Ex Parte Sorin et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 15, 2017

12955397 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 15, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/955,397 11/29/2010 Anthony SORIN Q121872 7415
23373 7590 06/19/2017
SUGHRUE MION, PLLC
2100 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
SUITE 800
WASHINGTON, DC 20037
EXAMINER
SY, MARIANO ONG
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3657
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/19/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PPROCESSING@SUGHRUE.COM
sughrue@sughrue.com
USPTO@sughrue.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ANTHONY SORIN, DAVID LEMAY,
MICHEL BASSET, and YANN CHAMAILLARD
Appeal 2016-001969
Application 12/955,3971
Technology Center 3600
Before BRUCE R. WINSOR, MICHAEL J. ENGLE, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1—11. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
Technology
The application relates to “managing the braking of an aircraft.”
Spec. 1:3—5.
Illustrative Claim
Claim 1 is illustrative and reproduced below with the limitations at
issue emphasized:
1 Appellants state the real party in interest is Messier-Bugatti. Br. 2.
Appeal 2016-001969
Application 12/955,397
1. A method of managing braking of an aircraft having landing
gear with wheels fitted with friction brakes and with auxiliary
brakes that enable energy to be dissipated by means other than
friction, the method comprising the steps of:
when a braking is requested and before braking is applied,
testing braking parameters to determine whether the aircraft is
in a braking situation for which the friction brakes are not
essential for providing the requested braking; and
performing the requested braking by giving priority to
actuating the auxiliary brakes so long as the aircraft remains
within said braking situation, and actuating the friction brakes
only if the aircraft departs from said braking situation.
Rejections
Claims 1—5 and 9-11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over the combination of Sullivan (US 7,226,018 B2; June 5, 2007)
and Crombez et al. (US 2003/0184155 Al; Oct. 2, 2003). Final Act. 3.
Claim 6 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the
combination of Sullivan, Crombez, and Anwar et al. (US 6,871,919 B2;
Mar. 29, 2005). Final Act. 8.
Claims 7 and 8 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious
over the combination of Sullivan, Crombez, and Oliver (US 7,311,163 B2;
Dec. 25, 2007). Final Act. 8.
ISSUES
1. Did the Examiner err in finding Crombez teaches or suggests
“when a braking is requested and before braking is applied, testing braking
parameters,” as recited in claim 1 ?
2. Does the Examiner’s combination of Sullivan and Crombez for
purposes of claim 1 render Sullivan unsatisfactory for its intended purpose?
3. Did the Examiner err in finding the combination of Sullivan
and Crombez teaches or suggests an “auxiliary brake,” as recited in claim 1?
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Application 12/955,397
ANALYSIS
Claims 1—5 and 9—11
Claim 1 recites “when a braking is requested and before braking is
applied, testing braking parameters” (emphasis added).
Appellants contend “Crombez does not perform testing before
braking is applied” because “Crombez discloses that regenerative braking is
first applied (if available — step 108 of FIG. 3 A) and that, after this step, the
regenerative braking torque is measured (step 110).” App. Br. 11—12. Yet
Appellants have not sufficiently addressed the Examiner’s finding that
Crombez, like Appellants’ invention, instead begins testing by “making
calculations by ‘calculate total brake torque requested’ which starts at step
106 of Fig. 3 A.” Ans. 3. The Examiner is correct that Crombez Figure 3 A
depicts calculating total brake torque requested (step 106) before
regenerative braking is applied (step 108). Moreover, in the present
application, claim 2 depends from claim 1 and further recites “the braking
parameters are selected from the group consisting of: requested braking
torque, ...” We therefore are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding
Crombez teaches testing braking parameters before braking is applied.
Appellants also argue the proposed modification of Crombez and
Sullivan would be unsatisfactory for an aircraft because Crombez is “from
the automotive braking field” and its approach “will result in a delay before
braking the aircraft.” App. Br. 12—13. Appellants’ unsupported attorney
argument, however, fails to address the Examiner’s finding that in “the flow
chart on Fig. 3 A of Crombez . . . calculations [would] be done in
milliseconds, which is so fast that the delay will be much smaller than the
delay of pressurizing the friction braking of the aircraft and should not have
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Application 12/955,397
any adverse effect.” Ans. 5. Thus, we are not persuaded the combination
would be unsatisfactory for an aircraft.
Appellants also argue regenerative brakes as in Sullivan or Crombez
“are not disclosed as” or “teach away from” auxiliary brakes. App. Br. 14—
15. Yet Appellants have not cited any intrinsic or extrinsic evidence for
their interpretation of “auxiliary brakes.” The Examiner, on the other hand,
correctly finds the Specification teaches the auxiliary brake is an
“electromagnetic brake” that produces useable energy. Ans. 6 (citing Spec.
4:19-28); see also Spec. 1:11—20. Given this record, we agree with the
Examiner that the term “auxiliary brake” does not preclude or teach away
from regenerative brakes.
Appellants argue Sullivan and Crombez fail to teach or suggest the
“wherein” limitations of independent claim 11 for the same reasons above
(App. Br. 24—25), which we do not find persuasive for the reasons above.
We agree with the Examiner that in Crombez, “the braking torque has to be
less than a maximum braking torque when regenerative brake is actuating;
but when the braking torque hits the maximum braking torque, the friction
brake will be activated.” Ans. 7.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 11,
and claims 2—5, 9, and 10, which Appellants argue are patentable for similar
reasons. See Br. 15, 19, 25; 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
Claim 6
Appellants argue claim 6 is patentable “for the reasons given for its
parent claim 5,” and “Anwar . . . does not remedy the deficiencies of
Sullivan in view of Crombez.” App. Br. 26. For the reasons above,
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Application 12/955,397
however, we are not persuaded there are deficiencies in the combination of
Sullivan and Crombez.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 6.
Claims 7 and 8
Appellants argue claims 7 and 8 are patentable “for the reasons given
for [their] parent claim[s] 1 and 5, respectively,” and “Oliver . . . does not
remedy the deficiencies of Sullivan in view of Crombez.” App. Br. 27. For
the reasons discussed above, however, we are not persuaded there are
deficiencies in the combination of Sullivan and Crombez.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 7 and 8.
DECISION
For the reasons above, we affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting
claims 1—11.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED
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