Ex Parte Solomon et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardDec 23, 201613736890 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 23, 2016) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/736,890 01/08/2013 James Solomon 8605P008C 3978 130093 7590 12/28/2016 Nicholson De Vos Webster & Elliott LLP 217 High Street Palo Alto, CA 94301 EXAMINER SYED, NABIL H ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2683 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/28/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): patent@nicholsondevos.com ndwe_docketing@cardinal-ip.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JAMES SOLOMON, MILTON TORMEY, PRAVEEN MANDAL, RICHARD LOWENTHAL, HARJINDER BHADE, and DAVID BAXTER Appeal 2016-001445 Application 13/736,890 Technology Center 2600 Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, JOHNNY A. KUMAR, and JON M. JURGOVAN, Administrative Patent Judges. SAADAT, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1,3, 4, 15, 17, 18, and 24-47, which are all the claims pending in this application.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C § 6(b). We affirm. 1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Chargepoint, Inc. (App. Br. 2). 2 Claims 2, 5—14, 16, and 19—23 have been canceled. Appeal 2016-001445 Application 13/736,890 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants’ invention relates to authorization in a networked electric vehicle charging system (Spec. 12). Exemplary claim 1 under appeal reads as follows: 1. A method in a networked electric vehicle charging station that is coupled with an electric vehicle charging station network server, the method comprising: receiving, from the electric vehicle charging station network server over a network, a list that includes a plurality of identifiers that identify a plurality of electric vehicle operators respectively; receiving a plurality of charging session requests that request a plurality of charging sessions between a plurality of electric vehicles and the networked electric vehicle charging station respectively, wherein each of the plurality of charging session requests includes an identifier that identifies an electric vehicle operator; for each of the charging session requests, performing a local authorization for that charging session request including comparing the identifier included in that charging session request against the received list to determine whether to grant the charging session request; and for each of the charging session requests that are granted, performing the following: enabling a charging session including allowing a corresponding one of the plurality of electric vehicles to be charged via the networked electric vehicle charging station, and transmitting, to the electric vehicle charging station network server over the network, an amount of energy transferred to the corresponding electric vehicle during enabled charging session. 2 Appeal 2016-001445 Application 13/736,890 REFERENCES and REJECTIONS Claims 1, 3, 4, 15, 17, 18, 24—26, 28—34, and 36—39 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Iwashita et al. (WO 2008/015893 Al; published Feb. 7, 2008) (relying on US 2010/0010698 Al as the English translation) (“Iwashita”), Li et al. (US 2004/0095230 Al; published May 20, 2004) (“Li”), and Landau-Holdsworth et al. (US 2010/0241560 Al; published Sept. 23, 2010) (“Landau-Holdsworth”) (see Final Act. 2—7). Claims 27, 35, and 40-47 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Iwashita, Li, Landau-Holdsworth, Faro et al. (US 2007/0188303) (“Faro”), and Ozer et al. (US 4,839,640; issued June 13, 1989) (“Ozer”) (see Final Act. 7-8).3 ANALYSIS Independent Claims 1, 15, 24, and 32 1. Combined Teachings of Iwashita, Li, and Landau-Holdsworth Appellants contend the Examiner has acknowledged the proposed combination of Iwashita, Li, and Landau-Holdsworth does not teach “performing a local authorization for [a] charging session request'' using a list that identifies “a plurality of electric vehicle operators,” and, thus, the Examiner has not made a prima facie case of obviousness with respect to the independent claims (App. Br. 8, 10-11; Reply Br. 2—4 (citing Final Act. 6)). 3 The Examiner mistakenly lists “Iwashita, Faro, and Ozer” as the references used to reject claims 27, 35, and 40-46, and inadvertently omits claim 47 from the rejected claim listing. We find these typographical errors to be harmless errors, as explained in our Analysis of claims 43 and 47. 3 Appeal 2016-001445 Application 13/736,890 This argument is not persuasive of error in the rejection. We agree with the Examiner’s finding that each of Iwashita and Li teach a method of performing a local authorization of a charging request based on vehicle identification information (Ans. 3—5 (citing Iwashita ’698 1 85; Li || 84, 94)). The Examiner further finds Landau-Holds worth teaches performing authorization using either vehicle identification or user (i.e., vehicle operator) identification (Ans. 5 (citing Landau-Holdsworth 122)). Based on this clarification of the Examiner’s position regarding the combination, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that the combination of references teaches or suggests the claimed local authorization of a charging request using vehicle operator information (Ans. 5). In fact, Landau-Holdsworth teaches authentication may be done using either vehicle identification or user identification (Landau-Holdsworth 122). Therefore, the mere substitution of user identification in place of vehicle identification in the authentication methods of Iwashita or Li is obvious because it does no more than yield predictable results. See KSR Int’l v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). 2. Rationale to Combine the References Appellants contend the Examiner has not provided a sufficiently articulated reason explaining why a skilled artisan would combine the teachings of Iwashita, Li, and Landau-Holdsworth to arrive at the claimed invention (App. Br. 9—12; Reply Br. 3—5). We are not persuaded by Appellants’ contention because the Examiner has provided “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness,” specifically, performing the local charging authorization of Iwashita or Li using the vehicle operator identification of Landau- Holdsworth further ensures the authenticity of the user (see Ans. 5). See 4 Appeal 2016-001445 Application 13/736,890 KSR, 550 U.S. at 417-18 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 1, 15, 24, and 32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Iwashita, Li, and Landau-Holdsworth. Claims 43 and 4 7 1. The Examiner’s Typographical Errors Appellants contend it is unclear what references the Examiner is using to reject claim 43 because base claim 1 is rejected over Iwashita, Li, and Landau-Holdsworth, and the Examiner has not provided any rationale for the rejection of claim 43 over Iwashita, Faro, and Ozer (App. Br. 13). Appellants further contend the Examiner has not rejected claim 47, because the claim number is not included in any rejection in the Final Office Action (App. Br. 13—14). Although the Examiner has made typographical errors in the rejection of claims 43 and 47, it is clear that claim 43 is rejected using the same references as base claim 1 (i.e., Iwashita, Li, and Landau- Holdsworth), with Ozer being introduced for the additional limitations of claim 43 (Final Act. 7—8; Ans. 6). Additionally, Appellants were on notice that claim 47 is rejected, because the claim is listed as “rejected” on the cover sheet of the Final Office Action (see Final Act. 1), and because the claim recites the same limitations as claim 43, which the Examiner addressed using Ozer (Final Act. 7—8; Ans. 6). 2. Teachings of Ozer We observe that Appellants did not file a petition to designate as a new ground of rejection the findings in the Examiner’s Answer regarding 5 Appeal 2016-001445 Application 13/736,890 Ozer (Ans. 6), rather, Appellants responded to the merits of the Examiner’s findings (Reply Br. 5—6). In their Reply Brief, Appellants contend Ozer does not teach “electric vehicle operators who have a particular account type that indicates a time period within the day during which to authorize a charging session request'’ (Reply Br. 6). Appellants’ contention is not persuasive of Examiner error, because Appellants are essentially attacking the Ozer reference individually where the rejection is based on the combination of Iwashita, Li, Landau- Holdsworth, and Ozer. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981) (“[0]ne cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where . . . the rejections are based on combinations of references.”). The Examiner relied on Ozer to teach the concept of restricting account access to a particular time of day (Ans. 6—7 (citing Ozer col. 7:61—65, col. 24:18—26)). Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that the combination of Ozer’s time-based authorization with the electric charging station system of Iwashita, Li, and Landau-Holdsworth teaches the disputed limitations of claims 43 and 47. Remaining Claims No separate arguments are presented for the remaining dependent claims (see App. Br. 14—15). We therefore sustain their rejections for the reasons stated with respect to independent claims 1, 15, 24, and 32. DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 3, 4, 15, 17, 18, and 24-47 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 6 Appeal 2016-001445 Application 13/736,890 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 7 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation