Ex Parte Sirpal et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 29, 2018

14920703 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 29, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO.
14/920,703
111285 7590
Sheridan Ross P.C.
1560 Broadway
Suite 1200
Denver, CO 80202
FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
10/22/2015 Sanjiv Sirpal
04/02/2018
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
6583-100-CON 2050
EXAMINER
EDWARDS, CAROLYN R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2625
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/02/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
edocket@sheridanross.com
flexpatents-sr@sheridanross.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED ST ATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SANJIV SIRP AL and MOHAMMED SELIM
Appeal 2017-008186
Application 14/920, 703
Technology Center 2600
Before HUNG H. BUI, NABEEL U. KHAN, and MICHAEL M. BARRY,
Administrative Patent Judges.
BARRY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants 1 appeal under 3 5 U.S. C. § 134( a) from a final rejection of
claims 21--40, which are all the pending claims. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affrrm.
1 Appellants identify the Applicant, Z124, as the real party in interest. App.
Br. 2.
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Application 14/920, 703
Introduction
Appellants describe and claim "[ m ]ethods and devices for configuring
and displaying individual display screens of a multi-display device relative
to the device state and/or user orientation of the device." Abstract.
Appellants describe embodiments that use sensors to detect the relationship
of a primary screen to a secondary screen for the purpose of" correlating or
controlling device state to management of windows, and correlating or
controlling transitional states between open and closed states to device
behavior and/ or window operations." Id.
Independent claim 21 is representative of the claims on appeal:
21. A method for controlling a multi-screen device
compnsmg:
providing the multi-screen device having at least a frrst
and second screens and a processor, wherein each of the frrst
and second screens are configured to display a frrst display
mode or a second display mode, each display mode configured
to display at least one user interface element, wherein the multi-
screen device is in one of:
an open state, wherein in the open state both the
frrst and second screens are facing a same direction and
are viewable by a user;
a closed stated, wherein in the closed state both the
frrst screen faces an opposite direction of the second
screen and only one of the frrst screen or second screen is
viewable by the user;
a special state includes one of an easel state or a
modified easel state, wherein in the special state the frrst
screen is at an angle to the second screen, wherein the
angle is less than 180° but more than 0°;
a transition state, wherein the transition state
occurs when the multi-screen device is in a process of
moving from one of the open state, the closed state, or
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the special state to a different one of the open state, the
closed state, or the special state;
receiving a first input from a first sensor indicating a
position of the frrst screen relative to the second screen,
wherein the frrst input includes an open indication, a closed
indication, or a third indication between open and closed;
continuously receiving a second input from a second
sensor indicating a movement of the frrst screen relative to the
second screen when the frrst screen is moving relative to the
second screen, wherein the second input includes a moving
indication or a not moving indication;
determining a state of the device based on both the frrst
input associated with the position and the second input
associated with the movement, wherein the state of the device is
in the transition state when the frrst input is the third indication
and the second input is the moving indication;
based at least on the state of the device being in the
transition state, the processor both:
prohibiting input into the at least one user interface
element while in the transition state; and
prohibiting a transition from the frrst display mode
to the second display mode while in the transition state.
App. Br. 20-21 (Claims App'x).
Rejecti ans & References
Claims 21-29 and 31--40 stand rejected underpre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Lee et al. (US 2010/0298032 Al; Nov. 25,
2010) ("Lee"), Kim et al. (US 2010/0182265 Al; July 22, 2010) ("Kim"),
and Kilpatrick, II et al. (US 2010/0064244 Al; Mar. 11, 2010)
("Kilpatrick"). Final Act. 6-13.
Claim 30 stands rejected under§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Lee,
Kim, Kilpatrick, and 0 'Gorman (US 200710120762 Al; May 31, 2007).
Final Act. 13-14.
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ANALYSIS
The Board "reviews the obviousness rejection[ s] for error based upon
the issues identified by appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence
produced thereon," and treats arguments not made as waived. Ex parte
Frye, 94USPQ2d1072, 1075 (BP AI 2010) (precedential) (cited with
approval in In re Jung, 637F.3d1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011)); see also
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
Appellants present several arguments of Examiner error for the
rejection of claim 21, which we address below. See App. Br. 8-19; Reply
Br. 2-8. Appellants rely solely on those same arguments for independent
claims 32 and 392 and dependent claims 22-31, 33-3 8, and 40. App. Br.
14--15, 19. Thus, all claims stand or fall with representative claim 21. 3 7
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
Issue 1 (first disputed limitation)- "continuously receiving a second input
from a second sensor indicating a movement of the first screen relative to
the second screen when the first screen is moving relative to the second
screen, wherein the second input includes a moving indication or a not
moving indication"
Appellants contend Lee does not teach the frrst disputed limitation.
App. Br. 8; Reply Br. 2--4. In particular, Appellants argue "the sensors of
Lee do not teach both sensors of claim 21" because the "sensors of Lee
measure only a current angle of the device and do not indicate movement,"
whereas the recited second sensor of claim 21 "continuously receives an
input indicating a movement and 'includes a moving indication or a not
moving indication.'" App. Br. 8 (also contending "the [H]all sensors of Lee
2 Independent claims 32 and 39 both recite limitations commensurate with
the argued limitations of claim 21. See App. Br. 22-24 (Claims App'x).
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measure position which is a point in space, whereas the sensors of the
present claim indicate movement"); see also Reply Br. 2--4.
Appellants' arguments are unpersuasive. Lee discloses its "sensing
unit" may include a "motion sensor" and/or an "acceleration sensor." Lee
if 79. Ordinarily skilled artisans understand that using such sensors involves
receiving and monitoring sensor input that indicates movement, which
teaches or suggests "continuously sensing the movement" as recited in claim
21. In particular, Lee discloses changing priority between frrst and second
touch screens based on detecting ranges of angles between the screens. See
Lee iii! 96, 110-13. This disclosure teaches continuously monitoring sensor
input, so that the system can react when it detects the angle moves into or
out of a specified range. Thus, Appellants do not persuade us the Examiner
errs in fmding Lee teaches continuously receiving sensor input for detecting
motion, as recited by the frrst disputed limitation. See Final Act. 8-9 (citing
Lee iii! 121, 125 (including Table 1), 127, Figs. 3--4, 12; Ans. 2-3 (further
citing Lee iii! 78-79).
Issue 2 (second disputed limitation)- "determining a state of the device
based on both the first input associated with the position and the second
input associated with the movement, wherein the state of the device is in
the transition state when the first input is the third indication and the
second input is the moving indication"
The Examiner fmds the combination of Lee and Kim teaches or
suggests the second disputed limitation. Final Act. 9-10 (citing Lee iii! 79,
121, 125, Figs. 2-8, 12-14, Kim iii! 38-55, Fig. 4); see also Ans. 3--4 (noting
"Kim was brought in just to show a more explicit teaching of this feature").
Similar to above, Appellants argue the Examiner's reliance on is
improper Lee because Lee's sensors "measure only the current position, and
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not movement." App. Br. 9. This argument is unpersuasive for the reasons
discussed.
Appellants also argue "[s]imilar to Lee, Kim teaches only sensor
measuring angles and fails to teach or suggest sensors measuring
movement." App. Br. 10. Appellants further argue "Kim teaches away from
determining a state of the device based on both the frrst input associated
with the position and the second input associated with the movement."
Reply Br. 5. These arguments are unpersuasive.
Kim discloses measuring angles using, inter alia, accelerometers, the
use of which, as discussed above, involves sensing movement. Kim if 38.
Kim also discloses generating events when the angle between two screens
transitions to specified values. See id. iii! 46-4 7 (also disclosing recognizing
transitions between different "folding states"). Kim further discloses
monitoring the amount of time a specific angle is sustained, and enables user
adjustment of thresholds to address issues with sensitivity to "minor
movement." Id. iii! 52, 54.
In view of these disclosures of Kim, we disagree with Appellants that
"Kim teaches only determining whether the device is in one of many
'representative folding angles.'" App. Br. 10. While we need not consider
the teaching away argument because Appellants provide no good cause
explanation for frrst raising it in the Reply Brief, 37 C.F.R. § 41.4 l(b )(2),
that argument is also unpersuasive. A teaching away requires a reference to
actually criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the claimed solution.
See In re Fulton, 391F.3d1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("The prior art's
mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching
away from any of these alternatives because such disclosure does not
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Application 14/920, 703
criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed."). Putting
aside that we disagree with Appellants over the scope of Kim's teachings,
"[a] finding that two inventions were designed to resolve different problems
... is insufficient to demonstrate that one invention teaches away from
another." Nat'l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319,
1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Even if Kim had no disclosure relevant to using
motion input, using "stationary" angular input as a basis for controlling a
multi-screen device does not teach away from also using motion.
Issue 3 (third disputed limitation)- "based on the state of the device being
in the transition state, the processor prohibiting input into the at least one
user interface element while in the transition state"
Appellants contend the Examiner errs in fmding Lee teaches the third
disputed limitation because Lee does not "teach that the GUI may change
based on the state of the device being in the transition state. Everyteaching
of Lee shows changing the GUI based solely on the current angle of the
device, and not whether that angle is in the process of changing." App. Br.
11. Specifically, Appellants argue that"[ e ]ven when Lee discusses changing
the GUI based on the device being within a range of angles, only the present
angle is required-and the device would be within the range whether or not
it is in the process of moving between angles." Id. at 12. Appellants further
argue "the GUis taught by Lee do not teach 'prohibiting input into the at
least one user interface element while in the transition state' as claimed." Id.
These arguments are unpersuasive. The Examiner fmds, and we
agree, that when a user moves the screens of Lee's device between open,
half-open, and closed states, the device is in a transition state. Final Act. 8
(citing Lee Figs. 2-8). Lee discloses a controller ("processor") that provides
GUis on frrst and second screens, and gives priority to one over the other
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under certain conditions, such as when the angle between the two screens is
within or departs from a certain range. See, e.g., Lee iii! 92-98, 110-16.
The controller may activate or maintain the original state of the touch screen
to which priority is not given. Lee if 116. Thus, Lee teaches activating or
deactivating screens and prioritizing or de-prioritizing GUis while the angle
between screens is in a range that corresponds to a transition state. In view
of this, Appellants do not persuade us the Examiner errs in fmding Lee
teaches or at least suggests prohibiting input while in the transition state, as
recited. Ans. 4 (citing Lee iii! 110-16, Figs. 1, 6, 7).
Issue 4 (fourth disputed limitation)- "based on the state of the device being
in the transition state, the processor ... prohibiting a transition from the
first display mode to the second display mode while in the transition state"
The Examiner relies on Kilpatrick, in view of Lee and Kim, for
teaching "prohibiting a transition from the first display mode to the second
display mode while in the transition state," as recited. Final Act. 10 (citing
Kilpatrick iii! 140-41, 235, Figs. 22-23, 56-57). Appellants argue the
Examiner errs because the claimed "transition state"
"occurs when the multi-screen device is in a process of moving
from one of the open state, the closed state, or the special state
to a different one of the open state, the closed state, or the
special state." See Claim 1. This "transition state" cannot be
determined based solely on the angle of the device, as taught by
Lee and Kilpatrick, but the determination relies on an indication
of movement which is not taught by any cited reference,
including Kilpatrick.
App. Br. 14 (further contending"[ n Jo [cited] reference teaches detecting that
the device is in the process of moving" and "theKilpatrickdevice cannot
detect movement").
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This argument is unpersuasive. As discussed supra, Lee and Kim
both disclose use of motion sensors, which teaches detecting movement of
the device. Moreover, specifically contrary to Appellants' assertion that
Kilpatrick' s device cannot detect movement, Kilpatrick also specifically
discloses sensor input that indicates "position, an orientation, or a
movement." Kilpatrick if 140 (emphasis added). Kilpatrick further discloses
using software to infer "that the device is in transition to a known state and
may wait for additional sensor inputs." Id. if 141.
In view these disclosures of Kilpatrick and of Lee's disclosure of frrst
and second display modes when its two displays are in the fully open and
closed configurations, see Lee iii! 108---09, Figs. 9 A-B (cited at Final Act. 7),
we agree with the Examiner that Kilpatrick teaches the additional limitation
for Lee's processor of "prohibiting a transition from the frrst display mode to
the second display mode while in the transition state," as recited.
Issue 5 - Motivation to Combine
Appellants contend the Examiner errs in combining the teachings of
Lee, Kim, and Kilpatrick. App. Br. 15-19. Appellants frrst argue the
Examiner commits reversible error by stating motivation to combine Lee
with Kim and Lee with Kilpatrick but not articulating a separate motivation
to combine thethree references together. App. Br. 15 (citing KSRint'l Co.
v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)). We disagree. There is no rule
that per se precludes fmding two separate motivations for combining two
secondary references with a primary reference, without articulating a
particularized motivation for combining all three references. Appellants'
citation to KSR does not support that proposition; rather, the cited section of
KSR explains that, in considering the motivation(s) to combine:
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Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated
teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to
the design community or present in the marketplace; and the
background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary
skill in the art, all in order to determine whether there was an
apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion
claimed by the patent at issue. To facilitate review, this analysis
should be made explicit. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988
([Fed. Cir.] 2006) ("[R]ejections on obviousness grounds
cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead,
there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational
underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness").
As our precedents make clear, however, the analysis need not
seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter
of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the
inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in
the art would employ.
550 U.S. at 418. In other words, the Examiner is only required to articulate
"reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion
of obviousness." In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988.
Appellants argue the Examiner's stated motivation for combining Lee
with Kim is conclusory. App. Br. 15-16. We disagree. Lee and Kim both
relate to foldable mobile devices and controlling the interface to displays
that rotate relative to each other. See Lee Title, Abstract, Spec. iii! 3-12,
Figs. 3--4; Kim Title, Abstract, Spec. iii! 3-11, Figs. 4--5. The Examiner
fmds an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine
Kim's teachings with those of Lee "so that desired functions can be easily
and intuitively activated in a user friendly convenient manner by folding the
mobile terminal at corresponding angles." Final Act. 11 (citing Kim if 11 ).
We agree with the Examiner. Kim specifically explains a benefit of
its disclosed technology is that it enables users to "manipulate the mobile
terminal [having a foldable display] in [a] much easier and intuitive manner"
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(if 11 ). Because Lee also relates to interfaces for mobile terminals having
foldable displays, this would have motivated an ordinarily skilled artisan to
have considered using Kim's teachings with the highly related teachings of
Lee. Thus, the Examiner fairly articulates "reasoning with some rational
underpinning" for the combination. In re Kahn, 441F.3dat988.
Appellants argue the Examiner's stated motivation for combining Lee
with Kilpatrick is "simply the general purpose of the reference as a whole,"
which is also conclusory and insufficient. App. Br. 16 (citing MPEP § 2141
(which cites In re Kahn and KSR) ). We find this argument unpersuasive.
Here, like Lee and Kim, Kilpatrick also specifically relates to foldable
mobile devices and controlling the interface to displays that rotate relative to
each other. See Kilpatrick Title, Abstract, Spec. iii! 3-9, Figs. 1--4. The
Examiner fmds an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to
combine Kilpatrick's teachings with those of Lee "to improve [a] user's
interactions with the device." Final Act. 11 (citing Kilpatrick if 9). While
this is terse, the Examiner specifically cites to a more detailed explanation in
Kilpatrick that fully supports the Examiner's fmding. Specifically, the cited
paragraph of Kilpatrick discloses, inter alia:
One particular advantage provided by at least one of the
disclosed embodiments is an intuitive operation of a multi-
panel electronic device in which a user can change the
electronic device's physical configuration based on the user's
preference, and the electronic device automatically adjusts
operation in response to detecting the change in physical
configuration.
Kilpatrick if 9.
Thus, contrary to Appellants' contention that the Examiner merely
restates the general purpose of Kilpatrick, the Examiner has specifically
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pointed to Kilpatrick's particular advantages. We agree with the Examiner
this advantage of Kilpatrick would have motivated an ordinarily skilled
artisan to consider combining its teachings with the teachings of Lee. Final
Act 11; Ans. 6. The claim I limitation of"prohibiting a transition from the
frrst display mode to the second display mode while in the transition state"
for which the Examiner cites Kilpatrick relates to Kilpatrick' s specifically
articulated advantages of "intuitive operation" and "adjust[ing] operation in
response to detecting the change in physical configuration." Kilpatrick if 9.
Thus, the Examiner articulates "reasoning with some rational underpinning"
for the combination of Lee and Kilpatrick. In re Kahn, 44 I F.3d at 988.
Appellants further argue (a) there would have been no motivation to
have combined Lee and Kim because the added functionality of Kim is
superfluous to existing functionality in Lee, (b) it is unclear how any benefit
from adding Kilpatrick' s functionality to Lee is supported by the rationale
for combining articulated by the Examiner, and ( c) the Examiner failed to
resolve the factual inquiries for an obviousness determination as required by
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966) (as set forth in MPEP
§ 2143). App. Br. 17-19.
These arguments are equally unpersuasive. Regarding the motivation
to combine Lee with Kim and Kilpatrick, the Examiner articulates sufficient
reasoning with rational underpinning, as discussed supra. Regarding the
necessary factual underpinnings as required by Graham, we disagree that the
Examiner has not"[ d]etermin[ ed] the scope and content of the prior art" or
"[a]scertain[ed] the differences between the claimed invention and the prior
art," or otherwise failed properly to establish how the cited art renders
obvious claim 21, as Appellants contend. App. Br. 18. To the extent the
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Final Rejection does not explicitly set forth a requisite finding according to
Graham, we find it implicitly does. For example, the prior art of record
reflects level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261
F.3d. 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 200l);In re GP AC Inc., 57F.3d1573, 1577
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
Conclusion
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's 35U.S.C.§103(a)rejection
of claim 21. In doing so, we adopt as our own the Examiner's fmdings and
reasons as set forth in the Final Rejection and in the Answer. We also,
accordingly, sustain the§ 103(a)rejections of claims 22--40.
DECISION
For the above reasons, we the affrrm rejection of claims 21--40 under
pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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