Ex Parte Solomon et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 28, 2016

13037326 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 28, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/037,326 02/28/2011
15757 7590 03/30/2016
Qualcomm /Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP
2200 Ross A venue
Suite 3600
Dallas, TX 75201-7932
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Mark C. Solomon
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
QLXX.P0863US 6662
EXAMINER
EUSTAQUIO, CAL J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/30/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
ocpat_uspto@qualcomm.com
doipdocket@nortonrosefulbright.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MARK C. SOLOMON, GLENN A. WONG,
APRIL SLAYDEN MITCHELL, SUSIE WEE, IAN N. ROBINSON, and
MANJIRNATH CHATTERJEE
Appeal2014-005398
Application 13/037,326
Technology Center 2600
Before KAL YANK. DESHPANDE, DAVID M. KOHUT, and
JUSTIN T. ARBES, Administrative Patent Judges.
DESHPANDE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF CASE1
Appellants seek review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner's
Final Rejection of claims 1 and 3-20.2 We have jurisdiction over the appeal
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.
1 Our decision makes reference to Appellants' Reply Brief ("Reply Br.,"
filed March 17, 2014), and Appellants' Appeal Brief ("App. Br.," filed
December 23, 2013), the Examiner's Answer ("Ans.," mailed January 16,
2014), and Final Office Action ("Final Act.," mailed August 16, 2013).
2 Claim 2 was canceled previously.
Appeal2014-005398
Application 13/037,326
Appellants' invention is directed to the use of a sensor to log into a
device. Spec. i-fi-f 11-13.
An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of
exemplary claim 1, which is reproduced below:
1. A method for logging a user into a device comprising:
detecting, by a sensor of the device, a touch of a portable
communication device on an accessible region of the device,
wherein the portable communication device is associated with a
user;
in response to detecting the touch of the portable
communication device on the accessible region, identifying the
portable communication device and logging the user into the
device using a profile of the user; and
generating a session on the device based on the profile of
the user.
REFERENCES
The Examiner relies on the following prior art:
Markham US 2005/0255840 Al Nov. 17, 2005
Alexander US 2008/0089277 Al Apr. 17, 2008
Kim US 2010/0240415 Al Sept. 23, 2010
REJECTIONS3
Claims 1, 3-13, 16, 18, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as obvious over Markham. Final Act. 3-10.
Claim 17 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
Markham and Alexander. Final Act. 10-11.
3 The Examiner has withdrawn the rejection of claim 20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, 2nd paragraph. See Final Act. 2; Ans. 7.
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Appeal2014-005398
Application 13/037,326
Claims 14, 15, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over Markham and Kim. Final Act. 11-13.
ISSUE
The issue of whether the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 3-13,
16, 18, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Markham turns on
whether Markham teaches "in response to detecting the touch of the portable
communication device, ... logging the user into [a second] device," as
recited in independent claim 1, and similarly recited in independent claims
10 and 18.
ANALYSIS
Claims 1, 3-13, 16, 18, and 19 are rejected under 35U.S.C.§103(a) as
obvious over Markham
Independent claim 1 recites "in response to detecting the touch of the
portable communication device . . . logging the user into [a second] device."
Independent claims 10 and 18 recite similar limitations. Markham teaches
an authentication system wherein a user's cell phone is inserted into a cradle
connected to a computer, and upon the user providing biometric data the cell
phone automatically logs the user into the computer. Markham i-f 18. The
Examiner finds inserting a cell phone into a cradle, as taught by Markham,
teaches detecting a "touch" of a portable communication device, as recited
in claim 1. Ans. 3 (citing Markham i-f 18). The Examiner further finds
logging a user into a device in response to detecting the touch of a portable
communication device, as required in claim 1, is taught by Markham's cell
phone logging into Markham's computer. Id. (citing Markham i-f 18).
In response to the Examiner finding that Markham teaches logging
into a computer in response to cradling a user's cell phone, Appellants argue
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Appeal2014-005398
Application 13/037,326
that Markham initiates a login procedure in response to the user's biometric
data being provided to the cell phone after it has been cradled and not in
response to the cell phone being inserted into the cradle (the alleged "touch"
according to the Examiner). See Ans. 3; Reply Br. 3--4.
We agree with Appellants. Claim 1 recites that "in response to
detecting the touch of the portable communication device . . . logging the
user into [a second] device." The Examiner finds that the computer in
Markham detects the touch of a cell phone when it is cradled in a USB port
that is connected to the computer. Final Act. 4 (citing Markham i-f 33); Ans.
3. However, the Examiner did not provide any evidence or rationale to
demonstrate that Markham teaches, in response to detecting this "touch,"
"logging the user into the [second] device using a profile of the user," as
recited by claim 1. We agree with Appellants that the user is not logged into
Markham's computer in response to cell phone being cradled because the
login process only occurs after biometric data is supplied to the USE-cradled
cell phone. See Markham i-f 18. Thus, the user is not logged into the
computer "in response to detecting the touch of [a] portable communication
device," as recited in independent claim 1, and similarly recited in
independent claims 1 0 and 18.
Accordingly, we cannot sustain the Examiner's rejection of
independent claims 1, 10, and 18 and dependent claims 3-9, 11-13, 16, and
19, which are not argued separately.
Claim 17 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Markham and
Alexander, and Claims 14, 15, and 20 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over Markham and Kim
Claims 14, 15, and 17 depend from independent claim 10 and claim
20 depends from independent claim 18. Accordingly, we cannot sustain the
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Appeal2014-005398
Application 13/037,326
Examiner's rejection of claims 14, 15, 17, and 20 for the same reasons
discussed above in our analysis of claims 10 and 18.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 3-13, 16, 18, and 19 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Markham.
The Examiner erred in rejecting claim 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over Markham and Alexander.
The Examiner erred in rejecting claims 14, 15, and 20 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Markham and Kim.
DECISION
To summarize, our decision is as follows:
• the rejection of claims 1, 3-13, 16, 18, and 19 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as obvious over Markham is reversed;
• the rejection of claim 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
the combination of Markham and Alexander is reversed; and
• the rejection of claims 14, 15, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over the combination of Markham and Kim is reversed.
REVERSED
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