Ex Parte Sink et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardApr 14, 201411548209 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 14, 2014) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte GREGORY A. SINK and PAUL M. GERGETS ____________________ Appeal 2011-012744 Application 11/548,209 Technology Center 2600 ____________________ Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY, III, THU A. DANG, and LARRY J. HUME, Administrative Patent Judges. DANG, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2011-012744 Application 11/548,209 2 I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of claims 1, 3-14, 16-28, 30-34, and 36. Claims 2, 15, 29 and 35 have been cancelled (App. Br. 2). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. A. INVENTION Appellants’ invention is directed to a fully integrated light bar for mounting to the roof of an emergency vehicle which houses a warning device, a control device, and a transceiver for wirelessly connecting the light bar to a wide area network; wherein, the vehicle operator uses the control device to toggle the warning device on and off and to broadcast warning signals (Abstract; Figs. 2A and 3; Spec. ¶¶ [0041] and [0065]). B. ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM Claim 1 is exemplary: 1. A system comprising: a first responder vehicle; a light bar for mounting to the first responder vehicle and containing in a single common housing (1) a warning device for broadcasting at least one of visual and audio emergency signals to an area external to the first responder vehicle in response to an emergency condition, (2) at least one transceiver in wireless communication with a public safety network and (3) at least one device connected to the transceiver for transmitting information over the public safety network related to the emergency condition, where the information includes information other than voice communications that inform a recipient of real time conditions of one or more of the first responder vehicle, its operator and the ambient environment of the vehicle and the operator; and Appeal 2011-012744 Application 11/548,209 3 a control device for mounting in an interior of the first responder vehicle separate from the light bar and in communication with the transceiver for controlling operation of the warning device by the vehicle operator such that the warning device toggles between off and on conditions in response to operator input, where all of the on conditions of the warning device result in the warning device broadcasting warning or emergency signals. C. REJECTION The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal is: Fridman US 2002/0112026 A1 Aug. 15, 2002 Pierce US 2007/0083298 A1 Apr. 12, 2007 (filed Sep. 27, 2006) Claims 1, 3-14, 16-28, 30-34, and 36 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Fridman in view of Pierce. II. ISSUE The dispositive issue before us is whether the Examiner has erred in finding the combination of Fridman and Pierce would have taught or suggested: a control device for mounting in an interior of the first responder vehicle separate from the light bar and in communication with the transceiver for controlling operation of the warning device by the vehicle operator such that the warning device toggles between off and on conditions in response to operator input, where all of the on conditions of the warning device result in the warning device broadcasting warning or emergency signals (claim 1, emphasis added). Appeal 2011-012744 Application 11/548,209 4 III. FINDINGS OF FACT The following Findings of Fact (FF) are shown by a preponderance of the evidence. Fridman 1. Fridman is directed to a vehicle mounted public display and system for displaying different messages based upon the time, location and estimate number of people; wherein, the system includes a cab mobile unit 104E which serves as a driver interface (Abstract; Fig. 21; ¶ [0307]). The driver is able to issue an emergency signal through driver input 392 including recorded images to a central system and police station (id.). In addition, the driver is able to sound an alarm and send messages to be displayed on the external mounted public display (id.). In addition, the driver can make the external display to flash the message on and off (id.). 2. The central system includes a wireless system 134 for transmitting and receiving wireless messages to and from individual mobile units (Fig. 1; ¶¶ [0096] and [0097]). 3. A digital view controller controls the backlighting associated with each display panel of a car-top box where each of the three gaged displays has a separate light sensor 1034 to sense the amount of light shining and to feed the output of this sensor to a pulse width modulation circuit 1044, which controls the power supplied to the display from a 12-volt power supplied by automobile electric system as filtered through power distribution board 1048 (Figs. 42 and 46; ¶ [0341]). Pierce 4. Pierce discloses mobile computing system for a motor vehicle, which includes a mobile computing device 14 (mounted in the trunk) that Appeal 2011-012744 Application 11/548,209 5 couples wirelessly to a user interface 12 (mounted in the cabin area) to enable a user to provide input using a keyboard 16 for viewing on a video display 18 (Fig. 1; ¶ [0025]). 5. The user can control camera 94 using module 80 and flashing beacon light 92 using module 78 to warn of the vehicle’s approach (Figs. 1 and 8; ¶¶ [0042] and [0043]). 6. Computing device 14 includes an enclosure 22 made of a conductive material that provides shielding against Electromagnetic and Radio Frequency Interference (EMI/RFI) (Figs. 2 and 3; ¶ [0028]). IV. ANALYSIS Claims 1, 3, 4, 7, 10, 11, 14, 16-28, and 30-32 Appellants contend “adding the toggling feature of Pierce to Fridman does not result in all of the on conditions of the ‘warning devices’ generate emergency or warning signals” (App. Br. 6). Appellants argue the “advertising system of Fridman teaches away from giving control of the displayed messages by the vehicle operator,” since “[t]o provide for the local control of the signage unit in Fridman by adding the operator control feature of Pierce would be contrary to the express purpose of the Fridman system giving control of the sign to the central system” and “providing local control of the ads displayed is a safety hazard” (App. Br. 8-9). However, the Examiner finds Fridman discloses the operator of the vehicle has the ability to “send a message to the central system and police station indicating the mobile unit's vehicle ID, the driver’s name, and the type of emergency after the driver” and to use the driver input to send a message to “the external display on the car-top or rooftop unit [to] show Appeal 2011-012744 Application 11/548,209 6 [the] message appropriate for the emergency type” where “the external displays could flash.” (Ans. 10). We give the claim its broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). We initially note that claim 1 merely recites “a control device” that is “in communication with the transceiver for controlling operation of the warning device by the vehicle operator” to toggle the warning device toggles off and on in response to operator input, where the warning device broadcasts an emergency signal when toggled in the on condition (claim 1). We conclude the “for controlling operation of the warning device” language merely represents a statement of intended use of the control device, which does not limit the claim. Particularly, an intended use will not limit the scope of the claim because it merely defines a context in which the invention operates. Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Thus, giving claim 1 its broadest reasonable interpretation, the claim merely requires a control device which communicates with the transceiver and is capable of controlling the warning device to toggle on and off and the warning device broadcasts an emergency signal during all on conditions. Nevertheless, Fridman is directed to a vehicle mounted public display that enables the driver to broadcast messages within an emergency signal to a central system and to the mounted public display, where the message flashes on and off (FF 1). We agree with the Examiner’s finding that Fridman’s system enables the driver to broadcast emergency messages and to display emergency messages on the external display, which flashes on and off (Ans. 10). That is, we find that Fridman’s control device is capable of Appeal 2011-012744 Application 11/548,209 7 controlling the warning device to toggle on and off, where all on conditions correspond with the warning device’s broadcasting of an emergency signal. In addition, Pierce discloses mobile computing system for a motor vehicle including a mobile computing device which couples wirelessly to a user interface that enables the user to control what is displayed on the video display and to control the flashing beacon light that sits on top of the vehicle (FF 4 and 5). We also agree with the Examiner’s finding that Pierce discloses a “light bar … [which] flashes between the lights of the light bar” (Ans. 11). Though Appellants also contend that the combination “teaches away” (App. Br. 8), our reviewing court has held that “‘[a] reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon [examining] the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.’” Para-Ordnance Mfg., Inc. v. SGS Importers Int’l., Inc., 73 F.3d 1085, 1090 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). Appellants have not identified persuasive support for a direction divergent from the claimed invention since we do not find that the disclosure in Fridman to enabling the driver to broadcast a warning signal to the central system or to send emergency messages to be displayed in the mounted public display mounted on the top of the vehicle would discourage one skilled in the art from further automating the process in Fridman with the toggling feature of Pierce. The issue we address here is not whether the system of Pierce could be bodily incorporated in the system of Fridman, but rather whether a person Appeal 2011-012744 Application 11/548,209 8 of ordinary skill, upon reading Fridman, would have been led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant. We see no error with the Examiner’s proffered motivation to combine the teachings and suggestions of Pierce with those of Fridman “in order to enhance system performance, performed effectively by adding more operator input modules for minimizing the inefficient elements in the law enforcement” (Ans. 11). The Supreme Court guides “[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). Thus, we find no error in the Examiner’s finding that the combination of Fridman’s system (including vehicle mounted public display) that enables the driver to broadcast emergency messages and to display a flashing emergency message, with the toggling feature disclosed in Pierce, would have produced a system having a control device capable of controlling a warning device that toggles on and off where all “on” conditions correspond with the warning device’s broadcasting of an emergency signal. (Ans. 11; FF 1, 4, and 5). Therefore, on this record, we are in accord with the Examiner’s underlying factual findings and ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness regarding representative claim 1. Accordingly, we find no error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Fridman in view of Pierce. Appellants make similar arguments to claim 17 having similar claim language. Further, independent claims 14 and 27 having similar claim language and claims 3, 4, 7, 10, 11, 16-26, 28, and 30-32 (depending from claims 1, 14, and 27) which have not been argued separately, fall with claim 1. Appeal 2011-012744 Application 11/548,209 9 Claims 5 and 6 Appellants contend that the Examiner’s finding regarding “a type of power source. . . . has nothing to do with a control device in the vehicle that communicates wirelessly with a controller within a light bar” (App. Br. 13). However, the Examiner finds that “Pierce et al discloses that light bar [i.e., transceiver] is coupled with user interface system 12 (laptop) [i.e., control device] via a wireless communication link” (Ans. 12-13). As noted supra, Pierce discloses mobile computing system for a motor vehicle including a mobile computing device which couples wirelessly to a user interface that enables the user to control what is displayed on the video display (FF 4). We agree with the Examiner’s finding that Pierce at least suggests “a wireless communications link between the at least one transceiver and the control device” (claim 5). Accordingly, we find no error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Fridman in view of Pierce. Further, claim 6 (depending from claim 1) which has not been argued separately, falls with claim 5. Claims 8, 9, and 16 Appellants contend that Fridman’s “Light Sensors 1034 are not supplying the power to the displays,” “[r]ather, the Light Sensors merely sense the amount of light shining on its side of the car-top box to determine how much power is allocated to each Power Distribution Board” (App. Br. 15). However, the Examiner finds Fridman “discloses wherein the light bar houses a power source for the transceiver and device connected to the transceiver” (Ans. 8). Appeal 2011-012744 Application 11/548,209 10 Fridman discloses that the backlighting associated with each display panel of a car-top box having a light sensor is powered by a 12-volt power supplied by automobile electric system as filtered through the power distribution board (FF3). We agree with the Examiner’s finding that Fridman at least suggests a light bar that houses a power source (Ans. 8). Accordingly, we find no error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Fridman in view of Pierce. Further, claims 9 and 16 (depending from claims 1 and 14), which have not been argued separately, fall with claim 8. Claim 36 Appellants contend “Pierce does not teach or suggest electromagnetic isolation of devices and transceivers from the warning devices in a light bar,” “[i]nstead, Pierce teaches shielding a computing device from general EMI/RFI” (App. Br. 17). However, the Examiner finds Pierce discloses an enclosure “which is made of metal or including a conductive material also provides shielding against electromagnetic and radio frequency interference isolating the warning device from the at least one device” (Ans. 14). As noted supra, Fridman discloses a vehicle mounted public display and system for displaying different messages including warning messages that are broadcasted (FF 1 and 2). Additionally, Pierce discloses a computing device includes an enclosure made of a conductive material that provides shielding against EMI/RFI (FF6). We agree with the Examiner’s finding that the combined teaching of Fridman and Pierce teaches or at least suggests the “housing of the light bar includes shielding for electromagnetically isolating the warning device from the at least one device and the transceiver” (claim 36). Appeal 2011-012744 Application 11/548,209 11 Accordingly, we find no error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 36 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Fridman in view of Pierce. Claims 33 and 34 Appellants contend that “[t]he cited paragraphs and figures of the references describe components of the advertising system, but do not describe the process through which a vehicle can be retrofitted with such an advertising system” (App. Br. 18). However, the Examiner “disagrees with [Appellants’] argument for the same reasons as discussed above with respect to claim 1” (Ans. 15). As noted supra, Fridman discloses a vehicle mounted public display and system for displaying different messages (FF 1). We agree with the Examiner’s finding that the vehicle is retrofitted with the public display mount (light bar) since it is mounted to the vehicle (Ans. 7). That is, Fridman discloses all of the steps for the method of retrofitting a vehicle with a public display as claimed, including mounting the light bar and control head, and establishing wireless communications. Accordingly, we find no error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 33 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Fridman in view of Pierce. Further, claim 34 (depending from claim 33) which has not been argued separately, falls with claim 33. Claims 12 and 13 Appellants contend that none of the Examiner’s recited “paragraphs or figures disclose or suggest a display comprising a primary display and another display for controlling a device in the light bar” (App. Br. 19). However, the Examiner finds that Pierce discloses a “touch-screen [i.e., Appeal 2011-012744 Application 11/548,209 12 display] [which] comprises a primary display through which a user can access another display for controlling the camera” (Ans. 15-16). Fridman discloses a car top box having three gaged displays (FF 3). In addition, Pierce discloses a video display and mobile computing device including a module that controls a camera (FF 5 and 6). We agree with the Examiner’s finding that Pierce’s touch-screen display “comprises a primary display through which a user can access another display for controlling the camera” (Ans. 16). Accordingly, we find no error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Fridman in view of Pierce. Further, claim 13 (depending from claim 1) which has not been argued separately, falls with claim 12. V. CONCLUSION AND DECISION The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3-14, 16-28, 30-34, and 36 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED tj Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation