Ex parte Slater et al.

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Apr 28, 1999

08308983 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 28, 1999)

Application for patent filed September 19, 1994. 1
According to appellants, this application is a continuation of
Application 08/107,454, filed August 17, 1993, now U.S. Patent
No. 5,396,900; which is a continuation-in-part of Application
07/922,023, filed July 28, 1992, now U.S. Patent No.
5,331,971; which is a continuation of Application 07/680,392,
filed April 4, 1991, now U.S. Patent No. 5,192,298; and a
continuation-in-part of Application 07/978,249, filed November
18, 1992, now U.S. Patent No. 5,395,375; and a continuation-
in-part of Application 08/016,595, filed February 11, 1993,
now abandoned.
1
THIS OPINION WAS NOT WRITTEN FOR PUBLICATION
The opinion in support of the decision being entered today
(1) was not written for publication in a law journal and
(2) is not binding precedent of the Board.
Paper No. 23
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
__________
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
__________
Ex parte CHARLES R. SLATER,
MATTHEW A. PALMER, and PETER KRATSCH
__________
Appeal No. 97-2486
Application 08/308,9831
__________
ON BRIEF
__________
Before McCandlish, Senior Administrative Patent Judge, MEISTER
and NASE, Administrative Patent Judges.
Appeal No. 97-2486
Application No. 08/308,983
Although the specification in describing the invention2
makes reference to Figs. 1, 1a, 1b, 2, 2a, 2b, 3, 3a, 3b, 4,
4a, 5, 5a, 6, 6a, 6b, 7, 8, 9a, 9b, 10a and 10b of the
drawings (as well as various reference numerals associated
therewith), the application file contains drawings depicting
only Figs. 9a, 9b, 10a and 10b. Our understanding of the
remaining figures is derived from copies of the drawings
obtained from parent application 08/107,454 (which was filed
under 37 CFR § 1.60).
2
MEISTER, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Charles R. Slater, Matthew A. Palmer and Peter Kratsch
(the appellants) appeal from the final rejection of claims 37-
40. Claims 29-36, the only other claims remaining in the
application, stand allowed.
We AFFIRM-IN-PART and, pursuant to our authority under
the provisions of 37 CFR § 1.196(b), enter a new rejection of
claim 38 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.
The appellants' invention pertains to a method of
manufacturing an end effector for an endoscopic
electrosurgical instrument. Independent claim 37 is further2
illustrative of the appealed subject matter and a copy thereof
may be found in the APPENDIX to the brief.
The references relied on by the examiner are:
Horton 3,153,826 Oct. 27, 1964
Appeal No. 97-2486
Application No. 08/308,983
According to the McGRAW-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND3
TECHNOLOGY, McGraw-Hill, Inc., New York, N.Y., 1971, Vol. 2,
p. 568:
In investment casting (lost-wax process) a wax or
frozen mercury pattern is made; it is then dipped
into a slurry of a refractory coating material such
as silica and into liquids including water, ethyl
alcohol, and acids. After the coating has dried,
the pattern assembly is placed in a flask and filled
with molding mixtures such as sand, water, and a
binder. After the mold has dried in air, the wax is
melted out by inverting and heating it between 200
and 300EF. Depending on the metal, the mold is then
heated between 1200 and 1900EF for burnout (to drive
off all gases) and for preheating, after which the
molten metal is poured into the mold. After
solidification of the casting, the mold is broken
away and the casting is removed. The process is
costly, but gives good surface finish and close
tolerances, is suitable for casting high-melting-
point alloys, and can be used for intricate shapes.
3
Stasz et al. 4,862,890 Sep. 5, 1989
(Stasz)
Eggers (EP) 0 518 230 Dec. 16, 1992
Claims 37-39 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Eggers in view of Horton. The
examiner considers that it would have been obvious to form the
conductive bodies of the end effectors 18, 19 of Eggers (see
the embodiment of Fig. 6A) by an investment casting process3
in view of the teachings of Horton.
Appeal No. 97-2486
Application No. 08/308,983
4
Claim 40 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Eggers in view of Stasz. The examiner is of
the opinion that it would have been obvious to mold the
ceramic
bodies of the end effectors 118, 119 of Eggers (see the
embodiment of Fig. 6C) and to trace a conductive path on these
bodies in view of the teachings of Stasz.
A detailed explanation of the rejections can be found on
pages 2 and 3 of the answer. The arguments of the appellants
and examiner in support of their respective positions can be
found on pages 6-12 of the brief, pages 1-9 of the reply brief
and pages 4-6 of the answer.
OPINION
Considering first to the rejection of claim 37 under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Eggers in view of
Horton, the appellants note various deficiencies of the
references individually and urge that there is no suggestion
to combine the teachings of Eggers and Horton in the manner
proposed by the examiner. In support of this position the
brief states that:
Appeal No. 97-2486
Application No. 08/308,983
The specification makes no mention whatsoever of4
"investment" casting the conductive body but, instead, more
broadly refers to "casting" this body (see, e.g., page 6, line
1). However, adequate descriptive support for this limitation
is found in claim 37 as originally filed. If the provision of
"investment" casting was such a vital part of the appellants'
invention, it seems strange to us that all mention of its
importance was omitted from the original description. See
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 24-26, 148 USPQ 459,
469-470 (1966).
5
Eggers teaching of how to make bipolar scissor
blades [i.e., end effectors] is set out in columns
14 and 15 of the '230 patent. In one embodiment,
Eggers teaches coating stainless steel blades with a
ceramic material. In another embodiment, Eggers
teaches coating most of the exterior surfaces of
ceramic blades with copper, silver, or nickel. In
neither embodiment does Eggers teach or suggest
investment casting. Claim 37 specifically requires
"casting a conductive body
according to an investment casting process". When4
an end effector is made by investment casting
according to the invention, all features of the end
effector are formed during casting to provide an
integral end effector element. This is in contrast
with the prior art practice of making stainless
steel end effectors which involves forging and
extensive machining to achieve the desired finished
forms. The use of investment casting eliminates the
need for forging, extensive machining, abrasive
blasting, pickling and other treatments. Therefore,
it is submitted that the step of investment casting
as set forth in method claim 37 provides unexpected
results as compared to the prior art methods of
making end effectors. [Pages 6 and 7; footnote
added.]
We are unpersuaded by the appellants' arguments. While
the obviousness of an invention cannot be established by
Appeal No. 97-2486
Application No. 08/308,983
More specifically, as stated by the court in Keller, 6425
F.2d at 425, 208 USPQ at 881:
The test for obviousness is not whether the features
of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated
into the structure of the primary reference; nor is
it that the claimed invention must be expressly
suggested in any one or all of the references.
Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of
the references would have suggested to those of
ordinary skill in the art.
6
combining the teachings of the prior art absent some teaching,
suggestion or incentive supporting the combination (see,
e.g., ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572,
1577, 221 USPQ 929, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984)), this does not mean
that the cited references or prior art must specifically
suggest making the combination (B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft
Braking Sys. Corp., 72 F.3d 1577, 1582, 37 USPQ2d 1314, 1318
(Fed. Cir. 1996) and In re Nilssen, 851 F.2d 1401, 1403, 7
USPQ2d 1500, 1502 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). Instead, obviousness may
be established by what the combined teachings of the
references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in
the art. In re Young, 927 F.2d 588, 591, 18 USPQ2d 1089, 1091
(Fed. Cir. 1991) and In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425, 208 USPQ
871, 881 (CCPA 1981) . Moreover, in evaluating such referenc-5
Appeal No. 97-2486
Application No. 08/308,983
7
es it is proper to take into account not only the specific
teachings of the references but also the inferences which one
skilled in the art would reasonably be expected to draw there-
from (In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826, 159 USPQ 342, 344 (CCPA
1968)), and all of the disclosures in a
reference must be evaluated for what they fairly teach one
having ordinary skill in the art (In re Boe, 355 F.2d 961,
965, 148 USPQ 507, 510 (CCPA 1966)).
Here, Eggers' explanation of how the end effectors 18, 19
are made is not limited only to columns 14 and 15 as the
appellants would apparently have us believe. Eggers in lines
20-25 of column 11 clearly states that the electrically
conductive end effectors 18, 19 may be formed by "numerous
methods, including forging followed by machining, die casting,
metal injection molding, and electrodischarge machining (EDM)
cut-out of the features" (emphasis added). The metal used in
casting the electrically conductive end effectors includes
stainless steels such as AISI 410 and 420 (see column 11, line
19; column 14, line 8). Eggers further teaches coating
selective portions of the bodies of the electrically
conductive end effectors with a non-conductive coating 49 (see
Appeal No. 97-2486
Application No. 08/308,983
8
column 11, lines 46-49; column 12, lines 34-42; column 14,
lines 2-19). In the embodiment of Fig. 4, Eggers utilizes a
clevis 72, 73 to couple the end effectors 18, 19 to the
actuator 16, 12, 13 of the endoscopic surgical instrument 10.
Thus, Eggers teaches all the limitations of claim 17 as
broadly set forth except for the particular die casting
procedure which is employed (i.e., "investment" casting).
With respect to this limitation, Eggers simply refers
generically to "die casting," leaving to the artisan to select
from well known die casting procedures (e.g., investment
casting) the particular die casting procedure to be employed.
By referring to the "investment casting industry" (column 1,
lines 11 and 12), Horton provides evidence that investment
casting is a well known die casting procedure. In making the
selection of the particular kind of die casting procedure to
be employed from various well known die casting procedures,
the artisan would have been well aware of the respective
advantages and disadvantages of each. See, e.g., In re
Heinrich, 268 F.2d 753, 756, 122 USPQ 388, 390 (CCPA 1959).
Moreover, Horton (1) provides a suggestion that investment
casting be used where "precision" casting (i.e., casting to
Appeal No. 97-2486
Application No. 08/308,983
9
close tolerances) is of concern (see column 1, line 10) and
(2) expressly teaches that the particular investment casting
process of his invention is especially useful in order to
overcome prior art problems of pitting when casting stainless
steels of the Type 400 series (see column 1, lines 13-23),
which stainless steels (as we have noted above) are among
those used by Eggers. In our view, the artisan would have
found it obvious to utilize the well known investment casting
process, such as that taught by Horton, to cast the end
effectors of Eggers. The artisan would particularly have been
motivated to utilize Horton's investment casting process to
cast Eggers' end effectors in order to achieve Horton's
suggested advantage of "precision"
casting (i.e., casting to close tolerances) and expressly
stated advantage of avoiding problems of pitting when casting
Type 400 stainless steels.
As to the appellants' contention that the use of an
investment casting process results in the unexpected result of
eliminating the need for forging, extensive machining,
abrasive blasting and pickling, these same results are
achieved by die casting (in general) as disclosed by Eggers.
Appeal No. 97-2486
Application No. 08/308,983
10
Moreover, such results are nothing more than would be
expected. It is well settled that expected beneficial results
are evidence of obviousness of a claimed invention, just as
unexpected beneficial results are evidence of nonobviousness.
See, e.g., Ex parte Novak, 16 USPQ2d 2041, 2043 (Bd. Pat. App.
& Int. 1989), aff'd mem. 899 F.2d 1228, 16 USPQ2d 2043 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
In view of the foregoing, we will sustain the rejection
of claim 37 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 based on the combined
teachings of Eggers and Horton.
We consider next the rejection of claims 38 and 39 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Eggers in view of
Horton. With respect to claim 38, for reasons stated infra in
our new rejection under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.196(b), we
are of the opinion that this claim fails to satisfy the
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. Normally a
claim which fails to comply with the second paragraph of § 112
will not be analyzed as to whether it is patentable over the
prior art since to do so would of necessity require
speculation with regard to the metes and bounds of the claimed
subject matter. See In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862-63, 134
Appeal No. 97-2486
Application No. 08/308,983
11
USPQ 292, 295-96 (CCPA 1962) and In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382,
1385, 165 USPQ 494, 496 (CCPA 1970). Nevertheless, in this
instance, we are of the opinion that the examiner's rejection
of claim 38 cannot be sustained on the basis of those portions
of the claimed invention that are understandable.
As the examiner recognizes, claim 38 requires the step of
coating the entire cast body and thereafter removing the
coating from selected locations, while claim 39 requires the
step of masking certain locations of the cast body prior to
coating and thereafter removing the mask from those locations.
With respect to these limitations, the examiner has simply
stated that "[t]he coating techniques of claims 38-39 are
conventional" (answer, page 3). We must point out, however,
obviousness under § 103 is a legal conclusion based on factual
evidence (In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1073, 5 USPQ2d 1596, 1598
(Fed. Cir. 1988)) and the mere fact that, as a broad
proposition, it might be known to remove a portion of coating
material from an object after coating the object and to mask
certain portions of an object before coating the object, does
not provide a sufficient factual basis for establishing the
obviousness of the specifically claimed method when
Appeal No. 97-2486
Application No. 08/308,983
12
considering that method in its entirety (see In re GPAC Inc.,
57 F.3d 1573, 1582, 35 USPQ2d 1116, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1995) and
In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017, 154 USPQ 173, 178 (CCPA
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1057 (1968)). Since the
examiner has failed to provide a factual basis (e.g.,
reference evidence) for concluding that method defined by
claims 38 and 39 (when taken as a whole) would have been
obvious, we are constrained to reverse the rejection of claims
38 and 39 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 based on the combined
teachings of Eggers and Horton.
Turning now to the rejection of claim 40 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over Eggers in view of Stasz, it
is the appellants' position that
Stasz et al. and Eggers are not properly combinable.
Stasz et al. is directed to an electrosurgical
scalpel which is not coupled to an actuation means,
and is not an endoscopic instrument. The scalpel of
Stasz et al. is a single blade which is not intended
for use with another similar blade; i.e., it is not
an "end effector" as claimed in the claim and
described in the specification. Meanwhile Eggers is
directed to a bipolar endoscopic instrument where
the entire outer surface of the end effector is
coated (i.e., there is no trace). If the traced
coating of Stasz et al. which extends on both sides
of the scalpel blade were to be applied to the
endoscopic instrument of Eggers, it would render
Eggers non-functional according to the teaching of
Appeal No. 97-2486
Application No. 08/308,983
13
Eggers. The instrument would short circuit.
[Brief, page 10.]
The appellants' contentions are not persuasive. In the
embodiment of Fig. 6C, Eggers provides end effectors 118, 119
having non-conductive bodies that are formed of "an
electrically insulating material, e.g., a ceramic material . .
." (column 14, lines 51-53). While Eggers does not
specifically state what process is employed to form the non-
conductive bodies of ceramic material, Eggers does state (as
we have noted above with respect to the rejection of claim
37), that in the embodiment of Fig. 6A, the metallic bodies
may be formed by die casting or injection molding (see column
11, in lines 20-25). This statement by Eggers regarding the
embodiment of Fig. 6A would have fairly suggested to the
artisan to likewise make the ceramic non-conductive bodies in
the embodiment of Fig. 6C by either die casting or injection
molding. In any event, Stasz teaches an electrosurgical
instrument (albeit a scalpel) wherein the non-conductive body
is formed by "injection molding a green ceramic and then
firing the molded part" (column 2, lines 65 and 66). Thus,
Stasz teaches that when forming the non-conductive of body of
an electrosurgical instrument of a ceramic material, an
Appeal No. 97-2486
Application No. 08/308,983
14
injection molding procedure should be employed. From our
perspective, a combined consideration of Eggers and Stasz
would have fairly suggested to the artisan to utilize a
molding procedure (such as injection molding) when forming the
ceramic non-conductive bodies of Eggers in view of the above-
noted teachings of Stasz.
As to the appellants' contention that Eggers does not
teach "tracing" a conductive path, we initially note that the
appellants on page 13 of the specification broadly refer to
"plated traces 714, 704, 705 for electrical conductivity"
which may be applied by "sputtering or by other suitable
procedures," but does not define these plated or coated traces
as being of any particular width or extent. Viewing Fig. 7 of
the drawing, the traces are depicted as being of significant
width and extent, and the purpose appears to be to simply
provide a coating of electrically conductive material to
conduct electricity from the point where clevis engages the
non-conductive body to the outer end or working surface of
that body. It is thus readily apparent that the appellants
have utilized the terminology "tracing" in a very broad sense.
In the embodiment of 6C, Eggers similarly provides a layer or
Appeal No. 97-2486
Application No. 08/308,983
It is well settled that the terminology in a pending6
application's claims is to be given its broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the specification. In re
Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1056, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir.
1997) and In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322
(Fed. Cir. 1989).
15
coating of electrically conductive material 166 to "most" of
the exterior surface of the non-conductive body for the
purpose of conducting electricity to the working surface of
that body (see the paragraph bridging columns 14 and 15 of
that body). Consistent with the appellants' specification, we
are of the opinion that the formation of the coating 166 on
the non-conductive body of Eggers can broadly be considered to
be "tracing a conductive path." Moreover, Stasz clearly6
teaches that conductive lines or "tracings" 24 and 26 of
relative narrow width may be provided to conduct electricity
to the working end of the electrosurgical tool (see column 3,
lines 38-42), and this teaching would have suggested to the
artisan to similarly provide conductive lines or tracings of
relative narrow width on the body of the electrosurgical
instrument of Eggers, if for no other reason than to save on
the amount of electrically conductive material that is coated
or deposited. While the appellants contend that if the
Appeal No. 97-2486
Application No. 08/308,983
16
teachings of Stasz (which has tracings on both sides of the
non-conductive body) were applied to the non-conductive body
of Eggers it would render Eggers' device non-functional, we
must point out that all of the features of the secondary
reference need not be bodily incorporated into the primary
reference (see In re Keller, at 642 F.2d 425, 208 USPQ 881)
and the artisan is not compelled to blindly follow the
teaching of one prior art reference over the other without the
exercise of independent judgment (Lear Siegler, Inc. v.
Aeroquip Corp., 733 F.2d 881, 889, 221 USPQ 1025, 1032 (Fed.
Cir. 1984). Here, it is the primary reference to Eggers that
teaches providing the electrically conductive material or
tracing only on one side of the non-conductive body.
For the reasons stated above, we will sustain the
rejection of claim 40 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 based on the
combined teachings of Eggers and Stasz.
Under the provisions of 37 CFR § 1.196(b) we make the
following new rejection:
Claim 38 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly
Appeal No. 97-2486
Application No. 08/308,983
17
point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the
appellants regard as the invention. The purpose of the second
paragraph of § 112 is to provide those who would endeavor, in
future enterprises, to approach the area circumscribed by the
claims of a patent, with adequate notice demanded by due
process of law, so that they may more readily and accurately
determine the boundaries of protection involved and evaluate
the possibility of infringement and dominance. In re Hammack,
427 F.2d 1378, 1382, 166 USPQ 204, 208 (CCPA 1970). Moreover,
in order to satisfy the requirements of the second paragraph
of § 112, a claim must accurately define the invention in the
technical sense. See In re Knowlton, 481 F.2d 1357, 1366, 178
USPQ 486, 492-93 (CCPA 1973). In addition, while the language
of claim 38 may appear, for the most part, to be
understandable when read in the abstract, no claim may be read
apart from and independent of the supporting disclosure on
which it is based. See In re Cohn, 438 F.2d 989, 993, 169
USPQ 95, 98 (CCPA 1971).
Applying these principles to the present case, we are of
the opinion that the recitation of the step of "coating the
entire cast conductive body" introduces uncertainty into the
Appeal No. 97-2486
Application No. 08/308,983
18
claim which would preclude one skilled in the art from
determining the metes and bounds of the claimed subject
matter. More specifically, this claim depends from claim 37
which sets forth that the step of coating cast conductive body
except for certain specified locations. Thus, parent claim 37
(which requires that less than the entirety of the cast
conductive body be coated) is inconsistent with dependent
claim 38 which requires that the entire cast conductive body
be coated. Thus, not only does claim 38 (which includes all
the limitations of claim 37 by virtue of its dependency
thereon) fail to accurately define the invention in the
technical sense since the cast conductive body cannot be
considered to be both partially coated and entirely coated,
but this language, when read in light of the appellants’ own
disclosure (which describes the subject matter of claims 37
and 38 as being separate, mutually exclusive embodiments),
results in an inexplicable inconsistency that renders it
indefinite.
In summary:
Appeal No. 97-2486
Application No. 08/308,983
19
The rejections of claims 37 and 40 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
are affirmed.
The rejection of claims 38 and 39 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
is reversed.
A new rejection of claim 38 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, has been made.
In addition to affirming the examiner’s rejection of one
or more claims, this decision contains a new ground of
rejection pursuant to 37 CFR § 1.196(b)(amended effective Dec.
1, 1997, by final rule notice, 62 Fed. Reg. 53,131, 53,197
(Oct. 10, 1997), 1203 Off. Gaz. Pat. & Trademark Office 63,
122 (Oct. 21, 1997)). 37 CFR § 1.196(b) provides, “A new
ground of rejection shall not be considered final for purposes
of judicial review.”
Regarding any affirmed rejection, 37 CFR § 1.197(b)
provides:
(b) Appellant may file a single request for
rehearing within two months from the date of the
original decision . . . .
37 CFR § 1.196(b) also provides that the appellants,
WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise
one of the following two options with respect to the new
Appeal No. 97-2486
Application No. 08/308,983
20
ground of rejection to avoid termination of proceedings (37
CFR § 1.197(c)) as to the rejected claims:
(1) Submit an appropriate amendment of the
claims so rejected or a showing of facts relating to
the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter
reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the
application will be remanded to the examiner. . . .
(2) Request that the application be reheard
under § 1.197(b) by the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences upon the same record. . . .
Should the appellants elect to prosecute further before
the Primary Examiner pursuant to 37 CFR § 1.196(b)(1), in
order to preserve the right to seek review under 35 U.S.C. §§
141 or 145 with respect to the affirmed rejection, the
effective date of the
affirmance is deferred until conclusion of the prosecution
before
the examiner unless, as a mere incident to the limited
prosecution, the affirmed rejection is overcome.
If the appellants elect prosecution before the examiner
and this does not result in allowance of the application,
abandonment or a second appeal, this case should be returned
to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences for final
Appeal No. 97-2486
Application No. 08/308,983
21
action on the affirmed rejection, including any timely request
for rehearing thereof.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in
connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 CFR
§ 1.136(a).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
37 CFR § 1.196(b)
Harrison E. McCandlish, Senior )
Administrative Patent Judge )
)
)
)
James M. Meister ) BOARD OF
PATENT
Administrative Patent Judge ) APPEALS AND
) INTERFERENCES
)
)
Jeffrey V. Nase )
Administrative Patent Judge )
tdc
Appeal No. 97-2486
Application No. 08/308,983
22
Barbara C. McCurdy
Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow,
Garrett & Dunner, L.L.P.
1300 I Street, N.W., Suite 700
Washington, DC 20005-3315