 191 USPQ 90, 96
(CCPA 1976). In order to meet the written description
requirement, the appellant does not have to utilize any
particular form of disclosure to describe the subject matter
claimed, but "the description must clearly allow persons of
ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [he or she] invented
what is claimed." In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012, 10 USPQ2d
1614, 1618 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Put another way, "the applicant
must . . . convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the
art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in
possession of the invention." Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935
F.2d 1555, 1563-64, 19 USPQ2d 1111, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Finally, "[p]recisely how close the original description must
come to comply with the description requirement of section 112
must be determined on a case-by-case basis." Eiselstein v.
Frank, 52 F.3d 1035, 1039, 34 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(quoting Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1561, 19 USPQ2d at 1116).
The examiner’s position (answer, page 3) is that the term
“homogenous” constitutes new matter. The examiner notes that
although the original specification has support for the term
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Appellant asserts (brief, page 4) that to ascertain the
meaning of a claim, the governing authority considers three
sources; i.e., the claims, the specification and the prosecution
history. It is asserted (
“monolithic,” (only one layer), there is no support for the term
“homogenous” which could have more than one layer.
id.) that dictionary definitions are
secondary and are not to trump the meaning from the
specification. The disclosure explains that the roller is a
solid piece of polymer with specific properties that are
expressed in the claims. It is argued (id.) that “[i]nstead of
interpreting “monolithic” and “homogenous” as having the same
meaning, e.g., in light of the specification and dictionary, the
Examiner opted to interpret “homogenous” in a manner consistent
with a dictionary definition, a secondary source, that is
incongruous with the disclosure, primary source”. Appellant
points out that claim 6 does not recite “homogenous thickness,”
but rather recites “homogenous roller.” It is argued (brief,
pages 5 and 6) that “[i]nterpreting the term homogenous in light
of the specification results in a definition that is synonymous
with monolithic; a ‘roller of the same nature, solid and uniform
(definitions of monolithic and homogenous merged to show
consistent meaning).”
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The examiner responds (answer, page 8) that the term
“homogenous” was added to the disclosure in the amendment filed
March 19, 2003, and that the specification has no description or
definition of the term “homogenous.” It is argued (id.) that by
adding the term “homogenous” appellant is attempting to cover
more than what was disclosed because “homogenous” could cover a
roller with multiple layers of multiple materials, whereas
appellant’s monolithic roller can only be made of a single layer
with a single material.
In the reply brief, appellant asserts (page 2) that
“Applicant and the Examiner agree that “monolithic” means solid
and uniform. This definition is consistent with the term
“homogenous”, which means “of the same or a similar kind or
nature” or “uniform in structure or composition throughout”
Appellant adds (reply brief, pages 2 and 3) that “[a]ccording to
binding precedent, “monolithic” and “homogenous”, which can be
interpreted as being consistent are to be interpreted as being
consistent.”
From our review of the specification, we find that the term
“homogeneous” does not appear, and agree with the examiner that
there is no definition or description of the term in the
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The specification discloses that the roller is formed from
an integral, single piece component formed of polymer, and that
the monolithic construction may be made by machining a piece of
round stock, boring the stock, cutting to length and detailing
the ends. We find from the specification that monolithic refers
to being formed from a single piece of material. This is
specification as originally filed. From our review of the
specification, we additionally find that:
(1) “the roller is a generally integral single piece
component formed of suitable polymer.” (page 3).
(2) “[w]here conventional rollers are assembled from
numerous parts, usually metal, to produce a hollow roller, the
conveyer roller of the present invention departs by being
constructed as a monolithic unit from a polymer material.) (page
3).
(3) “[i]t is an advantage of the invention to provide a
monolithic roller.” (page 4).
(4) “[m]anufacturing may be made simple by machining an
elongate piece of round stock to a suitable diameter, boring the
stock, cutting to length and detailing the ends to suit.
Surprisingly, it is efficient to machine rollers 10 from readily
available round stock.” (page 6).
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consistent with the dictionary definition of being constructed of
a single piece of material.1 Turning to the term “homogenous,” as
the term does not appear at all in the specification, we look to
a dictionary for a definition of the term. Because appellant
asserts (brief, page 5) that the examiner has used a dictionary
that defines the term in a manner that is incongruous with the
disclosure, we again rely upon the McGraw-Hill Dictionary of
Scientific and Technical terms for a definition of “homogenous.”
The term is defined as pertaining to a substance having uniform
composition or structure.2 From the definition of the term
“homogenous” we find that the term is not the same as monolithic,
but rather is broader and more encompassing because uniform
composition or structure does not have to be formed from a

1 McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms, Second Ed., 1969. A copy of the
pertinent page is enclosed with the Decision on Appeal.
2 A copy of the definition of the term “homogenous” is also enclosed with the Decision on Appeal.
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We are not persuaded that this definition, or the examiner’s
definition, is incongruous with the specification because there
is nothing in the specification defining or describing the term
”homogenous” for us to compare with. We find that the definition
of the term “homogenous” located by the Board, is broad enough to
read on an article made of plural layers of the same material, or
multiple layers of different materials that are of the same or
similar thickness, as advanced by the examiner. On page 2 of the
reply brief, appellant defines “homogenous” as being “of the same
or a similar kind or nature” or “uniform in structure or
composition throughout.” From the definition provided by
appellant, we similarly find, for the reasons,
monolithic stock material as disclosed in appellant’s
specification.
supra, that
“homogenous” and “monolithic” do not have the same meaning. Nor
do the terms have the same scope, with the term “homogeneous”
being broader and more encompassing that “monolithic”. In
addition, on page 5 of the reply brief, appellant’s state
“Applicant’s interpretation of ‘homogeneous’, e.g. solid
structure.” However, our interpretation of the term is broader
than a solid structure, and we find nothing in the specification
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or claim that would limit the interpretation of the term
“homogeneous” to mean a solid structure. In any event, a solid
structure may not be homogeneous, e.g., a uniform distribution of
substances3. From all of the above, we agree with the examiner
that the term “homogenous” lacks written description in the
specification as originally filed, and constitutes new matter.
The rejection of claim 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph,
is sustained.

3 Hawley’s Chemical Dictionary, Thirteenth Edition, ©1997. A copy of this definition of
“homogeneous” is enclosed with the Decision on Appeal.
We turn next to the rejection of claims 7, 10, and 13 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Thompson. To support
a rejection of a claim under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), it must be shown
that each element of the claim is found, either expressly
described or under principles of inherency, in a single prior art
reference. See Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760,
772, 218 USPQ 781, 789 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1026 (1984). We note at the outset that appellant has not
presented separate arguments for claim 10, but rather states
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(brief, page 6) that claims 7 and 10 stand or fall together. The
examiner’s rejection can be found on pages 3 and 4 of the answer.
Appellant asserts (brief, page 6) that Thompson does not
show a roller fabricated from a polymeric material, but rather a
roller that has a polymeric part. It is argued (brief, page 7)
that “[i]n particular, Thompson et al, teaches that his polymer
is not capable of supporting the weights borne by rollers”
because of the disclosure that “with increasing load, the tire is
locally flattened to the limiting radial extent R1 minus R2,
whereupon all further increments of load are sustained by flange
surfaces 15 alone.” It is additionally argued (id.) that
Thompson does not disclose the claimed burn rate of less than 4
inches per minute. It is further argued (id.) that “the Examiner
automatically assumed, without support, that nylon has all the
physical properties required for solid aircraft roller, since
nylon is in applicant’s list of suitable polymers for a general
type of roller.” It is asserted (brief, pages 7 and 8) that the
examiner has made a leap of faith in finding that since Thompson
uses nylon, his polymer must also have the physical properties
that applicant discloses for an aircraft roller fabricated from a
polymeric material. Appellant adds in the footnote at the bottom
of page 8 that “[t]here is perhaps an infinite number of nylons
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all with varying physical properties, but the Examiner treats all
nylons as having the same physical properties.
We begin our analysis with claim construction. Before
addressing the examiner's rejections based upon prior art, it is
an essential prerequisite that the claimed subject matter be
fully understood. Analysis of whether a claim is patentable over
the prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 103 begins with a determination
of the scope of the claim. The properly interpreted claim must
then be compared with the prior art. Claim interpretation must
begin with the language of the claim itself. See Smithkline
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Laboratories Corp., 859 F.2d 878,
882, 8 USPQ2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Accordingly, we will
initially direct our attention to appellant’s claim 7 to derive
an understanding of the scope and content thereof.
We find that the claim 7 language “the roller is fabricated
from a polymeric material” does not require that the roller is
fabricated from a monolithic block of stock material. Rather,
from the use of the transitional phrase “comprising,” and the
broad statement that the roller is fabricated from a polymeric
material, we find that the roller can be fabricated from more
than just a polymeric material, and can be fabricated from a
polymeric material along with other materials, such as metal. We
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Turning to Thompson, we find that the reference is directed
to a cargo roller for an airplane (col. 1, lines 4-6). The
economics of the air-freight industry demand that cargo aircraft
be capable of carrying the maximum possible freight load,
consistent with safe operation (col. 1, lines 7-9). This has led
to a demand for lighter-weight components as to allow carrying
additional cargo while keeping the total aircraft weight the same
(10-12). It was known to use a tubular aluminum shell with a
nylon tire molded onto the shell. This provided the desired
weight reduction, but abusive loads caused the nylon tire to
crack, leading to premature failure (col. 1, lines 21-25). An
object of the invention is to produce a cargo roller with a
molded nylon tire that will not be subjected to significant abuse
in the presence of an overload on the roller (col. 1, lines 38-
41). The cargo roller has a rigid tubular body 10 covered by a
solid tire 17 of plastic material such as nylon (col. 1, line 60
find nothing in the language of the claim that would limit the
roller to only being formed from a single piece of polymeric
material. Nor does the claim recite the type of polymeric
material used. What is required is that the roller be an
aircraft roller that has a burn rate of less than 4 inches per
minute.
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From the disclosure of Thompson that the aircraft roller is
fabricated from nylon and metal, we find that the aircraft roller
meets the claimed “fabricated from a polymeric material,” since
the claim does not preclude fabrication from other materials in
addition to the polymeric material. From the disclosure that the
roller is for use in aircraft, that it is capable of sustaining
even the worst loads, and that the nylon used is a “super-tough
nylon” we find that Thompson’s disclosure is sufficient to
establish a prima facie case of anticipation of claim 1. Note
that with respect to the claim language of “having a burn rate of
less than four inches per minute” we agree with the examiner that
through col. 2, line 14). Thompson further discloses (col. 2,
lines 63-65) that the described construction is found to satisfy
all stated objects and to provide long life in a light-weight
product which will sustain even the worst loads. It is further
disclosed (col. 3, lines 21-28) that “[t]he injected tire
material is basically a tough variety of nylon, which may be
compounded with or more additional materials selected from the
group one including carbon black, elastomeric material, and glass
fiber; and we have obtained our highly satisfactory results using
a so-called super-tough nylon known as Zytel, ST-100 Series,
being a product of the DuPont Company, Wilmington, Delaware.”
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because the roller of Thompson is for use in an aircraft roller
and is from a super-tough nylon, that the roller will inherently
have the characteristics required for being used in the airline
industry, as recited in claims 7, 10 and 13. Because the super-
tough nylon of Thompson is of the material claimed, is used for
the same purpose, and is used in the same environment as the
claimed roller, we find that the disclosure of Thompson is
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of anticipation of
claim 7 and shift the burden for production of evidence to
appellant to show that the roller of Thompson would not
inherently have the claimed burn rate.
Where the claimed and prior art products are identical
or substantially identical in structure or composition,
or are produced by identical or substantially identical
processes, a prima facie case of either anticipation or
obviousness has been established. In re Best, 562 F.2d
1252, 1255, 195 USPQ 430, 433 (CCPA 1977). “When the
PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products
of the applicant and the prior art are the same, the
applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.”
In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709, 15 USPQ2d 1655,
1658(Fed. Cir. 1990). Therefor, the prima facie case
can be rebutted by evidence showing that the prior art
products do not necessarily possess the characteristics
of the claimed product. In re Best, 562 F.2d at 1255,
195 USPQ at 733. See also Titanium Metals Corp. V.
Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 227 USPQ 773(Fed. Cir. 1985).

We are not persuaded by appellant’s assertion (brief, page
7) that Thompson teaches that his polymer is not capable of
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Nor are we persuaded by appellants assertion (brief, page 7)
that “the Examiner automatically assumed, without support, that
nylon has all the physical properties required for solid aircraft
roller, since nylon is in applicant’s list of suitable polymers
for a general type of roller.” From our review of appellant’s
specification, we find that the reference to nylon on page 5 is
not referring to a general type of roller, but rather to roller
10 of appellant’s invention. Nor are we persuaded by appellant’s
assertion (brief, page 8) that Thompson does not disclose the
compressibility strength, impact strength and flexural strength
of claim 13. From our findings,
supporting the weights borne by rollers. The passage referred to
by appellant is discussing how the invention does not require
tire 17 to take on excess force during overload conditions. This
is supported by Thompson’s disclosure that his invention
overcomes problems in the prior art where the tire was overloaded
and failed prematurely (col. 1, lines 19-25 and 38-41). This is
further supported by the disclosure of Thompson (col. 2, lines
63-65) that “the described construction is found to satisfy all
stated objects and to provide long life in a light-weight product
which will sustain even the worst loads.”
supra, that Thompson discloses
the roller to be fabricated from super-tough nylon, to be used
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for an aircraft cargo roller, to be able to sustain even the
worst loads, we find that the cargo roller of Thompson will
inherently have the characteristics required for an airplane
roller, as recited in claim 13.
Nor are we persuaded by appellant’s assertion (reply brief,
page 4) that Thompson is fabricated with a polymeric material,
not from a polymeric material. From our claim construction,
supra, we find that the language “fabricated from a polymeric
material” and the use of the transitional phrase comprising, that
the claim language is broad enough to be fabricated from other
materials in addition to the polymeric material. Accordingly, we
find that Thompson is fabricated from a polymeric material.
Nor are we persuaded by appellant’s assertion (reply brief,
page 6) that “the particular physical properties were identified
in applicant’s declaration filed March 19, 2003 as being
important to aircraft rollers differentiated from standard use.”

The rollers of Thompson are not for standard use, but rather
are specifically directed to cargo rollers for aircraft, with the
rollers being specifically designed to handle the worst loads
without product failure, which occurred in the past when nylon
rollers were used.
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Turning to the Declaration of the inventors, Bryan Spiess,
and of John Dallum, we find that the Declaration discusses the
advantages of appellant’s polymeric roller. However, a polymeric
roller is not claimed. What is recited in claims 7, 10 and 13 is
an aircraft roller fabricated from a polymeric material. The
Declaration states that although the Declarants have been in the
field of aircraft roller system repair and maintenance for about
25 years, that they have never seen an aircraft roller formed
from plastic, and that the FAA was surprised that the inventors
have created a polymeric roller that would work on aircraft.
As we found, supra, from our claim construction, the claims
are not limited to a roller fabricated solely from polymeric
material, or from a single piece of polymeric material. We are
cognizant of the differences between the rollers of Thompson and
the rollers disclosed by the appellant. However, these
differences have not been specified in appellant’s claims.
We agree with the Declaration that the requirements for
airplane rollers are different from the requirements of regular
rollers, such as the rollers for a boat trailer. However,
Thompson is directed to a roller for an airplane that is
fabricated, inter alia, from polymeric material, and is used for
the same purpose and in the same environment as appellant’s
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We turn next to the rejection of claims 1-6, 8 and 9 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Thompson in view of
Rowles. In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103, it is
incumbent upon the examiner to establish a factual basis to
support the legal conclusion of obviousness.
rollers. We are not persuaded that the super-tough nylon of
Thompson will function differently from the nylon disclosed in
appellant’s specification. Although we have considered the
Declaration, it is inapplicable to a rejection under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102.
From all of the above, we are unconvinced of any error on
the part of the examiner in rejecting claims 7, 10 and 13 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Thompson. The
rejection of claims 7, 10 and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) is
sustained.
See In re Fine, 837
F.2d 1071, 1073, 5 USPQ2d 1596, 1598 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In so
doing, the examiner is expected to make the factual
determinations set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,
17, 148 USPQ 459, 467 (1966), and to provide a reason why one
having ordinary skill in the pertinent art would have been led to
modify the prior art or to combine prior art references to arrive
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at the claimed invention. Such reason must stem from some
teaching, suggestion or implication in the prior art as a whole
or knowledge generally available to one having ordinary skill in
the art. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044,
1051, 5 USPQ2d 1434, 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Ashland Oil, Inc. v.
Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 293, 227 USPQ
657, 664 (Fed. Cir. 1985); ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore
Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577, 221 USPQ 929, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
These showings by the examiner are an essential part of complying
with the burden of presenting a prima facie case of obviousness.
Note In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444
(Fed. Cir. 1992). If that burden is met, the burden then shifts
to the applicant to overcome the prima facie case with argument
and/or evidence. Obviousness is then determined on the basis of
the evidence as a whole. See id.; In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038,
1039, 228 USPQ 685, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Piasecki, 745
F.2d 1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984); and In re
Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1052, 189 USPQ 143, 147 (CCPA 1976).
The examiner's position (answer, pages 4-7) is that Thompson
does not disclose the shaft within the aperture of the roller,
the retention means and the u-shaped roller rack. To overcome
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At the outset, we make reference to our findings,
this deficiency of Thompson, the examiner turns to Rowles for a
teaching of these features.
Appellant’s position (brief, pages 8-11) is to repeat
arguments relating to Thompson, and assert that the polymers
specified in claims 2 and 3 are not found in Rowles or Thompson.
It is further asserted that Rowles and Thompson do not disclose
the claimed physical properties.
supra,
with respect to claim construction, and the teachings, express
and inherent, in Thompson. Appellant does not dispute the
teachings of Thompson or the combinability of the references, but
rather implies that the combined teachings would not have
resulted in the invention of claims 1-6, 8 and 9. We make
reference to our findings, supra, with respect to the Declaration
by the co-inventors. The Declaration is unpersuasive for the
reasons, supra, and because the Declaration does not address the
Thompson reference. From the disclosure of Rowles, we agree with
the examiner that an artisan would have been motivated to use the
cargo roller support system of Rowles with the cargo roller of
Thompson for the reasons advanced by the examiner in the answer,
(pages 4-6). Accordingly, the rejection of claim 1 is sustained,
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along with claims 4 and 5 which depend therefrom, and which have
not been separately argued. Turning to claims 2, 3 and 6, we
note at the outset our interpretation, supra, of the term
homogeneous. From the disclosure of Thompson of having two
layers, each which is homogeneous, we find that the term
homogeneous of claim 6 is met. We turn next to the issue of the
polymers recited in claims 2, 3 and 6. From the disclosure of
Thompson of using nylon, which appellant lists along with the
claimed polymers in the specification as being suitable for the
claimed roller, we find that the disclosure of super-tough nylon
in Thompson would have suggested one or more of the polymers set
forth in claims 2, 3 and 6. Appellant presents no convincing
reasons why the disclosed super-tough nylon would not have
suggested the polymers recited in claims 2,, 3 and 6.
Accordingly, the rejection of claims 2, 3 and 6 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) is sustained, along with claims 8 and 9, as appellants
have not provided any reasons why they believe that the physical
properties recited in claims 8 and 9 would not have been taught
or suggested by Thompson and Rowles.
We turn next to the rejection of claims 11 and 12 under
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35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Thompson. We will
sustain the rejection of claims 11 and 12 for the same reasons as
we sustained the rejection of claims 2 and 3.

CONCLUSION
To summarize, the decision of the examiner to reject claim 6
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph is affirmed. The decision
of the examiner to reject claims 7, 10 and 13 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) is affirmed. The decision of the examiner to reject
claims 1-6, 8, 9, 11 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is affirmed.
Appeal No. 2006-1692
Application No. 10/068,243

Παγε 25

No time period for taking any subsequent action in
connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 CFR
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD )
Administrative Patent Judge )
)
)
)
) BOARD OF PATENT
STUART S. LEVY ) APPEALS
Administrative Patent Judge ) AND
) INTERFERENCES
)
)
)
ANTON W. FETTING )
Administrative Patent Judge )

N. PAUL FRIEDERICHS
ANGENEHM LAW FIRM, LTD.
P.O. BOX 48755
COON RAPIDS, MN 55448-0755

Appeal No. 2006-1692
Application No. 10/068,243

Παγε 26

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